People v. Butterfield CA4/2 (2015) · DecisionDepot
People v. Butterfield CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Jan 21, 2015 No. E060509Unpublished
Filed 1/21/15 P. v. Butterfield CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E060509
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1310033)
HENRY LEWIS BUTTERFIELD, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Irma Poole Asberry,
Judge. Affirmed with directions.
James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General,
Arlene A. Sevidal and Andrew Mestman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
1
Defendant and appellant Henry Lewis Butterfield appeals from a judgment of
Defendant was sentenced to a total term of four years in state prison—the middle
term of three years for the section 273.5 conviction and one year for the prior prison term.
The court also imposed a concurrent eight-month term for the false imprisonment and
stayed a six-month term for the assault pursuant to section 654.
On this appeal defendant contends that the trial court erred by imposing a separate
term for the false imprisonment conviction, which he argues was also prohibited by
section 654. We disagree and affirm the judgment. However, we will order the
correction of the abstract of judgment as explained below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant and his girlfriend, Sharon Loosevelt (the victim), were homeless but
had a regular location for sleeping and living near the Riverside Metrolink station. Early
on the evening of September 5, 2013, while returning to the campsite, Ms. Loosevelt saw
defendant with another woman and became angry. She told defendant she intended to
leave, and he grabbed her by the arms and legs. The victim was pulled onto a mattress
and held down; at one point defendant bit her in the face and punched her repeatedly.
1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Eventually an acquaintance appeared and defendant released the victim. The victim fled
to a nearby gas station where she encountered California Highway Patrol (CHP) officers.
The victim’s estimate of the duration of the incident was up to four hours. She
judged this by the observation that when she arrived, the sun was still up, but by the time
she got away from defendant it was dark. The victim also testified that on the previous
evening, defendant had “drug me across the parking lot” because “[h]e wanted me to
come back home again,” and that “[h]e didn’t want me to leave . . . I didn’t want to have
to be with him no more, so he would come back after me and start running and screaming
after me . . . .” She further testified that such behavior, along with physical violence
exerted to prevent her from leaving him, was a regular feature of the relationship.
A Riverside police officer who had been dispatched to the gas station in response
to notification from the CHP testified that he arrived about 10:30 at night. He observed
the victim with blood on her face and a bruise near her eye.
The person whose arrival allowed the victim to flee agreed that it was probably at
least 8:00 o’clock when he arrived and that it was dark. He confirmed that after he and
defendant exchanged words, the victim jumped up and ran, telling him “[y]ou better get
out of here or you’ll end up looking the way I am.” The witness saw that her face was
“all bruised and bloody.”
3
Defendant testified to a version in which he did not assault the victim and only
grabbed her when she began throwing things around the campsite after finding him with
the other female.
DISCUSSION
A.
Defendant’s first argument is that he harbored only a single criminal intent when
he forcibly detained the victim and then committed the physical assaults which
constituted the violation of section 273.5.
Section 654 provides that “[a]n act or omission that is punishable in different ways
by different provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the
longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be
punished under more than one provision.” When section 654 applies, the proper
procedure is to impose the sentence on the lesser offense, but stay it.2 (People v. Alford
(2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1469.)
2 When the court imposes a concurrent sentence, that is treated as an implicit finding that the court found separate intents. (See People v. Garcia (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1564-1565.) In this case it is unnecessary to infer the court’s conclusion, because the defense agreed that section 654 did not prohibit multiple terms. However, the People agree that a sentence which violates section 654 is an unauthorized sentence and the failure to object at trial does not prevent the appellate court from correcting the error. (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 294-295; People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354, fn. 17.)
4
The crucial factor in determining whether section 654 prohibits multiple
punishment is whether or not the defendant can be found to have harbored multiple
criminal objectives; if all offenses were incidental to a single objective, multiple
punishment is prohibited. (People v. Kurtenbach (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1288.)
The trial court’s determination that separate intents were involved will be upheld if
supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 618.)
After a general discussion of the law in this respect, defendant relies on People v.
Guzman (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1023 (Guzman). In that case, the victim observed
defendant and others removing property from his (attached) garage. He pursued them,
and when he confronted them, defendant and another perpetrator beat, choked, and
kicked the victim before fleeing. (Id. at pp. 1025-1026.) Defendant was convicted of and
separately sentenced for burglary, robbery, and grand theft. The appellate court held that
the attack on the victim (which made the matter a robbery case through the use of force)
occurred while the perpetrators were attempting to escape after the burglary and that
separate punishment was inappropriate.3 (Id. at p. 1028.)
Guzman is inapposite here. First, if the trial court believed that the victim’s
estimate of the time involved was anywhere near accurate, the false imprisonment
extended far beyond the time needed to inflict half a dozen punches and a bite. Perhaps
more conclusively, there was evidence that defendant first grabbed and detained the
3 It also stayed the term imposed for grand theft, as a lesser included offense to robbery. (Guzman, at p. 1028.)
5
victim not in order to assault her, but specifically to prevent her from leaving him and the
area. The victim testified that she had announced her intent to leave when he seized her.
She also testified that defendant had been controlling throughout their relationship and on
the very evening before had forcibly dragged her across a parking lot to force her to
return with him to their campsite.
It is possible that the assault reflected the same intent as the false imprisonment—
to coerce the victim into remaining with defendant through fear and violence. However,
the trial court could also have reasonably found that the false imprisonment reflected the
intent to prevent the victim from leaving, while the subsequent protracted assault,
including biting, simply reflected an intent to injure.4 The circumstances provide
substantial evidence to support the trial court’s ruling.
B.
The trial court orally imposed a subordinate concurrent term of eight months for
the false imprisonment conviction, calculated as one-third the midterm of two years.
However, the abstract of judgment erroneously shows that the full middle term of two
years was imposed. The People concede the error and agree that the abstract should be
corrected. We will so order.
4 Indeed, the trial court made an express finding that the physical assault was committed with the intent to physically hurt the victim in applying section 654 to the cohabitant abuse and assault convictions.
6
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to issue a corrected abstract
of judgment reflecting the imposition of a concurrent eight-month term for count 3, false
imprisonment, and to forward a copy of the corrected abstract of judgment to the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
HOLLENHORST J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
KING J.
7
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the trial court did not err in imposing separate sentences for spousal abuse and false imprisonment, as substantial evidence supported the finding of separate criminal intents. The court also ordered a correction to the abstract of judgment to reflect the correct concurrent sentence length.
Issues
Whether Penal Code section 654 prohibits separate punishment for false imprisonment and spousal abuse when the defendant claims a single criminal intent.
Disposition. Affirmed with directions.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The trial court’s determination that separate intents were involved will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.”
“The circumstances provide substantial evidence to support the trial court’s ruling.”