Sean & Shenassa v. Chicago Title Co. CA4/1 (2014) · DecisionDepot
Sean & Shenassa v. Chicago Title Co. CA4/1
California Court of Appeal Oct 31, 2014 No. D063003Unpublished
Filed 10/31/14 Sean & Shenassa v. Chicago Title Co. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SEAN & SHENASSA 26, LLC, D063003
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2011-00094742- CU-CO-CTL) CHICAGO TITLE COMPANY,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Timothy B. Taylor, Judge. Affirmed.
Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker and Robert Cooper for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Garrett & Tully, Ryan C. Squire, Edward W. Racek; Andersen Hilbert & Parker
and Jason L. Satterly for Defendant and Respondent.
Sean & Shenassa 26, LLC (S&S) appeals a judgment in favor of Chicago Title
Company (Chicago Title) on S&S's claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligent
performance of contract. S&S argues (1) the trial court erred by failing to properly
instruct the jury on the principle of causation on its claim for negligent performance of
contract, and (2) the trial court did not instruct and the special verdict form did not
require the jury to find S&S gave "informed" consent to Chicago Title performing its
fiduciary duty the way it did. We reject these arguments and affirm the judgment.
(Mock).) " 'The determination whether, in a specific instance, the probable effect of the
instruction has been to mislead the jury and whether the error has been prejudicial so as
to require reversal depends on all of the circumstances of the case, including the evidence
and the other instructions given. No precise formula can be drawn.' " (Ibid., italics
omitted.)
II. Causation Instruction
A. Background
At trial, S&S argued it would have canceled the transaction if it could not secure
an ALTA policy. However, Chicago Title improperly closed escrow without obtaining
an ALTA policy and released S&S's $1.2 million down payment to the seller. Chicago
Title, on the other hand, argued S&S lost its money because it failed to make its mortgage
payments and S&S's losses had nothing to do with the type of title insurance policy it
received.
On S&S's negligent performance of contract claim, the trial court instructed the
jury that "[t]o recover damages from Chicago Title for negligent performance of an
escrow contract, S&S must prove all of the following: First, that S&S and Chicago Title
entered into a contract. Second, that S&S did all or substantially all of the significant
things that the contract required it to do. Third, that Chicago Title negligently failed to
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do something that the contract required it to do. Four, that S&S was harmed by that
failure." (Italics added.)
In a special verdict on the negligent performance of contractual obligations claim,
the jury found the following:
"1. Did S&S and Chicago Title enter into a contract requiring Chicago Title to obtain an ALTA Owner's policy of title insurance for S&S? [¶] Answer 'yes' or 'no.'
"Answer: Yes
"[¶] . . . [¶]
"2. Did S&S modify the contract by providing Chicago Title with oral escrow instructions whereby Chicago Title was required to get a Binder for a CLTA Standard Coverage policy of title insurance and not required to get an ALTA Owner's policy? [¶] Answer 'yes' or 'no.'
"Answer: No
"[¶] . . . [¶]
"3. Did S&S waive any requirement by Chicago Title to get an ALTA Owner's policy of title insurance when S&S executed the Second Amendment to Purchase and Sale Agreement? [¶] Answer 'yes' or 'no.'
"Answer: No
"[¶] . . . [¶]
"4. Did S&S consent to Chicago Title issuing a Binder for a CLTA Standard Coverage policy of title insurance by reviewing and acknowledging the preliminary reports issued by Chicago Title and by reviewing and executing the estimated closing statements? [¶] Answer 'yes' or 'no.'
"Answer: No
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"[¶] . . . [¶]
"5. Did [Chicago Title] negligently fail to follow the escrow instructions? [¶] Answer 'yes' or 'no.'
"Answer: Yes
"[¶] . . . [¶]
"6. Was S&S harmed by [Chicago Title's] failure to follow the escrow instructions? [¶] Answer 'yes' or 'no.'
"Answer: No"
B. Analysis
S&S argues the trial court erred by failing to instruct on the principle of concurrent
causation. Specifically, S&S contends it was only required to show "[Chicago Title's]
conduct was a substantial factor in contributing to the harm, . . . regardless of whether
there were other contributing causes or whether those contributing causes were sufficient,
on their own to cause the damage." S&S asserts that in the absence of a concurrent
causation instruction, the jury was not informed that Chicago Title could be liable for
S&S's damages even if S&S's failure to make mortgage payments was also a cause of
harm. Further, S&S takes issue with the instruction providing the elements S&S must
establish to prove negligent performance of the escrow contract because that instruction
combined the elements of causation and damages by stating S&S must prove it was
"harmed" by Chicago Title's conduct.
Chicago Title contends S&S waived its claim of instructional error by failing to
request a "concurrent causation" instruction or a more specific causation instruction.
Chicago Title's contention has merit.
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We find no indication in the record and S&S does not point to any request for a
modification or addition to the instructions concerning causation. The record also does
not reveal whether S&S objected to the court's instruction on the elements of negligent
performance of the escrow instructions. S&S thus waived its right to claim instructional
error by acquiescing in the court's instruction. In Mesecher v. County of San Diego
(1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1677, 1686 (Mesecher), we explained principles of waiver "apply
with particular force in the area of jury instructions." "A civil litigant must propose
complete instructions in accordance with his or her theory of the litigation and a trial
court is not 'obligated to seek out theories [a party] might have advanced, or to articulate
for him that which he has left unspoken.' [Citations.]" (Ibid.)
Anticipating Chicago Title's waiver argument, S&S contends the trial court had a
sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the principle of concurrent causation. It relies on
case law standing for the proposition that the trial court has a duty to instruct on
controlling legal principles in the case. (See Pepper v. Underwood (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d
698, 709-710; Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 951 (Agarwal).) This rule
applies where there is a "complete failure to instruct on material issues and controlling
legal principles . . . ." (Agarwal, at p. 951.) Otherwise, there is ordinarily no duty to
instruct in the absence of a specific request by a party. (Ibid.)
S&S's reliance on the above-stated rule is unavailing because this is not a case
where the trial court entirely failed to instruct on material principles. The trial court
instructed the jury that S&S must prove it was "harmed by" Chicago Title's negligent
failure to do something required by the contract. This is the same terminology used in
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standard jury instructions approved by the Judicial Council of California, such as the
instruction setting forth the elements of breach of contract (CACI No. 300) and the
standard verdict form for breach of contract (CACI No. VF-300). In fact, the court's
instruction on the essential factual elements of negligent performance of contractual
obligations appears to be modeled off of CACI No. 303 on breach of contract. In our
view, the court's instruction was at most deficient by reason of generality. Under these
circumstances, S&S was required to object and propose a more specific or more complete
instruction. (See Agarwal, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 948-949.) By not requesting
instructions more clearly explaining principles of causation, S&S waived its claim of
error. (Ibid.)
III. Consent Instruction
A. Background
At trial, Chicago Title argued that S&S consented to Chicago Title obtaining a
CLTA interim binder rather than an ALTA policy by not objecting to the preliminary
reports and closing statements. S&S claimed, however, that it never wanted an interim
binder, never discussed the binder with Chicago Title, and had never heard of the concept
of an interim binder until after the close of escrow.
The trial court instructed the jury that on S&S's claim for breach of fiduciary duty,
the jury must resolve "Chicago Title['s] alleg[ation] that S&S accepted or consented to
Chicago Title's alleged conduct, [and] S&S waived the provisions in the Purchase and
Sale Agreement conditioning the close of escrow on S&S's ability to obtain an ALTA[]
owner's policy of title insurance." In a special verdict, the jury found S&S did not waive
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the performance of Chicago Title's fiduciary duty, but S&S did "consent to [Chicago
Title] in performing its fiduciary duty as it did." Although the special verdict form did
not require the jury answer any other questions on the form, the jury proceeded to answer
the next question, which asked, "Did [Chicago Title] breach its fiduciary duty owed to
S&S." By a vote of eleven to one, the jury responded, "No."
B. Analysis
S&S contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct that on Chicago Title's
consent defense, the jury must find S&S gave "informed" consent allowing Chicago Title
to perform its fiduciary duty the way it did. S&S also argues the special verdict form was
incomplete because it did not require a finding of "informed" consent and the jury's
consent finding on the fiduciary duty claim conflicted with its finding on the contract
claim.
1. Jury Instruction on Consent
"[F]ailure to object to civil jury instructions will not be deemed a waiver where the
instruction is prejudicially erroneous as given, that is which is an incorrect statement of
the law. On the other hand, a jury instruction which is incomplete or too general must be
accompanied by an objection or qualifying instruction to avoid the doctrine of waiver."
(Bishop v. Hyundai Motor America (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 750, 760.)
Here, the trial court informed the jury it must resolve Chicago Title's allegation
that S&S consented to Chicago Title's conduct. Based on our review of the record, S&S
did not object to this instruction or request an amplifying instruction informing the jury
that Chicago Title must have obtained S&S's informed consent. Thus, S&S forfeited its
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argument that the trial court failed to instruct on the principle of informed consent as it
was obligated to request a qualifying instruction if it wanted one.
Even if S&S did not forfeit its argument, we conclude the alleged error was not
likely to have misled the jury and did not result in a miscarriage of justice. In
determining whether an alleged instructional error resulted in prejudice, we look to all of
the circumstances of the case, including the evidence, the other instructions given,
counsel's argument, and any indications by the jury that it was misled. (Mock, supra, 4
Cal.App.4th at p. 335; Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 580.)
There is no indication that the jury was misled regarding the nature or timing of
the consent required to prove Chicago Title's defense. The jurors did not pose any
questions in this regard. Further, the other jury instructions informed jurors regarding an
escrow holder's heightened duties pertaining to the escrow instructions. For example, the
instructions provided that escrow holders must "comply strictly" with the escrow
instructions, substantial performance of the escrow instructions was not enough, and the
escrow holder had a duty to take corrective steps to clear up conflict or error in the
escrow instructions.
The jury's findings on S&S's negligent performance of contractual obligations
claim also reveals the jury did not find consent based on S&S's failure to object to the
preliminary reports and closing statements. On the contract claim, the jury expressly
found S&S did not "consent to Chicago Title issuing a Binder for a CLTA Standard
Coverage policy of title insurance by reviewing and acknowledging the preliminary
reports issued by Chicago Title and by reviewing and executing the estimated closing
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statements[.]" Thus, any suggestion that the jury based its consent finding on the
fiduciary duty claim on S&S's acquiescence to the title reports and closing statements
lacks merit. Lastly, we note that although the jury was not required to answer whether
Chicago Title breached its fiduciary duty to S&S, the jury concluded it did not.
Based on the record before us, we conclude the alleged instructional error did not
prejudice S&S.
2. Special Verdict
S&S contends the special verdict form was incomplete because it did not require a
finding of "informed" consent. S&S also argues the jury's finding that S&S consented to
the way Chicago Title performed its fiduciary duty conflicted with the jury's finding on
the contract claim.
"Unlike a general verdict (which merely implies findings on all issues in favor of
the plaintiff or defendant), a special verdict presents to the jury each ultimate fact in the
case. The jury must resolve all of the ultimate facts presented to it in the special verdict,
so that 'nothing shall remain to the court but to draw from them conclusions of law.'
[Citation.] [¶] The requirement that the jury must resolve every controverted issue is one
of the recognized pitfalls of special verdicts. '[T]he possibility of a defective or
incomplete special verdict, or possibly no verdict at all, is much greater than with a
general verdict that is tested by special findings . . . .' " (Falls v. Superior Court (1987)
194 Cal.App.3d 851, 854-855.) In the case of a special verdict form, reversal is not
merited for an internally inconsistent verdict if the inconsistency was invited by the
appellant, i.e., if the appellant drafted or stipulated to the special verdict form. (See
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Mesecher, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1686-1687; Myers Building Industries, Ltd. v.
Interface Technology, Inc. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 949, 960, fn. 8; see also Stevens v.
findings will be treated as inconsistent only if they are clearly antagonistic and absolutely
irreconcilable with each other under any rational view of the evidence. (Lowen v. Finnila
(1940) 15 Cal.2d 502, 504.)
Here, the parties stipulated to special verdict forms. Although S&S stated it
continued to object to "issues [it] raised during the jury instructions," we see no
indication in the record that S&S specifically requested an instruction on "informed
consent" or that it requested to modify the special verdict form to include that language.
S&S also does not point us to its specific objection on this issue. Instead, S&S only
points to a general objection that Chicago Title's waiver and consent affirmative defenses
do not apply to breach of fiduciary duty. This was not sufficient to alert the trial court
that S&S sought to modify the verdict form and instructions to require the jury to make a
finding of "informed consent." If S&S wanted such an instruction or finding, it was
incumbent on S&S to request it. Accordingly, S&S is barred by the invited error doctrine
from complaining about inconsistencies in the verdict on appeal. S&S also forfeited its
claim regarding the completeness of the special verdict form by failing to raise the issue
below.
Furthermore, S&S's claim fails on the merits as the jury's findings are not clearly
antagonistic and absolutely irreconcilable with each other. (Lowen v. Finnila, supra, 15
Cal.2d at p. 504.) The jury determined that S&S did not consent to Chicago Title issuing
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a CLTA binder by failing to object to the preliminary reports and closing statements.
The jury, however, also found that S&S did consent to Chicago Title "performing its
fiduciary duty as it did." These are two separate findings. The first provided discrete
issues for the jury to resolve while the second was a general finding on consent in the
fiduciary duty context. At trial, S&S argued Chicago Title breached its duties in multiple
ways that did not relate to Chicago Title's contractual obligation to obtain an ALTA
policy. For example, S&S argued, among other things, that Chicago Title failed to
comply with its duty to clarify ambiguities in the escrow instructions and to remain
neutral in the transaction. Because there were at least two separate courses of conduct on
which the jury's findings could have been based, the jury's determinations are not clearly
irreconcilable. The verdict is thus not inconsistent.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to its costs on appeal.
MCINTYRE, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
NARES, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of the defendant, holding that the plaintiff waived its claims of instructional error regarding causation and informed consent by failing to request specific instructions or object to the trial court's general instructions at trial. Furthermore, the court found no reversible error in the special verdict form or the jury's findings.
Issues
Did the trial court err by failing to instruct the jury on the principle of concurrent causation?
Did the trial court err by failing to instruct the jury on the requirement of 'informed' consent?
Was the special verdict form incomplete or internally inconsistent regarding the findings of consent?
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“A civil litigant must propose complete instructions in accordance with his or her theory of the litigation and a trial court is not 'obligated to seek out theories [a party] might have advanced, or to articulate for him that which he has left unspoken.'”