California Court of Appeal Dec 31, 2014 No. D066178Unpublished
Filed 12/31/14 In re Arianna M. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re ARIANNA M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D066178 SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. NJ014780) Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ARIANNA M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Kimberlee A.
Lagotta, Judge. Affirmed.
Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County
Counsel, and Paula J. Roach, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Michele Anne Cella, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Respondent, Breanna K.
Julie E. Braden, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Respondent, A.M.
Arianna M. appeals the juvenile court's order setting aside its prior judgment of
paternity. We affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Arianna M. was detained at the hospital at her birth by the San Diego County
Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) as a result of her mother's admitted
methamphetamine use. Arianna's mother, Breanna K., and her boyfriend, Alex M., were
homeless at the time and had no supplies to care for a newborn. Breanna admitted to a
20-year history of drug abuse. She also had a long history of involvement with child
protective services, and as a result, Breanna's two older children (ages one and 10 at the
time Arianna was detained) were in a guardianship with Breanna's mother. Arianna and
her one year-old brother share the same biological father, Scott S. Alex, who claimed to
be Arianna's father when she was detained, also admitted to a long history of drug abuse
and had tens of criminal convictions.
When interviewed by the Agency's social worker shortly after Arianna's birth,
Breanna stated she was not sure whether Alex or Scott was Arianna's biological father.
However, Breanna and Alex considered Alex to be Arianna's father. Breanna told the
social worker that Scott knew she was pregnant but he wanted nothing to do with the
child. Alex knew he might not be Arianna's biological father, but considered himself her
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father and wanted to support Breanna and Arianna. Alex completed a voluntary
declaration of paternity at the hospital. In the initial interview, the Agency's social
worker observed that Breanna seemed to rely on Alex to make decisions for her and that
she called Alex "daddy." As a result, the social worker was concerned about possible
domestic violence in their relationship.
Breanna, Alex and Scott all appeared at the detention hearing and the court
appointed counsel for each. The court found detention of Arianna was necessary because
of the substantial danger and risk of harm presented by custody with her parents. The
court removed Arianna from her parents' custody and ordered reunification services for
Breanna, Scott and Alex. At the hearing, Scott requested paternity testing and Alex
requested presumed father status. Since the state Department of Child Support Services
(DCSS) had not yet acknowledged Alex's paternity declaration, the court deferred the
issue of paternity to the jurisdictional hearing.
By the time of the initial jurisdictional hearing, Breanna and Alex had obtained
housing and were visiting Arianna two or three times each week. At the hearing Scott
denied paternity and indicated he did not want to participate in the dependency
proceeding. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted Scott's request, relieved
his counsel and provisionally found Alex to be Arianna's presumed father. Thereafter,
the court struck Scott from the Agency's petition. At Breanna and Alex's request, the
juvenile court set a further contested hearing on the jurisdictional and dispositional
issues.
3
Prior to the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing, Alex was arrested for
several drug related offenses. At the hearing, the court received the DCSS's
acknowledgement of Alex's voluntary declaration of paternity and found Alex to be
Arianna's presumed father. The court also determined jurisdiction was warranted,
removed Arianna from her parents' care, placed Arianna in a licensed foster home and
ordered continued reunification services as well as increased visitation for Breanna and
Alex.1 The juvenile court also set a six month review hearing.
Before the review hearing, Breanna and Alex ended their relationship and stopped
living together. Both parents, however, actively participated in reunification services and
visited regularly with Arianna. At the review hearing, Breanna and Alex contested the
matter and the juvenile court set a later hearing. Before that hearing, Breanna filed a
motion to set aside the court's prior judgment of paternity for Alex and requested
paternity testing. In a letter accompanying her motion, Breanna stated she feared Alex
was toxic to Arianna's well-being and at the time she allowed Alex to be listed as
Arianna's father on her birth certificate she was suffering from battered women's
syndrome.
At the six-month review hearing, the court denied Breanna's motion without
prejudice, finding it was filed under the wrong statutory provision. The court also
ordered continued reunification services and visitation for both parents, and set the 12-
month review hearing. The Agency's report in advance of the 12-month hearing noted
1 Breanna unsuccessfully appealed the jurisdictional and dispositional order.
4
both parents were holding jobs, progressing in their recovery and had regular, appropriate
and loving visits with Arianna. Because Breanna and Alex had not found adequate
housing, however, the Agency recommended that the family continue to receive
reunification services for an additional six months.
The same day as the 12-month review hearing Breanna filed a second motion to
set aside Alex's presumed father status and again requested genetic testing. Breanna's
supporting declaration stated that Alex was not Arianna's biological father and that she
signed Alex's voluntary declaration of paternity because she was under his control and
"was dependent on [Alex] for support and felt [she] had no option but to place him on the
birth certificate." Breanna also stated her concern that Alex would engage in controlling
behavior with Arianna and that he viewed Arianna as "his last bit of control over
[Breanna] and that his reason to continue his involvement with Arianna is control and not
her best interests." At the review hearing the court ordered genetic testing for Alex and
also set a contested hearing on the Agency's recommendation to continue services.
At the contested 12-month review hearing, the Agency recommended that
Arianna, now 14-months old, be placed with Breanna. The Agency also submitted the
results of the genetic testing, which confirmed Alex was not Arianna's biological father.
The court followed the Agency's recommendation and placed Arianna with Breanna. The
court continued Breanna's motion to set aside the prior paternity finding to give Alex's
counsel time to address the results of the genetic test with him. At the continued hearing,
Alex joined in Breanna's request to set aside the juvenile court's prior paternity finding.
Arianna's counsel objected to setting aside the prior paternity finding on the grounds it
5
would leave Arianna without a father and requested that Scott be notified of the paternity
developments. The juvenile court set an evidentiary hearing for the following month on
the issue of paternity.
At the evidentiary hearing the court heard the testimony of the Agency's social
worker and received into evidence Breanna's declaration, the Agency's reports and
visitation logs, Breanna's paternity inquiry forms for Alex and Scott and the results of
Alex's genetic testing. The Agency's social worker, Todd Clark, testified Alex was
engaged in reunification services and had positive interactions with Arianna throughout
the dependency. Clark testified that when he gave Alex the results of the genetic test,
Alex needed time to process the information. Clark then waited for Alex to contact him
to arrange further visitation with Arianna but Alex did not contact him again. Clark also
testified that Alex's relationship with Breanna was strained and he believed Breanna had
a restraining order in place against Alex.
Following closing arguments by counsel, the juvenile court issued its ruling. The
court recognized the difficulty of the decision before it and noted the decision was
complicated by the fact that there had been no objection to the earlier judgment of non-
paternity with respect to Scott. The court found that although it was not generally in the
interest of a child to leave her fatherless, in this case it was in Arianna's best interest not
to force a co-parenting relationship between Breanna and Alex and granted Breanna's
motion to set aside Alex's voluntary declaration of paternity.
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DISCUSSION
Arianna argues the juvenile court's order setting aside Alex's voluntary declaration
of paternity should be reversed because it was not in her best interests. The Agency, Alex
and Breanna each filed a brief asking this court to affirm the order.
I
The execution of a voluntary declaration of paternity is one way an alleged father
can assert his status as a presumed father entitled to custody and reunification services in
a dependency proceeding. (Fam. Code § 7571.2) After the declaration is signed and
filed with the DCSS it has the effect of a judgment and is a conclusive presumption of
paternity until it is set aside. (§§ 7573, 7611, 7612, subd. (a).) A voluntary declaration
of paternity filed with the DCSS is generally sufficient to entitle the male declarant to
presumed father status in dependency proceedings. (In re Liam L. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th
739, 747.)
When a man who has signed a voluntary declaration of paternity is determined by
genetic testing not to be the biological father of the child, section 7575, subdivision (b)(1)
authorizes a court to "set aside a voluntary declaration of paternity unless the court
determines that denial of the action to set aside the voluntary declaration of paternity is in
the best interest of the child, after consideration of" a set of factors, including "[t]he age
of the child," "[t]he length of time since the execution of the voluntary declaration of
paternity," "[t]he nature, duration, and quality of any relationship between the man who
2 All statutory references are to the Family Code. 7
signed the voluntary declaration and the child, including the duration and frequency of
any time periods during which the child and the man . . . resided in the same household or
enjoyed a parent-child relationship," "[t]he request of the man who signed the voluntary
declaration that the parent-child relationship continue," "[n]otice by the biological father
of the child that he does not oppose preservation of the relationship between the man who
signed the voluntary declaration and the child," "[t]he benefit or detriment to the child in
establishing the biological parentage of the child," and "[a]dditional factors deemed by
the court to be relevant to its determination of the best interest of the child."
(§7575, subd. (b)(1).)3
An order setting aside a voluntary declaration of paternity is reviewed by this
court for abuse of discretion. (Gabriel P. v. Suedi D. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 850, 862-
63; In re William K. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1, 10.) The order will not be disturbed on
appeal unless the court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary,
capricious or patently absurd determination. When two or more inferences reasonably can
be deduced from the facts, we have no authority to reweigh the evidence or substitute our
decision for that of the juvenile court. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-
319.)
3 Section 7646, subdivision (a)(2) also authorizes a judgment establishing paternity based on the execution of a voluntary declaration of paternity to be set aside if genetic testing indicates the man is not the biological father of the child. (§ 7646, subd. (a)(2).) Breanna's motion was brought under both sections 7646 and 7575. 8
II
We agree with Alex, Breanna and the Agency that the juvenile court did not abuse
its discretion by setting aside Alex's voluntary declaration of paternity. The juvenile
court conducted an evidentiary hearing and considered the applicable law and relevant
factors before finding that setting aside the declaration was in Arianna's best interests.
The court acknowledged its order would leave Arianna without a legal father and did not
take this fact lightly in concluding that the practical realities in this unusual situation
favored setting aside Alex's paternity judgment.
The court found there was no point in denying Breanna and Alex's request if, as
the present circumstances indicated, Alex would be a "parent in name only" and would
not contribute to Arianna's life or well-being. The court noted that Alex's reunification
efforts were to be commended and that it was possible he would take an interest in
Arianna's life down the road if the paternity judgment were upheld. However, the court
found this uncertain possibility did not outweigh the benefits to Arianna of severing the
legal tie to Alex, allowing Breanna to strengthen and develop her relationship with
Arianna unimpeded by a relationship with Alex that Breanna viewed as unhealthy. This
finding was supported by the facts before the juvenile court and did not constitute an
abuse of discretion.
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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
O'ROURKE, J.
AARON, J.
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside a voluntary declaration of paternity after genetic testing confirmed the declarant was not the biological father, finding it in the child's best interest to sever the legal tie.
Issues
Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by setting aside a voluntary declaration of paternity under Family Code sections 7575 and 7646.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The court found that although it was not generally in the interest of a child to leave her fatherless, in this case it was in Arianna's best interest not to force a co-parenting relationship between Breanna and Alex”
“The court found there was no point in denying Breanna and Alex's request if, as the present circumstances indicated, Alex would be a "parent in name only" and would not contribute to Arianna's life or well-being.”