California Court of Appeal May 4, 2015 No. E061236Unpublished
Filed 5/4/15 P. v. Young CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E061236
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF74426)
TEDDY JEROME YOUNG, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Becky Dugan, Judge.
Affirmed.
Neil Auwarter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General,
Barry Carlton and Minh U. Le, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Teddy Jerome Young appeals after the trial court denied
his petition under Penal Code section 1170.126 for resentencing under the Three Strikes
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Reform Act of 2012, or Proposition 36. At issue is whether defendant’s petition showed
that he was eligible to be considered for resentencing. We affirm.
154]; see People v. Verduzco (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1414 [149 Cal.Rptr.3d 200].)
[¶] We also ‘ “refer to other indicia of the voters’ intent, particularly the analyses and
arguments contained in the official ballot pamphlet.” [Citation.]’ (People v. Rizo
[(2000)] 22 Cal.4th [681], at p. 685.) ‘Using these extrinsic aids, we “select the
construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the [electorate], with a
view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an
interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences.” [Citation.]’ (People v. Sinohui
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 205, 212 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 783, 47 P.3d 629].) ‘ “ ‘The meaning of a
statute may not be determined from a single word or sentence; the words must be
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construed in context, and provisions relating to the same subject matter must be
harmonized to the extent possible. [Citation.]’ ” ’ (People v. Mohammed (2008) 162
Cal.App.4th 920, 928 [76 Cal.Rptr.3d 372].) ‘ “[W]e do not construe statutes in
isolation, but rather read every statute ‘with reference to the entire scheme of law of
which it is part so that the whole may be harmonized and retain effectiveness.’
[Citation.]” [Citation.]’ (Horwich v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 276.)”
(People v. Brown (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1508-1509 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].)
We now apply these principles to the issue at hand.
II. Defendant Was Not Eligible for Resentencing for His Nonviolent, Nonserious Felony
Penal Code section 1170.126, subdivision (e), sets forth the criteria for eligibility
for resentencing: “(e) An inmate is eligible for resentencing if: [¶] (1) The inmate is
serving an indeterminate term of life imprisonment imposed pursuant to paragraph (2)
of subdivision (e) of Section 667 or subdivision (c) of Section 1170.12 for a conviction
of a felony or felonies that are not defined as serious and/or violent felonies by
subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 or subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7. [¶] (2) The
inmate’s current sentence was not imposed for any of the offenses appearing in clauses (i)
to (iii), inclusive, of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667
or clauses (i) to (iii), inclusive, of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of
Section 1170.12. [¶] (3) The inmate has no prior convictions for any of the offenses
appearing in clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of
Section 667 or clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of
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Section 1170.12.” That is, the inmate may be eligible for resentencing if: (1) the inmate
is serving a third strike life term for a felony that is not serious or violent; (2) the inmate
has no specified “disqualifying factors” for any current offenses, such as certain sex
offenses, drug charges, use of firearms or great bodily injury; and (3) prior offenses do
not include specified crimes such as certain sex offenses, homicide crimes, certain
assaults on peace officers, or felonies punishable by life imprisonment or death.
Defendant argues that he is eligible under section 1170.126, subdivision (e)(1),
because he is serving an indeterminate term of life imprisonment imposed under the
Three Strikes law for a felony that was and is not defined as serious or violent, namely,
evading an officer, a Vehicle Code offense. Defendant urges that Penal Code
section 1170.126, subdivision (e)(1), contains no suggestion that an accompanying
serious or violent felony (for which the inmate will be ineligible to seek resentencing)
renders the inmate also ineligible to seek resentencing on the nonserious three strike
felony.
Arguably, Penal Code section 1170.126, subdivision (e)(1), is distinguishable
from the language of section 1170.126, subdivision (e)(2), which makes it very clear that
an inmate is made ineligible for resentencing on an otherwise eligible offense if the
aggregate sentence also includes the specified disqualifying offenses. Under this
construction, the difference in language between section 1170.126, subdivision (e)(1) and
(2) would be deemed purposeful; subdivision (e)(2) would be meant to completely
disqualify an offender whose aggregate sentence includes the disqualifying offenses,
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whereas subdivision (e)(1) focuses only on the offense for which the inmate seeks to be
resentenced.
Against this possible interpretation, Penal Code section 1170.126,
subdivision (e)(1), can be interpreted in an alternate fashion: The words, an “inmate []
serving an indeterminate term of life imprisonment,” for a felony that is not serious or
violent, do not include an inmate who is serving two life terms—one for a serious/violent
felony and another for a nonserious/nonviolent felony.
We first look to section 1170.126, subdivision (a), which sets forth the objective of
the statute. “The resentencing provisions under this section and related statutes are
intended to apply exclusively to persons presently serving an indeterminate term of
imprisonment [for a nonviolent and nonserious felony], whose sentence under this act
would not have been an indeterminate life sentence” under the Three Strikes law as
amended by the 2012 act. (Italics added.) The use of the terms “exclusively” and
“persons” imply that the overall intent of the statute is to exclude from its benefits any
“persons” whose current commitment offenses include a serious or violent felony. This
language also contradicts any suggestion that the Act, specifically section 1170.126,
subdivision (e)(1), focuses only on the offense for which an inmate seeks resentencing,
rather than on the offender as a whole. Rather, the statutory language refers specifically
to an offender whose current commitment offenses include a serious or violent felony. A
person “whose sentence under this act would not have been an indeterminate life
sentence” cannot, by definition, include an inmate, one of whose commitment offenses is
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a serious or violent felony that is subject to an indeterminate life sentence. In other
words, an inmate, like defendant, who is simultaneously serving life terms for one
offense, not violent or serious, and for another offense that is violent or serious, is not a
person “whose sentence under this act would not have been an indeterminate life
sentence” under the Act.
Second, Penal Code section 1170.126, subdivision (d), requires the petition for
recall of sentence to “specify all of the currently charged felonies, which resulted in the
sentence . . . .” The specific requirement that an inmate list all of the commitment
felonies indicates that each of the currently charged felonies affects the inmate’s
eligibility for resentencing, and that the sentencing court must consider all of the inmate’s
current felonies in making its eligibility determination, not just the felony for which the
inmate requests resentencing. In addition, this subdivision clearly uses the term
“sentence” to mean the combination of all terms resulting from all of the felonies of
which defendant was convicted in the latest proceedings. Viewed in this light, the use of
the word “sentence” in section 1170.126, subdivision (a), even more clearly indicates that
having a serious or violent felony as one of his or her commitment offenses disqualifies
an inmate from being resentenced on any of his or her indeterminate life sentences.
Third, as set forth in People v. Yearwood (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 161 [151
Cal.Rptr.3d 901], the ballot arguments in favor of Proposition 36, which “have been
recognized as a proper extrinsic aid in construing voter initiatives adopted by popular
vote” (People v. Yearwood, at p. 171), repeatedly and plainly stressed that truly
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dangerous criminals, namely those convicted of a serious or violent felony, would not
receive any benefit whatsoever from the proposed amendments to the Three Strikes law.
Examples of such language in the ballot arguments are: “ ‘Prop. 36 prevents dangerous
criminals from being released early’ ”; “ ‘Prop. 36 will keep dangerous criminals off the
streets’ ”; and “ ‘truly dangerous criminals will receive no benefits whatsoever from the
reform.’ ” (People v. Yearwood, at p. 171, quoting Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec.
(Nov. 6, 2012) argument in favor of Prop. 36, pp. 52-53.) These arguments indicate an
intent by the voters that an inmate convicted of a serious or violent felony in the latest
proceedings will not benefit, at all, from the reduced sentencing of the 2012 act.
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that both the language of
section 1170.126 and the evidence of voter intent support the conclusion that an inmate is
not eligible for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 when any of the
offenses for which he or she is serving a three strikes sentence is a serious or violent
felony. We therefore affirm the superior court’s order in this case denying defendant’s
petition for resentencing.
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DISPOSITION
The court’s ruling is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
KING J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. An inmate serving an indeterminate life sentence under the Three Strikes law is ineligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.126 if any of their current commitment offenses are serious or violent felonies.
Issues
Whether an inmate is eligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.126 on a nonviolent, nonserious felony count if they are also serving a concurrent life sentence for a serious or violent felony.
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The resentencing provisions under this section and related statutes are intended to apply exclusively to persons presently serving an indeterminate term of imprisonment [for a nonviolent and nonserious felony]”
“an inmate is not eligible for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 when any of the offenses for which he or she is serving a three strikes sentence is a serious or violent felony.”