California Court of Appeal Apr 14, 2015 No. D065846Unpublished
Filed 4/14/15 P. v. Hernandez CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D065846
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN319924)
ANDRES C. HERNANDEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Robert J.
Kearney, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Russell S. Babcock and Russell S. Babcock, under appointment by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Michael
Pulos, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury found Andres C. Hernandez guilty of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen.
Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)),1 with the further finding that Hernandez personally used a
dangerous and deadly weapon (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)); resisting an executive officer
(§ 69); battery (§ 242); being under the influence of a controlled substance (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11550, subd. (a)); and attempting to dissuade a witness from reporting a crime
(§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court made a true finding that Hernandez incurred a
prior strike (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and a prior serious felony (§ 667.5,
subd. (b)), and sentenced Hernandez to prison for 14 years four months.
Hernandez contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his
posttrial motion to obtain juror identifying information. We concluded that Hernandez's
contention lacks merit, and we accordingly affirm the judgment.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
While under the influence of methamphetamine, Hernandez got into a violent
altercation with two of his brothers, with whom he shared a residence. Hernandez first
punched and shoved his brother Elias2 shortly after Elias returned home from work in the
afternoon. Elias retreated to his car, locked the door and called 911 while Hernandez was
violently punching the car. Hernandez's brother Steven then intervened by trying to pull
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
2 Because the brothers share the same last name, for the sake of clarity we will refer to Hernandez's brothers by their first names, and we intend no disrespect by doing so.
2
Hernandez away from the car. Hernandez started punching Steven, who was walking
with a crutch because of a broken ankle. Hernandez grabbed Steven's crutch, hitting
Steven with the crutch four times while Steven was on the ground, and then continued to
punch Steven. Neighbors intervened by pulling Hernandez off Steven and tackling
Hernandez.
Sheriff deputies arrived in response to the 911 call. Hernandez was agitated and
yelling profanities after the deputies handcuffed him. While a deputy was in the process
of moving Hernandez to the patrol car, Hernandez jumped up into the air, placed his legs
straddling the officer's legs, violently twisted his body, and attempted to roll. The deputy
identified the maneuver as a technique used by prisoners to injure an officer's legs.
Hernandez was charged with assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)),
with the further allegation that he personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon
(§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)); resisting an executive officer (§ 69); battery (§ 242); being
under the influence of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a));
and attempting to dissuade a witness from reporting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1)). The
jury found Hernandez guilty on all counts, and the trial court made a true finding that
Hernandez incurred a prior rape conviction (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)) that was a prior "strike"
under the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and a prior serious felony
(§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
After trial, but before sentencing, Hernandez filed an application for an order
disclosing the jurors' addresses and telephone numbers. The motion was based on the
3
fact that the court clerk had received two phone calls from a juror after the verdict
inquiring about Hernandez's sentencing status.
The first telephone call from the juror was brought to counsel's attention by the
trial court in an informal and unreported discussion on November 13, 2013. Although no
reporter's transcript was prepared for the informal discussion, at a hearing on
November 20, 2013, the trial court described for the record the content of the first
telephone call from the juror. Specifically, in a telephone call to the clerk, the juror
indicated that "he had conversations with another juror. The other juror had done
research and had indicated to the caller that Mr. Hernandez had a serious criminal history
and therefore that was why they were interested in the sentencing."
At a hearing the next day, November 21, the trial court reported to counsel that the
same juror called a second time to find out the date of the sentencing hearing, and during
that conversation the juror gave further information about the research that his fellow
juror had conducted on Hernandez's criminal history. As the trial court explained, the
juror stated to the clerk that his fellow juror conducted the research on Hernandez after
the trial was over and did no research during trial.
Hernandez's motion, filed January 8, 2014, sought the release of juror identifying
information so that defense counsel could interview jurors to determine whether
Hernandez's prior criminal history was discussed during trial. The trial court denied the
motion, ruling that Hernandez had not made a prima facie case for the release of the juror
identifying information as there was no indication that any juror considered improperly
obtained information prior to the verdict.
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II.
DISCUSSION
Hernandez's sole contention on appeal is that the trial court improperly denied his
motion for the release of juror identifying information.
As applicable here, the law provides that after the recordation of a jury's verdict in
a criminal jury proceeding, the court's record is sealed, with all personal identifying
information of trial jurors removed from the court record. (Code Civ. Proc., § 237,
subd. (a)(2)-(3).) Under Code of Civil Procedure section 206, subdivision (g), "a
defendant or defendant's counsel may . . . petition the court for access to personal juror
identifying information within the court's records necessary for the defendant to
communicate with jurors for the purpose of developing a motion for new trial or any
other lawful purpose." (Ibid.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 237, subdivision (b) sets forth the standard by
which a petition for release of juror information is evaluated. "The petition shall be
supported by a declaration that includes facts sufficient to establish good cause for the
release of the juror's personal identifying information. The court shall set the matter for
hearing if the petition and supporting declaration establish a prima facie showing of good
cause for the release of the personal juror identifying information, but shall not set the
matter for hearing if there is a showing on the record of facts that establish a compelling
interest against disclosure. A compelling interest includes, but is not limited to,
protecting jurors from threats or danger of physical harm." (Ibid.)
5
A prima facie case of good cause is shown "if the defendant sets forth a sufficient
showing to support a reasonable belief that jury misconduct occurred." (People v.
Rhodes (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 541, 552 (Rhodes); see also People v. Carrasco (2008)
163 Cal.App.4th 978, 990 (Carrasco) ["Even though Rhodes was decided before the
statute's present enactment requiring a showing of good cause, the Rhodes test survived
the amendments."].) To establish good cause "the defendant . . . has to prove that talking
to the jurors is reasonably likely to produce admissible evidence of juror misconduct."
(People v. Johnson (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 486, 493.) "This rule safeguards both juror
privacy and the integrity of our jury process against unwarranted 'fishing expeditions' by
parties hoping to uncover information to invalidate the jury's verdict." (Rhodes, at
p. 552.)
If the trial court decides that the petitioning party has made a prima facie showing
of good cause for the release of the juror identifying information, and there is no other
compelling interest against disclosure, jurors are given notice of the proposed release of
information and an opportunity to protest, and a hearing is held to determine whether to
release the information. (Code Civ. Proc., § 237, subd. (c).)
A trial court's decision that a defendant has not made a prima facie showing of
good cause for the release of juror identifying information is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. (Carrasco, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 991.)
Here, the trial court denied Hernandez's petition for the release of juror identifying
information on the ground that he did not make a prima facie showing of good cause
because there was no indication of any juror misconduct warranting a factual
6
investigation. As we will explain, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reaching
that conclusion.
It is well settled that a juror commits misconduct by conducting independent
research during a trial. (See, e.g., § 1122, subd. (a)(1); People v. Ledesma (2006) 39
Cal.4th 641, 743.) "It is absolutely forbidden for jurors to do their own investigation
outside the courtroom." (People v. Vigil (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1483.) However,
these restrictions apply only during trial, and as the trial court expressly instructed the
jurors in this case, they were free to discuss the case after being dismissed from jury
service.
Here, there was no indication of any juror research done during trial. The juror
who called the clerk expressly stated during the second telephone call that his fellow
juror had looked into Hernandez's criminal background only after the verdict. Based on
those facts, Hernandez did not "set[] forth a sufficient showing to support a reasonable
belief that jury misconduct occurred" (Rhodes, supra, 212 Cal.App.3d at p. 552, italics
added), as it was purely speculative to believe that the jurors might have conducted
outside research prior to the verdict. (People v. Wilson (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 839, 852
[defense counsel's "speculative account" of how the jurors may have reasoned about the
case did not establish a prima facie showing of good cause for the release of juror
identifying information].) Hernandez argues that he should have been permitted to
contact the jurors to verify that no outside research was done during trial, but this
argument fails. Because the juror did not say anything to the court clerk even remotely
suggesting improper research during trial, there was no good cause to contact the juror to
7
verify that no such research occurred. Accordingly, the trial court was within its
discretion to conclude that Hernandez did not establish a prima facie showing of good
cause for release of juror information.
Hernandez contends that the trial court abused its discretion because it did not
apply the correct legal standard when ruling on the motion for release of juror contact
information.3 Specifically, based on the trial court's wording of its ruling at the motion
hearing in which the trial court stated "I don't find there's any misconduct," Hernandez
contends that the trial court improperly examined whether Hernandez established juror
misconduct rather than whether Hernandez made a prima facie case of good cause for the
release of juror information so that he could investigate juror misconduct. We disagree.
Looking at the trial court's entire statement in context, it is clear that the trial court
understood the correct legal standard and applied it. As the trial court summarized its
ruling, "Given that there was no information that anything occurred prior to the verdict in
this case, I don't find there's any misconduct, therefore, I don't find a prima facie case has
been made." This statement shows that the trial court was properly focused on whether
Hernandez had made a prima facie showing of good cause, and that in referring to
whether misconduct occurred, the trial court was simply examining whether the scenario
described by the juror to the clerk indicated that a juror had potentially done anything
3 Hernandez also contends that the trial court's purported error in applying an incorrect legal standard violated his rights to due process and compulsory process under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Because we conclude that the trial court applied the proper standard in ruling on the motion for release of juror identifying information, we also reject the constitutional argument. 8
improper warranting further investigation. Finding that the scenario did not constitute
improper juror activity, the trial court concluded that Hernandez had not made a prima
facie showing to warrant release of juror identifying information. Indeed, a prima facie
showing of good cause is defined as "a sufficient showing to support a reasonable belief
that jury misconduct occurred." (Rhodes, supra, 212 Cal.App.3d at p. 552.) Applying
this standard, the trial court properly conducted its analysis of whether Hernandez had
made a prima facie showing of good cause by focusing on whether there was any
suggestion of misconduct in what the juror reported during his telephone calls to the
clerk.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
IRION, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
HUFFMAN, J.
9
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for juror identifying information because the defendant failed to establish a prima facie showing of good cause for potential juror misconduct.
Issues
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying the defendant's motion for disclosure of juror identifying information?
Did the trial court apply the correct legal standard in evaluating the defendant's prima facie showing of good cause?
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The trial court denied the motion, ruling that Hernandez had not made a prima facie case for the release of the juror identifying information as there was no indication that any juror considered improperly obtained information prior to the verdict.”