California Court of Appeal Apr 30, 2015 No. D065368Unpublished
Filed 4/30/15 P. v. Solorzano CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D065368
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. JCF31284)
RAUL GONZALEZ SOLORZANO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Imperial County, Donal B.
Donnelly, Judge. Affirmed.
Ava R. Stralla, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr. and Anthony Da
Silva, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Raul Gonzalez Solorzano was convicted of one count of
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forcible oral copulation by a minor over 14 years old (Pen. Code,1 § 288a, subd.
(c)(2)(C)) and one count of sexual battery by restraint (§ 243.4, subd. (a)). Both counts
involved sexual assaults on J., his 17-year-old daughter. Solorzano was sentenced to 13
Given the sexual and provocative nature of the images, the trial court could also
reasonably conclude that it might easily and unfairly prejudice J. in the minds of one or
more of the jurors. The trial court could also reasonably conclude that the number of
images and their nature would consume an undue amount of time if J. were required to
explain each of them to the jury; in this regard, we again note the evidence was only
somewhat probative with respect to entirely collateral issues. In sum then, the disputed
evidence was only slightly probative and carried a very real risk of prejudice and undue
consumption of time. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding it.
II
Next, Solorzano contends the record does not contain sufficient evidence that
when J. orally copulated him he acted forcibly within the meaning of section 288a,
subdivision (c)(2)(C). We disagree.
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As defined by our Penal Code, forcible sex acts may occur notwithstanding the
victim's unwillingness or inability to physically resist the defendant. (See People v.
Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1024–1025.) "'[T]he fundamental wrong at which the
law of rape is aimed is not the application of physical force that causes physical harm.
Rather, the law of rape primarily guards the integrity of a woman's will and the privacy of
her sexuality from an act of intercourse undertaken without her consent. Because the
fundamental wrong is the violation of a woman's will and sexuality, the law of rape does
not require that "force" cause physical harm. Rather, in this scenario, "force" plays
merely a supporting evidentiary role, as necessary only to insure an act of intercourse has
been undertaken against a victim's will.' [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
Of significance here is the theory of rape, penetration and oral sex by duress,
which are all species of the forcible crimes proscribed by sections 261, subdivision (a)(2),
289, subdivision (a)(1)(A), and 288a, subdivision (c)(2)(A). In defining forcible rape by
duress, section 261, subdivision (b) states: "As used in this section, 'duress' means a
direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, or retribution sufficient to coerce a
reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to perform an act which otherwise would
not have been performed, or acquiesce in an act to which one otherwise would not have
submitted. The total circumstances, including the age of the victim, and his or her
relationship to the defendant, are factors to consider in appraising the existence of
duress." (See People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1004–1005; CALCRIM Nos. 1000,
1015, 1045.) This definition makes it plain that a victim's acquiescence in a sex crime
will not deprive the crime of its forcible nature.
Sex crimes by duress have repeatedly been found in circumstances very similar to
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the ones presented here, where the perpetrator is an adult member of a child victim's
household and uses his psychological authority rather than overt physical force to compel
compliance. (See People v. Cochran (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 8, 14 (Cochran); People v.
Senior (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 765, 775 (Senior); People v. Superior Court (Kneip) (1990)
219 Cal.App.3d 235, 238 (Kneip).) In Cochran, the court found sufficient evidence of
duress where a father was convicted of forcible lewd conduct on his nine-year-old
daughter. (Cochran, at p. 12.) The daughter testified that her father instructed her to
engage in various sexual acts, including intercourse and forced sodomy. The daughter
testified that she was not afraid of her father, but that he told her not to tell anyone
because he would get into trouble and go to jail and that he gave her money and gifts
when they were alone. The defendant was five feet nine inches tall and weighed 100
pounds more than his four-foot-three-inch daughter. In finding duress, we stated: "This
record paints a picture of a small, vulnerable and isolated child who engaged in sex acts
only in response to her father's parental and physical authority. Her compliance was
derived from intimidation and the psychological control he exercised over her and not the
result of freely given consent." (Id. at pp. 15–16.)
In Senior, the court found duress where a father forcibly molested his 14-year-old
daughter. The court noted that the defendant was the victim's father and an authority
figure to her; the defendant threatened to hit the victim and told her that if she did not
submit to the molestation it could result in a divorce, thus jeopardizing the family unit.
(Senior, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 775.)
In Kneip, the defendant was accused of molesting his small sons and a family
friend. In finding sufficient evidence of duress, the court stated: "Where the defendant is
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a family member and the victim is young, other courts have also looked to factors such as
the position of dominance and authority of the defendant and his continuous exploitation
of the victim in determining the existence of force or fear." (Kneip, supra, 219
Cal.App.3d at p. 239.)
In light of the cases in which rape or other sex crimes by duress have been found
where the defendant was an adult member of the victim's household, here we have little
hesitation affirming Solorzano's convictions. Solorzano's role as J.'s father, and J.'s
testimony about the physical control he exerted over her hand and head before and during
the oral copulation, as well as later in the bedroom, provide ample evidence of the
psychological and physical coercion that is sufficient to establish duress. (See Cochran,
supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at pp. 15–16.) Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support
Solorzano's conviction.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
BENKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
McINTYRE, J.
AARON, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding graphic images found on the victim's phone under Evidence Code section 352, and that there was sufficient evidence of coercion to support the defendant's conviction for forcible oral copulation.
Issues
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of graphic images found on the victim's cellular telephone?
Was there sufficient evidence of coercion to support a conviction for forcible oral copulation under Penal Code section 288a, subdivision (c)(2)(C)?
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding them as unduly prejudicial.”
“J.'s testimony about what occurred, her age, Solorzano's role in her life, and her fairly prompt reporting of the incidents to her mother, were more than sufficient evidence J. was the victim of coercion”