California Court of Appeal Dec 4, 2014 No. E061142Unpublished
Filed 12/4/14 In re N.S. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re N.S., et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E061142
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.Nos. J252823 & J252824)
v. OPINION
J.S.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Lily L. Sinfield,
Judge. Affirmed.
Suzanne Davidson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Jean-Rene Basle, County Counsel, Jeffrey L. Bryson, Deputy County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
The juvenile court declared minors, N.S. (born 1999) and N.Y.S. (born 2002),
dependents of the court, removed them from the custody of defendant and appellant J.S.
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(father), and placed them with their mother under family maintenance services.1 The
juvenile court additionally denied father reunification services finding, pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code section 361, subdivision (b)(6),2 that N.Y.S. had been
between the parent . . . and the child or a sibling . . . for the sexual gratification of the
parent . . . .” (Ibid.)
“In determining whether reunification services will benefit the child pursuant to
3 At the disposition hearing, father’s counsel indicated father had confused the date of the jurisdiction hearing with the date he was supposed to report to jury duty.
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paragraph (6) . . . of subdivision (b), the court shall consider any information it deems
relevant, including the following factors: [¶] (1) The specific act or omission comprising
the severe sexual abuse or the severe physical harm inflicted on the child or the child’s
sibling . . . . [¶] (2) The circumstances under which the abuse or harm was inflicted on
the child or the child’s sibling . . . . [¶] (3) The severity of the emotional trauma suffered
by the child or the child’s sibling . . . . [¶] (4) Any history of abuse of other children by
the offending parent . . . . [¶] (5) The likelihood that the child may be safely returned to
the care of the offending parent or guardian within 12 months with no continuing
supervision. [¶] (6) Whether or not the child desires to be reunified with the offending
parent or guardian.” (§ 361.5, subd. (i)(1)-(6).)
“‘“‘[O]nce it is determined one of the situations outlined in [section 361.5,]
subdivision (b) applies, the general rule favoring reunification is replaced by a legislative
assumption that offering services would be an unwise use of governmental resources.
[Citation.]’” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Thus, ‘[t]he court shall not order reunification for a
parent . . . described in [section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) or (7)] unless the court finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child.’
[Citation.] ‘The burden is on the parent to . . . show that reunification would serve the
best interests of the child.’ [Citation.] The best interests determination encompasses a
consideration of the parent’s current efforts, fitness and history; the seriousness of the
problem that led to the dependency; the strength of the parent-child and caretaker-child
bonds; and the child’s need for stability and continuity. [Citation.] A best interests
finding also requires a likelihood that reunification services will succeed. [Citation.] ‘In
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other words, there must be some “reasonable basis to conclude” that reunification is
possible before services are offered to a parent who need not be provided them.
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re A.G. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 276, 281.)
“We review an order denying reunification services by determining if substantial
evidence supports it. [Citation.] In doing so, we resolve all conflicts in the evidence in
favor of the juvenile court’s finding. [Citation.]” (In re S.B. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th
612, 623.)
Here, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that section
361.5, subdivision (6) was applicable. Father had engaged in varying acts of sexual
abuse against his then 11-year-old daughter on a daily basis for approximately two
months. N.Y.S.’s disclosures during the CAC interview were extremely detailed and
highly disturbing. She reported father would tell her he was “excited for her to get older
so that he [could] ‘do more things to her as a woman.’” N.Y.S. refused any offer to see
father and stated that she never wished to live with him again. N.S. had apparently
witnessed at least one sexual incident between father and N.Y.S. N.S. was visibly
shaking with fear when around father on at least two occasions during the proceedings.
Father disavowed all the allegations: “Such denial on the part of a parent usually
[indicates] a poor prognosis for family reunification, as any child will always remain at
extreme high risk for abuse or neglect.” Father had apparently told N.S. not to reveal
what he had witnessed to anyone. Likewise, father had told N.Y.S. not to tell anyone
what he did to her because he would go to prison and she would be put in foster care.
Father’s sister had attempted to get N.Y.S. to recant the allegations when speaking to her
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by telephone at the foster parent’s home. Nearly every circumstance itemized under
section 361.5, subdivision (i)(1) through (6) was applicable in this case. Sufficient
evidence supported the juvenile court’s denial of reunification services for father.
Father exposits In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, In re Andy G. (2010) 183
Cal.App.4th 1405, and In re Karen R. (2001) 95 Cal.App.4th 84, for the proposition that
reunification services may properly be ordered for a parent who sexually molested a
minor. However, all of these cases dealt with jurisdictional findings, not dispositional
orders such as an order regarding reunification services. (I.J., at pp. 771-772, 778; Andy
G., at pp. 1407, 1409-1410, 1415; Karen R., at pp. 88-89. 91.) “‘[I]t is axiomatic that
cases are not authority for propositions not considered.’ [Citation.]” (Sonic-Calabasas
A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1160.) In any event, the fact that reunification
services may be ordered to an offending parent is not commensurate with a requirement
that the juvenile court must offer such services. Here, substantial evidence supported the
court’s finding that N.Y.S. was severely sexually abused by father, and father failed to
prove that reunification services would benefit minors.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS CODRINGTON J. We concur: