California Court of Appeal Mar 17, 2015 No. D066151Unpublished
Filed 3/17/15 P. v. Johnson CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D066151
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD248196)
TYRONE JOHNSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Albert T.
Harutunian III and Leo Valentine, Jr., Judges. Reversed.
Nancy Olsen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Ryan H.
Peeck, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
At 1:10 a.m. on May 17, 2013, intruders entered the victim's apartment on
Imperial Avenue and stole his television set. Tyrone Johnson was charged with the
crime. After the court denied his motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5;
further statutory references are to this Code), a jury found Johnson guilty of receiving
stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)) and residential burglary when another person was in the
may 'draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and
deductions about the cumulative information available to them that "might well elude an
untrained person." [Citations.]' [Citation.] [¶] However, officers are not entitled to rely
on mere hunches." (Hernandez, at p. 299.) "It is logical to assume that a suspect might
get into a vehicle to leave the location of a crime and its investigation. Without more,
however, that assumption does not rise to the particularized suspicion necessary to detain
the vehicle and its occupants." (People v. Bates (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 60, 67.)
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In denying Johnson's suppression motion, the superior court relied on People v.
Conway (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 385. That case is distinguishable. There, the police
dispatch reported "a burglary in progress" with two suspects. (Id. at pp. 388, 390.) The
"defendant's vehicle . . . was leaving the immediate area of [the] reported burglary." (Id.
at p. 388.) "The stop occurred less than two minutes from the time [the officer] received
the burglary dispatch." (Ibid.) Here, Valenzuela stopped Johnson merely because there
had been a report of a burglary in the area, Johnson was backing out of a driveway, he
was the only person Valenzuela saw, he was driving a rental car and Valenzuela knew
"that sometimes people commit crimes in rental cars . . . ."
The only evidence presented by respondent at trial stemmed from the stop of
Johnson's car. Because we reverse the order denying the suppression motion, we reverse
the judgment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed.
MCINTYRE, J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, Acting P. J.
O'ROURKE, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. Consequently, the judgment of conviction was reversed as the evidence supporting it was derived from the unlawful stop.
Issues
Did the trial court err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence?
Was there sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop of the defendant's vehicle?
Disposition. reversed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Respondent correctly concedes the court should have granted the suppression motion and the conviction should be reversed.”
“Because we reverse the order denying the suppression motion, we reverse the judgment.”