California Court of Appeal Apr 15, 2015 No. E062828Unpublished
Filed 4/15/15 A.C. v. Super. Ct. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
A.C., E062828 Petitioner, (Super.Ct.No. SWJ007455) v. OPINION THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY,
Respondent;
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES,
Real Party in Interest.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ. Timothy F. Freer,
Judge. Petition denied.
Jodi M. Vande Witte for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, James E. Brown, Guy B. Pittman, and Julie
Koons Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
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Petitioner A.C. (Mother) filed a petition for extraordinary writ pursuant to
California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, challenging an order of the juvenile court denying
her reunification services and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code1
section 366.26 as to her four-year-old child, A.L. She contends that the juvenile
court erred by not ordering reunification services for her under section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(10). We find no error, and deny Mother’s writ petition.
Mother argues that the juvenile court equated “reasonableness with a success or a
cure, implying that had her efforts been ‘reasonable’ the current dependency would not
exist.” Mother also asserts that the juvenile court “found that the mother’s efforts were
not poor or half-hearted, thus implying they were reasonable.” Mother’s interpretation
of the juvenile court’s comments is in error. The juvenile court correctly noted the
language in section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), and pointed out that the language in
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), does not require, as indicated by DPSS, whether
Mother made a “poor effort or a half-hearted effort.” The court also noted that “[w]hat
she did in the meantime, after the social worker and law enforcement arrived—it appears
that mother’s made a significant effort. [¶] And—based on [mother’s counsel’s
arguments] . . . it’s a better effort than she did on the prior case, but that’s not what the
code is saying . . . what the code is saying is that reasonable efforts to prevent her putting
herself in the position now that she’s got another child in the same situation.”
In conclusion, the court found that there was clear and convincing evidence that Mother
had not “achieved the language that is required in [section] 361, sub[division] (b),
subsection (10),” to make reasonable efforts to treat the problem that led to the removal
of A.L.’s half siblings. Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding. Prior to the
current dependency, Mother had only attended one substance abuse program several
years prior. From October 2010 to October 2014, Mother did nothing to treat her
substance abuse or provide safe living conditions for A.L.
R.T. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 908 (R.T.) is instructive. In R.T.,
the child was removed from his parents’ care after his father was arrested for domestic
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violence and the mother admitted drug and alcohol use. The parents had previously
failed to reunify with the child’s sibling, P.T., who was removed based on the parents’
substance abuse and chronic homelessness. (Id. at p. 911.) The parents had made only
minimal efforts to engage in reunification services in P.T.’s case. But, two months after
the minor’s removal, the mother moved to a safe residence, separated from the father,
was following mental health recommendations, and had started attending a drug
treatment program and 12-step meetings. Notwithstanding these efforts, the juvenile
court ordered bypass of reunification services, citing the termination of parental rights in
P.T.’s case and finding the parents had not made reasonable efforts to treat the underlying
problems. (Id. at pp. 911-913.)
The Court of Appeal explained: “We do not read the ‘reasonable effort’ language
in the bypass provisions to mean that any effort by a parent, even if clearly genuine, to
address the problems leading to removal will constitute a reasonable effort and as such
render these provisions inapplicable. It is certainly appropriate for the juvenile court to
consider the duration, extent and context of the parent’s efforts, as well as any other
factors relating to the quality and quantity of those efforts, when evaluating the effort for
reasonableness. And while the degree of progress is not the focus of the inquiry, a
parent’s progress, or lack of progress, both in the short and long term, may be considered
to the extent it bears on the reasonableness of the effort made. [¶] Simply stated,
although success alone is not the sole measure of reasonableness, the measure of success
achieved is properly considered a factor in the juvenile court’s determination of whether
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an effort qualifies as reasonable.” (R.T., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at pp. 914-915, italics
omitted.)
In concluding that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding, the
R.T. court observed: “There is no evidence that mother made any effort to address her
substance abuse issues after minor was returned to her, until minor was once again
removed and bypass was recommended. By then, mother had been using drugs again for
nearly a year, if not longer, and minor was once again languishing without proper care as
a result. There is no evidence in the record that mother, in the month or two of services
following minor’s second removal, had engaged in these services in any meaningful way.
[Citation.] In any event, the juvenile court properly could conclude this recent effort,
even assuming the effort were substantiated, was simply too little, too late.” (R.T., supra,
202 Cal.App.4th at p. 915, italics omitted.)
By the time of the dispositional hearing in A.L.’s case, Mother was participating in
an outpatient substance abuse program with no negative reports. She was compliant with
the program and testing clean. In addition, her hair follicle test result showed negative
for all controlled substances. However, the duration, extent, and context of Mother’s
efforts reveal a pattern that, especially when combined with Mother’s actual progress,
could reasonably lead to the conclusion that Mother’s efforts were only superficial.
Although there are other inferences that can be drawn, the timing of Mother’s efforts
does reasonably suggest that she was not motivated by a genuine desire to change.
Rather, one could reasonably infer that Mother was only prompted to resume a substance
abuse program after A.L. was removed from her care.
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When the record is viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, the
juvenile court could reasonably conclude that Mother’s efforts to deal with her persistent
substance abuse issues, and to provide for the safety and security of her child, were
“lackadaisical or half-hearted” (Cheryl P. v. Superior Court, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at
p. 99) considering the duration, extent, and context of her efforts. The juvenile court
could reasonably reject Mother’s argument that her three months of participation in a
substance abuse treatment program constituted a reasonable effort to treat her long-term
methamphetamine addiction and to provide proper care for her child. In view of
Mother’s history of substance abuse and prior opportunities to treat her addiction, the
record supports the conclusion that Mother’s recent participation in substance abuse
treatment, while a positive step, is both qualitatively and quantitatively insufficient to
support the finding that she made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that had led to
the removal of A.L.’s half siblings from her care. (R.T., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at
p. 914.)
The purpose of the reasonable effort prong of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), is
not to create further delay for a child by allowing a parent, who up to that point has not
reasonably addressed his or her problems, another opportunity to do so. (In re Harmony
B., supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 843.) Viewing Mother’s history in its totality, we
conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that
Mother did not make a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to the removal of
A.L.’s half siblings from her care. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not err when it
denied reunification services to Mother under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10).
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III
DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is denied.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ P. J. We concur:
McKINSTER J.
KING J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's denial of reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), because the mother failed to make reasonable efforts to treat the substance abuse and safety issues that led to the removal of her older children.
Issues
Whether the juvenile court erred in denying reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10).
Whether the mother made reasonable efforts to treat the problems that led to the removal of her older children.
Disposition. denied
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), authorizes the denial of services based on a parent’s previous failure to rehabilitate.”
“substantial evidence shows that Mother did not make reasonable efforts to address the problems underlying A.L.’s siblings’ removals.”