California Court of Appeal Feb 23, 2015 No. E060943Unpublished
Filed 2/23/15 P. v. Collier CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E060943
v. (Super.Ct.No. FVI1300754)
SKYLAR PETYON COLLIER, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Eric M. Nakata,
Judge. Affirmed.
Ava R. Stralla, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General,
William M. Wood and Felicity Senoski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
1
A jury convicted defendant and appellant Skylar Peyton Collier of second degree
robbery. (Pen. Code,1 § 211, count 1.) He was sentenced to three years in state prison.
On appeal, defendant argues that his conviction should be reversed and reduced to grand
theft person (§ 487, subd. (c)) on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to
support the finding of force or fear necessary for a robbery conviction. Defendant also
Here, the prosecutor ceased questioning the officer as soon as he elicited the
invocation testimony. Defense counsel did not object to the testimony, and the
prosecutor did not attempt to use the testimony against defendant (e.g., by inviting the
jury to draw an adverse inference from his invocation). Therefore, not only was there no
violation of defendant’s constitutional rights, but also defendant waived any Doyle error
argument by failing to object during trial.
Putting aside the issue of waiver and assuming the invocation testimony violates
Doyle, any error in permitting the violation is not reversible if it is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. (Thomas, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 936-937.) In People v. Hinton
(2006) 37 Cal.4th 839 (Hinton), the prosecutor elicited testimony that the defendant had
invoked his Miranda rights during an interview, as well as testimony that the defendant
had admitted to giving police false statements both before and after his invocation. (Id. at
p. 867.) The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a mistrial on the basis of Doyle
error, expressing doubt that the jurors were “ ‘going to do much with [the invocation
testimony]’ ” and directing the prosecutor not to mention or refer to the testimony.
(Ibid.)
On appeal, the court upheld the trial court’s ruling, concluding that the Doyle error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Hinton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 867-868.)
10
The court based its conclusion on the dual grounds that “the prosecutor never again
mentioned the invocation during trial or closing argument” and that the invocation
testimony was “both cumulative of—and inferior to—the other evidence indicating that
he had fabricated the account he . . . provided . . . at trial.” (Ibid.) The court reasoned
that while “the jury could in theory have relied on defendant’s unwillingness to speak to
the police . . . to infer that he was fabricating a defense . . . . The problem with
defendant’s trial testimony was not that the jury heard that he once invoked his Miranda
rights, but that he repeatedly provided in the other interviews untrue accounts of his
involvement . . . .” (Id. at pp. 867-868, italics added.)
Similarly here, the prosecutor did not mention the invocation testimony after
having elicited it, and defendant admitted to having given the officer untrue accounts of
his involvement in the incident. As in Hinton, the problem with defendant’s trial
testimony was not that the jury heard that he once invoked his Miranda rights, but that he
testified he lied to the officer about being at the truck stop because he “was scared to get
into any trouble.” While it is conceivable that the invocation testimony could allow a
jury to conclude that defendant’s credibility is poor and, thus, that he could be lying
about the central issue in the case—whether he used force to take the bank bag from the
victim—that testimony was cumulative of, and inferior to, the direct evidence that
defendant affirmatively lied to the officer during the interview before invoking his
Miranda rights. Because the prosecutor did nothing with the testimony and because the
testimony was cumulative of, and less harmful than, other testimony the jury heard
11
during trial,4 we conclude that the invocation testimony could not have affected the jury’s
finding on the force element. We therefore hold that any Doyle error here was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ P. J.
We concur:
HOLLENHORST J.
McKINSTER J.
4 This testimony includes defendant’s admission that he lied to the police about his presence at the truck stop as well as the testimony given by the victim and her mother describing the taking as a struggle. (See Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 332 [any Doyle error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt “in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt”].)
12
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that there was sufficient evidence of force to support a robbery conviction and that the admission of testimony regarding the defendant's invocation of his Miranda rights was harmless error.
Issues
Whether there was sufficient evidence of force or fear to support a second degree robbery conviction.
Whether the admission of testimony regarding the defendant's invocation of his Miranda rights constituted reversible error or ineffective assistance of counsel.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The amount of force required to constitute a robbery “ ‘ “is such force as is actually sufficient to overcome the victim’s resistance.” ’ ””
“We therefore hold that any Doyle error here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”