NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
ROBERT J. CASTRO,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E061030
v. (Super.Ct.No. INC1302920)
INDYMAC INDX MORTGAGE LOAN OPINION TRUST 2005-AR21 et al.,
Defendants and Respondents. ROBERT J. CASTRO,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E061704
v. (Super.Ct.No. INC1302920)
NDEX WEST, LLC et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. David M. Chapman,
Judge. Affirmed.
Robert J. Castro, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
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Haight Brown & Bonesteel, S. Christian Stouder, Jules Zeman, Krsto Mijanovic,
and Melinda Carrido for Defendants and Respondents LPS Default Solutions, Inc. and
Scott Walter.
Dykema Gossett, J. Kevin Snyder and Lukas Sosnicki for Defendants and
Respondents Deutsche Bank etc., Onewest Bank etc., Erica Johnson-Seck, Chamagne
business practices (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 72000), intentional infliction of emotional
distress, declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and accounting.
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B. The Demurrers
Deutsche Bank demurred on the grounds that a presumption of validity applies to
foreclosure documents (Civ. Code, § 2924, subd. (c)) and Castro could not demonstrate
prejudice because he was admittedly in default on the subject loan. Furthermore,
OneWest was the authorized servicer acting for Deutsche Bank, the loan’s owner. (Cal.
U. Com. Code, § 3301.) Deutsche Bank maintained Castro had based his complaint on
misrepresentations of the facts and misunderstanding of the applicable law. As explained
by Deutsche Bank, the first cause of action for fraud, the sixth cause of action for “unjust
enrichment,” the eighth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and the ninth, tenth, and eleventh causes of action were defectively pleaded and not
actionable. The second and third causes of action based on Civil Code section 2923.5,
the fourth cause of action for cancellation of a trustee’s deed, and the fifth cause of action
for quiet title do not apply after a foreclosure sale has been completed and without a
tender of the amounts owing. (Mabry v. Superior Court (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 208,
235; Williams v. Koenig (1934) 219 Cal. 656, 660.) The seventh cause of action for
unfair business practices fails as a derivative claim. NDeX joined in Deutsche Bank’s
demurrer.
Quality, an interim trustee, filed a demurrer contending it was protected from
liability by the statutory litigation privilege for trustees. (Civ. Code, §§ 47, 2924, subd.
(b); Kachlon v. Markowitz (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 316, 343-344.) Quality also was not
the trustee for the foreclosure sale on May 1, 2013, which was conducted by NDeX. LPS
and Walker also demurred to the third, fourth, and seventh causes of action on the
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grounds that Castro was in default on the loan and failed to tender the debt owing. Castro
also failed to allege facts showing causation.
C. The Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court issued a written ruling sustaining all defendants’ demurrers without
leave to amend. The court determined Castro had no standing to challenge the
foreclosure sale instituted by Deutsche Bank as the holder of the note and trust deed and
OneWest and NDeX, acting as its agents. (Cal. U. Com. Code, § 3301; Boyce v. T.D.
Service Company, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at pp. 436-437.) In addition, the trial court
held that Castro could not allege prejudice because he was in default on the mortgage.
The trial court, like most appellate courts, declined to follow the much-criticized case of
Glaski v. Bank of America (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1079.2
III
DISCUSSION
We independently review the complaint to determine whether it contains sufficient
facts to state a claim. We next determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in
denying leave to amend. (G. L. Mezzetta v. City of American Canyon (2000) 78
Cal.App.4th 1087, 1091-1092; Rossberg v. Bank of America, N.A. (2013) 219
Cal.App.4th 1481, 1491.)
2 Our Supreme Court has granted review in three wrongful foreclosure cases that declined to follow Glaski. (Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2014) formerly 226 Cal.App.4th 495, review granted Aug. 27, 2014, S218973; Keshtgar v. U.S. Bank, N.A. (2014) formerly 226 Cal.App.4th 1201 reviewed granted Oct. 1, 2014, S220012, and Mendoza v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2014) formerly 228 Cal.App.4th 1020, review granted Nov. 12, 2014, S220675.)
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Like many who have come before the courts, Castro asserts he can allege
numerous causes of action challenging the nonjudicial foreclosure. His appeals are
directed mainly at the Deutsche Bank and OneWest defendants and at NDeX as the
trustee which conducted the nonjudicial foreclosure sale in May 2013. To the extent he
does not mention or offer salient argument about the other defendants, Castro appears to
have abandoned his claims against Quality, Servicelink, LPS, and the individuals,
Johnson-Seck, Williams, Panameno, and Walker. (Wiz Technology, Inc. v. Coopers &
Lybrand (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1, 9, fn. 1.)
Nevertheless, Castro asserts there are many reasons the May 2013 foreclosure was
defective, including that defendants did not properly comply with the PSA and new
theories on appeal about alter ego liability, “third-party beneficiary status,” and
contractual interference. In Castro’s opening brief, he asserts that Quality, LPS, Walker,
Johnson-Seck, and Williams violated the foreclosure statutes, in part due to “robo-
signing” and defective assignments and recording, although the 2009 foreclosure was
never completed. Castro also charged Servicelink, NDeX, and OneWest’s employee,
Panameno, with participating in defective assignments and recordings.
Together all the defendants counter jointly with various contentions that Castro
lacks standing; he cannot show prejudice; and he failed to make the required tender of the
amount owing to cure the defect, as well as other dispositive arguments.
Castro’s argument that he has standing to challenge the nonjudicial foreclosure is
based on purported defects in the sale, assignment, transfer, and recordation of the note
and trust deed. However, the record demonstrates the foreclosure was properly
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conducted according to statutory procedures by NDeX, the trustee, and OneWest, acting
as a servicer for Deustche Bank, the holder of the promissory note and trust deed for the
La Quinta property. (Civ. Code, § 2924; Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2011)
192 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1154-1158; Debrunner v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.
(2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 433, 440-442.)
Castro relies mostly on Glaski to argue that he can challenge the authority to
conduct the foreclosure by alleging the subject loan had never been properly transferred
to its current owner, a securitized trust. (Glaski v. Bank of America, supra, 218
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1087-1088.) “In Glaski the mortgage investment pool was formed
under a New York statute that, according to the court, rendered the loan assignment
‘void’ because the deed of trust was assigned after the investment pool closed. (Glaski,
supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 1096.) Based on the New York statute, the court opined that
the borrower/plaintiff could sue for wrongful foreclosure. (Glaski, at pp. 1096-1097.)
Other courts have criticized Glaski as inconsistent with California’s foreclosure
jurisprudence. [Citations.]” (Boyce v. T.D. Service Company, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at
p. 437.)
However, we agree with defendants Glaski does not apply because—even if
Deutsche Bank did not receive a valid assignment of the debt—Castro cannot allege he
was injured by an invalid transfer. (Fontentot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198
Cal.App.4th 256, 272.) As the borrower, Castro cannot claim any interest in the note and
trust deed after they were transferred from the original holder: “[T]he relevant parties to
such a transaction were the holders (transferors) of the promissory note and the third
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party acquirers (transferees) of the note. . . . As an unrelated third party to the alleged
securitization, and any other subsequent transfers of the beneficial interest under the
promissory note, [plaintiff] lacks standing to enforce any agreements, including the
investment trust’s pooling and servicing agreement, relating to such transactions.”
(Jenkins v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 497, 515; Boyce v. T.D.
Service Company, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 437.)
To explain further: “Because a promissory note is a negotiable instrument, a
borrower must anticipate it can and might be transferred to another creditor. As to
plaintiff, an assignment merely substituted one creditor for another, without changing her
obligations under the note.” (Herrera v. Federal National Mortgage Assn. (2012) 205
Cal.App.4th 1495, 1507; Boyce v. T.D. Service Company, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p.
437.)
Castro cannot claim to be the victim of invalid transfers because his obligation to
pay the note remained unchanged: “Instead, the true victim may be an individual or
entity that believes it has a present beneficial interest in the promissory note and may
suffer the unauthorized loss of its interest in the note. It is also possible to imagine one or
many invalid transfers of the promissory note may cause a string of civil lawsuits
between transferors and transferees” but plaintiff “may not assume the theoretical claims
of hypothetical transferors and transferees . . . .” (Jenkins v. JP Morgan Chase Bank,
supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 515; Boyce v. T.D. Service Company, supra, 235
Cal.App.4th at p. 437.)
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For similar reasons, Castro cannot show prejudice from the foreclosure. (Siliga v.
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 75, 85.)
Furthermore, no prejudice occurs when a borrower is in default and fails to tender and
cure the default. (Ibid.; Herrera v. Federal National Mortgage Assn., supra, 205
Cal.App.4th at p. 1508; Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p.
272.) We reject Castro’s effort to rely on contrary federal decisions that predate these
dispositive California authorities.
None of Castro’s arguments demonstrate he can cure the SAC by amendment.
(Torres v. City of Yorba Linda (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1041.) In fact, he admits he
would need to conduct discovery to be more specific. His brand new theories on appeal
about alter ego liability for Deutsche Bank, Castro being a third party beneficiary of the
PSA, and “defending the lien” were not raised in the trial court and are completely
unsupported by the record. (B & P Dev. Corp. v. City of Saratoga (1986) 185
Cal.App.3d 949, 959; Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 655,
685.) We will not allow Castro to assert new arguments which were not properly raised
below.
IV
DISPOSITION
In conclusion, we again adopt the sentiments from the Second District: “There is
one constant theme in most, if not all, ‘wrongful foreclosure’ cases: failure to pay on the
note secured by a deed of trust. The instant case is no exception. We will not erase
appellant’s signature from the note. He expressly agreed that the note could be sold. It
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was sold consistent with statutory and decisional law.” (Boyce v. T.D. Service Company,
supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 438.)
We affirm the judgment and order defendants to recover their costs.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON J.
We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
KING J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the nonjudicial foreclosure of his property because he was in default on his mortgage and failed to tender the amount owing, and he could not demonstrate prejudice from the alleged defects in the loan's transfer.
Issues
Whether the plaintiff has standing to challenge a nonjudicial foreclosure based on alleged defects in the assignment of the note and trust deed.
Whether the plaintiff can demonstrate prejudice from the foreclosure sale given his admitted default and failure to tender the debt.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the defendants' demurrers without leave to amend.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Castro’s fundamental problem is he stopped paying his mortgage in 2008 and never cured the default. Therefore, he has no standing and cannot allege prejudice.”
“As the borrower, Castro cannot claim any interest in the note and trust deed after they were transferred from the original holder”
“no prejudice occurs when a borrower is in default and fails to tender and cure the default.”