Silva v. City of Fullerton CA4/3
Filed 2/27/15 Silva v. City of Fullerton CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
TERESA SILVA, G049617 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 30-2013-00652228) v. OPINION CITY OF FULLERTON,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, David Chaffee, Judge. Affirmed. Jones & Mayer, James R. Touchstone, Krista MacNevin Jee and Elena Q. Gerli for Defendant and Appellant. The Chang Firm and Randy Chang for Plaintiff and Respondent. * * *
The City of Fullerton (city) appeals from the trial court’s order denying its motion to strike plaintiff Teresa Silva’s complaint against the city as a prohibited strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP). (See Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16 [authorizing strike motions to gain early dismissal of a SLAPP lawsuit or cause of action]; all further statutory references are to this code.) Silva’s complaint alleged an equal protection violation and other causes of action to redress the city’s selective, groundless, and retaliatory enforcement of its housing code. The city asserts that because Silva mentioned in her complaint conversations and correspondence involving city code enforcement personnel, her complaint triggers the anti-SLAPP statute because it targets the rights of city personnel to free speech and petition. Not so. Most acts are accompanied by speech, but that does not transform speech into the target when someone complains about an act. Here, Silva plainly targeted as the gravamen of her complaint the city’s allegedly illegal conduct in selectively enforcing baseless claims of a housing violation for a retaliatory motive. City actions, not words, formed the basis of her complaint. Whatever words were spoken by, to, or among city personnel, Silva sued only when the city actually took enforcement action against her, which she challenged as unfounded, selective, and retaliatory. A city right of free speech or petition had nothing to do with her claims. The city’s motion was wholly without merit and we therefore affirm the trial court’s ruling. I FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The parties’ dispute centers on a “granny flat” or additional dwelling unit constructed over Silva’s garage before she purchased her home. The trial court summarized the pertinent facts and proceedings in its minute order, as follows: “In or about 1948, someone constructed a conventional wood-framed living quarter (‘unit’) above the garage located at [Silva’s address] in the City of Fullerton . . . . Although City records have been lost, Silva contends that Page 13 of Exhibit ‘A’ to her declaration is a
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