Sam v. Garfield Beach CVS CA4/2 (2015) · DecisionDepot
Sam v. Garfield Beach CVS CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Jan 15, 2015 No. E057531Unpublished
Filed 1/15/15 Sam v. Garfield Beach CVS CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
JOSEPH SAM,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E057531
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIC1109016)
GARFIELD BEACH CVS, LLC, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Paulette Durand-Barkley,
A defendant moving for summary judgment has the initial burden to make a prima
facie showing there is no merit to a cause of action and that therefore the defendant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); Wilson v. 21st Century Ins.
Co. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 713, 720.) To satisfy this burden, the moving defendant must
show that at least one of the elements of the cause of action has not been established by
the plaintiff and cannot reasonably be established, or must establish the elements of a
complete defense to the cause of action. (§ 437c, subds. (o), (p)(2); Allstate Ins. Co.,
supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1017; Jessen v. Mentor Corp. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1484
(Jessen).) If the moving defendant meets this burden, then the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to show that there is at least one triable issue of material fact regarding the cause
5
of action or as to the complete defense. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849 (Aguilar); Jessen, at p. 1484.) “There is a
triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of
fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance
with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar, at p. 850.)
IV
MALPRACTICE CAUSE OF ACTION
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in ruling plaintiff’s malpractice cause of
action was barred by the statute of limitations under section 340.5. Plaintiff alleges in his
first cause of action for malpractice that on March 11, 2010, CVS breached its duty of
care owed to plaintiff by negligently refilling plaintiff’s prescription by giving plaintiff
pills that were 10 times the prescribed dosage. CVS’s negligence allegedly caused
plaintiff to sustain injuries and damages. Plaintiff further alleges that he discovered
CVS’s negligence on May 7, 2010.
Section 340.5 sets forth the statute of limitations applicable to this medical
malpractice case. (Jefferson v. County of Kern (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 606, 610.) Section
340.5, subdivision (1), defines a health care provider as including any person licensed or
certified pursuant to Division 2 of the Business and Professions Code. Pharmacists and
pharmacies are licensed pursuant to Division 2 of the Business and Professions Code and
thus fall within this statutory definition of health care provider. (See Bus. & Prof. Code,
§§ 4000-4125.)
6
Section 340.5 states that in an action for injury or death against a health care
provider, based upon alleged professional negligence, the action shall be commenced
within three years after the date of injury, or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or
through reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury and its negligent cause,
whichever occurs first. Section 340.5 further provides that in no event shall the
limitations period exceed three years unless tolled because of (1) proof of fraud; (2)
intentional concealment; or (3) the presence of a foreign body, without any therapeutic or
diagnostic purpose or effect, in the injured person. (Rose v. Fife (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d
760, 767-768; Jefferson v. County of Kern, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 610, fn. 15.)
The one-year limitation period applies in the instant case. Plaintiff argues the one-
year limitation period did not begin running until May 7, 2010, when he received the
letter from CVS advising him that CVS had erred in refilling plaintiff’s Doxepin
prescription. Plaintiff asserts this was when he first became aware his overdose was
caused by CVS. Up until then, plaintiff was concerned he did something wrong and
thought the discrepancy in the dosage might have been because the pills were generic.
Plaintiff was unaware of the reason for CVS employees calling him. Plaintiff argues
these facts raise a triable issue as to whether the one-year statute of limitations began
running before May 7, 2010. We disagree.
Notice triggering the statute of limitations “may be actual or constructive. (Civ.
Code, § 18.) Actual notice is ‘express information of a fact,’ while constructive notice is
that ‘which is imputed by law.’ (Ibid.) A person with ‘actual notice of circumstances
sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry’ is deemed to have constructive notice of all
7
facts that a reasonable inquiry would disclose. (Civ. Code, § 19; [citations].)” (E-Fab,
Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1318-1319 (E-Fab).)
Even though normally the accrual of the statute of limitations is a question of fact
(Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 810 (Fox)), when reasonable
minds can draw only one conclusion from undisputed facts, accrual may be determined as
a matter of law. (Ibid.) “More specifically, as to accrual, ‘once properly pleaded, belated
discovery is a question of fact.’ [Citation.] As our state’s high court has observed:
‘There are no hard and fast rules for determining what facts or circumstances will compel
inquiry by the injured party and render him chargeable with knowledge. [Citation.] It is
a question for the trier of fact.’ [Citation.] ‘However, whenever reasonable minds can
draw only one conclusion from the evidence, the question becomes one of law.’ (Snow v.
A. H. Robins Co. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 120, 128 [reversing summary judgment].)” (E-
Fab, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1320.) Thus, when an appeal is taken from a judgment
of dismissal following the sustention of a demurrer or summary judgment, “‘the issue is
whether the trial court could determine as a matter of law that failure to discover was due
to failure to investigate or to act without diligence.’” (E-Fab, at p. 1320, quoting Bastian
v. County of San Luis Obispo (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 520, 527.)
When applying the discovery rule to the statute of limitations, we must therefore
determine “when and how the plaintiff discovered an injury, whether the plaintiff
conducted a reasonable investigation, when such an investigation would have brought to
light the factual basis for the cause of action for which the plaintiff sought delayed
8
accrual, and whether the plaintiff could have discovered the factual basis for a cause of
action earlier by exercising reasonable diligence.” (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 810.)
As the California Supreme Court explained in Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pages 807-
808, “The discovery rule only delays accrual until the plaintiff has, or should have,
inquiry notice of the cause of action. The discovery rule does not encourage dilatory
tactics because plaintiffs are charged with presumptive knowledge of an injury[] if they
have ‘“‘information of circumstances to put [them] on inquiry’”’ or if they have ‘“‘the
opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to [their] investigation.’”’
[Citations.] In other words, plaintiffs are required to conduct a reasonable investigation
after becoming aware of an injury, and are charged with knowledge of the information
that would have been revealed by such an investigation.”
Undisputed evidence in the instant case established that, prior to May 7, 2010,
plaintiff had actual or constructive notice his overdose was caused by taking Doxepin 100
mg pills and that CVS was negligent in causing his injury by misfilling his prescription
with 100 mg Doxepin pills, instead of the prescribed 10 mg pills. Plaintiff testified that,
after picking up his refilled prescription on March 11, 2010, plaintiff took two to three
pills that night, as prescribed. Plaintiff was hospitalized of an overdose and, on his way
home from the hospital, told his friend that his hospitalization “was probably because of
my medication I took.” Plaintiff said he thought this “[b]ecause that could be the only
reason.”
Plaintiff testified he tried to “figure out what happened.” When Plaintiff got home
early in the morning, he checked the Doxepin bottle and realized “the milligrams were
9
different.” Plaintiff noticed the dosage written on the bottle was 100 mg, which was
different from what he was prescribed. When plaintiff noticed this, he thought, “this
might have caused me to be in the hospital.” On March 12, 2010, after plaintiff got
home, he called Dr. Schwartz, and when he saw Dr. Schwartz on March 15, 2010,
plaintiff told him CVS had given plaintiff Doxepin 100 mg. Dr. Schwartz told plaintiff
“he didn’t write the prescription for that and for me not to go back to CVS.” Dr.
Schwartz told plaintiff he wrote the prescription for 10 mg and that he would never write
the prescription that high. During plaintiff’s deposition, plaintiff was asked if he knew,
when Dr. Schwartz told him he did not write the Doxepin prescription for 100 mg, that
CVS made a mistake in refilling his Doxepin prescription. Plaintiff replied that he did
not know this but he “had suspicions.”
Plaintiff’s deposition testimony and declaration establish that he was aware he
overdosed from taking Doxepin, that CVS was responsible for refilling his prescription,
and that he received Doxepin 100 mg, rather than Doxepin 10 mg prescribed by his
doctor. Plaintiff also testified he suspected CVS had erred in filling his prescription and
immediately checked the Doxepin bottle when he returned from the hospital. He noticed
that the bottle was for 100 mg, not Doxepin 10 mg. Plaintiff also noticed the pills and
bottle were larger than the previous Doxepin pills and bottle received from CVS.
Plaintiff informed Dr. Schwartz of these facts and Dr. Schwartz told plaintiff the Doxepin
100 mg pills CVS gave him were not what Dr. Schwartz had prescribed. Dr. Schwartz
also told plaintiff not to go back to CVS for his prescriptions. These facts were more
than sufficient to trigger the running of the one-year statute of limitations before May 7,
10
2010, as a matter of law. It is undisputed that shortly after plaintiff returned home from
the hospital, and at the latest after he visited his doctor on May 15, 2010, plaintiff
suspected or should have suspected CVS had committed wrongdoing by misfilling his
prescription, causing his overdose. (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 807.)
In addition, there is evidence plaintiff began investigating the cause of his
overdose as soon as he returned home from the hospital. Immediately upon returning
home, he checked the Doxepin bottle and noticed he was given 100 mg of Doxepin,
instead of the usual 10 mg. Also, plaintiff visited his doctor and told him CVS had given
him Doxepin 100 mg, instead of Doxepin 10 mg. In addition, in April 2010, plaintiff
visited an attorney for the purpose of determining whether he had a valid claim against
CVS. Plaintiff stated in his declaration and in deposition testimony that in April 2010, he
discussed with attorney Alvin Gomez CVS’s liability and whether plaintiff had a case
against CVS.
Despite these facts, plaintiff argues he raised triable issues of fact by presenting
evidence he was unaware CVS had erred in filling his prescription until he received
CVS’s May 7, 2010 letter. Such evidence includes his deposition testimony and
declaration in which plaintiff stated he thought his medication may have been generic and
therefore required a greater dosage than what he normally received. He was also
concerned about his employer finding out about the overdose incident and suspecting he
was suicidal. But even if plaintiff wanted to avoid disclosing the incident to his employer
and was uncertain as to CVS’s wrongdoing, plaintiff was on sufficient inquiry notice to
trigger the statute of limitations.
11
Plaintiff was charged with presumptive knowledge of an injury prior to May 7,
2010, because he, not only had information of circumstances putting him on inquiry, but
also had the opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to his investigation.
(Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 807-808.) Under such circumstances, plaintiff was charged
with knowledge of the information that would have been revealed by conducting a
reasonable investigation. (Ibid.; Unruh-Haxton v. Regents of University of California
(2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 343, 360-361.) It is highly likely, that had plaintiff called CVS
and inquired regarding his prescription or returned CVS’s multiple calls prior to May 7,
2010, plaintiff would have confirmed that CVS had misfilled his prescription and the
error caused his overdose, hospitalization, and injuries.
Furthermore, had plaintiff inquired regarding generic medication, he would have
discovered that, even if his medication was a generic brand, the dosage should not have
been higher than what his doctor had prescribed. Plaintiff easily could have asked his
doctor about generic medication when plaintiff called Dr. Schwartz on March 12, 2010,
and visited him on March 15, 2010. Plaintiff is therefore charged with knowing that,
regardless of whether his medication was filled with a generic brand, CVS misfilled his
prescription, which caused his overdose.
Even though plaintiff’s attorney may have told plaintiff he could not file a case
against CVS for medical malpractice without an admission of fault by CVS or a
declaration by an expert medical witness stating that CVS had committed malpractice,
the statute of limitations had already begun running because plaintiff was on notice of his
injury and its negligent cause. Plaintiff therefore had a duty to investigate, and did so.
12
Plaintiff stated in his deposition and declaration that he “consulted an attorney precisely
because [he] wished to explore [his] legal remedies.” (Guitierrez v. Mofid (1985) 39
Cal.3d 892, 897.) The limitation period was not delayed, suspended, or tolled merely
because plaintiff’s attorney told him he did not have sufficient evidence to file a claim.
(Id. at p. 898.)
Even when liberally construing plaintiff’s opposition to summary judgment, we
conclude plaintiff has not raised a triable issue as to the statute of limitations. As a matter
of law, based on the unrefuted evidence, plaintiff was on inquiry notice and thus the
statute of limitations began running at the earliest on March 12, 2010, and at the latest by
April 20, 2010. As a consequence the one-year statute of limitations expired before
plaintiff filed his complaint for malpractice on May 7, 2011.
V
FRAUD CAUSE OF ACTION
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as to his
fraud cause of action on the ground it was not a valid cause of action. The trial court
concluded the fraud cause of action was merely a recasting of the malpractice cause of
action and therefore was barred by the one-year malpractice statute of limitations.
A. Statute of Limitations Bar
Plaintiff alleged in his fraud cause of action that on March 11, 2010, CVS
represented to plaintiff that it would fill plaintiff’s prescription in accordance with the
prescription provided by plaintiff’s doctor. CVS also represented to plaintiff that the
medication provided to plaintiff was what had been prescribed and that CVS has a
13
process to ensure that the prescriptions are filled exactly as prescribed. Plaintiff’s
prescription was not filled as prescribed. Instead, CVS gave plaintiff pills that were 10
times the prescribed dosage. In addition, CVS allegedly did not have safeguards in place
to prevent the dissemination of the incorrect and deadly prescription to plaintiff. Plaintiff
further alleged CVS’s representations were thus false and CVS did not disclose to
plaintiff CVS’s error in filling plaintiff’s prescription or that the medication would be
deadly if taken as prescribed. Plaintiff took the medication, suffered loss of
consciousness, and almost died.
Plaintiff argues that the one-year statute of limitations does not apply to his fraud
cause of action because the fraud cause of action is a distinct, properly pled theory of
recovery, which was alleged separately from his malpractice cause of action. Plaintiff
asserts that his fraud claim is not founded on the rendering of professional services but,
rather, is founded on marketing that induced customers to believe CVS’s quality control
would prevent mistakes in filling customers’ prescriptions. In addition, plaintiff argues
that he presented evidence raising triable issues concerning his allegations of intentional
misrepresentations as to the accuracy of prescriptions filled by CVS.
The medical malpractice statute of limitations set forth in section 340.5 applies to
“an action for injury or death against a health care provider based upon such person’s
alleged professional negligence.” (§ 340.5.) The statute of limitations for medical
malpractice is “three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers,
or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever
occurs first.” (§ 340.5.) Plaintiff argues the three-year statute of limitations (§ 338, subd.
14
(d)) generally applicable to fraud causes of action applies to his fraud cause of action, not
the section 340.5, one-year statute of limitations.
“‘To determine the statute of limitations which applies to a cause of action it is
necessary to identify the nature of the cause of action, i.e., the “gravamen” of the cause of
action.’ [Citation.] The nature of the cause of action and the primary right involved, not
the form or label of the cause of action or the relief demanded, determine which statute of
limitations applies.” (Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC (2011) 198
Cal.App.4th 396, 412; accord, Hydro-Mill Co., Inc. v. Hayward, Tilton and Rolapp Ins.
Associates, Inc. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1153.) The one-year limitation period
may apply to a medical malpractice action, even when the action includes a fraud claim.
(Tell v. Taylor (1961) 191 Cal.App.2d 266, 271 (Tell); Weinstock v. Eissler (1964) 224
Cal.App.2d 212, 227.) In Weinstock, the court held the one-year, malpractice limitation
period applied even though the plaintiff alleged a cause of action for deceit based on the
physician’s false representations and fraudulent concealment of the nature and extent of
injury. The false representation and concealment claim was treated as a medical
malpractice claim for purposes of applying the statute of limitations. (Ibid.)
Likewise, in Tell, supra, 191 Cal.App.2d 266, also a medical malpractice action,
the court rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to rely on the three-year limitation for fraud
when alleging a claim for deceit founded on misrepresentation of the plaintiff’s injury.
The Tell court explained: “As to her second cause of action for deceit, the appellant
argues that the trial court erred as the statute of limitations for fraud is three years under
subsection 4 of section 338 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, appellant has cited
15
no authority in this state or elsewhere to indicate that it is possible to extend the statute of
limitations in a personal injury action by bringing it on a theory of fraud. Rather, even
though the plaintiff alleges false representations on the part of the physician or fraudulent
concealment, our courts have always treated the action as one for malpractice [citation].”
(Id. at p. 271.)
Relying on Smith v. Ben Bennett, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1514 (Smith),
plaintiff argues that he properly alleged fraud as an independent cause of action, separate
from his malpractice cause of action. In Smith, the court stated that “additional causes of
action frequently arise out of the same facts as a medical malpractice cause of action.
These may include . . . fraud. . .” (Ibid.)
Plaintiff’s reliance on Smith is misplaced. Smith is distinguishable because it
concerned the issue of whether the MICRA2 statute of limitations, section 364, applied to
the plaintiff’s claim under the Elder Abuse Act.3 In concluding the MICRA statute of
limitations did not apply because the claim was not based on professional negligence, we
noted: “[I]n dealing with the statute of limitations, what is controlling is not the nature of
the cause of action (in the sense of the legal theory), but the gravamen of the cause of
action. [Citation.] One cause of action—e.g., negligent misrepresentation—may be
governed by different statutes of limitations, whenever the gravamen of the cause of
action is different—e.g., professional negligence rather than fraud. [Citation.]” (Smith,
2 Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act, enacted in 1975. 3Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15600 et seq.).
16
supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 1525.) In the instant case, the gravamen of the malpractice
and fraud causes of action does not differ. Both causes of action are founded on
malpractice arising from CVS misfilling plaintiff’s prescription, causing him to overdose
on Doxepin.
Plaintiff attempts to circumvent the one-year statute of limitations by alleging that
CVS fraudulently misrepresented that CVS would properly fill plaintiff’s prescription
and CVS had procedures to prevent filling prescriptions incorrectly. Despite allegations
recasting plaintiff’s malpractice claim as fraud, the one-year statute of limitations
applicable to malpractice nevertheless applies. (Rubin v. Green (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1187,
1201-1202.) Since plaintiff failed to file his complaint within one year of discovery of
his claim, plaintiff’s fraud cause of action is barred by the one-year statute of limitations
under section 340.5 as a matter of law.
B. Fraud Cause of Action Unsupported by Evidence
Because we conclude the trial court did not err in ruling plaintiff’s fraud cause of
action is barred by the statute of limitations, we need not consider plaintiff’s contention
that evidence supports his fraud cause of action. Nevertheless, we will briefly address the
issue on the merits.
“The elements of fraud are (a) a misrepresentation (false representation,
concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) scienter or knowledge of its falsity; (c) intent to
induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” (Hinesley v.
Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.) Plaintiff did not establish in
his opposition to CVS’s summary judgment motion that he can prove each of these
17
elements. He did not provide any evidence he reasonably relied on any false
representations made by CVS to plaintiff regarding his medication or quality control; that
CVS made the alleged representations recklessly or knowing they were false; that CVS
intended to induce plaintiff to rely on the representations; or that such reliance resulted in
plaintiff’s injuries.
Plaintiff testified at his deposition that he had been filling his Doxepin 10 mg
prescription at CVS since 2009, and had done so on March 11, 2010, just as he had done
in the past. Plaintiff said he did not recall speaking to a pharmacist or anyone else at
CVS regarding his medication when he picked up his prescription that day. He merely
went to CVS to refill his prescription, as he had done many times before, and CVS
mistakenly refilled the prescription with Doxepin 100 mg, instead of Doxepin 10 mg.
The bottle of pills he received on March 11, 2010, accurately stated the pills were 100 mg
and there is no evidence that plaintiff relied on any other representations by CVS that
induced him to take the pills. There is no evidence he was told CVS correctly refilled his
prescription or was told that CVS had a process to ensure his prescriptions were filled
exactly as prescribed, and these representations induced him to take the Doxepin 100 mg
pills on March 11, 2010.
Since plaintiff has failed to present any evidence establishing that he can prevail
on his fraud claim, the trial court appropriately granted summary judgment on the fraud
cause of action.
18
VI
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendant is awarded its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON J.
We concur:
HOLLENHORST Acting P. J.
KING J.
19
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the plaintiff's medical malpractice and fraud claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 because the plaintiff was on inquiry notice of the pharmacy's negligence shortly after his hospitalization. The court further determined that the fraud claim was essentially a recasting of the malpractice claim and thus subject to the same statutory limitations period.
Issues
Whether the plaintiff's medical malpractice claim was barred by the one-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5.
Whether the plaintiff's fraud claim was a distinct cause of action or subject to the one-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“It is undisputed plaintiff’s malpractice and fraud claims are barred by the one-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5.”
“The nature of the cause of action and the primary right involved, not the form or label of the cause of action or the relief demanded, determine which statute of limitations applies.”
“In the instant case, the gravamen of the malpractice and fraud causes of action does not differ.”