DecisionDepot is for informational use only. Not legal advice. Always verify against the source ruling before relying on any analysis.
© 2026 DecisionDepot
27,059 rulings indexed. Last ingest about 5 hours ago .
Data refreshes about every 15 minutes during California business hours.
DecisionDepot is for informational use only. Not legal advice. Always verify against the source ruling before relying on any analysis.
© 2026 DecisionDepot dev · 2026-07-08 01:03 UTC Admin
Hemphill v. Wright Family, LLC (2015) · DecisionDepot
/ California Court of Appeal Hemphill v. Wright Family, LLC Published Before: McINTYRE
Filed 2/25/15
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DON R. HEMPHILL, D065462 Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2012-00054705- CU-PO-NC) WRIGHT FAMILY, LLC et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Robert P. Dahlquist, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Skolnick Law Group, Suzanne C. Skolnick; Kohn Law Office and Russell S.
Kohn for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Wolfe & Wyman, Gregg L. Vorwerck and David C. Olson for Defendants and
Respondents.
In this action, we interpret an attorney fee provision in a lease agreement which
allows the prevailing party in any action arising out of the homeowner's tenancy, the
agreement, or the provisions of the Mobilehome Residency Law (Civ. Code, § 798 et
seq.) to recover reasonable expenses including attorney fees and costs. We conclude
that a tenant's fall while walking across a common area lawn arose out of the
homeowner's tenancy and entitled him to an award of attorney fees as the prevailing
party in the action. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order denying a fee award
and remand the matter for further proceedings.
More from California Court of Appeal Source: opinion data from the Free Law Project / CourtListener (public-domain court records). DecisionDepot is for informational use only and is not legal advice — verify against the official reporter before relying on any text or AI-generated summary.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Wright Family, LLC dba Roadrunner Club (Roadrunner Club) is about a 200
acre manufactured home park consisting of home sites, a golf course, common areas
and a large "greenbelt" common area lawn. Don Hemphill purchased a home at the
park and leased the space under a written lease agreement with Roadrunner Club.
Roadrunner Club is required to maintain the common area lawns, which are open to
residents 24 hours per day, seven days a week. While on the lawn area near his home,
Hemphill stepped into a sunken and uncovered drainage hole causing him to fall and
Hemphill sued Roadrunner Club alleging negligence and premises liability on
the property in which Hemphill was a tenant under the lease agreement. After being
instructed with CACI No. 1006 regarding a landlord's duty, a jury returned a special
verdict in favor of Hemphill and awarded him damages of $311,899.67. Following
trial, Hemphill moved for an award of attorney fees under his lease agreement with
Roadrunner Club, which allows the prevailing party to recover fees if the action arose
out of, among other things, the homeowner's tenancy. The trial court denied the
motion. Hemphill timely appealed.
DISCUSSION Hemphill argues the trial court erred in denying his attorney fees motion
because the action arose out of his tenancy and the Mobilehome Residency Law. We
conclude that the action arose out of Hemphill's tenancy. Accordingly, we need not
address Hemphill's alternative argument that the action arose out of the Mobilehome
Generally, each party to litigation must bear its own attorney fees, unless
otherwise provided by statute or contract. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021, undesignated
statutory references are to this code.) While section 1021 does not independently
authorize recovery of attorney fees (Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 607, fn.
4), "[i]f a contractual attorney fee provision is phrased broadly enough . . . it may
support an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in an action alleging both
contract and tort claims." (Id. at p. 608.) We use traditional contract interpretation
principles in assessing the extent of the parties' rights to recover attorney fees. (Ibid.)
Where, as here, the parties do not present extrinsic evidence to interpret the attorney
fee provision of a contract, we determine de novo whether the contractual attorney fee
provision entitles the prevailing party to attorney fees. (Exxess Electronixx v. Heger
Realty Corp. (1998) 64 Cal. App. 4th 698, 705.)
Here, the Roadrunner Club lease agreement provides that in "any action
aris[ing] out of the Homeowner's tenancy, this Agreement, or the provisions of the
Mobilehome Residency Law, the prevailing party or parties shall be entitled to recover
reasonable expenses, including without limitation" attorney fees and costs. The
attorney fee provision is written in the disjunctive and provides three independent
bases upon which attorney fees may be awarded. Significantly, the term
"[h]omeowner's tenancy" is not defined in the lease agreement. Roadrunner Club has
not offered a definition of the term, nor has it offered examples of the type of actions
arising out of a homeowner's tenancy. Moreover, as Hemphill notes, the lease
agreement is a preprinted form with blanks on the face page and first page to input the
date and tenant specific information. Accordingly, to the extent that an ambiguity
exists, we interpret the language "most strongly against the party who caused the
uncertainty to exist." (Civ. Code, § 1654.) On its face, the term "[h]omeowner's
The lease requires Roadrunner Club to maintain all physical improvements,
including common area lawns, in good working order and condition "for the non-
exclusive use of [h]omeowners." The lease agreement defines a resident as, among
other things, "the person(s) signing th[e] [lease] as [h]omeowner." In contrast, an
extra person is defined as, among other things, persons sharing the home site and
invitees on the home site "at the invitation, request or tolerance of [h]omeowner."
Additionally, until the prospective purchaser has been approved for tenancy and has
closed escrow on the home occupying the home site, such person is deemed to be an
"extra person" and not a "homeowner." Thus, the lease agreement clearly
differentiates a homeowner with a tenancy relationship with the Roadrunner Club from
Hemphill was a homeowner and thus a tenant of the Roadrunner Club. The
jury found that Hemphill suffered injuries while crossing a common area lawn as a
result of Roadrunner Club's negligence. To make this determination, the court had
instructed the jury with CACI No. 1006 regarding a landlord's duty of care. On these
facts, we conclude the action here arose out of the homeowner's tenancy and the trial
court erred in denying Hemphill's motion.
To avoid this result, Roadrunner Club argues the legal duty it breached was not
created by the lease agreement. While this assertion is correct, it ignores that the
attorney fee provision in the lease agreement contains three independent bases upon
which attorney fees may be awarded. "Courts must interpret contractual language in a
manner which gives force and effect to every provision, and not in a way which
renders some clauses nugatory, inoperative or meaningless." (City of Atascadero v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 445, 473.)
Roadrunner Club's interpretation of the attorney fee provision renders the term
"[h]omeowner's tenancy" meaningless.
The order is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for a
determination of the reasonable amount of attorney fees and costs to be awarded
against Roadrunner Club for trial and this appeal. (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d
621, 637 [attorney "fees, if recoverable at all—pursuant either to statute or parties'
agreement—are available for services at trial and on appeal"]; Lindelli v. Town of San
Anselmo (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1517 [determination of the amount of fees "is
a factual issue more properly considered in the first instance by the trial court on
DISPOSITION The order is reversed. The matter is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. Appellant is awarded his costs on appeal.
MCINTYRE, J.
HALLER, J. AI-generated · verify before citing Holding. The court held that a tenant's negligence action against a landlord for injuries sustained in a common area arose out of the 'homeowner's tenancy' as defined in the lease's attorney fee provision, thereby entitling the prevailing tenant to recover attorney fees.
Issues
Whether a negligence action for injuries sustained in a common area arises out of a 'homeowner's tenancy' under a lease's attorney fee provision. Whether the trial court erred in denying the prevailing tenant's motion for attorney fees. Disposition. reversed and remanded
“We conclude that a tenant's fall while walking across a common area lawn arose out of the homeowner's tenancy and entitled him to an award of attorney fees as the prevailing party in the action.” “We conclude the action here arose out of the homeowner's tenancy and the trial court erred in denying Hemphill's motion.”