California Court of Appeal Feb 27, 2015 No. D065318Unpublished
Filed 2/27/15 P. v. Crespo CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D065318
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD251158)
JUAN PABLO CRESPO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Peter L.
Gallagher, Judge. Affirmed.
Michael P. Goldstein, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Stacy
Tyler, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted Juan Pablo Crespo of four counts of burglary (Pen. Code,
§ 459),1 two counts of grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)), and one count of using multiple
checks knowing he had insufficient funds in the bank for payment of the checks (§ 476a,
subd. (a)). Crespo admitted he committed these crimes while he was out of custody on
instructional error affected the substantial rights of the defendant necessarily requires an
examination of the merits of the claim—at least to the extent of ascertaining whether the
asserted error would result in prejudice if error it was." (People v. Ramos (2008) 163
Cal.App.4th 1082, 1087.) As we explain in the section below, we conclude the
instructions given correctly stated the law. Therefore, Crespo forfeited his claim of
instructional error by failing to request a clarifying instruction.
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II
" 'An appellate court reviews the wording of a jury instruction de novo and
assesses whether the instruction accurately states the law.' [Citation] ' " '[T]he
correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not
from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.' " '
[Citation.] Taking into account the instructions as a whole and the trial record, we
'determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an
impermissible manner.' [Citation.] We presume that jurors are intelligent and capable of
correctly understanding, correlating, applying, and following the court's instructions."
(People v. Acosta (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 108, 119.) "Instructions should be interpreted,
if possible, so as to support the judgment rather than defeat it if they are reasonably
susceptible to such interpretation." (People v. Martin (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1107,
1112.)
In Bender, supra, 27 Cal.2d 164, the Supreme Court stated in cases involving the
use of circumstantial evidence, a jury should be instructed with the principle that " 'to
justify a conviction, the facts or circumstances must not only be entirely consistent with
the theory of guilt but must be inconsistent with any other rational conclusion.' " (Id.
at p. 175.) The Supreme Court also agreed " '[n]either the statement in an instruction that
the guilt of the defendant may be established beyond a reasonable doubt, nor the
statement that as between two opposing reasonable inferences the one which is consistent
with innocence must be preferred to the one tending to show guilt, satisfies the right of
the defendant to have the jury instructed that where circumstantial evidence is relied upon
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by the People it must be irreconcilable with the theory of innocence in order to furnish a
sound basis for conviction.' " (Id. at pp. 175-176, quoting People v. Hatchett (1944) 63
Cal.App.2d 144, 155.) However, the Supreme Court concluded there was no miscarriage
of justice based on instructional error because the jury was "not altogether uninstructed"
(they were instructed about evidence susceptible to conflicting interpretations) and
because the evidence pointed "irresistibly" to the defendant as the perpetrator of the
crime. (Bender, at p. 177.)
Neither CALCRIM No. 224 nor CALCRIM No. 225 contain language stating
circumstantial evidence must either be "inconsistent with any . . . rational conclusion
[other than guilt]" or "irreconcilable with the theory of innocence." (Bender, supra, 27
Cal.2d at pp. 175-176.) However, Crespo cites no authority requiring the use of this
precise language. The precise form of the traditional instruction is not essential, as long
as the doctrine is plainly stated. (People v. Navarro (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 544, 550
["[w]ords of equal import may be substituted if the principle is substantially but clearly
and fairly set forth"].) The Supreme Court has held courts should give "an instruction
embodying the principle that to justify a conviction on circumstantial evidence the facts
and circumstances must not only be entirely consistent with the theory of guilt but must
be inconsistent with any other rational conclusion." (People v. Yrigoyen (1955) 45
Cal.2d 46, 49, italics added.)
In this case, the trial court instructed the jury regarding the use of circumstantial
evidence with CALCRIM No. 224 as follows: "Before you may rely on circumstantial
evidence to conclude that a fact necessary to find Mr. Crespo guilty has been proved, you
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must be convinced that the People have proved each fact essential to that conclusion
beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶] Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to
find [Mr. Crespo] guilty, you must be convinced that the only reasonable conclusion
supported by the circumstantial evidence is that [Mr. Crespo] is guilty. If you can draw
two or more reasonable conclusions from the circumstantial evidence, and one of those
reasonable conclusions points to innocence and another to guilt, you must accept the one
that points to innocence. However, when considering circumstantial evidence, you must
accept only reasonable conclusions and reject any that are unreasonable." (Italics added)
The trial court also instructed the jury regarding the use of circumstantial evidence
to prove intent or mental state with CALCRIM No. 225 as follows: "The People must
prove not only that [Mr. Crespo] did the act charged, but that he also acted with a
particular intent or mental state. The instruction for each crime and allegation explains
the intent or mental state required. [¶] An intent or mental state may be proved by
circumstantial evidence. [¶] Before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude
that a fact necessary to find [Mr. Crespo] guilty has been proved, you must be convinced
that the People have proved each fact essential to that conclusion beyond a reasonable
doubt. [¶] Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that [Mr.
Crespo] had the required intent or mental state, you must be convinced that the only
reasonable conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is that [Mr. Crespo] had
the required intent or mental state. If you can draw two or more reasonable conclusions
from the circumstantial evidence, and one of those reasonable conclusions supports a
finding that [Mr. Crespo] did have the required intent or mental state and another
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reasonable conclusion supports a finding that he did not, you must conclude that the
required intent or mental state was not proved by the circumstantial evidence. However,
when considering circumstantial evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions
and reject any that are unreasonable." (Italics added.)
We conclude the language we italicized above from both CALCRIM Nos. 224 and
225 instructs the jury it must be convinced "the only reasonable conclusion" supported by
the circumstantial evidence was guilt or the possession of the required mental state is a
correct statement of the law. The language adequately conveys and embodies the
principle articulated in Bender, supra, 27 Cal.2d at page 175 that circumstantial evidence
must be " 'inconsistent with any . . . rational conclusion' " other than guilt. Contrary to
Crespo's contention, the CALCRIM language does not merely convey circumstantial
evidence must be consistent with guilt, it must be "the only reasonable conclusion" to be
drawn from the circumstantial evidence. (CALCRIM Nos. 224, 225, italics added.)
In this case, even if these instructions could be construed as erroneous, we
conclude there was no miscarriage of justice. "[A] 'miscarriage of justice' should be
declared only when the court, 'after an examination of the entire cause, including the
evidence,' is of the 'opinion' that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to
the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error." (People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) The evidence in this case leads to the overwhelming
conclusion Crespo knew he had insufficient funds in his credit union account when he
wrote the checks to the Pro Shop and to the Studio. Numerous checks were returned for
insufficient funds. He made numerous balance inquiries and withdrawal attempts in early
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May 2012, which showed he had a negative balance before he wrote the checks to the Pro
Shop. His account was closed before he wrote the checks to the Studio. The fact he
asked for a discount or selected sale items in no way leads to a rational conclusion he did
not intend to defraud the merchants by passing bad checks.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
O'ROURKE, J.
AARON, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that CALCRIM Nos. 224 and 225 correctly state the law regarding circumstantial evidence by requiring that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the evidence must be guilt.
Issues
Whether CALCRIM Nos. 224 and 225 are consistent with the requirement that circumstantial evidence must be inconsistent with any rational conclusion other than guilt.
Whether the defendant forfeited his claim of instructional error by failing to object at trial.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We conclude the instructions given correctly state the law and we affirm the judgment.”
“We conclude the language we italicized above from both CALCRIM Nos. 224 and 225 instructs the jury it must be convinced "the only reasonable conclusion" supported by the circumstantial evidence was guilt or the possession of the required mental state”