California Court of Appeal Feb 19, 2015 No. E060441Unpublished
Filed 2/19/15 P. v. K.C. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E060441
v. (Super.Ct.No. FELSS1304873)
K.C., OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Annemarie G.
Pace, Judge. Affirmed.
Barbara A. Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General,
Arlene A. Sevidal, and Junichi P. Semitsu, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
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I
INTRODUCTION
Defendant K.C. is a mentally disordered offender (MDO), who was committed to
Patton State Hospital with two MDO-qualifying convictions for felony assault and a
diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that the
claims that could have been raised below but were not. (People v. Williams (1997) 16
Cal.4th 153, 250.) Defendant’s current challenges to the admission of this testimony
were therefore plainly forfeited.
To the extent that defendant is arguing that any admission of evidence violated her
due process rights or her Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses, defendant’s
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failure to object on any of these grounds also results in her claims being forfeited.
(People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758, 827, fn. 33; People v. Tafoya (2007) 42
Cal.4th 147, 166; People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1028 & fn. 19;
People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 424.)
C. Sufficiency of Evidence
In this case, resolving all conflicts in favor of the judgment, sufficient evidence
supports the jury’s finding that defendant was treated for at least 90 days in the year
before being paroled. Section 2962 does not require 90 days of “continuous” treatment,
only 90 days of treatment within a 12-month period. (§ 2962, subds. (c) and (d)(1).)
By itself, the testimony of Dr. Hu is sufficient to support the jury’s finding. Hu
testified that defendant received no fewer than 90 days of treatment within the year
before her parole date between September 2012 and 2013. Hu further testified defendant
was consistently offered psychiatric treatment from October 2012 until September 2013.
The medical records showed defendant was treated for about 252 days.
Other evidence shows defendant was treated for 111 days between November 28,
2012, and March 18, 2013, and additionally on March 13 and May 2, 2013. Adding these
dates together, over 112 days of psychiatric treatment were received by defendant
between November 2012 and May 2013. Other treatment occurred on June 29, 2013, and
September 20, 2013. A nursing assessment, conducted on September 20, 2013,
concluded that defendant “has been in treatment for 90 days or more in the past year.”
The spreadsheet documenting defendant’s mental health treatment shows defendant
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received at least 252 days of treatment from October 1, 2012, until September 18, 2013,
before her parole release date of September 20, 2013. Given the severity of defendant’s
mental illness, it was unlikely she was not being treated at any time during her
incarceration.
Defendant incorrectly argues that only certified prison records could have fulfilled
the 90-day requirement and that “Dr. Hu‘s printout is not an official record . . . covered
by Penal Code§ 2981.” Section 2981 only states: “For the purpose of proving the fact
that a prisoner has received 90 days or more of treatment within the year prior to the
prisoner’s parole or release, the records or copies of records of any state penitentiary,
county jail, federal penitentiary, or state hospital in which that person has been confined,
when the records or copies thereof have been certified by the official custodian of those
records, may be admitted as evidence.” (§ 2981.) The statute allows certified records but
it does not require them. (People v. Martin, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 976.) Nor does
the statute limit alternative methods of proof. The Martin court held that the evidence
pertaining to the 90-day treatment, which contained no certified records, was nonetheless
“legally sufficient.” (Ibid.)
Defendant argues this court should follow its decision in People v. Baker, supra,
204 Cal.App.4th at page 1247, in which this court held that the issue had not been
preserved for appeal. Even if the issue was not also forfeited here, Baker does not apply
in this case because there was significant testimony from those who personally treated
defendant, as well as multiple documents offered into evidence that either do not
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constitute hearsay or are subject to the hearsay exception for official records: “Evidence
of a writing made as a record of an act, condition, or event is not made inadmissible by
the hearsay rule when offered in any . . . criminal proceeding to prove the act, condition,
or event if . . . : [¶] (a) The writing was made by and within the scope of duty of a public
employee. [¶] (b) The writing was made at or near the time of the act, condition, or
event. [¶] (c) The sources of information and method and time of preparation were such
as to indicate its trustworthiness.” (Evid. Code, § 1280.) Furthermore, an expert may
testify that a prisoner received 90 or more days of treatment by interpreting her medical
records. A medical expert’s basic interpretation of such “reliable” records would “assist”
the trier of fact in making its determination. (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).)
Defendant never suggested—or offered evidence—below that defendant received
fewer than 90 days of treatment. At trial, defendant made no objections to the
introduction of the prosecution’s evidence. The standard of review requires this court to
draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all conflicts in favor of the jury’s MDO
determination. When considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the People,
a rational trier of fact in this case certainly could have found that defendant was treated
for her paranoid schizophrenia for 90 days or more in the year between September 2012
and September 2013 before her parole release date. As such, sufficient evidence
supported the jury’s determination that defendant was in treatment for her severe mental
disorder for no fewer than 90 days before scheduled release.
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IV
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON J.
We concur:
KING Acting P. J.
MILLER J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the defendant forfeited her challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the 90-day treatment requirement by failing to object at trial, and that, in any event, substantial evidence supported the jury's finding.
Issues
Whether the trial court's MDO commitment order was supported by substantial evidence regarding the 90-day treatment requirement.
Whether the defendant forfeited her claim by failing to object to the admission of evidence at trial.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Defendant forfeited her claim by not raising it below.”
“After resolving all conflicts in favor of the judgment, substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that defendant was treated for at least 90 days—and probably most of the year—before being paroled.”
“The statute allows certified records but it does not require them.”