People v. Bartholomew CA4/1 (2015) · DecisionDepot
People v. Bartholomew CA4/1
California Court of Appeal Jan 22, 2015 No. D066352Unpublished
Filed 1/22/15 P. v. Bartholomew CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D066352
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. RIF1101678)
DOREEN LOUISE BARTHOLOMEW,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Richard T.
Fields, Judge. Affirmed in part, modified in part.
Marilee Marshall, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr., and Randall D.
Einhorn, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted Doreen Louise Bartholomew of arson of an inhabited structure
(Pen. Code § 451, subd. (b); count 1)1 and animal cruelty (§ 597, subd. (a); count 4). The
court sentenced Bartholomew to the midterm of five years in prison on count 1 and the
midterm of two years on count 4 to be served concurrently.
Bartholomew contends there was insufficient evidence to establish (1) the
mobilehome was a structure under section 450, subdivision (b), because the prosecution
did not prove the mobilehome was fixed to a particular location, and (2) Bartholomew
possessed specific intent to kill the dog because she did not want the dog to burn or die
when she set fire to the mobilehome. Bartholomew also contends her sentence for count
4 should have been stayed under section 654 because both of the convictions for counts 1
and 4 were based on a single act. We modify the judgment to stay the sentence on count
4, and we otherwise affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Bartholomew suffered multiple seizures and strokes over several years, limiting
her ability to process verbal communication, express her thoughts, and care for herself.
When it became too difficult for her husband to care for her, he arranged for
Bartholomew to live with her best friend, Barbara Hoke. On December 31, 2010,
Bartholomew moved in with Hoke who assisted Bartholomew with daily activities such
as cooking meals and driving Bartholomew to medical appointments.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2
Hoke lived in a mobilehome for at least seven years. At trial, the home was
described variously as a mobilehome, house, doublewide manufactured home, pre-
manufactured home, modular home and structure. In February 2011 another tenant
rented the third bedroom of the mobilehome.
On February 23, 2011, the day before the fire, Bartholomew became upset with
Hoke because Hoke convinced Bartholomew to keep the dental appointment
Bartholomew wanted to reschedule. Bartholomew texted her brother, "Gonna kill
Barbara l-o-l just kidding she text me to do something as she wake me . . . ." Upon
arrival at the dentist's office, they discovered the dentist rescheduled the appointment and
could not see Bartholomew that day.
Bartholomew became very upset. During an argument with Hoke, Bartholomew
threw a notebook and refused to speak further with Hoke.2 Bartholomew spent the
evening online using the computer in her bedroom.
At approximately 3:45 a.m., one of Hoke's two small dogs began to bark,
awakening Hoke. Hoke realized there was a fire in Bartholomew's room after she
knocked on Bartholomew's door and discovered the door was very hot. Hoke stepped
away from the door and called for Bartholomew and the other tenant. When
Bartholomew's door exploded, Hoke saw the bedroom was engulfed in flames. Hoke
escaped through the front door with one dog because she could not locate the other dog in
2 Hoke occasionally communicated with Bartholomew by writing in a notebook to help Bartholomew understand.
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the smoke. The other tenant escaped through the back door. Bartholomew was found in
the carport with a knife in her lap and a non-life threatening injury to her chest.
Bartholomew admitted she lit a scented candle that evening. She claimed she
placed it on the floor near her bed. She said she returned to the computer after lighting
the candle and later noticed embers burning the bed skirt. Bartholomew posted a
message to her brother on a social media site, stating, "I woke up, and I'm leaving.
[Hoke] is sleeping. If you wake her, I'll hate you. Okay. I'm burning, and I don't care.
Wow, this is crazy. Time to go." Instead of putting out the fire burning the bed skirt,
Bartholomew left her bedroom, closed the bedroom door, took a knife from the kitchen,
walked out of the back door of the mobilehome, and used the knife to stab her chest.
The investigating fire battalion chief later conducted a controlled burn test and
determined placing a lighted candle on the floor next to a bed was not sufficient to cause
the fire.
DISCUSSION
I
Bartholomew contends there was insufficient evidence to establish (1) the
mobilehome was a structure for purposes of the arson statutes because the People did not
prove the mobilehome was fixed to a particular location, and (2) Bartholomew possessed
specific intent to kill the dog because she did not want the dog to burn or die when she set
fire to the mobilehome. We disagree.
We apply the substantial evidence standard of review to assess the sufficiency of
the evidence. (People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal. 4th 1113, 1156.) Substantial evidence is
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defined as "evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."
(Ibid.) We view the record in the light most favorable to the judgment, and affirm the
convictions if any rational trier of fact could have found guilt based on the evidence and
inferences. (Ibid.)
A
Bartholomew contends the People failed to prove the mobilehome was a structure
within the meaning of section 451, subdivision (b), to support a conviction of arson of an
inhabited structure. Specifically, Bartholomew contends the People did not establish the
mobilehome was affixed to a particular location and could not readily be moved. (People
v. Labaer (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 289, 292 (Labaer).)
Section 451 states, "A person is guilty of arson when he or she willfully and
maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned or who aids, counsels, or procures
the burning of, any structure . . . ." The statutory definition of structure includes "any
building." (§ 450, subd. (a).) Because the term "building" is not statutorily defined, we
apply the plain meaning of the statute in light of the evidence before us. (Labaer, supra,
88 Cal.App.4th at p. 292.) The term building "describes a covered structure that stands
predominately by itself and appears more separate and distinct from any other structure
than connected to and a part of another structure." (People v. Muszynski (2002) 100
Cal.App.4th 672, 679.)
In Labaer, we held a partially disassembled mobilehome satisfied the statutory
definition of a structure. (Labaer, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 294.) In that case, the
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defendant did not dispute the mobilehome constituted a "building" for the purposes of
arson statutes in the months prior to the fire. (Id. at 292.) We noted the "evidence
established the home was fixed to a particular location, could not be readily moved, and
had been used as [defendant's] residence for several months." (Ibid.) The issue before us
in Labaer was whether defendant's actions of dismantling the mobilehome the day before
the fire "converted the mobilehome from a 'structure' under section 451, subdivision (c)
to generic 'property' subject to lesser punishment under section 451, subdivision (d)."
(Id., at p. 293.) We concluded it remained a structure because the dismantling was not
completed. (Ibid.) It had four sides not amounting to solid walls, but with insulation and
a partial roof. The interior was largely intact with an interior wall, furnishings, stairs
leading to the front door and a particleboard floor.3 (Id., at pp. 293-294.)
In this case, Hoke used the mobilehome as her residence for at least seven years.
The mobilehome had stairs leading to the front door, exterior walls, a full roof, bathroom,
kitchen, living room, bedrooms and furniture. The fire battalion chief explained, to
determine the cause of the fire, his team removed "structural components of the room of
origin," including floor joists, flooring and insulation.
Therefore, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding
the mobilehome satisfied the statutory definition of a structure for purposes of arson.
3 Bartholomew relies heavily on People v. Goolsby, which involved a motor home. The case was depublished, however, when the California Supreme Court granted review. (People v. Goolsby (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1251, review granted Apr. 23, 2014, E052297.)
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B
Bartholomew also contends insufficient evidence supported the jury's finding she
had the requisite intent for animal cruelty because there was no evidence she intended to
kill the dog. Again, we disagree.
Section 597, subdivision (a) states, "[E]very person who maliciously and
intentionally maims, tortures, or wounds a living animal, or maliciously and intentionally
kills an animal, is guilty of a crime . . . ." We have concluded section 597, subdivision
(a) is a general, not specific, intent crime. (People v. Alvarado (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th
1179, 1190.) The expressions " 'intentionally,' and 'maliciously' are expressions of
general, not specific, intent when used in a penal statute." (Id., at p. 1188.) The
defendant, therefore, must intend the wrongful act, but is not required to have intended
the result. (People v. Iraheta (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 611, 621.)4
Here, the jury found Bartholomew intentionally started the mobilehome fire,
which resulted in the dog's death. The evidence showed Bartholomew knew the dogs
were in the mobilehome when she lit the candle, saw the embers burning her bed skirt,
closed her bedroom door, took her purse and a knife and left the mobilehome. Moreover,
Bartholomew does not dispute she possessed the requisite general intent to start the fire.
4 We decline to accept Bartholomew's invitation to adopt the reasoning of the concurring opinion in Alvarado, which argued animal abuse under section 597, subdivision (a), should be construed as a specific intent crime. (People v. Alvarado, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1192 (conc. opn. of McIntyre, J.).) 7
The evidence was, therefore, sufficient for the jury to find Bartholomew possessed
the general intent required to find her guilty of animal cruelty under section 597,
subdivision (a).
II
Section 654 precludes imposing multiple sentences for a single act resulting in
multiple convictions because a single act can only be punished once. (People v. Jones
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 360; see People v. Lujano (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 175, 190.) The
court imposed a five-year sentence for count 1 and a concurrent two-year sentence for
count 4. The People concede the court below erred by imposing concurrent sentencing
for counts 1 and 4 under section 654 because both were based on the single act of starting
the fire. Accordingly, the judgment is modified to stay the execution of the sentence on
count 4.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to stay the sentence on count 4 pursuant to section 654.
The superior court is directed to amend the abstract of judgment reflecting the
modification and to forward a certified copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is
affirmed.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
HALLER, J.
AARON, J.
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AI Brief
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Holding. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions for arson and animal cruelty, but that the sentence for animal cruelty must be stayed under Penal Code section 654 because it arose from the same act as the arson.
Issues
Whether a mobilehome constitutes a 'structure' under the arson statute if not proven to be fixed to a specific location.
Whether animal cruelty under Penal Code section 597, subdivision (a) is a specific intent crime.
Whether the trial court erred by imposing concurrent sentences for arson and animal cruelty arising from a single act.
Disposition. Affirmed in part, modified in part.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“we conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding the mobilehome satisfied the statutory definition of a structure for purposes of arson.”
“We have concluded section 597, subdivision (a) is a general, not specific, intent crime.”
“The People concede the court below erred by imposing concurrent sentencing for counts 1 and 4 under section 654 because both were based on the single act of starting the fire.”