park lots on a real property site (the park site) that is subject to a 1979 master lease
between the landowner defendant and respondent, the City of San Diego (the City), and
the predecessors of defendants and Respondents Tecolote Investors, LLC, et al.
(Landlord Defendants).1 The master lease for the park site was entered into after the City
negotiated with developers to provide low income housing opportunities there.
Appellant's complaint was filed in 2012 against the Landlord Defendants and the
City (together Respondents), and alleges that the park site is located on and should be
properly characterized as "Pueblo lands," within the meaning of San Diego City Charter
section 219 (section 219). This section and its predecessors since 1909 have been applied
to certain Pueblo lands north of the San Diego River to require approval by City Council
ordinance and City voters for any sale or lease of them for more than 15 years.2 (See
1 Additional Landlord Defendants and respondents are C.H. Harp and Joan E. Harp (deceased), trustees of the C.H. Harp Family Trust; River Paradise Partnership; Stephen Leonard Fox and Lynda K. Fox, trustees of Fox Revocable Trust and Matthew Follett.
2 Section 219 reads in relevant part: "No sale of Pueblo Lands owned by The City of San Diego which are situated North of the North line of the San Diego River shall ever be valid and binding upon said City unless such sale shall have been first 2
DeYoung v. City of San Diego (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 11, 15, 21 (DeYoung) [terms "sell
or convey" impliedly include the power to lease].)
Since no voter approval was sought or obtained for this transaction, Appellant
alleges the City was without power to enter into the existing 55-year master lease of the
park site with the Landlord Defendants (or their predecessors). As a consequence,
Appellant seeks decrees to invalidate the master lease and consequently its subleases,
specifically attacking the 1983 City-approved provisions allowing periodic rent increases.
Appellant also claims entitlement to various other types of relief, such as damages.
Following demurrer proceedings and a hearing on Appellant's motion for
preliminary injunction, the trial court sustained the Landlord Defendants' demurrer
without leave to amend, and denied the requested injunctive relief. At the joint hearing
on the motions, Respondents presented to the trial court extensive historical
documentation of the chain of title of the park site and its vicinity, through judicial notice
requests and also by lodgment of exhibits in connection with authenticating declarations.
According to the recorded ownership history of the park site and surrounding areas, at the
close of the California Spanish-Mexican period and under the treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, the United States came into ownership in 1847 of many parcels of "Pueblo
lands," including numbers 1190 and 1196, where this 74-acre park site is contained
(designated here "the parcels"). (See Richert v. City of San Diego (1930) 109 Cal.App.
authorized by an ordinance duly passed by the Council and thereafter ratified by the electors of The City of San Diego at any special or general municipal election. The City Manager shall have authority to lease Pueblo Lands, provided that any lease for a term exceeding one year shall not be valid unless first authorized by ordinance of the Council. No lease shall be valid for a period of time exceeding fifteen years." 3
548, 555-556 (Richert).) By the 1850's and as confirmed by an 1874 patent deed, the
United States recognized the claim of the City to all property rights in those historic
Pueblo lands.
Beginning in the 1850's, the City transferred its ownership of many of the Pueblo
lands properties to various private landowners, starting with railroad companies, which in
turn made additional conveyances. In the 1940's, all existing private landowners of
approximately 297 acres around and including the parcels became subject to judgments
of eminent domain takings by the federal government. In 1959, the federal government
recorded a quitclaim deed back to the City of all those holdings. In the 1970's, after the
Landlord defendants' predecessor agreed to provide low income housing opportunities on
the parcels, the 1979 master lease was signed.3
Against this historic backdrop, Appellant argues on appeal that the trial court
utilized the wrong legal standards in sustaining the demurrer, and abused its discretion in
denying leave to amend the pleading. Appellant contends the master lease entered into
between the Respondents, as amended and assigned, was invalid, void, or voidable, for
lack of compliance with the voter approval term of section 219. Based on Appellant's
3 The parcels have had several historic designations, beginning for our purposes with Pueblo Lands Nos. 1190 and 1196 in the U.S.-City patent deed (from an 1800's map, the Pascoe Map). A 1957 County survey map changed the designations of Pueblo Lands Nos. 1190 and 1196 (and other adjoining Pueblo Lands parcels) to Parcels Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15, all amounting to 297.3437 acres then owned by the federal government. In 1959, the federal government quitclaimed to the City all the parcels it had taken. In the 1997 assignment of the lease to the Landlord defendants, the description of the park site within the parcels, as found in a 1980 recorded map, is Lots 1 through 4 of Linda Vista Village. For purposes of charter interpretation, we refer to the parcels as a whole, even though the park site occupies only a portion of them. 4
broad interpretation of this charter provision for voter approval of transfer of Pueblo
lands, it argues that regardless of the history of title of the parcels, it can successfully
amend to allege that the "reacquired" parcels retained "the nature of Pueblo lands" and
should still be "classified" or characterized as Pueblo lands that are subject to these
charter restrictions on transfers.
Appellant thus contends these parcels remain within the protections and
prohibitions of section 219, even though they were released from City ownership for
years but were then returned to it. Appellant seems to argue that the charter requirement
of voter approval survived all transfers of the parcels, including the eminent domain
proceedings, even if the Pueblo lands regulation became dormant or " 'quiescent' " at
times. (See U.S. v. 32.42 Acres of Land, More or Less, Located in San Diego County,
Cal. (9th Cir. 2012) 683 F.3d 1030, 1034 (U.S. v. 32.42 Acres of Land).)
On review, we apply the rule that a complaint may be subject to demurrer where
facts that can be judicially noticed render it defective. (Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006)
38 Cal.4th 1, 6 (Evans).) Before oral argument, we gave notice to the parties that we
proposed to take judicial notice on appeal of certain recorded title documents in the
record, showing the mid-19th century transfers of the parcels out of City ownership to
private landowners, followed by a federal exercise of eminent domain that took the
parcels by judgments recorded in the 1940's. In 1959, a quitclaim deed returned the
parcels to the City. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d); 455, subd. (a); 459, subd. (c).)
In response to the notice we gave, the Landlord Defendants submitted a motion for
judicial notice of their previously lodged documents containing that same chain of title
5
information, as well as other documents submitted with their opposition to the
preliminary injunction request. Opposition has been received and considered and the
matter discussed at oral argument. As explained in part III.D, post, the judicial notice
motion is granted in part and denied in part.
In light of the applicable authorities, the recorded title documents for the parcels
demonstrate as a matter of law that on this record, the restrictions of section 219 do not
apply, the face of the pleading fails to state its causes of action, and the Landlord
Defendants' demurrer was correctly sustained without leave to amend. Based on de novo
analysis that is akin to judgment on the pleadings, the record fully supports the dismissal
of all causes of action as to the City as well. (See Coshow v. City of Escondido (2005)
132 Cal.App.4th 687, 701-703 (Coshow); pt. III.B, post.) We affirm.
I
BACKGROUND
A. Complaint
In analyzing the challenged demurrer ruling, we take the facts properly pleaded to
assess, as a matter of law, whether they state their causes of action. (Blank v. Kirwan
(1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) In ruling on demurrers, courts appropriately " 'consider
matters which may be judicially noticed,' " as if they had been pled. (Evans, supra, 38
Cal.4th 1, 6; Helix Land Co. v. City of San Diego (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 932, 937 (Helix
Land Co.) [where demurrers were sustained without leave to amend, the reviewing court
may consider other relevant matters of which the trial court could have taken notice, if
relevant, as having been pleaded]; Weil v. Barthel (1955) 45 Cal.2d 835, 837.) The
6
courts accept the plaintiff's properly pleaded facts as true, but a demurrer is not deemed to
admit any conclusions of law or fact, nor any mere contentions. (People ex rel Lungren
v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 300-301.)
The complaint sets forth five causes of action, initially seeking declaratory relief
against all Respondents, on the basis that the park site is "located . . . on Pueblo
Lands . . . ." As against the Landlord Defendants, the Association brings related claims
for setting aside the master lease or subleases through rescission, or for recovering
damages for statutory violations or negligent misrepresentation. All claims are based on
the premise that this portion of the City's parcels could not be leased to the Landlord
Defendants without voter approval. (Unfair Business Practices, Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 17200 et seq.; Mobilehome Residency Law, Civ. Code, § 798, et seq.) All causes of
action were pled in terms of a class or representative action, on the basis that there were
numerous residents who had typical claims, based on common issues of law and fact
regarding the validity of the lease and subleases under section 219.
In paragraph 38 of the complaint, Appellant originally pled that the site of the park
within the parcels had been maintained in the City's ownership since January 19, 1909
(the date of an important charter amendment to the predecessor of section 219), through
the date of the master lease in 1979. (See pt. III.C, post.) However, Appellant now
concedes that in other transactions beginning in the 1850's, the City transferred the
7
parcels into private ownership, beginning with various railroad enterprises.4 The parcels
remained in private hands until 1941, when the federal government took them for World
War II defense housing. In 1959, the federal government returned the entire 297.3437
acres in the two parcels to City ownership by a quitclaim deed.
The complaint sets forth the history of the 1979 master lease arrangements,
including a 1977 City resolution to enable a portion of the parcels to be developed as
mobilehome properties and leased to low or moderate income tenants for the term of the
lease. Other City resolutions continued to require low or moderate income housing to be
provided there. The mobilehome park began operating in late 1980, and the Master
Lease was amended several times.
In 1983, negotiations were held on disputes among the parties about preserving the
low income status of the property. Only the Landlord Defendants and the City remained
parties to the lease, but they consulted a committee of Appellant homeowners'
association. The 1983 amendments changed the base rent provisions in the master lease
to allow a yearly minimum increase in space rent and to provide for reduction of rent for
subsidized tenants, among other things. In 1997, the Landlord Defendants took the
master lease by assignment.
4 The 1889 charter did not allow transfer of Pueblo lands that had been dedicated or reserved for public use (e.g., parks), although the Supreme Court held in Ames v. City of San Diego (1894) 101 Cal. 390, 395 that adverse possession could occur against other types of City holdings. (Richert, supra, 109 Cal.App. at p. 556.) These parcels have never been dedicated to public use and this is not an adverse possession claim about them. (Cf. Hoadley v. San Francisco (1875) 50 Cal. 265, 275-276 (Hoadley).) 8
In all its causes of action, Appellant claims that due to the alleged voidness or
invalidity of the master lease for noncompliance with section 219, the Landlord
Defendants and their predecessors had no power to impose rent increases, and that
Appellant's members were being constructively evicted through such conduct. Appellant
sought a preliminary injunction to restrict the Landlord Defendants from raising rents or
dissipating services, pending the outcome of these claims.
B. Responses and Motions
The City filed an answer to the complaint, asserting as affirmative defenses that
the City's conduct was legal and that Appellant had failed to state any of its causes of
action, as well as numerous other defenses.
The Landlord Defendants demurred, asserting failure to adequately state any of the
causes of action, and a lack of standing in Appellant to pursue any such claims.
After a temporary restraining order was granted, Respondents each opposed
Appellant's motion for a preliminary injunction, and joined in each other's opposition. In
the moving and opposing papers for both the demurrer and the injunction, the parties
discussed the effect of the ownership history of these parcels. The lodged defense
exhibits included copies of judgments from the eminent domain takings of the parcels by
the federal government in the 1940's and the quitclaim deed returning the parcels to City
ownership in 1959.
With respect to the Landlord Defendants' demurrer proceedings, held concurrently
with Appellant's preliminary injunction request, the record does not indicate that the trial
court was requested to take judicial notice of those historic private transfer deeds, or the
9
recorded eminent domain judgments, or the quitclaim deed to the City. In opposition to
the preliminary injunction motion, the Landlord Defendants requested judicial notice of
maps associated with the quitclaim deed from the federal government to the City, but did
not do so for the deed itself, or the 1940's condemnation judgments.5
C. Hearing and Rulings
Before the hearing, the trial court tentatively indicated in writing that any fact-
based standing issues that were being raised, in terms of Appellant's entitlement to class
certification, could not be appropriately resolved through demurrer proceedings. The
trial court requested that the parties address, at the upcoming hearing, certain additional
significant issues relating to standing that might affect the outcome of the motions.
At the hearing before the trial court, Appellant contended the City could not claim
that the previous conveyances cleared restrictions on these Pueblo lands. Instead, the
parcels should remain subject to the terms of section 219. Appellant offered to set forth
evidence that the City had reacquired several other parcels of former Pueblo lands and
had sought voter approval for future transfers of them. Without granting any offer of
proof, the court took the matter under submission.
5 As noted, these materials were the subject of our order of October 21, 2014 notifying the parties we proposed to take judicial notice on appeal of title documents. (Evid. Code, §§ 455, 459.) We subsequently received the Landlord Defendants' motion requesting such judicial notice, as well as opposition, and addressed those issues at oral argument. Although Appellant requested an opportunity to file supplemental briefing on the propriety of the requested judicial notice, or to further address estoppel issues against the City, we declined its request on the basis that the pertinent ownership issues are subject to resolution as issues of law on the current and now supplemented record. (See pt. III.D, post.) 10
In the written ruling, the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend
on numerous alternative grounds, including determinations that Appellant lacked
standing to sue on the related causes of action, and the action was barred by the
applicable limitations periods. The court also ruled that the parcels had lost any
characterization of "Pueblo Lands," within the meaning of section 219, through numerous
title transfers. The request for injunctive relief was denied. Both as to the Landlord
Defendants and the City, the court dismissed the entire action.
Subsequently, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of that ruling or for a
new trial, setting forth documentation of the same three examples, as previously offered,
about other former Pueblo lands parcels that had been reacquired by the City, then
subjected to voter approval for future transactions about them. Appellant argued, without
authority, that the City should be estopped from denying that election proceedings were
required by section 219 regarding a lease transfer of these parcels, such as it had
conducted elsewhere. Appellant defended the adequacy of its standing to sue and the
timeliness of its filing of the complaint. Reconsideration was denied, Appellant brought
this appeal, and we heard oral argument.
II
ISSUES PRESENTED AND SCOPE OF APPELLATE ANALYSIS
We review the dismissal judgment that followed the ruling sustaining, without
leave to amend, the Landlord Defendants' demurrer, which was heard concurrently with
Appellant's motion for a preliminary injunction. Appellant makes no arguments on
appeal about the denial of the injunctive relief. Although that ruling is not directly before
11
us in this appeal, the trial court correctly observed that there was a fair amount of "cross-
over" analysis and documentation between the two sets of motions, and that is true of the
reconsideration phase of the proceedings, as well.
In that light and on this record, we next address various procedural problems
argued by the parties. In parts III and IV, post, we shall analyze the adequacy of the
complaint's statement of its declaratory relief and related causes of action, and address the
judicial notice motion on appeal.
A. Preliminary Standing Discussion; Limitations Issue
Appellant complains that the trial court employed irregular procedures here in
connection with the demurrer, by sua sponte raising issues about problems with
Appellant's standing to sue and the applicable limitations periods, or by incorrectly
utilizing preliminary injunction legal standards. Appellant further claims the court
abused its discretion by failing to allow amendment of the pleadings, particularly in
connection with the denial of its reconsideration motion.
Based upon the nature of the legal issues inherent in dismissal of this complaint on
demurrer, the better approach on appeal is to assume arguendo that Appellant can
sufficiently assert standing to sue on each of the related causes of action. We will posit
here that Appellant can adequately show its fitness to raise issues about whether the
master lease is in compliance with City charter standards. (See Harman v. City and
County of San Francisco (1972) 7 Cal.3d 150, 159 [municipal taxpayer had standing to
challenge alleged waste of municipal assets]; Code Civ. Proc., § 526a.)
12
We likewise accept for purposes of argument that Appellant can assert standing to
challenge the validity of the City/Landlord Defendants' master lease, based upon alleged
third-party beneficiary status, as "intended beneficiaries" of the lease contract. (Marina
Tenants Assn. v. Deauville Marina Development Co. (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 122, 127-
128 (Marina Tenants Assn.) [issues of law resolved on demurrer where trial court took
judicial notice of a public entity's master lease, which placed the master lease within the
scope of the pleadings]; Helix Land Co., supra, 82 Cal.App.3d at p. 937.)
To the extent that statutory limitations theories formed a basis of the challenged
ruling, we need not resolve those issues. (Gov. Code, § 66499.37 [Subdivision Map Act
provisions]; Gov. Code, § 65009 [Planning and Zoning Law provisions].) We view this
complaint as essentially alleging that public property was illegally transferred, in
violation of "binding" charter provisions. Such claims about ongoing public entitlement
to use of contested property can be exempted from the application of statutes of
limitations. For claims of adverse or illegal use of public property, " 'It is immaterial
where the title—that is, the record title—is held, whether by the state at large, or by a
county, or by some municipal department or other official body. There can be no adverse
holding of such land which will deprive the public of the right thereto, or give title to the
adverse claimant, or create a title by virtue of the statute of limitations. The rule is
universal in its application to all property set apart or reserved to the public use, and the
public use for which it is appropriated is immaterial.' " (Sixth Dist. Agr. Ass'n. v. Wright
(1908) 154 Cal. 119, 130; see Hoadley, supra, 50 Cal. 265, 275-276 [when land is
13
dedicated to public use, the public entity's title cannot be extinguished by adverse
possession and no statute of limitations applies].)
The nature of the essential legal questions about interpreting the language of
section 219 in this context, as discussed in both sets of moving papers, allows us to
conclude that the trial court and this court have both been given an adequate basis in the
record to identify and resolve the dispositive issues raised in the complaint. The two
matters addressed at the hearing, as well as the reconsideration motion, involve closely
related "cross-over" issues of law.
By letter before oral argument, we requested that the parties discuss whether the
filing of the City's answer, including its affirmative defenses, affected the City's
entitlement to dismissal of the complaint. In response to our request, the attorney
representing the City pointed to the affirmative defense it raised to the only cause of
action pled against it, declaratory relief, which asserted a failure to state sufficient facts to
constitute a cause of action. Appellant responded that factual matters may remain to be
litigated, on whether the City's actions in voluntarily seeking voter approval of
transactions concerning a different set of former Pueblo lands should estop it from
claiming that it was not required to do so in this instance.
Under all the relevant circumstances, it was not essential for the City to join in the
Landlord Defendants' demurrer, in order for it to be entitled to defend the dismissal
judgment it obtained against this appeal. The City was seeking in the answer on file to
have the complaint dismissed, for failure to state its causes of action that were all based
on alleged noncompliance with City charter provisions. (See Coshow, supra, 132
14
Cal.App.4th 687, 701-703 [trial court's inherent powers to control the progress of the
proceedings allowed the court to construe motions in limine concerning critical evidence
that was justifiably excluded, as equivalent to motion for judgment on the pleadings,
establishing that no viable cause of action could be stated].)
We rely upon the affirmative defenses pled by the City as raising the same issues
of law litigated in the demurrer, concerning the validity of the master lease in light of
charter provisions. We shall construe the City's answer and opposition to Appellant's
motion for a preliminary injunction as effectively the same as a City motion for judgment
on the pleadings. (Coshow, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th 687, 701-703.)
With that approach, and assuming without deciding that neither standing concerns
nor limitations problems are dispositive here, we next analyze the questions of law
underlying the claims against all Respondents, regarding the applicability and effect of
section 219 upon the "Pueblo lands" as they are described in this set of pleaded facts.
B. Rules of Review: Demurrer, Judgment on the Pleadings, Reconsideration
The dismissal judgment determined that Appellant cannot set forth sufficient facts
to support its declaratory relief and related causes of action for invalidation of the master
lease, on its current theory of noncompliance with the cited charter provisions, as to all
Respondents. We review that trial court conclusion under the rule that a demurrer tests
the legal sufficiency of the complaint. (Grinzi v. San Diego Hospice Corp. (2004) 120
creates a necessity for interpretation, or a choice among two or more possible meanings];
Economic Empowerment Foundation v. Quackenbush, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th 677, 685.)
They say this phrase "could have at least two meanings, based upon the contentions of
the parties in this case." (City of Poway, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d 847, 859-860 [recourse
to legislative history may be made to ascertain legislative intent].)
On review, the question becomes, what period of ownership by the City of the
subject parcels is necessary for the operative language of section 219 to apply and thus to
forbid the lease transfer of them as "Pueblo Lands owned by The City," unless voter
approval is obtained?
22
D. Judicial Notice
Judicial notice includes "the fact of a document's recordation, the date the
document was recorded and executed, the parties to the transaction reflected in a recorded
document, and the document's legally operative language, assuming there is no genuine
dispute regarding the document's authenticity. From this, the court may deduce and rely
upon the legal effect of the recorded document, when that effect is clear from its face."
(Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 265 (Fontenot).)
Previously, we notified the parties we were considering taking judicial notice of
specified deeds and judgments, on our own motion. (Evid. Code, §§ 459, subd. (c); 455,
subd. (a).) We now address the Landlord Defendants' request for judicial notice on
appeal of exhibits they and the City previously lodged with the trial court (motion
contains an exhibit A table, listing items Nos. 1 through 99 [with a few gaps]).6 We
considered the opposition filed to the motion for judicial notice and heard the parties'
views at oral argument.
First, the Landlord Defendants request judicial notice of their previous exhibits to
declarations, the recorded deeds showing that the City transferred these parcels to private
ownership beginning in the 1860's. The Landlord Defendants supplied to the trial court
their lodged exhibits Nos. 2, 3, 4A, 4B (the 1868-1873 conveyances away from the City),
and Nos. 4c through 32 (1873-1940 non-City title holders). The City supplied documents
6 In the exhibit A list that was supplied as an attachment to the motion for judicial notice, there is no document corresponding to any requested item numbers 70 through 71, 74 through 76, 82, 86, 89, or 92 through 98. 23
showing the 1855 sales by City to the railroads, and exhibit No. 1, the 1874 U.S. Patent
deed to the City. Additionally, the City lodged versions of section 219, from 1909 and
1929, to the present. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c) [official government acts].)
Next, the Landlord Defendants seek judicial notice of their previously lodged
exhibits, Nos. 33 through 38 (the 1941-1943 federal condemnation judgments). In 1959,
the federal government issued a quitclaim deed for the parcels to the City, with associated
maps. At the trial level, the Landlord Defendants requested judicial notice of those maps.
On appeal, they have additionally sought judicial notice of exhibit No. 39, the deed itself.
The trial court's order does not expressly show whether any judicial notice requests were
granted. We can assume the trial court took notice of mandatory items, or discretionary
material for which notice was given at the trial level. (Evid. Code, § 453.)
It is well accepted that when courts take judicial notice of the existence of court
documents, the legal effect of the results reached in orders and judgments may be
established. (Fontenot, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 265; Williams v. Wraxall (1995) 33
Cal.App.4th 120, 130, fn. 7; see People v. Harbolt (1997) 61 Cal.App.4th 123, 127 [no
authority found that an appellate opinion affirming a conviction is not part of the "record
of conviction"].) It is not disputed that the same parcels at issue in the complaint are
those described in the copies provided of the 1940's eminent domain judgments.
Likewise, the same properties were the subject of the earlier transfer deeds involving the
railroads and others, and the 1959 quitclaim deed, in the documents provided.
We grant the motion as to the dispositive title documents. (Evid. Code, §§ 455,
subd. (a); 459, subd. (c).) These include the Landlord Defendants' exhibits Nos. 2, 3, 4A,
24
4B (the 1868-1873 conveyances away from the City), and Nos. 4c through 32 (1873-
1940 non-City title holders). We also take judicial notice of the City's title and charter
documents (the 1855 sales by City to Railroad and exhibit No. 1, the 1874 U.S. Patent
deed to the City; and the 1909, 1929 and current versions of § 219). Further, we grant
judicial notice of exhibits Nos. 33 through 38 (the 1941-1943 federal condemnation
judgments), and exhibits Nos. 39 through 41 (federal government quitclaiming the
property to the City; i.e., motion granted as to all requested items Nos. 1-41).
With respect to the Landlord Defendants' request for judicial notice on appeal of
lodged exhibits Nos. 52 through 57, 60 through 61, 80, 84 (i.e., newspaper articles and
historical articles and brochures that are not recorded documents), it is arguable whether
they clearly fall within the provisions of Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h), as
"facts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute" that are "capable of
immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable
with the Landlord Defendants that "section 219 was not intended to protect former City
owned Pueblo Lands re-acquired after the 1909 date of the original provision."
Even if the "ownership" language of section 219 is arguably ambiguous, we
should select the interpretation that is consistent with the apparent intent expressed in the
charter history since 1909, that was to prevent transfers of the City's then-remaining
Pueblo lands unless approval by ordinance and the voters was obtained. (See DeYoung,
supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at pp. 20-21.) It would not be consistent with the apparent
purpose of section 219 to apply its requirements to parcels, such as these, that were not
continuously held in City ownership in 1909 and thereafter.
F. Section 219 Interpretation on Record Showing Chain of Title
We next address Appellant's express or implied claims that even if the City's
property rights were severed after the 1850's-era private transfers concerning the parcels,
such that section 219 might not apply, it was only a temporary severance of charter
protections. Appellant seeks an opportunity for more discovery to clarify factual matters
about title transfers of the parcels and to amend the pleadings to assert that the City's
rights and obligations, to secure voter approval for transfers pursuant to the charter, still
exist despite those transfers and the 1940's eminent domain taking that occurred of the
parcels, and that affected (took) the entire property interests of the then-private
landowners.
In light of the ownership history of these parcels as laid out in connection with the
concurrent preliminary injunction proceedings, and as above, we will not disregard the
judicially noticeable materials showing that the federal government obtained full title to
29
this property for almost two decades, then deeded it to the City. The authorities establish
that when a complete taking of a property interest pursuant to federal eminent domain
occurs, it establishes new title and extinguishes previous interests not specifically
excepted by the taker. (U.S. v. 32.42 Acres of Land, supra, 683 F.3d 1030, 1034;
Burkhart v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1955) 227 F.2d 659, 661-662; U.S. v. Carmack (1946) 329 U.S.
230, 240-242.) No exceptions to these takings were specified on the face of the
judgments.
In U.S. v. 32.42 Acres of Land, supra, 683 F.3d 1030, the court was concerned
with a dispute between the federal government and the California State Lands
Commission (the Commission) over land formerly owned by the Commission. The
Commission unsuccessfully argued its public trust rights to some of the lands (as
tidelands) had survived a taking by the federal government, although the government had
paid just compensation for the property. The court concluded any such state rights were
extinguished, and no such " 'quiescent' " rights would reemerge for the Commission, such
as if the United States later sought to transfer the property to a private party. (Id. at
p. 1038; 11 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (3d ed. 2011) § 30A:4, p. 30A-8, and 2014-
2015 supp., p. 53.)
Our de novo pleadings interpretation of the language of the complaint properly
takes into account these judgments and deeds affecting the title history of the property.
(U.S. v. 32.42 Acres of Land, supra, 683 F.3d 1030, 1034.) As a matter of law, not only
the pre-1909 break that occurred in the chain of title between the periods of the City's
ownership of the parcels, but also the later taking by eminent domain, operated to
30
extinguish the section 219 requirement for voter approval of this master lease concerning
these parcels. Once the 1940's eminent domain taking was accomplished, the property
interests that could be conveyed back to the City by the federal government did not
include the allegedly appurtenant City charter restrictions.
Even assuming there is some ambiguity in the ownership language of section 219,
the eminent domain taking was definitive and defeated any potential applicability of the
1909 charter restrictions in this respect. (Williams v. Wraxall, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th 120,
130, fn. 7 [judicial notice of the truth of results reached in orders and judgments
allowed].) Accordingly, the previous historic characterization of the parcels as Pueblo
lands, before they were repeatedly transferred out of City ownership, became inoperative
for purposes of charter interpretation, as construed in light of judicially noticed materials.
The legal effect of the documents' language is clear and not reasonably subject to dispute.
(Fontenot, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 265.) It would be fictitious and unduly
conclusory to make allegations in the complaint about violation of "binding" charter
provisions, since such allegations are defective when viewed in light of contrary facts that
are judicially noticeable. (Evans, supra, 38 Cal.4th 1, 6.)
Even if we take into account the three examples of reacquired City property (for
which voter approval of transactions was sought), that were offered as the subjects of
Appellant's reconsideration motion (but without substantive briefing), no different result
will obtain. As the Landlord Defendants properly observe, "[S]imply because the City
sought voter approval of the transfer and/or exchange of certain other Pueblo Lots at a
certain point in time," it did not therefore concede the application of section 219 to all its
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reacquired property. The City can decide to go beyond charter requirements in going to
the voters, but it was not compelled to do so in this instance. We see no indication in the
legislative history that the protections of section 219 should reattach to formerly owned
City property, if it is ultimately reacquired by the City. (See DeYoung, supra, 147
Cal.App.3d 11, 17-18.)
Both to the trial court and at oral argument before this court, Appellant has
admitted that it cannot properly allege the City held ownership of these parcels as of the
time the provisions of section 219 were enacted, until 1959, when the City regained
possession. Appellant cannot show a right to amend its pleading to attempt to bring the
parcels within the scope of section 219, as it is properly interpreted in light of its
legislative history. Also, Appellant has not established why any governing City
legislation or authority would serve the same function of reinstating Pueblo lands
protections on reacquired property, nor suggested why its estoppel theory could be
successfully pled as based on anything other than a discretionary or nonbinding policy for
placing land use matters concerning reacquired property before the voters.
We may not interpret charter restrictions as arising on the basis of implication,
such as any implied dormant or " 'quiescent' " obligations retained by the City to seek
voter approval of the master lease. (U.S. v. 32.42 Acres of Land, supra, 683 F.3d at
p. 1032; Domar Electric, Inc., supra, 9 Cal.4th 161, 170-171.) These parcels have not
continuously retained their Pueblo land status over the relevant time periods, and
therefore Appellant has not asserted rights and duties that entitle it to declaratory relief on
charter interpretation, with respect to any applicable voter approval requirements under
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section 219. (See Otay Land Co., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th 556, 562-563.) The proposed
amendments are ineffective conclusory statements that are contradicted by the record.
(Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126; see Evans, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 6.) The dismissal
of the declaratory relief cause of action was proper as to all Respondents.
IV
REMAINING STATUTORY AND TORT CLAIMS AGAINST LANDLORD DEFENDANTS
Appellant's complaint alternatively seeks relief through rescission of the master
lease and/or the subleases, or awards of restitution of rents, or tort damages for negligent
misrepresentations. Appellant alleges or would amend to allege that the City-owned
parcels remained subject to section 219, as "in the nature of" Pueblo lands. It therefore
claims the Landlord Defendants and their predecessors had no power to impose the
amended rent provisions that allowed yearly rent increases, pursuant to the master lease
and the related City resolutions permitting development on the parcels to include low or
moderate income housing. Appellant takes the position that its members were being
constructively evicted through such "illegal" conduct.
In its statutory causes of action, Appellant sought to restrict the Landlord
Defendants from carrying out those allegedly unfair business practices, to raise rents or
dissipate services, pending the outcome of these claims. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et
seq.; Civ. Code, § 798 et seq.) These theories seem to ask the courts, effectively, to
compel renegotiation of the rent increase provisions in the master lease, in such a manner
as to accomplish rent control for the subleases, all due to alleged invalidity under section
219. However, the key interpretive question of ownership of the parcels at the relevant
33
times must be resolved against Appellant's position. For the same reasons explained
above, it would not be consistent with the evident purpose of section 219 to permit the
use of these alternative theories in the complaint as vehicles to seek changes in the terms
of the master lease.
To the extent the record gives insight into the meaning of section 219, we may
look to " ' "matters such as context, the object in view, the evils to be remedied, the
history of the times and of legislation upon the same subject, public policy, and
contemporaneous construction." ' " (See DeYoung, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 18.) We
believe the City could reasonably interpret section 219 as allowing it to pursue legitimate
public policy goals even on historic Pueblo lands, such as leasing these parcels for the
purpose of providing low to moderate income housing development, as specified in the
lease. As amended, the master lease allows the parties to require regular rent
adjustments. Such a policy was recognized in the factual context of DeYoung as being
fiscally prudent for the City. (DeYoung, supra, at p. 22, fn. 6.)
In conclusion, Appellant has not established any entitlement to relief based on its
claim that reacquired City Pueblo lands (following periods of severed City ownership
rights) somehow remain subject to section 219 requirements for voter approval of
property transactions. We disagree with any claim that the trial court failed to use proper
procedures in ruling on the various motions. When resolving the pleadings questions, the
trial court was not required to ignore the judicially noticeable material presented in
connection with the other motion being heard. (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c), (d).) The
dispositive legal questions as to all Respondents were properly brought before the trial
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court in the demurrer proceedings, the companion motion and its record, and in the City's
answer on file, and they have been fully presented in this appeal. Judgment on the
pleadings was appropriate and the demurrer was properly sustained without leave to
amend.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal is affirmed as to all Respondents. The motion for
judicial notice is granted in part as to all requests, with the exception that it is denied as to
exhibits Nos. 52 through 57, 60 through 61, 80 and 84 as they are listed in exhibit A to
the motion. Costs are awarded to Respondents.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, J.
McDONALD, J.
35
Filed 2/9/15 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
LINDA VISTA VILLAGE SAN DIEGO D064741 HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 37-2012-00085269- v. CU-MC-CTL)
TECOLOTE INVESTORS, LLC, et al., ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION FOR PUBLICATION Defendants and Respondents.
THE COURT:
The opinion filed January 27, 2015, is ordered certified for publication.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
Copies to: All parties
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the San Diego City Charter section 219 voter approval requirements for the lease of Pueblo lands do not apply to the subject property because the land had been transferred out of City ownership and subsequently reacquired, thereby losing its characterization as Pueblo lands.
Issues
Whether the San Diego City Charter section 219 voter approval requirement for the lease of Pueblo lands applies to property that was previously transferred out of City ownership and later reacquired.
Whether the trial court properly sustained the demurrer without leave to amend based on judicially noticed title documents.
Whether the City's answer and opposition to the preliminary injunction could be construed as a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Disposition. affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“In light of the applicable authorities, the recorded title documents for the parcels demonstrate as a matter of law that on this record, the restrictions of section 219 do not apply”