Galluzzi v. San Diego Unified Port Dist. CA4/1 (2015) · DecisionDepot
Galluzzi v. San Diego Unified Port Dist. CA4/1
California Court of Appeal May 18, 2015 No. D066579Unpublished
Filed 5/18/15 Galluzzi v. San Diego Unified Port Dist. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
GIANNI GALLUZZI, D066579
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2014-00003637-CU-WM-CTL) SAN DIEGO UNIFIED PORT DISTRICT,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Eddie C.
Sturgeon, Judge. Affirmed.
Gianni Galluzzi, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Thomas A. Russell and Simon M. Kann for Defendant and Respondent.
Gianni Galluzzi appeals a judgment after the trial court sustained the demurrer of
San Diego Unified Port District, acting as the San Diego Harbor Police (District), to his
petition for writ of administrative mandamus and writ of mandamus arising out of
District's alleged wrongful removal and storage of his sailboat. On appeal, Galluzzi
contends the trial court erred by sustaining District's demurrer to his petition because: (1)
District wrongfully issued a notice of storage to him; (2) District should be required to
pay him for damage to his sailboat; and (3) District's hearing officer erred by denying his
1086 provides: "The writ must be issued in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law. . . ." Based on the record in this
case, Galluzzi has not shown he does not have an adequate remedy at law (e.g., tort
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action for damages) to obtain relief for the alleged damage to his sailboat.1 Accordingly,
his petition for writ relief does not state a cause of action to obtain an award of damages
against District for damage to his sailboat.
IV
Poststorage Administrative Hearing Decision
Galluzzi contends the trial court erred by sustaining District's demurrer to his writ
petition because its hearing officer erred by denying his claims at the poststorage
administrative hearing.
A
On November 25, 2013, District mailed a notice of storage to Galluzzi, notifying
him that his sailboat was removed from its anchorage in San Diego Bay and was being
stored at Marine Group Boatworks in Chula Vista. The notice expressly cited Code
section 4.38(i)(6) as the authority for such removal and storage. The notice of storage
informed Galluzzi that he was entitled to a poststorage hearing to contest District's action.
On December 30, District hearing officer Womack issued a decision after
conducting a poststorage administrative hearing, finding District lawfully impounded and
stored the sailboat based on its regulations for anchoring permits, and that Galluzzi's
inability to move his sailboat because of personal health and financial reasons did not
1 Furthermore, as District asserts, Galluzzi has not shown he satisfied the Government Claims Act's (Gov. Code, §§ 810 et seq.) requirements before filing the instant petition seeking damages against it. (Connelly v. County of Fresno (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 29, 37 ["Failure to timely present a claim for money or damages to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity."].)
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preclude District from lawfully removing and storing it. He denied Galluzzi's request
that District pay for damage to his sailboat that occurred while anchored and/or stored
and concluded District was not responsible for any storage or towing fees. Galluzzi then
filed the instant petition, challenging the hearing officer's decision.
B
Code section 4.38 sets forth regulations for the anchorage of vessels in the
navigable waters of San Diego Bay. It requires an owner of a vessel to obtain an
anchoring permit from District before anchoring a vessel in certain areas of San Diego
Bay. (Code, § 4.38(c)(1).) No person shall allow a vessel to remain anchored in those
areas after the expiration of that anchoring permit. (Code, § 4.38(c)(2).) For anchoring
in the "A-9" area, permits will be issued for a 30-day period with a maximum anchorage
of 90 days within a 365-day period. (Code, § 4.38(h)(4)(b), (c).)
Importantly, for purposes of this case, Code section 4.38(i)(6) provides: "Any
vessel anchored in violation of any provision of this Section is subject to removal and
storage, by any Harbor Police Officer, pursuant to Section 8.25(a) of this Code. The
registered and/or legal owner of the vessel may be liable for all costs related to the
removal and storage of the vessel." Code section 8.25(a)(1) authorizes any District
harbor police officer to remove and impound any vessel found in violation of the Code.
The owner may secure release of the vessel after proving ownership and paying District
the costs and expenses for removal, impound, and storage. (Code, § 8.25(a)(3).)
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C
Although we presume Galluzzi's petition may seek review of District's poststorage
hearing decision as an administrative hearing decision subject to Code of Civil Procedure
section 1094.5 writ review,2 the allegations in his petition nevertheless show the trial
court properly concluded he did not state a cause of action for such relief. Alternatively
stated, assuming the factual allegations of his petition are true, those allegations do not
show District erred by upholding the validity of its removal and storage of the sailboat.
His petition asserted his sailboat was anchored in San Diego Bay and its District
anchorage permit had expired before it was towed and stored. Based on the provisions of
District's Code quoted above, District was authorized to remove, store, and impound any
vessel anchored in San Diego Bay in violation of the Code. (Code, §§ 4.38(i)(6),
8.25(a).) One violation is allowing a vessel to remain anchored after the expiration of its
anchoring permit. (Code, § 4.38(c)(2).) Accordingly, Galluzzi's petition did not allege
facts showing District did not have authority to remove, store, and impound his sailboat
or otherwise improperly acted in so doing. His petition's assertion that he was suffering
from personal health and financial problems at the time of the sailboat's removal and
storage does not state a cause of action for wrongful removal and storage because those
factors are not mentioned in the Code and are therefore irrelevant to District's
enforcement of the Code. Furthermore, Galluzzi has not cited any authority showing
2 Galluzzi does not appear to argue, nor could he successfully argue, District's administrative hearing decision can properly be challenged under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 rather than section 1094.5.
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those problems are sufficient to preclude District from removing and storing a vessel with
an expired anchorage permit.
Galluzzi wrongly argues District erred by removing and storing his sailboat on the
ground it was a wreck and/or abandoned vessel pursuant to Harbor and Navigation Code
sections 522 and 526.3 The notice of storage does not state that ground for removal and
storage of Galluzzi's sailboat. On the contrary, it expressly cites Code section 4.38(i)(6)
as the ground for its removal and storage (i.e., violation of Code by continuing to anchor
his sailboat after expiration of his anchorage permit), and that is the ground on which
District's hearing officer upheld such removal and storage.
Because the allegations in Galluzzi's petition show he did not state a cause of
action for writ relief under either Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 or section 1085,
the trial court correctly sustained District's demurrer to his petition. Galluzzi has not
carried his burden on appeal to persuade us otherwise, and he does not show how he
could amend his petition to state a cause of action. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles,
supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1081.)
3 Harbor and Navigations Code section 522 generally provides that any wreck or parts of a vessel allowed to remain in an unseaworthy or dilapidated condition on publicly owned submerged lands or tidelands for more than 30 days is abandoned property; the public entity may take title to that abandoned property, remove it at least 15 days after notifying the registered owner thereof, and then cause it to be sold, destroyed or otherwise disposed of. Harbor and Navigations Code section 526 generally provides any wrecked or abandoned property (e.g., vessel) removed from a navigable waterway may be sold or otherwise disposed of by the public agency pursuant to certain procedures, including the opportunity for a poststorage hearing before the public agency.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
McDONALD, J.
WE CONCUR:
HALLER, Acting P. J.
IRION, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the trial court properly sustained the defendant's demurrer because the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for writ relief, as the District acted within its authority to remove a vessel with an expired permit and the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law for damages.
Issues
Whether the District's issuance of a notice of storage is reviewable via a petition for writ of administrative or ordinary mandamus.
Whether the plaintiff stated a cause of action for damages against the District via a writ petition.
Whether the District's poststorage administrative hearing decision was supported by its regulations regarding expired anchorage permits.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“District was authorized to remove, store, and impound any vessel anchored in San Diego Bay in violation of the Code.”