California Court of Appeal Sep 29, 2014 No. D065301Unpublished
Filed 9/29/14 In re Frances G. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re FRANCES G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D065301 THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. J234154)
v.
FRANCES G.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Richard R.
Monroy, Judge. Affirmed.
Robert Booher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, and Charles C. Ragland and Stacy
Tyler, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The juvenile delinquency court made a true finding that Frances G. had received
stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)), a felony. The court declared her a ward and
ordered her placed with her adult sister, under the supervision of the probation officer.
Frances appeals, contending the court violated her due process rights by not holding a
hearing to consider her suitability for deferred entry of judgment (Welf. & Inst. Code,
judgment] consideration by contesting the charges." (In re D.L., supra, at p. 1244.)
Frances correctly concedes "[t]he prosecutor fulfilled its duty to inform the court
and [Frances] that [Frances] was eligible for a deferred entry of judgment . . . ." In re
Luis B. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1117, on which Frances relies, is therefore
distinguishable; in that case, the prosecutor did not give the required notice. (Id. at
p. 1123.) In re D.L., supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at page 1240, is also distinguishable. There,
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the probation department filed a report stating D.L. was eligible but not suitable for
deferred entry of judgment. (Id. at p. 1242.) The court summarily found the minor was
not suitable and the minor then entered a denial to the allegations of the petition. (Id. at
pp. 1242-1243, 1245.)
In re Kenneth J., supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at page 973, on the other hand, is
apposite. There, the prosecutor gave the requisite notice. (Id. at p. 977.) A hearing on
deferred entry of judgment was set, but never held. (Id. at p. 978.) Before the date set for
the hearing on deferred entry of judgment, the minor requested a contested jurisdictional
hearing. (Id. at pp. 977-979.) The reviewing court rejected his contention that the
juvenile court had erred by failing to hold a hearing on deferred entry of judgment. (Id.
at p. 976.) The fact that a hearing was set in In re Kenneth J. does not distinguish it from
Frances's case, and the words of the reviewing court there are apt here. "It is perhaps true
the [deferred entry of judgment] statutes make no express provision for a minor in
Kenneth's position, one who is advised of his [deferred entry of judgment] eligibility,
who does not admit the charges in the petition or waive a jurisdictional hearing, and who
does not show the least interest in probation, but who insists on a jurisdictional hearing in
order to contest the charges. But the [deferred entry of judgment] is clearly intended to
provide an expedited mechanism for channeling certain first-time offenders away from
the full panoply of a contested delinquency proceeding. That goal could not co-exist with
a minor who insists on exercising every procedural protection offered, and who then on
appeal faults the juvenile court for not intervening and short circuiting those very
protections." (Id. at pp. 979-980.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NARES, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
MCDONALD, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The juvenile court is not required to hold a hearing on deferred entry of judgment when a minor, having received proper notice of eligibility, chooses to contest the charges in the delinquency petition.
Issues
Did the juvenile court violate the minor's due process rights by failing to hold a hearing on deferred entry of judgment?
Does a minor's decision to contest the charges in a delinquency petition constitute a rejection of deferred entry of judgment consideration?
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The juvenile court is excused from its mandatory duty to hold a hearing if, after receiving notice of eligibility for [deferred entry of judgment], the minor nonetheless rejects [deferred entry of judgment] consideration by contesting the charges.”
“That goal could not co-exist with a minor who insists on exercising every procedural protection offered, and who then on appeal faults the juvenile court for not intervening and short circuiting those very protections.”