Baldwin v. JPMorgan Chase Bank CA2/2

Filed 10/9/14 Baldwin v. JPMorgan Chase Bank CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

JUDITH L. BALDWIN et al., B247882

Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. EC058619) v.

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Laura A. Matz, Judge. Affirmed. Judith L. Baldwin, in pro. per., and Prince Song Cambilargiu, in pro. per., for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Bryan Cave, Christopher L. Dueringer, and Richard P. Steelman for Defendant and Respondent.

Can the tender of a check drawn on an individual and postdated 50 years pay off a home loan? The trial court ruled it could not, and we agree. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff Judith L. Baldwin (Baldwin) borrowed $664,000 in a 40-year loan from Washington Mutual (WaMu). WaMu took out a deed of trust secured by Baldwin’s home in Valley Village, California, naming itself as beneficiary and California Reconveyance Company (CRC) as trustee. Beneficial ownership of the deed of trust later passed to defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase), and then to Bank of America. Baldwin eventually fell behind in her mortgage payments, and CRC filed a notice of default, followed by four notices of trustee’s sale. Before a nonjudicial foreclosure sale took place, Baldwin quitclaimed 20 percent of her interest in the home to plaintiff Prince Song Cambilargiu (Cambilargiu). Cambilargiu then mailed Chase an untitled check purporting to pay off the entire balance of the mortgage, except that the check was drawn on Cambilargiu himself (not a bank) and was postdated 50 years. When Chase refused to accept the check in satisfaction of the loan or to reconvey the deed of trust to plaintiffs, they sued Chase, in pertinent part, for breach of contract, for violations of Civil Code sections 2924, subdivision (a)(1) and 2941, and to quiet title. The trial court sustained Chase’s demurrer without leave to amend. DISCUSSION Our task in reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend is twofold: We ask “whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action,” and “whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “[W]e accept as true both facts alleged in the text of the [pertinent] complaint and facts appearing in exhibits attached to it. If the facts appearing in the attached exhibit contradict those expressly pleaded, those in the exhibit are given precedence.” (Mead v. Sanwa Bank California (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 561, 567-568.)