People v. Daniels CA3

Filed 5/4/15 P. v. Daniels CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Yolo) ----

THE PEOPLE, C076295

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. F132513)

v.

VINT KYLE DANIELS,

Defendant and Appellant.

Yolo County Sheriff’s Deputy Ryan Mez was patrolling northbound Interstate 5 when he noticed a white truck without a rear license plate parked at a rest stop. He asked the driver, defendant Vint Kyle Daniels, to step out of the truck and for consent to conduct a search of his person. Defendant agreed to be searched. The search of defendant’s person and the subsequent search of his truck revealed drugs, ammunition, body armor, and a stun gun. Following a preliminary examination, defendant was charged with three felonies and three misdemeanors.

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Defendant then moved to suppress the physical evidence obtained from the searches of his person and his truck. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Defendant pled no contest to two counts and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of two years. On appeal, defendant first argues that the transcript of the preliminary examination must be considered part of the record on review of the denial of his motion to suppress because his references to it in his motion put that transcript before the trial court during the suppression hearing. We disagree. A preliminary examination transcript must be formally received in evidence via stipulation or an exception to the hearsay rule to be considered during a suppression hearing. (People v. Neighbours (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1115, 1120.) Because neither of those events occurred, the preliminary examination transcript was not before the trial court during the suppression hearing and is not part of the record on review. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion. He makes two arguments in support of his claim of error. The first is that Deputy Mez’s general search of defendant exceeded the scope of defendant’s consent, which he contends was limited to a search for weapons on his person. The second is that this generalized search extended the duration of the traffic stop beyond the length of time reasonably necessary for Deputy Mez to perform the duties authorized for the initial detention. As to defendant’s first point, he fails to show that the trial court’s finding that the search of defendant remained within the scope of his consent is not supported by substantial evidence. As to his second point, defendant has not demonstrated that Deputy Mez, by conducting a lawful and consensual search related to the justifications for the initial detention, unreasonably prolonged the encounter. For these reasons, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress. We will affirm.