California Court of Appeal Dec 22, 2014 No. D064735Unpublished
Filed 12/22/14 P. v. Chenda CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D064735
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. Nos. SCD243991, SCD246610) LACHAPELLE LORN CHENDA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Frederick
L. Link, Judge. Affirmed.
Patricia A. Scott, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General,
Arlene A. Sevidal and Tami Falkenstein Hennick, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
A jury found Lachapelle Chenda guilty of numerous crimes committed over a two-
year period, including: 11 counts of robbery, one count of burglary, one count of
attempted robbery, one count of receiving, concealing, or withholding a stolen vehicle,
and one count of acquiring access cards of four or more persons. (Pen. Code, §§ 211,
459, 664, 496d, 484e, subd. (b).)1 On the burglary and robbery counts, the jury found
true that Chenda was armed with, and/or personally discharged or used, a firearm.
The court did not err in imposing the sentence on count 14. The trial court could
have reasonably concluded that Chenda had multiple and distinct objectives in
committing the receiving stolen property crime and in committing the armed robbery
crimes. The vehicle was taken in Mission Valley between 8:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m.
Although Chenda was not specifically charged with taking the vehicle, it is reasonable to
infer that he took possession of the stolen vehicle during those hours or shortly thereafter.
Several hours later, about midnight, Chenda entered the Koon Thai Kitchen restaurant
and committed the robberies (and attempted robbery) against the six individuals. Under
these facts, the court could have reached a reasonable conclusion that Chenda's objective
in taking possession of the stolen vehicle was to either obtain the personal property inside
the vehicle and/or to use the stolen vehicle for transportation to locations other than (or in
addition to) the Koon Thai Kitchen restaurant. Because these objectives are different
from Chenda's purpose in committing the robberies, section 654 is inapplicable.
Further, "multiple crimes are not one transaction [for purposes of section 654]
where the defendant had a chance to reflect between offenses and each offense created a
new risk of harm." (People v. Felix (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 905, 915.) "Under section
654, a course of conduct divisible in time, though directed to one objective, may give rise
to multiple convictions and multiple punishment 'where the offenses are temporally
separated in such a way as to afford the defendant opportunity to reflect and renew his or
her intent before committing the next one, thereby aggravating the violation of public
security or policy already undertaken.' [Citation.]" (People v. Lopez, supra, 198
5
Cal.App.4th at pp. 717-718; accord People v. Petronella (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 945,
964; see also People v. Trotter (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 363, 367-368.)
The amount of time between the time the vehicle was stolen and the time the
robberies occurred (somewhere between two and four hours) was sufficient for Chenda to
reflect upon what he had already accomplished (received a stolen vehicle with various
personal items) and what he was about to do (armed robberies of customers and
employees inside a restaurant in Kearny Mesa). Although the record does not show
exactly the time at which Chenda received the vehicle, the court could reasonably infer
that he received it at or near the time it was stolen, or at least a sufficient time before he
entered the restaurant to permit him to reflect upon his acts.
In support of his argument that the only reasonable interpretation of the evidence
is that he received the stolen car for the sole purpose of facilitating the Koon Thai
Kitchen robberies, Chenda relies on a statement in the prosecutor's closing argument in
which the prosecutor suggested that the purpose of Chenda and his accomplice in stealing
the Honda was to "use it to [hide] their identit[ies]" during the subsequent robbery.
Although this may have been one of Chenda's purposes, the court was entitled to
conclude that Chenda had other objectives, particularly given the time difference between
the vehicle taking and the robberies, and the fact that the personal items were no longer in
the vehicle after it was found following the robberies. A reasonable factfinder could
conclude that Chenda took possession of the stolen vehicle because he wanted to obtain
the contents of the vehicle and/or wanted to use the stolen vehicle to transport himself to
another location, in addition to using the vehicle to commit the Koon Thai Kitchen
6
robberies later that evening. Additionally, the evidence supports that Chenda had the
opportunity to reflect between obtaining the stolen vehicle and entering the Koon Thai
Kitchen restaurant to commit the robbery crimes against the six individuals.
Chenda's reliance on People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158 is unhelpful.
Cooper stands for the proposition that the commission of robbery continues until the
stolen property is carried away to a place of temporary safety. (Id. at p. 1165.) This rule
does not preclude a finding that Chenda had multiple and distinct objectives when he
committed the receiving stolen property offense and when he committed the armed
robberies. The commission of the robberies and the receiving stolen property created a
substantially greater risk of harm than if Chenda had committed only one set of crimes,
warranting separate punishment.
DISPOSITION
Judgment affirmed.
HALLER, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
MCINTYRE, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the defendant's sentence for receiving a stolen vehicle did not violate Penal Code section 654 because the offense involved distinct objectives and a sufficient temporal separation from the subsequent robberies to allow for reflection.
Issues
Whether the trial court erred in failing to stay the sentence for receiving a stolen vehicle under Penal Code section 654.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The trial court could have reasonably concluded that Chenda had multiple and distinct objectives in committing the receiving stolen property crime and in committing the armed robbery crimes.”
“multiple crimes are not one transaction [for purposes of section 654] where the defendant had a chance to reflect between offenses and each offense created a new risk of harm.”