McBride v. Stewart CA2/5

Filed 1/8/15 McBride v. Stewart CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

ANA McBRIDE, B249439

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC474777) v.

GIRLEE STEWART,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Roy L. Paul, Judge. Affirmed. Ana McBride, in pro per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Marc S. Duvernay for Defendant and Respondent.

Plaintiff Ana McBride filed suit against Girlee Stewart, individually and as the administrator of the Estate of Brenda Pillors (the Estate) to establish her rights in certain real property owned by Ms. Pillors at the time of her death in 2005. The trial court granted the Estate’s demurrer to the complaint, ruling that plaintiff’s action was time- barred. We conclude the complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted, and so affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Prior to his death, Isaiah Pillors and his daughter, Brenda, held title as joint tenants to residential real property located at 2621 Virginia Road in Los Angeles (the Property). When Mr. Pillors died in 1999, Ms. Pillors became the fee simple owner of the Property. According to the factual allegations of the first amended complaint, which we take to be true for purposes of this appeal, plaintiff and Ms. Pillors, a resident of Virginia, entered into a written agreement for plaintiff’s purchase of the Property. That agreement was destroyed by Ms. Pillors’s fiancé, Marwan Burgan, in 2005, shortly after Ms. Pillors’s death; plaintiff did not produce a copy of the agreement. The complaint recites the terms of the agreement as follows: “On or about March 1, 2004, Plaintiff and [Ms. Pillors] entered into a written Agreement in which [Ms. Pillors] agreed to sell the Real Property to the Plaintiff and further agreed that [Ms. Pillors] would pay for: water, gardener, mortgage, property taxes and insurance. They agreed that Plaintiff would pay for the repairs to get them started and [Ms. Pillors] would reimburse $4,000, and the remaining expenses would be held towards the purchase of the property to take place in August 2006. [¶] . . . Another consideration was the renovations done to the home; . . . in return [Ms. Pillors] turned over possess[ion] of the property in March 2004, renovations were completed in August 2004 and Plaintiff moved-in in mid-August of 2004.” The complaint does not recite the price plaintiff agreed to pay to purchase the Property. Plaintiff alleges that the Estate “ratified” the foregoing agreement when, in April 2010, plaintiff and Girlee Stewart, Ms. Pillors’s great-aunt who commenced a probate proceeding in Louisiana in connection with Ms. Pillor’s estate, executed a “California