Torres v. Blankenship CA4/2 (2014) · DecisionDepot
Torres v. Blankenship CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Oct 14, 2014 No. E057465Unpublished
Filed 10/14/14 Torres v. Blankenship CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
MARY LOU TORRES,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E057465
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIC496283)
MARK IRVIN BLANKENSHIP, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Mac R. Fisher, Judge.
Affirmed.
Mary Lou Torres, in pro. per., and Joel M. Murillo for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Eric M. Strong for Defendant and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Mark Irvin Blankenship was a California lawyer who resigned from the
State Bar with charges pending against him. Beginning in October 2004, plaintiffs Mary
1
Lou Torres and her brother, Angel Torres,1 had hired defendant to represent them and
their children in several matters. Defendant did not disclose to them until March 2006
that he was being investigated by the State Bar and had been suspended in January 2006.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendant for breach of contract and fraud. On
the first day of trial, the trial court dismissed Angel for failure to appear (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 581, subd. (b)(1))2 and granted defendant’s oral motion for judgment on the pleadings
(§ 438) against Mary Lou. The purported “judgment” prepared by defendant’s counsel
was not an appealable judgment. The trial court entered the actual judgment on
September 14, 2012.
Plaintiff Mary Lou appeals, arguing the trial court applied the wrong statute of
limitations and erred in finding that plaintiff had not pleaded fraud with sufficient
specificity. She also argues she was denied due process because she was not given an
adequate opportunity to respond to the oral motion for judgment on the pleadings or to
amend her complaint. Defendant challenges the timeliness of the appeal and, of course,
defends the trial court’s rulings and judgment.
We hold the appeal is timely. As was determined by this court on April 17 and
May 18, 2012, the “judgment” of December 15, 2011, was not an appealable judgment.
1 We use their first names for ease of reference. Angel and the children are not parties to this appeal.
2 All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
2
The appealable judgment was entered on September 14, 2012. On the merits, we hold the
trial court applied the correct statute of limitations and properly granted the motion for
judgment on the pleadings. We affirm the judgment.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Although it not part of the record on appeal, Mary Lou has attached to her opening
brief a copy of a nonbinding arbitration award, dated March 2008, and denying her
claims against defendant. The parties discussed the arbitration proceeding and award
with the trial court. The parties also refer to the arbitration as part of the history of the
case in their appellate briefs. Therefore, we will also consider it here to assist in a full
understanding of the issues and arguments.
The arbitration panel of three made the following findings and award: “Ms.
Torres contends that she paid Attorney Blankenship $26,000 to represent her in various
legal matters. Ms. Torres paid Attorney Blankenship approximately $10,000 to represent
her brother in a criminal case through preliminary hearing, which he did and that fee was
earned. Ms. Torres lacks standing to pursue any fee dispute regarding those fees because
she is not the client. The panel finds that Ms. Torres paid an additional $5,000 to
Attorney Blankenship concerning allegations of criminal misconduct and continued
harassment from the school officials. The harassment stopped with the help of Attorney
Blankenship. The fee that was paid has been earned as it relates to that issue. Attorney
Blankenship entered into another legal relationship for an immigration matter and the fee
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of $2,000 was refunded to the client. There is no other credible evidence that any other
fees were paid to Attorney Blankenship.” The panel further found that Mary Lou had
paid $5,000 for services rendered and was not entitled to any award of fees.
Plaintiffs filed the original complaint on March 24, 2008. In August 2008,
plaintiffs filed an amended complaint for breach of contract, negligence, and fraud,
seeking damages of $50,000. Plaintiffs alleged that they employed defendant in 2004,
2005, and 2006 to provide legal representation in a civil case, a criminal case, and “an
education advocacy matter.” Defendant did not disclose until March 24, 2006, that he
was being investigated by the State Bar and had been suspended two months earlier on
January 25, 2006. Plaintiffs paid defendant $26,000 and had to hire substitute counsel for
$24,000.
In February 2009, defendant filed a general denial and affirmative defenses,
including the statute of limitations. Various proceedings were conducted in the superior
court between February 2009 and December 2011. In March 2011, the court set a date
for a five-day jury trial in November 2011. The trial date was continued to December 2,
2011, when the trial court denied Mary Lou’s ex parte application to continue the trial
date again.
On December 5, 2011, the court dismissed Angel for failure to appear for trial.
(§ 581.) Defendant then made a motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the one-
year statute of limitations for an action against an attorney; the one-year limitations
period expired in March 2007. (§§ 338, 340.6.) Defendant also argued the fraud cause of
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action was not specifically pleaded and plaintiff had not attached a written contract or
pleaded its terms. The trial court agreed the complaint was time-barred and granted the
motion for judgment on the pleadings. The judgment, prepared by defendant’s attorney,
was filed on December 15, 2011.3
On February 6, 2012, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal (E055664) from the
judgment of December 15, 2011. On April 17, 2012, this court issued an order stating
that “the December 15, 2011, order is a judgment only as to plaintiff Angel Torres and
that as to [Mary Lou] it is merely an order granting a motion for judgment on the
pleadings and is therefore not an appealable order. (Neufeld v. State Bd. of Equalization
(2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1471, 1476, fn. 4.)” We dismissed the appeal without prejudice.
On May 18, 2012, we repeated our order that there was no appealable judgment against
plaintiff Mary Lou.
On July 19, 2012, plaintiff filed a motion to “correct clerical error in judgment
nunc pro tunc.”4 Defendant filed opposition. On August 24, 2012, the trial court,
following our determination, found that the so-called judgment of December 15, 2011,
was only an order with respect to plaintiff Mary Lou. The trial court granted a motion to
amend the judgment. A judgment in favor of defendant and against both plaintiffs was
3 Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion that the judgment was not signed by a judge, it was in fact signed by Kenneth G. Ziebarth, a retired judge sitting by assignment. (Cal. Const. art. VI, § 6.)
4 The motion is not part of the appellate record.
5
entered on September 14, 2012. Plaintiff Mary Lou filed a notice of appeal on November
2, 2012.
III
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Because this court previously twice held that the order of December 15, 2011, was
not an appealable judgment, we will not revisit the issue a third time in this appeal. The
appeal from the judgment of September 14, 2012, is timely. We also will not address the
dismissal of Angel Torres, who is not party to this appeal, and whose dismissal is not the
subject of Mary Lou’s appeal. Angel Torres’s minor children are also not parties to this
appeal and any claims they may have against defendant are irrelevant. Finally, plaintiff
offers no argument regarding the breach of contract cause of action.5
Instead, the only issue for us to resolve is the propriety of the trial court granting
defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the one-year statute of
limitations for attorney misconduct as it applies to plaintiff’s cause of action for fraud.
(§ 340.6.) The standard of review is the same as for reviewing the sustaining of a general
demurrer. We accept as true the properly-pleaded allegations of the complaint—as well
as any facts that may be judicially noticed—to determine whether a complaint states, or
5We disregard plaintiff’s effort to address the breach of contract claim at oral argument. We also reject plaintiff’s other arguments raised for the first time.
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may be amended to state, a valid cause of action. (Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th
666, 672.)
Section 340.6 provides: “(a) An action against an attorney for a wrongful act or
omission, other than for actual fraud, arising in the performance of professional services
shall be commenced within one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of
reasonable diligence should have discovered, the facts constituting the wrongful act or
omission, . . .”
According to the allegations of the complaint, defendant provided legal
representation to Mary Lou and her brother in 2004, 2005, and 2006 until defendant
notified them on March 24, 2006, that he had been suspended from practice by the State
Bar on January 25, 2006. Unless defendant committed “actual fraud,” the one-year
statute of limitations expired on March 24, 2007, and the complaint filed on March 24,
2008, was obviously time-barred. There is no authority whatsoever for plaintiff’s
argument that participating in a nonbinding arbitration—which concluded on March 20,
2008—somehow tolled the one-year statutory limitations period.
Claims of actual fraud are governed by a three-year statute of limitations. (§ 338,
subd. (d).) However, where the gravamen of the claim is legal malpractice, the client
cannot avoid application of section 340.6 by pleading alternative theories or by masking
the legal malpractice claim as something else like breach of contract or breach of
fiduciary duty: “In all cases other than actual fraud, whether the theory of liability is
based on the breach of an oral or written contract, a tort, or a breach of a fiduciary duty,
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the one-year statutory period applies.” (Levin v. Graham & James (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th
798, 805; Quintilliani v. Mannerino (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 54, 68.)
Plaintiff’s fundamental claim here is that defendant engaged in malpractice
because he could not practice law when he was under investigation and suspended by the
State Bar. Plaintiff cites no authority that defendant’s conduct constituted actual fraud
instead of attorney misconduct. Negligent legal service is legal malpractice, not actual
fraud. Defendant’s inability to practice law while suspended was not actual fraud. Legal
malpractice, as opposed to actual fraud, involves the failure to use ordinary skill,
prudence, and diligence as lawyers commonly possess and exercise—something
defendant could not do while he was suspended. (See Quintilliani v. Mannerino, supra,
62 Cal.App.4th at p. 64, citing Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand (1971)
6 Cal.3d 176, 180.) An attorney fee dispute is usually not characterized as actual fraud.
(Levin v. Graham & James, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 805.) Furthermore, breach of
fiduciary duty based on defendant’s nondisclosure of his suspension is also subject to the
one-year limitations period. (See Stoll v. Superior Court (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1362,
1365-1369.)
In this case, defendant rendered legal services to plaintiff and her brother
beginning in October 2004. Before he was suspended in January 2006, defendant
provided legal representation for at least 15 months. Mary Lou’s complaint seeks to
8
recover all the money paid to defendant in three cases.6 For that reason, she participated
in the arbitration involving attorney’s fees for the performance of legal services.
Fundamentally, this case involves Mary Lou’s contention that defendant could not
represent her for the two months after he had been suspended. In other words, defendant
committed professional misconduct for which she seeks damages. Section 340.6 applies
to Mary Lou’s claims.
We summarily reject plaintiff’s additional claims that she was deprived of due
process because the trial court granted defendant’s oral motion without giving plaintiff
reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard or to amend her complaint. Defendant’s
answer—including the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations—was filed in
February 2009. Plaintiff had almost three years before December 5, 2011, to try to
remedy the deficiencies in her complaint. On the day of trial, she did not ask leave to
amend after the judgment on the pleadings was granted or explain how she could amend
to avoid the limitations issue. On appeal, she also does not make an offer of proof to
justify amending her complaint. Plaintiff’s only argument in this respect is that she had
30 days after the date of the arbitration award to file a complaint. But any deadlines
triggered by the arbitration award have nothing to do with the application of the one-year
limitation period set forth in section 340.6.
6 The record does not disclose whether the three cases, if any, were ongoing as of January 2006.
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Whether a trial court should grant leave to amend depends on whether there is a
reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Mendoza v.
Continental Sales Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1402.) The plaintiff carries the
burden of demonstrating she can cure the pleading defect. (Foundation for Taxpayer &
Consumer Rights v. Nextel Communications, Inc. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 131, 135.)
Because plaintiff did not seek leave to amend her complaint below and has failed to meet
her burden of demonstrating she could amend her complaint, we conclude the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend.
IV
DISPOSITION
The trial court properly granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings based on
section 340.6. We affirm the judgment.
In the interests of justice, the parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON J.
We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
RICHLI J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the plaintiff's claims against her former attorney were time-barred under the one-year statute of limitations for attorney misconduct, as the allegations constituted legal malpractice rather than actual fraud. The court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint.
Issues
Whether the trial court correctly applied the one-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 to the plaintiff's claims.
Whether the plaintiff's allegations of attorney misconduct constituted actual fraud, thereby avoiding the one-year limitations period.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings without granting leave to amend.
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Negligent legal service is legal malpractice, not actual fraud.”
“Because plaintiff did not seek leave to amend her complaint below and has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating she could amend her complaint, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend.”