Decker v. Vestra Resources CA3

Filed 10/30/14 Decker v. Vestra Resources CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Shasta) ----

ANDREW DECKER, C075297

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 13CVCV0176787) v.

VESTRA RESOURCES INCORPORATED et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

Plaintiff Andrew Decker, acting in propria persona, appeals from an order granting defendant Vestra Resources Incorporated’s motion for attorney fees. Decker contends Vestra is not entitled to attorney fees under either contract or statute, and challenges the amount. As we explain, Vestra is entitled to attorney fees under both contract and statute, and Decker has failed to show the trial court abused its discretion as to the amount. Accordingly, we affirm.

1

BACKGROUND Decker settled his charge of employment discrimination with Vestra. Under the settlement agreement, Decker received $7,000. The agreement also contained an attorney fee provision that provides: “If any action at law or in equity, or any motion, is brought to enforce, interpret or rescind this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to all of its costs in bringing and prosecuting said action or motion, including reasonable attorney’s fees.” Decker brought an action against Vestra to rescind the settlement agreement, also claiming religious discrimination and wrongful termination with respect to his previous employment there. His additional claims were dependent on his successfully rescinding the settlement agreement. The cause of action for rescission (and thus the entire complaint) was based on a letter Vestra’s counsel, Benjamin Kennedy, had sent Decker during negotiation of the settlement. Decker alleged that the letter had caused him to sign the settlement agreement under duress or undue influence. In response, Vestra brought a special motion to strike Decker’s complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute).1 The trial court granted the motion. The court found Decker’s lawsuit arose from Vestra’s exercise of a protected activity--counsel’s letter during negotiations. The court further found Decker failed to show a probability of success to rescind the settlement agreement due to duress because the evidence showed Kennedy’s letter did not intimidate Decker; it had no effect on him. The court granted judgment to Vestra. Vestra moved for attorney fees pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1) and the attorney fee provision of the settlement agreement.