Yazdani v. Bank of America CA4/1 (2015) · DecisionDepot
Yazdani v. Bank of America CA4/1
California Court of Appeal May 26, 2015 No. D066141Unpublished
Filed 5/26/15 Yazdani v. Bank of America CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
KAVEH YAZDANI, D066141
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2013-00045361- CU-OR-NC) BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Robert P.
Dahlquist, Judge. Affirmed.
Leon E. Campbell, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Akerman, Karen P. Ciccone and Evan F. Anderson, for Defendants and
Respondents.
INTRODUCTION
Kaveh Yazdani appeals from the judgment entered in favor of Bank of America,
N.A. (BofA) and ReconTrust Company, N.A.1 (ReconTrust, together with BofA,
defendants) after the trial court sustained the demurrer to Yazdani's third amended
complaint (TAC) without leave to amend. Yazdani contends the court erred in sustaining
the demurrer without leave to amend because his TAC stated sufficient facts to constitute
a cause of action for breach of the implied duty to act in good faith and fair dealing. We
2924.18, and the federal Home Affordable Modification Program as authorized by the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2009, and as amended by the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.
The court sustained defendants' demurrer to Yazdani's TAC without leave to
amend. The court explained Yazdani's TAC still suffered from the same defects as the
SAC. Additionally, the court stated Yazdani's TAC "fails to allege facts constituting any
cognizable cause of action" and "consists almost entirely of conclusory allegations of
alleged wrongdoing, with no facts pled to support the conclusions." The court entered
judgment in favor of defendants and dismissed Yazdani's action with prejudice.
4
DISCUSSION
I
Standard of Review
On appeal from a judgment of dismissal following the sustaining of a demurrer
without leave to amend, we initially review the allegations of the complaint de novo to
determine if it alleges facts sufficient to state a claim for relief under any legal theory.
(Jenkins v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 497, 506 (Jenkins).)
"[W]e give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in
their context." (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) However, we do not
assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (Evans v. City
of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 6.)
"In order to prevail on appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer, the appellant
must affirmatively demonstrate error. Specifically, the appellant must show that the facts
pleaded are sufficient to establish every element of a cause of action and overcome all
legal grounds on which the trial court sustained the demurrer." (Intengan v. BAC Home
Loans Servicing LP (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1052.) "A judgment of dismissal after
a demurrer has been sustained without leave to amend will be affirmed if proper on any
grounds stated in the demurrer, whether or not the court acted on that ground." (Carman
v. Alvord (1982) 31 Cal.3d 318, 324.) "However, it is error for a trial court to sustain a
demurrer when the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory."
(Genesis Environmental Services v. San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control
Dist. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 597, 603.)
5
If we conclude the complaint fails on any grounds stated in the demurrer, and if
the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, we must then review
whether the trial court's failure to grant leave to amend was an abuse of discretion.
(Jenkins, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at pp. 506-507.) Specifically, "we decide whether there
is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the
trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of
discretion and we affirm." (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.) The plaintiff
has the burden of demonstrating abuse of discretion by showing how the complaint can
be amended to state a cause of action. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31
Cal.4th 1074, 1081.)
II
Inadequacy of the Complaint
Rule 2.112 of the California Rules of Court requires each cause of action to be
numbered separately and its nature stated. In addition, where there is more than one
plaintiff or defendant, the names of the plaintiffs asserting the particular cause of action
and the names of the defendants against whom the cause of action is asserted must
appear. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.112.)
In sustaining defendants' demurrer to Yazdani's SAC with leave to amend, the trial
court expressly pointed out Yazdani's failure to comply with the pleading format set forth
in California Rules of Court, rule 2.112. Yazdani failed to cure these formatting defects
in his TAC. The cause of action was not numbered, although Yazdani alleges he is
asserting a single cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
6
dealing, which he alleges caused various statutory violations. There are no allegations
alleging the basis of a cause of action against ReconTrust.
Additionally, the complaint does not comply with Code of Civil Procedure section
425.10, subdivision (a)(1), which requires "[a] statement of the facts constituting the
cause of action, in ordinary and concise language." "Conclusions or deductions from the
facts alleged do not constitute a cause of action." (Whaley v. Jansen (1962) 208
Cal.App.2d 222, 229.)
Here, Yazdani has repeatedly failed to sustain his burden of setting forth factual
allegations constituting a cause of action. Yazdani's TAC consists almost entirely of
conclusory allegations of wrongdoing, i.e., broad allegations of various statutory
violations, with no facts pled to support the conclusions.
III
Tender Rule
Even if we overlook these pleading violations, defendants contend Yazdani's claim
fails because he did not allege a valid tender of the entire amount owed. We agree.
"It is settled that an action to set aside a trustee's sale for irregularities in sale
notice or procedure should be accompanied by an offer to pay the full amount of the debt
for which the property was security. [Citations.] This rule is premised upon the
equitable maxim that a court of equity will not order that a useless act be performed.
'Equity will not interpose its remedial power in the accomplishment of what seemingly
would be nothing but an idly and expensively futile act, nor will it purposely speculate in
a field where there has been no proof as to what beneficial purpose may be subserved
7
through its intervention.' " (Arnolds Management Corp. v. Eischen (1984) 158
Cal.App.3d 575, 578-579.) "To hold otherwise would permit plaintiffs to state a cause of
action without the necessary element of damage to themselves." (Id. at p. 580.)
Moreover, as the court in Stebley v. Litton Loan Servicing, LLP (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th
522, 526, explained, "Allowing plaintiffs to recoup the property without full tender would
give them an inequitable windfall, allowing them to evade their lawful debt." This tender
rule is strictly enforced. (Nguyen v. Calhoun (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 428, 439.)
There are many exceptions to the tender rule. These exceptions include: (1) when
the borrower is attacking the validity of the underlying debt; (2) when the party attacking
the foreclosure sale has a counterclaim against the beneficiary equal to or greater than the
amount of the tender; (3) when the party attacking the foreclosure sale is not liable for the
debt; and (4) when the party attacking the foreclosure sale is not relying on equity
because the trustee's deed upon sale is void on its face. (Shuster v. BAC Home Loans
Servicing, LP (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 505, 512.) However, Yazdani's TAC does not
allege facts implicating these exceptions.
Here, the notice of default notified Yazdani that he owed $12,279.49 on his home
loan. Yazdani did not plead, or provide any judicially noticeable evidence establishing,
he tendered his outstanding debt to defendants. Yazdani also did not propose any facts
showing it would be inequitable to require a full tender.
Yazdani contends, with no citation to authority, the tender rule only applies before
the sale and is therefore inapplicable to the present case. Yazdani's argument fails to
comply with California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), which requires briefs to
8
"support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority." We may treat
as waived any points not supported by reasoned argument or citation to authority.
(Nelson v. Avondale Homeowners Assn. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862.)
Nevertheless, we note, "[a] cause of action 'implicitly integrated' with the irregular
sale fails unless the trustor can allege and establish a valid tender." (Arnolds
Management Corp. v. Eischen (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 575, 579; see Karlsen v. American
Sav. & Loan Assn. (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 112, 121 ["Appellant's alleged cause of action
for breach of an oral agreement is implicitly integrated with the voidable sale. However,
absent an effective and valid tender, the sale became valid and proper. The hurdle which
appellant has not been able to clear either legally or financially is that he never made a
valid tender."].) Yazdani's alleged cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing is implicitly integrated with the foreclosure sale. Therefore,
the tender rule is applicable to the present case. Accordingly, Yazdani cannot state a
valid cause of action because he failed to allege tender or to allege circumstances to
indicate an exception to the tender rule applies.
IV
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Finally, even if the tender rule did not apply, Yazdani's TAC fails to state
sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for breach of the implied duty to act in good
faith and fair dealing.
"There is implied in every contract a covenant by each party not to do anything
which will deprive the other parties thereto of the benefits of the contract. [Citations.]
9
This covenant not only imposes upon each contracting party the duty to refrain from
doing anything which would render performance of the contract impossible by any act of
his own, but also the duty to do everything that the contract presupposes that he will do to
accomplish its purpose." (Harm v. Frasher (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 405, 417.) "The
covenant of good faith finds particular application in situations where one party is
invested with a discretionary power affecting the rights of another. Such power must be
exercised in good faith." (Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Development
California, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 342, 372.) However, "it is well settled the implied
covenant does not extend so far as to impose enforceable duties that are beyond the scope
of the contract, nor does the covenant prohibit actions that are expressly authorized by the
contract's terms." (Jenkins, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 525; Carma Developers (Cal.),
Inc. v. Marathon Development California, Inc., supra, at p. 373 ["[i]t is universally
recognized the scope of conduct prohibited by the covenant of good faith is
circumscribed by the purposes and express terms of the contract."].)
Here, Yazdani generally alleges BofA breached the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing by making conclusory and vague allegations of various statutory violations in
connection with the nonjudicial foreclosure. However nowhere in his complaint does
Yazdani identify an express term or underlying purpose of the deed of trust or any other
contract to which the alleged breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing relates. Moreover, Yazdani sets forth no facts to support the alleged statutory
violations or how the alleged statutory violations deprived him of the benefit of the loan
agreement. (Jenkins, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 528; see Pasadena Live v. City of
10
Pasadena (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1089, 1094 [" 'implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is limited to assuring compliance with the express terms of the contract, and
cannot be extended to create obligations not contemplated by the contract.' "].) As such,
Yazdani failed to state a valid cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.
V
Denial of Leave to Amend
Finally, we must also consider whether Yazdani has shown there is a reasonable
probability he could cure the defects we have identified in the cause of action.
(Schifando, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) We conclude he has not done so.
Yazdani has not described new or more specific facts, or how those allegations
would state a cause of action. Significantly, Yazdani does not assert he should have been
granted leave to amend to cure any defects in his complaint. Rather, Yazdani states
"[t]he alleged violations are ultimate facts. Probative facts would take up many pages if
known. [Yazdani] alleges that full information is not available to [Yazdani], and that
such probative facts are yet to be discovered." Furthermore, in his opposition to
demurrer to the TAC, Yazdani asserts, "[BofA] has full information concerning such
violations; and that such information is unknown to [Yazdani] who is dependent on
discovery to obtain such information." However, Yazdani fails to articulate what
discoverable evidence he believes BofA possesses and how it relates to the elements of a
cause of action.
11
Yazdani contends Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods
Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197 provides an exception to the usual rules of pleading.
However, there, the Supreme Court discussed an exception to the strict pleading standard
for allegations of fraud. (Id. at p. 217.) Furthermore, the strict pleading standard is only
relaxed if it is apparent the defendant possesses full information concerning the facts of
the controversy. (Ibid.)
Yazdani does not allege a cause of action for fraud. Moreover, Yazdani vaguely
asserts BofA possesses full information, but this is far from apparent because Yazdani
fails to state with any specificity what facts defendants possess, how those facts are
legally significant, or why Yazdani is not privy to any factual basis for his claim.
Therefore, the exception is inapplicable to the present case.
Yazdani bears the burden of demonstrating abuse of discretion by showing how
the complaint can be amended to state a cause of action. He has not met this burden.
(Schifando v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p.1081.) As a result, there is no
basis on which to grant leave to amend and the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
(Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1158–1159.)
VI
Conclusion
Yazdani has failed to state a viable cause of action for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Yazdani was granted ample opportunity and
instruction from the trial court to cure the defects in his pleading, but failed to do so. The
12
TAC is unsuccessful because neither the very limited properly asserted facts nor the
remaining conclusory allegations state the requisite elements of his cause of action.
Yazdani has not provided adequate legal authority or factual allegations to satisfy his
burden of showing there is a reasonable possibility he can amend the legal effect of his
complaint. (Rossberg v. Bank of America, N.A. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1491.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, J.
MCINTYRE, J.
13
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint, holding that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and failed to satisfy the tender rule required to challenge a nonjudicial foreclosure.
Issues
Whether the plaintiff's third amended complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Whether the plaintiff's failure to tender the outstanding debt barred his challenge to the nonjudicial foreclosure sale.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying further leave to amend the complaint.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“It is settled that an action to set aside a trustee's sale for irregularities in sale notice or procedure should be accompanied by an offer to pay the full amount of the debt for which the property was security.”
“Yazdani's alleged cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implicitly integrated with the foreclosure sale. Therefore, the tender rule is applicable to the present case.”
“it is well settled the implied covenant does not extend so far as to impose enforceable duties that are beyond the scope of the contract, nor does the covenant prohibit actions that are expressly authorized by the contract's terms.”