Masterson v. Super. Ct. CA4/1 (2015) · DecisionDepot
Masterson v. Super. Ct. CA4/1
California Court of Appeal Jan 15, 2015 No. D067097Unpublished
Filed 1/15/15 Masterson v. Super. Ct. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DANIEL J. MASTERSON, D067097
Petitioner,
v. (San Diego County Super. Ct. No. HSC11462) THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY,
Respondent;
DANIEL PARAMO, as Warden, etc.,
Real Party in Interest.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING in mandate. David J. Danielson, Judge. Petition
granted.
Daniel J. Masterson, in propria persona, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, and Amy M. Roebuck, Deputy Attorney
General, for Real Party in Interest.
By petition for writ of mandate, Daniel J. Masterson challenges the refusal of the
San Diego County Superior Court (the trial court) to process his petition for a writ
directing Daniel Paramo, warden of the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility
(Donovan), to disclose certain records pursuant to the California Public Records Act (the
Act; Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.). We grant the petition.
Masterson was sentenced to prison in 1992 by the Los Angeles County Superior
Court for life without the possibility of parole for murder and is currently incarcerated at
Donovan, which is located in San Diego County. He recently submitted to Donovan's
litigation coordinator two requests to inspect documents under the Act.
In the first request, Masterson asked for the first initial of a female correctional
officer whose surname is Hyman, the length of her employment by the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the Department), the positions she held,
and the "total amount of 'staff complaints' for the entire period of employment," so that
he could identify the officer in a federal civil rights complaint. The litigation coordinator
responded by letter: "The Public Records Act provides for public access to existing
documents, not the creation of new documents. Since you have not identified or
described an existing responsive document in your request, your request is denied."
The second request concerned what Masterson described as numerous suspicious
prisoner deaths at Donovan that he believed a grand jury should investigate. He asked for
2
the total number of prisoner deaths from any cause at Donovan since January 1, 2012. In
a second letter, the litigation coordinator denied the request on the ground the requested
records were not subject to disclosure under certain provisions of the Act.
After receiving the denial letters, Masterson filed in the trial court a Judicial
Council form petition for writ of habeas corpus and a verified "petition for writ of
mandate, injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to California Government Code
§ 6285." He alleged the Act required the Department to disclose the information he
requested and sought a writ directing the Department to do so. The trial court
(Hon. Stephanie Sontag) ruled the relief Masterson sought could not be granted in habeas
corpus and denied the petition to the extent it sought such relief. Judge Sontag also ruled
the proper form of relief was a writ of mandate, and ordered the petition transferred to the
central courthouse to be heard there. The clerk at the central courthouse, however,
refused to process the petition and returned it to Masterson on the ground that petitions
for writ of mandate "are filed at the . . . sentencing court."
Masterson then petitioned this court for writ of mandate directing the trial court to
process his petition under the Act. He contends the trial court clerk's erroneous refusal to
process his petition frustrates his right of access to the courts, and a writ of mandate must
issue to correct the error. We solicited an informal response from Paramo, who stated
that "Judge Sontag's original order to transfer the mandate petition to the civil division
was correct." We notified the parties we were considering issuing a peremptory writ in
the first instance. (See Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171,
178-180.)
3
DISCUSSION
We conclude Judge Sontag correctly transferred Masterson's case to the civil
division for processing as a petition for writ of mandate under the Act, but the trial court
clerk erroneously refused to process the petition. The Act provides: "Any person may
institute proceedings for injunctive or declarative relief or writ of mandate in any court of
competent jurisdiction to enforce his or her right to inspect or to receive a copy of any
public record or class of public records under [the Act]." (Gov. Code, § 6258.) The
remedy provided by the Act is available to any person seeking disclosure of public
records if the public entity is allegedly improperly withholding those records. (Id.,
§ 6259, subd. (a); County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 119,
127.) As "the superior court of the county where the records . . . are situated" (Gov.
Code, § 6259, subd. (a)), the trial court has jurisdiction to process Masterson's petition.
In particular, the trial court must set the times for responsive pleadings and for hearings
"with the object of securing a decision . . . at the earliest possible time." (Id., § 6258; see
Filarsky v. Superior Court (2002) 28 Cal.4th 419, 426.)
We further conclude this is an appropriate case for issuance of a peremptory writ
in the first instance. An appellate court properly issues a writ of mandate to compel a
trial court to exercise jurisdiction when it has erroneously refused to do so. (County of
Nevada v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 663, 664; Morrison Drilling Co. v. Superior
Court (1962) 208 Cal.App.2d 740, 744.) Furthermore, no useful purpose would be
served by full briefing and argument because the material facts are not in dispute, the law
is well-settled, and Paramo has conceded the trial court clerk's error. (See Code Civ.
4
Proc., § 1088; Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1240-1241; Fontaine v.
Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 830, 842.)
DISPOSITION
Let a writ of mandate issue directing the trial court: (1) to rescind its letter of
November 25, 2014, refusing to process the "petition for writ of mandate, injunctive and
declaratory relief pursuant to California Government Code § 6285," filed on November 4,
2014, and assigned case No. HSC11462; and (2) to process said petition in a manner
consistent with the processing of other petitions filed under the Act. Masterson is entitled
to costs of this writ proceeding. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.493(a)(1)(A).)
BENKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, J.
HALLER, J.
5
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the trial court clerk erroneously refused to process the petitioner's writ of mandate under the California Public Records Act, as the trial court has jurisdiction to hear such petitions where the records are situated.
Issues
Whether the trial court clerk erred in refusing to process a petition for writ of mandate filed under the California Public Records Act.
Whether the superior court of the county where the records are situated has jurisdiction to process a petition for writ of mandate under the Act.
Disposition. granted
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The trial court clerk erroneously refused to process the petition.”
“As "the superior court of the county where the records . . . are situated" (Gov. Code, § 6259, subd. (a)), the trial court has jurisdiction to process Masterson's petition.”
“An appellate court properly issues a writ of mandate to compel a trial court to exercise jurisdiction when it has erroneously refused to do so.”