California Court of Appeal Jun 3, 2015 No. D067089Unpublished
Filed 6/3/15 In re N,R. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re N.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D067089 SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. NJ014851) Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
L.J.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Michael J.
Imhoff, Commissioner. Affirmed.
Cristina Gabrielidis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County
Counsel, and Dana C. Shoffner, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
L.J. (Mother) appeals from an order of the juvenile court issued at the contested
six-month review hearing on a juvenile dependency petition filed by the San Diego
County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) on behalf of her daughter N.R.
(born 2001). Mother contends the Agency failed to provide reasonable reunification
services to her because it failed to facilitate conjoint therapy. She seeks reversal of the
juvenile court's finding that reasonable services had been provided with directions to the
Agency to provide her additional services. We affirm the order.
In early September 2013, the Agency received a child welfare referral indicating
N.R.'s stepfather, Brian H., hit her with a wooden spoon and belt, causing multiple
bruises. The social worker observed large linear bruises on N.R.'s arms and buttock, but
Mother stated she never witnessed any abuse and claimed N.R. probably bruised herself
or bumped into a wall. The social worker took N.R. into protective custody and detained
her in a foster home after N.R. claimed Mother was lying. A doctor at Polinsky
Children's Center documented 11 areas of injury on N.R., including patterned bruises,
abrasions, and loop shaped bruises. She concluded "the multiple inflicted injuries on this
child are the result of severe, [and] vicious and repeated incidents of inflicted trauma
(physical abuse). To return [N.R.] to an unchanged environment could further jeopardize
this patient's health and expose her to further injury and/or death." After seeing
photographs of N.R.'s injuries, Mother stated she had no idea how N.R. obtained them,
that she and Brian did not abuse N.R. and claimed N.R. was making up stories and
rebelling against them because they did not let N.R. do the things she wanted to do.
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The Agency filed a petition on behalf of N.R. and the juvenile court later ordered
N.R. detained, removed her from Mother's custody and deferred making visitation orders
until N.R. was in counseling. It also ordered services to be provided as soon as possible
and authorized "conjoint counseling when deemed appropriate for the mother and the
child." (Capitalization omitted.) At the October 2013 jurisdiction and disposition
hearing, Mother set the case for trial. At a later settlement conference, the Agency
amended the petition to allege Mother's failure to protect N.R. Mother pleaded nolo
contendre to the new count and the juvenile court dismissed the counts of the original
petition and allowed supervised visitation.
In November 2013, N.R. left her foster placement because the foster mother was
fearful about caring for N.R. In December 2013, N.R. left her second foster placement
after N.R. attempted suicide by strangulation through use of her own hands and a belt
noose. A physician diagnosed N.R. with major depressive disorder with psychotic
features and recommended N.R. take medication for her depression and auditory
hallucinations. Over Mother's objections, the juvenile court granted the request to
administer N.R. psychotropic medication. In February 2014, the juvenile court ordered
that N.R. be placed at San Pasqual Academy (SPA), a residential facility. At the
February 2014 contested disposition hearing, the juvenile court removed N.R. from the
custody of her parents, declared N.R. a dependent and ordered the Agency to provide
Mother with reunification services consistent with the case plan. The court also
authorized the therapist at SPA to encourage conjoint therapy if deemed appropriate for
N.R.
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At the initial conjoint therapy session in August 2014, Mother's failure to mention
the abuse N.R. suffered resulted in N.R. feeling frustrated, angry and hurt. The therapist
reported that Mother was unable to communicate with N.R. in a supportive or empathetic
way and did not pick up on N.R.'s emotional cues. The therapist opined conjoint therapy
was not appropriate and might be detrimental to N.R. at that time, given the Mother's
denial of the abuse.
At the contested six-month review hearing in October 2014, the juvenile court
heard testimony from the social worker, Mother, Mother's therapist and the conjoint
therapist. The juvenile court found that Mother had made substantive progress with the
provisions of her case plan, that reasonable services had been provided to Mother,
ordered further reunification services and set a 12-month review hearing date.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding that reasonable reunification
services had been provided because the Agency failed to facilitate vital conjoint therapy
for her and N.R. She notes that conjoint therapy did not occur for a year after being
ordered and was attempted once, but the conjoint therapist was unprepared for the session
and then failed to follow-up after the session. Mother argues that conjoint therapy was
critical to the reunification process, but the Agency did nothing to facilitate conjoint
therapy after the one failed attempt, such as having her and N.R.'s individual therapists,
and the future conjoint therapist communicate to set up a conjoint therapy session.
Although the trial court ordered an additional six months of services, Mother claims that
unless the order is reversed she will be prejudiced by the juvenile court's ruling later in
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the proceedings. The Agency argues that Mother's claim of future prejudice is
speculative and submits the services provided were reasonable under the circumstances,
especially given N.R.'s status, background and emotional state. As we shall explain, we
agree with the Agency.
The purpose of a reunification plan is "to overcome the problem that led to
removal in the first place." (Blanca P. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1738,
1748.) "Each reunification plan must be appropriate to the particular individual and
based on the unique facts of that individual." (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538,
545 (Misako).) To support a finding of reasonable services, "the record should show that
the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered
services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the
parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the
parents in areas where compliance proved difficult . . . ." (In re Riva M. (1991) 235
Cal.App.3d 403, 414.)
"The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be
provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the
circumstances." (Misako, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547.) The remedy for failing to
offer or provide reasonable services is to extend the reunification period and continue
services. (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 975.) When a party challenges the
finding that reasonable services were offered or provided, we determine whether there is
substantial evidence to support the court's finding by reviewing the evidence most
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favorably to the prevailing party and indulging in all legitimate and reasonable inferences
to uphold the court's ruling. (Misako, at p. 545.)
After considering the reports and carefully listening to the testimony, the juvenile
court addressed the issue of Mother's services at length. It found that Mother and N.R.
were progressing in their individual therapy. It noted that while the circumstances
surrounding the conjoint therapy session were not ideal, the session "derailed" not
because of its structure but because of "the intensity of the interaction between the
Mother and [N.R.]." Although the conjoint therapy session did not go well, the court
noted this was not necessarily a negative as the session provided additional information.
In hindsight, the court believed it was premature to begin conjoint therapy at that time. It
noted that the issue of admitting abuse is a therapeutic issue with both Mother and N.R.
holding "very deeply held perspectives of what happened" that do not match. The court
believed the case would ultimately be successful, but expressed doubt that Mother and
N.R. were at the point they could be productive in conjoint therapy.
The juvenile court's astute comments and ultimate finding that the Agency
provided reasonable services to Mother are supported by the record. The juvenile court
authorized conjoint therapy at the detention hearing "when deemed appropriate" for
Mother and N.R. (Capitalization omitted.) The initial case plan provided for Mother and
N.R. to "participate in conjoint therapy once feedback is received from their respective
therapists and deemed appropriate in order to address their relationship and any problems
that may arise." It was not until late June 2014 that the therapists for Mother and N.R.
agreed conjoint therapy would be appropriate. Nothing in the record suggests the Agency
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could have done anything to advance conjoint therapy or did anything to delay conjoint
therapy. Rather, it appears Mother's actions may have contributed to the delay. The
record shows that from early April 2014 to June 2014, N.R. refused to participate in
visitation after she received a letter from Mother that included list of things N.R. needed
to " 'work on' " including that she " 'forgive' " Brian. This letter greatly upset N.R. When
visitation resumed in early June 2014, encouraging visits with Mother prompted N.R. to
agree to conjoint therapy.
In early August 2014, Mother and N.R. attended a conjoint therapy session after
their respective therapists felt it was an appropriate time to begin conjoint therapy. The
conjoint therapist believed she would be evaluating N.R. for joint therapy and, ideally,
would have liked to have separately interviewed Mother and N.R. and reviewed reports
from their individual therapists. Nonetheless, the therapist had an opportunity to speak
with N.R. individually and learned about N.R.'s allegations of abuse by the stepfather and
Mother's belief that N.R. lied and made things up. When Mother entered the room, N.R.
became uncomfortable and wanted Mother to sit as far away from her as possible. N.R.
became angry after Mother refused to mention abuse as the reason for conjoint therapy.
When N.R. pleaded with Mother to be honest about their home situation, Mother skirted
the issue. The therapist observed Mother's inability to calm N.R. or engage in supportive
and empathic dialogue with N.R. The therapist discharged N.R., concluding "conjoint
therapy may be detrimental to [N.R.]'s emotional state and [she] would not benefit from
the process at this time" given her emotional distress during the session and Mother's
denial of the abuse.
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Mother's complaint regarding the adequacy of her services centers on the Agency's
failure to facilitate conjoint therapy after this one failed attempt. The record shows,
however, that after this session, the social worker spoke to the individual therapists for
N.R. and Mother. N.R.'s therapist agreed with the conjoint therapist's conclusion that
conjoint therapy was not appropriate at this time. Thereafter, the social worker remained
in constant contact with N.R.'s therapist and consulted another conjoint therapist, who
declined to offer services until Mother accepted responsibility. The social worker and
Mother's therapist also agreed it would be beneficial to have a treatment team update
involving the social worker, Mother, N.R. and their individual therapists. The social
worker also expressed her belief that conjoint therapy would be beneficial to N.R. once
N.R. and N.R.'s therapist stated N.R. was ready.
Taken to its essence, Mother's argument boils down to an assertion that the
Agency should have forced N.R. into conjoint therapy. We do not agree.
Mother's position ignores the conclusions of the conjoint therapist that N.R. would
not benefit from conjoint therapy at this time and conjoint therapy might be detrimental
to N.R.'s emotional state. N.R.'s statements and actions support this conclusion. In a
report dated November 2014, the social worker noted that while N.R. loves Mother, N.R.
has "never wavered from her wishes of not wanting to return home" as she does not
believe Mother "is able to keep her safe" and "does not feel . . . Mother has taken
accountability for her part in the reason for [the] removal." After Mother sent N.R. an
"atonement letter," N.R. did not want to "process [the] letter or have any contact" with
Mother despite encouragement from the Agency and N.R.'s therapist.
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N.R. was 13 years old at the time of the contested six-month review hearing. The
court-appointed special advocate assigned to the case described N.R. as "a bright and
articulate young woman who, in many respects, is incredibly mature for her age" and
who possesses a "grasp of complex concepts and situations" that belie her age. N.R. was
of an age and maturity level to meaningfully express her feelings. Mother complains that
it should not be up to N.R. or her therapist to decide whether conjoint therapy occurred.
N.R., however, did not express her feelings about conjoint therapy, she expressed them
about Mother. Her feelings about Mother have not changed primarily because Mother's
attitude about the case and the abuse N.R. suffered has not changed. On this record we
cannot conclude that the Agency's failure to schedule another conjoint therapy session
rendered the services provided to Mother unreasonable. (Cf. Randi R. v. Superior Court
(1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 67, 71 [Mother "seems to think her compliance with the terms of
her reunification plan is all that was required for reunification to occur. But that position
reflects neither reality nor the law. The juvenile court may decline to return a child to
parental custody where, although that parent has complied with the reunification plan, the
child continues to suffer severe emotional problems as a result of the parent's earlier
abuse and where those problems would be exacerbated by return of the child."].)
Finally, it is important to note that the juvenile court ordered the Agency to
continue providing services to Mother and scheduled the matter for a 12-month review
hearing. Thus, even assuming the trial court erred, Mother suffered no prejudice.
Although Mother argues the prejudice will manifest in a later phase of the proceedings,
"Welfare and Institutions Code section 352 provides an emergency escape valve" should
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the juvenile court determine N.R.'s best interests would be served by a continuance of a
review hearing beyond the statutorily permissible time frame. (In re Elizabeth R. (1995)
35 Cal.App.4th 1774, 1798-1799 [juvenile court had discretion under Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 352 to continue the 18-month review hearing and order the provision of additional
reunification services].)
In summary, the record also shows Mother cares deeply for N.R. and wishes
reunification. As the juvenile court noted, however, this case presents "materially
complex" emotional and therapeutic issues. To echo the juvenile court's comments, to be
successful in reunification both Mother and N.R. will require a lot of tears, courage and
"give and take."
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
MCINTYRE, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
IRION, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The juvenile court did not err in finding that the Agency provided reasonable reunification services, as the record supported the conclusion that conjoint therapy was premature and potentially detrimental to the child due to the mother's continued denial of abuse.
Issues
Whether the Agency failed to provide reasonable reunification services by not facilitating conjoint therapy between the mother and child.
Whether the juvenile court's finding of reasonable services is supported by substantial evidence.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.”
“On this record we cannot conclude that the Agency's failure to schedule another conjoint therapy session rendered the services provided to Mother unreasonable.”