California Court of Appeal Apr 22, 2015 No. D064781Unpublished
Filed 4/22/15 P. v. Williams CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D064781
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD242869, SCD238325) JOHN WILLIAMS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, David M.
Gill, Judge. Affirmed.
Carl Fabian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Elizabeth
M. Carino, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
John Williams appeals from a judgment convicting him robbery, aggravated
assault, petty theft, and other offenses. He argues the judgment must be reversed because
(1) the police searched his cell phone without a warrant, and (2) the jury was improperly
presented with prior misconduct evidence. We find no reversible error and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant, age 20 at the time of the crimes involved in this case, is a member of
we shall explain, pending a decision on this issue from our state high court, we conclude
the good faith exception does apply.
In Davis, the United States Supreme Court evaluated the applicability of the good
faith exception in a case involving a change in the law concerning the permissibility of
automobile searches incident to arrest. Davis held that "searches conducted in
objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the
exclusionary rule." (Davis, supra, 131 S.Ct. at pp. 2423-2424, 2426-2429.) The Davis
court explained that the exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right nor is it
designed to redress the injury caused by an unconstitutional search; rather, its sole
purpose is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations. (Id. at p. 2426.) "For exclusion
to be appropriate, the deterrence benefits of suppression must outweigh its heavy costs."
(Id. at p. 2427.)
This cost-benefit analysis focuses on the " 'flagrancy of the police misconduct' at
issue. [Citation.] . . . When the police exhibit 'deliberate,' 'reckless,' or 'grossly
negligent' disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is
8
strong and tends to outweigh the resulting costs. [Citation.] But when the police act with
an objectively 'reasonable good-faith belief' that their conduct is lawful [Citation] . . .
' "the deterrence rationale loses much of its force," ' and exclusion cannot 'pay its way.' "
(Davis, supra, 131 S.Ct. at pp. 2427-2428.) Davis elaborated that "[p]olice practices
trigger the harsh sanction of exclusion only when they are deliberate enough to yield
'meaningfu[l]' deterrence, and culpable enough to be 'worth the price paid by the justice
system.' [Citation.] . . . The police [here] acted in strict compliance with binding
precedent, and their behavior was not wrongful. Unless the exclusionary rule is to
become a strict-liability regime, it can have no application to this case. [¶] . . . [¶] . . .
[W]hen binding appellate precedent specifically authorizes a particular police practice,
well-trained officers will and should use that tool to fulfill their crime-detection and
public-safety responsibilities . . . ." (Id. at pp. 2428-2429, first bracketed material in
original.)
The warrantless search of defendant's cell phone was in compliance with the
California Supreme Court's holding in Diaz. Because the officers were authorized under
Diaz to conduct a warrantless search of the phone, they were properly performing their
duties. We note this is not a case where the law in California on cell phone searches was
unsettled. (See Davis, supra, 131 S.Ct. at pp. 2435-2436 (conc. opn. of Sotomayor, J.).)1
1 Justice Sotomayor stated that although the Davis majority held it was proper to apply the good faith exception when binding appellate precedent specifically authorized a particular police practice, the majority's holding did not resolve the question of whether the exception should be applied when the constitutionality of the search is unsettled. (Davis, supra, 131 S.Ct. at pp. 2435-2436 (conc. opn. of Sotomayor, J.) [suggesting that 9
At the time of defendant's arrest, binding California Supreme Court authority provided
that Fourth Amendment constitutional protections did not require a warrant to search a
cell phone seized incident to an arrest. Accordingly, the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule applies, and there is no basis to provide relief to defendant based on the
change in the law.
Defendant argues we should not apply the good faith exception because the record
indicates Detective Castro did not rely on Diaz but rather thought a warrant was required
to search his cell phone. In support, he cites Detective Castro's statement to Phillips
(during her recorded police interview) that the police "do search warrants on cell phones"
and they had seen a text to her from defendant referring to a gun. This statement does not
defeat the applicability of the good faith exception for several reasons. First, a broad
statement that the police obtain search warrants for cell phone searches does not
necessarily reflect a belief that warrants are required for a cell phone search incident to
an arrest; indeed, even under Diaz there are a broad array of circumstances where a
warrant would be required for a cell phone search. Second, the relevant inquiry for the
good faith exception is primarily objective; i.e., whether a reasonably well trained officer
would have thought the search was legal in light of all the circumstances. (See Herring v.
United States (2009) 555 U.S. 135, 145; Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd (2011) __ U.S. __ [131 S.Ct.
2074, 2080]; United States v. Madden (10th Cir. 2012) 682 F.3d 920, 927-928.) Here, a
reasonably well trained officer would have thought the warrantless search of defendant's
if constitutionality of police practice is unsettled, it might be appropriate not to apply good faith exception so that police have incentive to err on side of constitutional behavior].) 10
cell phone was legal under binding California Supreme Court authority. Third, to the
extent a court considers whether an officer has engaged in improper conduct so as to
warrant rejection of the good faith exception in a particular case (see Herring, supra, at p.
146), there is no bad faith demonstrated here. Detective Castro's reference to the practice
of securing a warrant for cell phones does not suggest he engaged in " 'deliberate,'
'reckless,' or 'grossly negligent' disregard for Fourth Amendment rights" when he
searched defendant's cell phone without a warrant. (Davis, supra, 131 S.Ct. at p. 2427.)
Because Detective Castro's search of the cell phone complied with controlling California
Supreme Court authority, there is no basis to characterize his conduct as being in bad
faith.
We also reject defendant's contention that the Diaz decision cannot support the
good faith exception because the California Supreme Court has no authority to decide a
federal constitutional issue and was merely speculating about how the United States
Supreme Court would view the issue. State courts are fully authorized to decide federal
constitutional issues, subject to the dictates of the United States Supreme Court. (See
People v. Lessie (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1152, 1164, 1167; People v. Estrada (1965) 234
Cal.App.2d 136, 145; 7 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Constitutional
Law, § 112, p. 217; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, §§ 505-506, pp. 568-
569.) Because the United States Supreme Court had not yet ruled on the issue of
warrantless cell phone searches at the time of defendant's arrest, the California Supreme
Court's decision was binding in California.
11
Given our conclusion that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
applies, we need not consider the Attorney General's contention that the issue was
forfeited, nor need we evaluate whether the warrantless search was a permissible
probation search.2
II. Counsel's Failure To Object to Uncharged Misconduct Evidence
Defendant argues he was not provided effective representation and he was
deprived of a fair trial because his counsel did not object to the admission of two
statements (made by witnesses to the police during the robbery/assault investigation) that
referred to his commission of other crimes. Defendant contends this evidence was
inadmissible uncharged misconduct evidence, and there was no tactical reason for his
counsel not to object to admission of the evidence.
The complained-of evidence consists of (1) a statement by victim Wagner during
the photo lineup, and (2) a comment by defendant's accomplice Wells during her
recorded police interview. As to Wagner's statement, Detective Castro testified at trial
that when he showed the photos to Wagner at her father's residence, she immediately
said, " 'Dad, you remember when my wallet got stolen? This is the guy that stole it.' "
Wagner explained to Detective Castro that a year before the charged robbery/assault
incident, she had a party at her home and her friends told her that defendant had taken her
wallet. As to Wells's statement, during the recorded police interview that was played for
2 Although we need not reach the probation search issue, we note that the officer (Detective Castro) who seized and searched defendant's cell phone testified at the preliminary hearing that he conducted a "probation search" of defendant's residence after his arrest. 12
the jury, she described defendant's participation in the robbery/assault incident and during
this narrative commented, "Every party [defendant] goes to, he ends up robbing
somebody."
To show ineffective representation, the defendant must establish that counsel's
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that there is a
reasonable probability that absent counsel's deficiency the result would have been
different. (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 925.) There is a strong presumption
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,
and on appeal we will not find ineffective assistance unless there could be no conceivable
tactical reason for counsel's acts or omissions. (Id. at pp. 925-926.) Further, if the record
does not show prejudice from counsel's alleged deficiency, we may reject the claim
without determining whether counsel's performance was deficient. (People v. Sapp
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 263.)
The record reflects that defense counsel may have tactically refrained from
objecting to Wagner's statement to her father during the photo lineup. On cross-
examination of Detective Castro, defense counsel elicited Castro's acknowledgement that
during an interview conducted several hours before the photo lineup, Wagner made no
mention that she recognized one of the assailants in the robbery/assault incident as the
male who had stolen her wallet at a previous party. Defense counsel could have
reasonably assessed that Wagner's statement about the wallet theft, indicating that she
knew defendant but when first interviewed failed to tell Detective Castro about his
13
presence at the robbery/assault incident, was useful impeachment evidence concerning
her subsequent identification of defendant as a participant in the robbery/assault offenses.
In any event, the admission of these two statements by Wagner and Wells was not
prejudicial. For purposes of evaluating the gang enhancements and defendant's state of
mind, the jury was presented with a gang expert's testimony describing defendant's prior
participation in a robbery in 2009 and a robbery and assault in 2011. In light of this other
evidence showing defendant's gang-related criminal activities, there is no reasonable
likelihood the jury's perception of defendant was significantly impacted by Wagner's and
Wells's brief statements referencing his commission of a wallet theft and tendency to
commit robberies at parties. Also, there was strong evidence that defendant was a
perpetrator in the charged backpack theft and robbery/assault incidents. For the backpack
thefts, he was identified by two witnesses (Perez and Kuy) as the perpetrator, and an
identification card of one of the victims was found in his bedroom. For the robbery and
assaults, he was identified by three witnesses (Wagner, Wells, and Phillips) as a
participant; he exchanged text messages with Phillips supporting that he was involved;
and he was depicted in a photo taken the night of the offenses wearing a distinctive shirt
that matched a victim's description of one of the assailants. There is no reasonable
probability the passing comments by Wagner and Wells affected the jury's verdict.
14
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
HALLER, J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, Acting P. J.
O'ROURKE, J.
15
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to a warrantless cell phone search conducted in reliance on binding California Supreme Court precedent, even though that precedent was later overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court. The court further held that the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice from his counsel's failure to object to certain uncharged misconduct evidence.
Issues
Whether a warrantless search of a cell phone conducted in reliance on binding state precedent is subject to the exclusionary rule after that precedent is overruled.
Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to witness statements regarding the defendant's prior uncharged misconduct.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule.”
“The police [here] acted in strict compliance with binding precedent, and their behavior was not wrongful.”
“There is no reasonable probability the passing comments by Wagner and Wells affected the jury's verdict.”