California Court of Appeal Mar 3, 2015 No. E058882Unpublished
Filed 3/3/15 P. v. Quinones CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E058882
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1106224)
LOUIS JOHN QUINONES, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Larrie R. Brainard, Judge.
(Retired judge of the San Diego Super. Ct., assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art.
VI, § 6, of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
Jill M. Klein, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General,
Randall D. Einhorn, and Peter Quon, Jr., Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
1
I
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Louis John Quinones appeals from judgment entered following a jury
conviction for possessing heroin for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351). In a bifurcated
15167) “establish that the sources of the information in the CLETS printout were public
employees of California who had a duty to observe, report, record, and disseminate the
information. . . . Under these statutes, ‘the public employees involved in the recording or
reporting of criminal offender record information in the CLETS system have a duty to
employ methods ensuring a reasonable level of accuracy and reliability.’ [Citation.]”
(Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 129-130.) The Martinez court also noted that the
Legislature enacted statutes (§§ 11120-11121, 11124, 11126) affording defendants an
opportunity to refute any erroneous or inaccurate criminal history information stated in a
CLETS report. (Martinez, at p. 131.)
In rejecting the Martinez defendant’s contention the CLETS report was not
trustworthy, because it was a government computer record, the Martinez court stated:
“Defendant’s arguments are unpersuasive. First, as we have already explained, in 1971
the Legislature statutorily established a process for review and correction of the criminal
history information in the Department’s possession. (§ 11120 et seq.) . . . Second, our
courts have refused to require, as a prerequisite to admission of computer records,
testimony on the ‘acceptability, accuracy, maintenance, and reliability of . . . computer
hardware and software.’ [Citation.]” (Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 132.)
26
Defendant attempts to distinguish Martinez, by arguing that in Martinez, the
prosecution presented additional evidence establishing the trustworthiness of the CLETS
report, which included testimony by a district attorney paralegal, who generated the
printout. There also was testimony by a deputy sheriff, who had previously questioned
the defendant about his criminal history and to whom the defendant made admissions
consistent with the computer printout. (Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 131.) Although
there was no similar testimony in the instant case establishing trustworthiness of the
CLETS report, it was not required because, unlike in Martinez, the CLETS report was
certified. It contained a certification stamp on the last page, which was signed by a
district attorney records section employee, and the stamp was dated the day the document
was introduced into evidence. Certification of the CLETS report was sufficient to
establish the third element of the official records hearsay exception, without presenting
additional testimony establishing trustworthiness. We therefore reject defendant’s IAC
challenge, since the CLETS report was admissible under the official records hearsay
exception.
VII
ROMERO MOTION
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Romero
motion to dismiss his 1992 prior serious felony conviction under section 1385. We
disagree.
27
A. Procedural Background and Facts
Defendant was charged with suffering a prior serious felony conviction under
sections 667, subdivisions (c) and (e)(1), and 1170.12, subdivision (c)(1). On September
16, 1992, defendant sustained the prior conviction for burglary (§ 459). During a
bifurcated trial on defendant’s prior conviction enhancements, the prosecution presented
evidence establishing the 1992 prior strike conviction (1992 prior) and the trial court
found true the allegation.
Defendant filed a motion under People v. Superior Court (Romero), supra, 13
Cal.4th 497, requesting the trial court to dismiss his 1992 prior under section 1385,
subdivision (a). Defendant argued doing so was warranted based on the nature and
circumstances of his present and prior felony convictions, and based on his background,
character, and prospects. The prosecution opposed the motion on grounds the 1992 prior
was not remote in relation to defendant’s entire criminal history.
At the hearing on the motion, the trial court acknowledged defendant did not have
a history of committing any violent crimes but he had been unable to restrain himself
from perpetrating crimes. Defendant “can’t seem to stay out of trouble long enough to
prove he can be a law-abiding citizen.” The trial court denied defendant’s Romero
motion, explaining: “[I]t’s a one strike case, and I notice in some of these cases, Mr.
Quinones got 365. He hasn’t suffered much consequence of that strike before in terms of
going to prison. He never seems to learn, and I think the whole spirit of the three strike
law is that the ante goes up when the conduct doesn’t get better. [¶] And so I’m going to
28
deny the motion on that basis. If there had been a long period of time, or this was a [de
]minimis offense, I would consider it. . . .”
B. Applicable Law
Section 1385, subdivision (a), vests the trial court with discretion to dismiss a
qualifying strike conviction in furtherance of justice, but such discretion must be
exercised in strict compliance with section 1385, subdivision (a). (People v. Superior
Court (Romero), supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 530; People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148,
158 (Williams).) “[I]n ruling whether to strike or vacate a prior serious and/or violent
felony conviction allegation or finding under the Three Strikes law . . . or in reviewing
such a ruling, the court . . . must consider whether, in light of the nature and
circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions,
and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be
deemed outside the [three strikes] scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should
be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or
violent felonies.” (Williams, at p. 161.) These factors are commonly referred to as the
“Williams factors.”
We review the trial court’s decision not to dismiss a prior strike allegation under
section 1385 for abuse of discretion. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376.)
“[T]he three strikes law not only establishes a sentencing norm, it carefully circumscribes
the trial court’s power to depart from this norm and requires the court to explicitly justify
its decision to do so. In doing so, the law creates a strong presumption that any sentence
that conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . ‘[I]t
29
is not enough to show that reasonable people might disagree about whether to strike one
or more’ prior conviction allegations. . . . Because the circumstances must be
‘extraordinary . . . by which a career criminal can be deemed to fall outside the spirit of
the very scheme within which he squarely falls once he commits a strike as part of a long
and continuous criminal record, the continuation of which the law was meant to attack’
[citation], the circumstances where no reasonable people could disagree that the criminal
falls outside the spirit of the three strikes scheme must be even more extraordinary.” (Id.
at p. 378.)
C. Discussion
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in failing to dismiss his
1992 prior, which occurred in 1992, 21 years before the trial in the instant case.
Defendant argues the trial court’s decision denying his Romero motion was arbitrary and
irrational because consideration of the Williams factors compelled a finding defendant
did not fall within the spirit of the three strikes law and therefore his 1992 prior
conviction should have been stricken.
With regard to the Williams factors, defendant asserts his present minor,
nonviolent drug offenses, coupled with his drug abuse, do not support a finding he falls
within the spirit of the three strikes law. Defendant also argues he was not the type of
career criminal or flagrant recidivist who poses a danger to society, justifying an
enhanced sentence. The majority of defendant’s prior convictions were nonviolent theft
and drug-related crimes. Defendant suffered only one prior serious felony conviction, the
1992 conviction for first degree burglary. Defendant argues the remoteness of the
30
conviction should operate as a mitigating factor, since his charged offenses were not
particularly egregious. As to defendant’s background, character, and prospects,
defendant states he earned his Generalized Education Development certificate (GED),
went to upholstery trade school, and during the last 15 to 20 years, worked as a
landscaper.
Defendant has not established the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
Romero motion. Defendant has not led a crime-free life after suffering his strike
conviction in 1992. (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 163 [passage of 13 years between
strike offense and new offense not significant given defendant’s failure to refrain from
criminal activity in the interim]; People v. Humphrey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 809, 813
(Humphrey) [trial court abused its discretion by striking 20-year-old prior where
defendant did not subsequently lead a legally blameless life]; People v. Jefferson (2007)
154 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1388 [declining to strike 22-year-old strike].) Defendant has at
least 15 convictions between 1978 and 2010, resulting in being placed on probation and
incarcerated on numerous occasions. Defendant also violated parole or probation after
the 1992 prior at least six times. In addition, defendant’s 1992 conviction for residential
burglary was one of eight felony convictions defendant committed prior to the charged
offenses, and at the time of the charged crimes in December 2011, defendant was on
parole for committing petty theft with a prior theft related conviction (§ 666).
As the court in Humphrey, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at page 813, articulately stated
regarding remote prior convictions: “We must add a new category to the list of improper
bases for the striking of a prior. In determining whether a prior conviction is remote, the
31
trial court should not simply consult the Gregorian calendar with blinders on. To be sure,
a prior conviction may be stricken if it is remote in time. In criminal law parlance, this is
sometimes referred to as ‘washing out.’ [Citations.] The phrase is apt because it carries
the connotation of a crime-free cleansing period of rehabilitation after a defendant has
had the opportunity to reflect upon the error of his or her ways. Where, as here, the
defendant has led a continuous life of crime after the prior, there has been no ‘washing
out’ and there is simply nothing mitigating about a 20-year-old prior. Phrased otherwise,
the defendant has not lead a ‘legally blameless life’ since the 1976 prior. [Citations.] Far
from being ‘washed out,’ this prior was ‘dyed in.’”
As to defendant’s background, character, and prospects, they also are not
particularly favorable. Defendant has only a tenth grade education and, contrary to
defendant’s statement in his appellant’s opening brief, the probation report states he did
not earn his GED. Although defendant was self-employed as a landscaper, his age of 54
years at the time of sentencing and his physical condition, after abusing drugs since the
age of 14, including heroin since age 16, may limit his prospects of future self-
employment upon release from prison. Furthermore, his lengthy history of recidivism
and substance abuse supports the trial court’s finding that defendant falls within the spirit
of the three strikes law. The record shows the trial considered the Williams factors,
balanced the relevant facts, and did not abuse its broad discretion when denying
defendant’s Romero motion.
32
VIII
CUMULATIVE ERROR
Defendant asserts reversal of his convictions is required based on the cumulative
effect of errors collectively undermining the fundamental fairness of his trial and the
reliability of his guilty verdict. Because we have found no errors, defendant’s claim of
cumulative error also fails. (People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 639.)
IX
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON J.
We concur:
KING Acting P. J.
MILLER J.
33
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the defendant's conviction for possession of heroin for sale, holding that the expert testimony provided was admissible and that the defendant had personally waived his Fourth Amendment rights regarding the search of his cell phones.
Issues
Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to expert testimony regarding the defendant's intent to sell heroin.
Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance or exceeded his authority by stipulating to the search of the defendant's cell phones.
Whether the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 225.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's Romero motion to strike a prior felony conviction.
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Lackey’s expert opinion testimony did not usurp the fact finders’ function. Rather, it assisted the fact finder in providing insight into the significance of evidence supporting a finding of possession of heroin for sale.”
“The record provides sufficient evidence establishing that defendant intentionally and knowingly waived his Fourth Amendment search and seizure rights to his cell phones.”