California Court of Appeal Apr 9, 2015 No. E059544Unpublished
Filed 4/9/15 P. v. McGhee CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E059544
v. (Super.Ct.Nos. RIF1102902 & RIF1103074) TIWON GODFREY MCGHEE, OPINION Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Helios (Joe) Hernandez,
Judge. Affirmed.
Alan S. Yockelson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Joy Utomi,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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In a plea to the court, defendant and appellant Tiwon Godfrey McGhee, in propria
persona, pled guilty to grand theft of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (d)(2))1 and
possession of a firearm by a felon (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1)). Defendant also
admitted that he had suffered four prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and two prior
On May 1, 2012, defendant represented himself at a trial readiness conference. At
that conference, defendant discussed with the court the discovery he would need before
proceeding to trial. Defendant also informed the court that he intended to subpoena a
witness. As the conference continued, defendant admitted to the gun possession charge
and indicated that he wanted to negotiate a plea deal. Defendant indicated that he had
previously proposed a plea deal in which he would serve 10 years in prison, but the
People rejected the offer. The court stated that it would consider the mitigating
circumstances surrounding the offenses, but that it could not promise defendant a
specified sentence. The court also informed defendant that he could proceed to trial on
the charges or plead guilty and “throw yourself on the mercy of the court.” Defendant
indicated that he would plead guilty. The court then informed defendant that if he wished
to plead guilty there was a form he needed to complete. After the court received
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defendant’s assurance that he could read and understand the form, the court called a 10
minute recess to allow defendant to review and sign the plea form. Defendant initialed
and signed the plea form. In the plea form, defendant noted that he would be pleading
guilty to both counts and admitting the prior prison term and prior strike conviction
allegations.
Following the recess, the court noted that it had received defendant’s signed plea
to the court. The court examined defendant’s plea form and the following colloquy
occurred between the trial court and defendant:
“THE COURT: Did you go over this yellow [plea] form with yourself?
“DEFENDANT McGHEE: Yes.
“THE COURT: Are those your initials and signatures?
“DEFENDANT McGHEE: Yes.
“THE COURT: Did you understand everything?
“DEFENDANT MCGHEE: Yes.
“THE COURT: Do you have any questions at all?
“DEFENDANT McGHEE: No.
“THE COURT: Do you give up all these rights so you can admit your guilt?
“DEFENDANT McGHEE: Yes.”
Defendant thereafter pled guilty to counts 1 and 2, and admitted his prior
convictions allegations. The trial court found the plea and admissions were entered into
freely and voluntarily. The trial court also found the facts as stated in the probation
report served as a factual basis for the offenses. The clerk’s minute order states, “Court
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finds plea is free and voluntary. Court finds [defendant] knows and understands
constitutional rights, nature of charges and consequences of plea.” The clerk’s minute
order further noted that the court had advised defendant of his constitutional rights and
that after examining defendant, the court found defendant had the ability to understand
and did understand his constitutional rights. The clerk’s minute order also stated that
defendant’s pleas and admission of prior convictions were the result of defendant
expressly, knowingly, understandingly, and intelligently waiving his constitutional rights.
The sentencing hearing was held on June 13, 2012. At that time, the trial court
struck one of defendant’s prior strike convictions pursuant to section 1385, and sentenced
defendant to a total term of 11 years four months in state prison with credit of 566 days
for time served.
On June 12, 2013, defendant filed a writ petition in this court seeking leave to file
a late notice of appeal. (See In re McGhee, case No. E058913.) On August 6, 2013, this
court granted defendant’s petition and ordered the superior court clerk to consider a late
notice of appeal timely. (Ibid.)
On August 30, 2013, defendant filed a notice of appeal, challenging the sentence
or other matters occurring after the plea, as well as the validity of the plea. Defendant
also requested a certificate of probable cause alleging that he was not competent to make
his own decisions due to mental health issues, and that the court took advantage of him
due to those issues. The trial court denied defendant’s request for certificate of probable
cause on September 3, 2013.
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II
DISCUSSION
On appeal, defendant seeks to have his guilty pleas and admissions set aside on the
ground that the trial court did not properly advise him of his constitutional rights prior to
his guilty pleas and admissions. He further argues that the error was not harmless
because the record does not show defendant’s waiver was knowing and intelligent under
the totality of the circumstances.
The People respond the appeal must be dismissed because defendant did not
obtain a certificate of probable cause. In the alternative, the People maintain defendant’s
contention fails because defendant properly waived his constitutional rights and his guilty
pleas and admissions were knowingly and intelligently made and that any error was
harmless.
A. Failure to Obtain a Certificate of Probable Cause
Section 1237.5 states, “No appeal shall be taken by the defendant from a judgment
of conviction upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or a revocation of probation
following an admission of violation, except where both of the following are met: [¶]
(a) The defendant has filed with the trial court a written statement, executed under oath
or penalty of perjury showing reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds
going to the legality of the proceedings. [¶] (b) The trial court has executed and filed a
certificate of probable cause for such appeal with the clerk of the court.”
Section 1237.5 is not a pointless technicality. By requiring a defendant who has
pleaded guilty to obtain a certificate of probable cause to appeal, section 1237.5 promotes
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judicial economy by weeding out frivolous guilty plea appeals. (People v. Mendez
(1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “Its assumption is that, as a general matter, a judgment of
conviction entered on a defendant’s plea of guilty or nolo contendere does not present
any issue warranting relief on appeal, and hence should not be reviewed thereon.” (Id. at
p. 1097.) A certificate of probable cause is not required when the defendant’s appeal is
based on search and seizure issues or grounds that arose after his plea was entered and do
not affect the plea’s validity. (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 74; Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.304(b).)
Here, there is no dispute that defendant’s claims challenge the validity of his pleas
and admissions. (See, e.g., People v. Thurman (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 36, 44, fn. 6
[contention that court failed to make sufficient inquiry into basis for guilty plea
challenges legality of plea]; People v. Castelan (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1187 [claim
on appeal that trial court should have granted motion to withdraw plea, which was made
on basis that he did not make plea voluntarily, required certificate of probable cause].)
However, under the unique circumstances of this case, we decline to dismiss the
appeal and proceed to the merits of the appeal.
B. Advisement and Waiver of Constitutional Rights
Before a trial court may accept a defendant’s guilty plea, the defendant must be
informed of several rights, including the right to a jury trial, the right to confront the
defendant’s accusers, and the defendant’s privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination. (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 242-243 (Boykin); In re Tahl
(1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 132-133 (Tahl), disapproved on another point in Mills v. Municipal
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Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288, 307.) After being so advised, if the defendant decides to
waive those rights, the defendant must, as a matter of state law, waive them expressly and
specifically on the record. (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1175, 1179
(Howard) [so requiring under the court’s supervisory powers].) It is thus error (id. at
p. 1175) under state decisional law when a trial court fails to have the record reflect the
defendant’s express waiver of each specific constitutional right. Based on these
principles, defendant challenges the constitutional validity of his pleas and admissions,
contending that the trial court failed to advise him and confirm his waiver of these rights
when he pleaded guilty and admitted the prior convictions.
Howard followed then-recent federal decisions and held that such error is subject
to prejudice analysis. “[E]rrors in the articulation and waiver of those rights . . . require
the plea to be set aside only if the plea fails the federal test.” (Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th
at p. 1175.) Under that test as described in Howard, such error does not require reversal
despite a court’s failure to describe the important constitutional rights the defendant will
be waiving and obtain the defendant’s waiver of them “if the record affirmatively shows
that [a defendant’s guilty plea] is voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the
circumstances.” (Ibid.) To evaluate a claim of such error, “the reviewing court must
examine the record of ‘the entire proceeding’ to assess whether the defendant’s admission
of [guilt] was intelligent and voluntary . . . .” (People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353,
361 (Mosby).)
Howard and Mosby both addressed Boykin-Tahl considerations in the context of a
defendant’s admission of a prior conviction. But the Supreme Court has strongly implied
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that the same analysis applies “on direct appeal from a guilty plea to a substantive
offense.” (People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 424, 439, fn. 4; see People v. Collins (2001)
26 Cal.4th 297, 310-311.) In People v. Christian (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 688, the court
applied Howard and Mosby to a claim similar to defendant’s claim: that a plea of guilty
to a substantive offense should be set aside because of invalid advisements. We
undertake the same analysis here.
Thus, we review the “totality of the relevant circumstances” to determine whether
the defendant made a constitutionally adequate and valid plea and admission. (Howard,
supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1180; see People v. Allen, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 439, fn. 4.) We
consider the defendant’s in court statements as well as any plea agreement he or she may
have signed. (In re Moss (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 913, 925, fn. 7 (Moss) [“the desire to
plead guilty along with all the other statements contained on the plea form unmistakably
indicate an intent to plead guilty”].)
“In most cases, a defendant may enter a plea of guilty without any particular
incantation.” (Moss, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d at p. 925; see People v. Reeves (1966) 64
Cal.2d 766, 772.) “ ‘The form of the plea is not of vital importance, provided the
admission of guilt is clear, definite, and unconditional.’ ” (People v. Gibbs (1961) 188
Cal.App.2d 596, 600-601.)
Moss, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d 913 is instructive. In that case, the self-represented
defendant signed a “ ‘Waiver of Constitutional Rights’ ” form and pled guilty to driving
under the influence and driving with a suspended license. (Id. at pp. 918, 920.) There
was a gap in the transcript recording, so in the discussion with the court, the recording
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reflected no advisements or inquiries relating to the defendant’s constitutional rights.
Nor was there any mention or discussion of the “Waiver of Constitutional Rights” form
signed by the defendant. The trial court judge, however, testified that it was his practice
to ask a defendant who signed the waiver form whether he read and understood the form.
In holding that the defendant had properly waived his constitutional rights and pled
guilty, the appellate court stated: “The court may rely upon such a validly executed
waiver form in assessing whether a plea is voluntary and in assessing whether [the]
defendant has waived his constitutional rights. . . . [¶] Even when a defendant is not
represented by counsel, a waiver form, such as the one here, is sufficient, provided the
court is assured that a defendant has signed and understands the form.” (Id. at pp. 925-
926, italics added.) The appellate court found the waiver valid based on the form and
because the trial court also signed a portion of the plea form entitled “ ‘Findings and
Orders’ ” which stated the defendant had knowingly, intelligently and understandingly
waived his rights and that the waivers were given freely and voluntarily. (Id. at p. 927.)
Examining the record in this case, we find that under the totality of the
circumstances, defendant’s pleas and admissions were knowing and intelligent.
Defendant initialed and signed a plea form that stated he had a right to a jury trial, right to
cross-examine witnesses, right to compel and present evidence in his defense, right to an
attorney, right against self-incrimination, and right to remain silent. While defendant also
initialed some sections in the consequences of the plea that did not apply to him, at the
hearing the trial court asked defendant whether he read and understood the plea form and
whether he chose to give up those rights. As to each inquiry, defendant responded in the
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affirmative. The court also asked defendant whether he had any questions and defendant
replied, “No.” After inquiring of defendant, the trial court expressly found that the pleas
and admissions were entered freely and voluntarily. In addition, the court’s minute order
indicates the plea and admissions were knowingly, understandingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently made. (See Moss, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d at pp. 925-926 [minute order entry
waivers voluntary and intelligent]; Nelson v. Justice Court (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 64, 67
[same]; Zimmerman v. Municipal Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 174, 179 [docket entry
indicating defendant specifically advised of dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation]; Ganyo v. Municipal Court (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 522, 529-530 [docket
entry waiver voluntary and intelligent].)
Citing In re Birch (1973) 10 Cal.3d 314, defendant contends that the recitals in the
clerk’s minute order regarding the trial court’s advisements and findings and defendant’s
purported waivers must be disregarded because they are directly contradicted by the
reporter’s transcript. In re Birch is distinguishable. There, the Supreme Court was
confronted with a reporter’s transcript of proceedings at the arraignment in which
important particulars contradicted the recitals in the clerk’s docket entry. The reporter’s
transcript revealed only that the court had informed the defendant of the charge and asked
him how he pled, to which the defendant replied, “ ‘Guilty.’ ” (In re Birch, supra, 10
Cal.3d at pp. 316-317.) The Supreme Court noted, “The transcript contains nothing
which demonstrates that petitioner was advised of his right to counsel or any other
constitutional right, nor does it reveal that petitioner ever waived any of such rights. The
clerk’s docket entry, by contrast, contains hand-checked, rubber-stamped entries which
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purport to indicate that petitioner ‘expressly waived’ his right to counsel and various
other constitutional rights, and that ‘after inquiry by court, the court found such waivers
were knowingly, intelligently and understandingly made . . . .” (Id. at p. 317, fn.
omitted.) In a declaration filed with the court, a deputy city attorney declared that “it was
the regular practice in department 105 for him, the deputy city attorney, to read to all
unrepresented defendants a complete statement of their constitutional rights at the
commencement of court proceedings each day.” (Id. at p. 320, fn. 6.) The deputy city
attorney also declared that “the deputy city attorney would thereafter ask the collected
group of defendants if they had any questions about their rights, and if there were no
questions, he would distribute written waiver forms which defendants could sign to
indicate their awareness of their constitutional rights and their desire to waive such rights
through a plea of guilty.” (Ibid.) The declaration also stated, “however, that after a
thorough search of the court files, the deputy city attorney was unable to find any such
written waiver form signed by the present petitioner.” (Ibid.)
The Supreme Court found that because “absolutely nothing” in the reporter’s
transcript indicated that the defendant had properly been informed of his constitutional
right to counsel, the clerk’s docket entry “directly contradicted” the reporter’s transcript.
(In re Birch, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 320.) The court also noted that “when confronted by
a defendant who wishes to plead guilty without counsel, the trial judge, before accepting
the waiver and plea, should first determine that the defendant ‘ “understands the nature of
the charge, the elements of the offense, the pleas and defenses which may be available,
[and] the punishments which may be exacted.” ’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 319.) The court
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further asserted, “In view of the absence of any evidence demonstrating that the present
petitioner was afforded the ‘benefit’ of the described normal procedure, we have no
occasion to pass directly on the adequacy of the procedure utilized in department 105.
We do note, however . . . that the ‘better practice’ would be for the trial judge himself to
inform defendants of their constitutional rights. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 320, fn. 6., citation
omitted.)
Here, the trial court gave defendant written advisements and expressly asked
defendant if he understood and waived those rights. The clerk’s minute order listed the
written constitutional rights the trial court referred to when it asked defendant if he was
giving up “these rights.” Unlike in Birch, when viewed in conjuction with the
constitutional advisements contained in defendant’s plea form, the clerk’s minute order
does not contradict the reporter’s transcript and it correctly reflected the trial court’s
inquiry. The record also indicates that before accepting the waiver and pleas and
admissions, the trial court first determined whether defendant understood the charges and
defenses and the maximum penalty if he proceeded to trial, as cautioned by our Supreme
Court in In re Birch, supra, 10 Cal.3d at page 320. Prior to admitting his guilt, defendant
had admitted to having the gun. He also stated that he had previously tried to negotiate a
plea agreement with the prosecutor where he would serve 10 years. Defendant was
informed at a hearing by the trial court that he was facing a potential term of either 29 or
54 years to life in prison depending on whether counts 1 and 2 are run concurrent. The
trial court also had explained to defendant the nature of his charges and consequences at
the time of the hearing on his motion to dismiss the prior strike convictions.
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While we agree that the better practice would be for a trial court to “err on the side
of caution and employ the time necessary to explain adequately and to obtain express
waivers of the rights involved” (Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1179), the record here
demonstrates that defendant was advised of his constitutional rights before he pled guilty
and admitted his priors. Defendant was given a written plea form that contained
advisements of his constitutional rights and was given an opportunity to review them.
Defendant initialed and signed the plea form. At the plea hearing, the trial court asked
defendant whether he read and understood the plea form and whether he chose to give up
his constitutional rights. At each inquiry, defendant responded, “Yes.” Moreover,
defendant had heard a recitation of his constitutional rights at his arraignment.
The record of the entire proceedings also demonstrates that defendant understood
and properly waived his constitutional rights when he pled guilty and admitted his priors.
Defendant had been representing himself for several months prior to the plea hearing and
was preparing for trial on the charges. He had requested discovery and had discussed the
witnesses he had intended to call with the prosecutor and the trial court. He also had an
investigator appointed to assist him. Based on the circumstances, it was clear that
defendant knew and understood his constitutional rights to a jury trial and to confront
witnesses. Defendant was also aware that he had the right to remain silent and not to
incriminate himself. He had not only initialed and signed the plea form advising him of
this right, but had experience with the criminal justice system. Defendant had four prior
convictions and had stated he had previously represented himself twice. While the
probation report did not specify whether the convictions were as a result of a trial or plea,
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in either circumstances, defendant would have been advised of his constitutional rights or
been made aware of such rights while undergoing trial. Given defendant’s prior
experience with criminal proceedings, his history of representing himself, and his
statements to the trial court that he understood his constitutional rights, his waivers and
his subsequent pleas and admissions were knowingly and intelligently made.
Given the totality of the circumstances of this case, we conclude the record
demonstrates defendant was aware of his Boykin-Tahl rights before he pled guilty to the
substantive charges and admitted the prior conviction allegations.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ P. J.
We concur:
McKINSTER J.
KING J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the defendant's guilty pleas and admissions were knowing and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances, despite the defendant's claim that he was not properly advised of his constitutional rights.
Issues
Whether the trial court failed to properly advise the defendant of his constitutional rights prior to his guilty pleas and admissions.
Whether the defendant's guilty pleas and admissions were knowing and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“the record affirmatively shows that [a defendant’s guilty plea] is voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances.”
“we review the “totality of the relevant circumstances” to determine whether the defendant made a constitutionally adequate and valid plea and admission.”
“the record here demonstrates that defendant was advised of his constitutional rights before he pled guilty and admitted his priors.”