of the remaining appellant, Sky Vista, Inc. (Sky Vista), which is an active corporation.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A
The County approved a "Remedial Action Plan" (RAP) for a remediation project
at the former Otay Skeet and Trap Shooting Range (Project) in Chula Vista, California,
and adopted a "Final Mitigated Negative Declaration" (MND) on September 12, 2012.
The Project involved "investigation and remediation of surface and subsurface areas
impacted from historic shooting range activities" and included "remediation of soil
impacted by lead and polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), removal of 'White
Material['], as well as the removal of target debris and wood debris from the site."
The Otay Ranch, Sky Communities, and Sky Vista (collectively, Otay Ranch
parties) are the former owners of the shooting range. They filed a petition for writ of
mandate in October 2012 alleging the County (1) did not comply with the requirements
of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000
2
et seq.) when it approved and adopted the MND and RAP without preparing an
environmental impact report and (2) did not comply with Health and Safety Code
section 25356.1 in approving the RAP. The Otay Ranch parties also sought declaratory
and injunctive relief. Real party in interest, Flat Rock Land Company, LLC (Flat Rock),
is the current owner of the shooting range property and project applicant, which is
undertaking voluntary remediation of the site before future development.
B
The Otay Ranch parties elected to prepare the record of the proceedings, subject to
certification of accuracy by the County. (Pub. Resources Code, § 21167.6, subd. (b)(2).)
After the court denied the Otay Ranch parties' application for a temporary restraining
order to halt the remediation work, the parties stipulated to extend the deadline for
preparation and certification of the administrative record to the end of January 2013. The
court set a briefing schedule and ordered a hearing date for July 12, 2013.
In January, the parties stipulated again to extend the deadline for certification of
the record of proceedings to February 8, 2013, and later agreed to a further informal
extension. The parties met on February 7, 2013, to discuss the proposed CEQA record.
According to counsel for the County, over half of the documents listed in the proposed
index were documents not properly part of the CEQA record and the index omitted
hundreds of documents that were part of the CEQA record. After this meeting, the Otay
Ranch parties voluntarily dismissed the CEQA cause of action.
The Otay Ranch parties filed an amended petition in April 2013 alleging a cause
of action for lack of compliance with the Health and Safety Code and a request for
3
declaratory relief. The Otay Ranch parties did not file the administrative record with the
amended petition or indicate when the administrative record would be filed.
On April 25, 2013, the court denied Otay Ranch's request for an order shortening
time to hear a motion to stay the briefing and hearing in this case pending the outcome of
the trial in another case involving environmental clean-up of the shooting range.1 During
the ex parte hearing, the court inquired about the status of the administrative record.
Since the Otay Ranch parties had not prepared the record, counsel for the County stated
the County would undertake preparation of the administrative record and would file it
with its answer, which was due within 10 days. The Otay Ranch parties did not object to
the County preparing the record nor did it challenge the County's assertion the Otay
Ranch parties would be obligated to pay the costs of preparing the record.
C
Because the County department responsible for maintaining the files associated
with the project did not have the manpower or resources to prepare the administrative
record, it asked the outside law firm representing it in the litigation to prepare the record.
Counsel for the County worked with James G. Clay, the County staff member most
knowledgeable regarding the project, to gather and electronically reproduce the pertinent
portions of the administrative record. Although the County maintained the project files in
1 This is one of several cases pending in the San Diego Superior Court concerning the environmental cleanup of the former shooting range. (Otay Land Company, et al. v. U.E. Limited, L.P. et al. (2006, No. GIC 869480); Otay Land Company, et al. v. U.E. Limited, et al. (2009, 37-2009-00101976-CU-OR-CTL); Otay Land Company, et al. v. U.E. limited, et al. (2012, 37-2012-00104941-CU-BT-CTL).)
4
a manner allowing the County to perform its responsibilities on the case over the previous
decade, parts of the file were segregated, duplicated and disseminated to various staff,
divisions and departments.
Counsel for the County initially tasked preparation of the administrative record to
experienced paralegals, document clerks and an electronic record vendor. However, as
the work unfolded, it became necessary for the attorney to become actively involved in
reviewing and organizing the record. Given the technical complexity of the documents,
the scope of the record and the manner in which the documents were maintained, the
attorney hired by the County was the only person who understood the interplay of the
various versions of the documents as well as which documents should be included in the
administrative record and which should not. According to Mr. Clay, the work required
someone with specific knowledge and a comprehensive understanding of the project over
the previous decade to reassemble various documents and technical reports with
supporting documentation to prepare an adequate administrative record, but the County
did not have adequate staffing to undertake this effort.
The attorney and the paralegals worked extended hours and through the weekend
to prepare the record. The County filed and served the administrative record on May 8,
2013, consisting of 326 documents totaling more than 18,000 pages. The following day,
May 9, 2013, the Otay Ranch parties dismissed the entire action.
D
The County submitted a memorandum of costs seeking recovery of $66,638.14 for
preparation of the administrative record. The Otay Ranch parties moved to tax the
5
County's cost, requesting the court disallow $59,545 for attorney and paralegal time
incurred to prepare the administrative record. The Otay Ranch parties argued, as they do
on appeal, attorney fees should not be included in a cost award for preparation of the
administrative record because attorney fees are not authorized in this action by contract,
statute or law. The Otay Ranch parties did not object to $7,093.14 in record preparation
costs for time spent by law firm document clerks and county staff or to costs associated
with producing the electronic record through an outside vendor.
The County opposed the motion arguing the "labor costs of 'persons with
specialized knowledge,' are recoverable when they are reasonably necessary" to prepare
an administrative record. The County presented declarations from Mr. Clay, defense
counsel and a paralegal explaining the process of assembling the administrative record
and why it was reasonably necessary to expend attorney and paralegal time to prepare the
administrative record. The County also submitted supporting billing statements.
Noting the Otay Ranch parties failed to prepare the administrative record in the six
months since the action was filed, the trial court ruled the Otay Ranch parties were
responsible for the costs of preparing the record. The court ruled a recoverable cost
incurred in preparing the record "must include the labors of the County" in preparing the
record. Relying on this court's holding in River Valley Preservation Project v.
any apparent authority to bind the limited partnership." (U. Limited Partnership Act
Com. com., 24A West's Ann. Corp. Code (2014 ed.) foll. § 15902.03, p. 266.)
Here, Otay Ranch filed a certificate of cancellation on December 24, 2012, in
which the general partners executed a statement of cancellation under penalty of perjury
stating, "the above-named California limited partnership has completed winding up its
affairs and is cancelled." (Some capitalization omitted, italics added.) The Certificate of
Status from the California Secretary of State certifies, "[t]he records of this office
indicate [Otay Ranch] filed a Certificate of Cancellation on December 24, 2012, and the
entity's powers, rights and privileges have ceased." Applying the plain meaning of the
statutes (In re C.H. (2011) 53 Cal.4th 94, 101), and taking Otay Ranch's general partners
at their word that the limited partnership completed winding up its affairs as of the filing
of the certificate of cancellation on December 24, 2012, we conclude Otay Ranch's
current appeal cannot be deemed part of the winding up process. As a result, we dismiss
the appeal of Otay Ranch.
9
B
Sky Communities
"[A] 'corporation may not prosecute or defend an action, nor appeal from an
adverse judgment in an action while its corporate rights are suspended for failure to pay
taxes.' " (Bourhis v. Lord (2013) 56 Cal.4th 320, 324 (Bourhis).) However, "[a]
corporation whose powers have been suspended may apply with the Franchise Tax Board
for reinstatement after satisfying its obligations. ([Rev. & Tax. Code,] § 23305.) If the
statutory requirements are met, the Franchise Tax Board issues a 'certificate of revivor.'
([Rev. & Tax. Code,] § 23305.) 'Upon the issuance of the certificate [of revivor] by the
Franchise Tax Board the taxpayer therein named shall become reinstated . . . .' ([Rev. &
Tax. Code,] § 23305a.)" (Bourhis, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 324.)
The California Franchise Tax Board suspended the powers, rights and privileges
of Sky Communities on September 3, 2013, after the voluntary dismissal of the petition
but before the entry of the cost order at issue in this appeal. In the certificate of interested
entities or persons submitted with the opening brief, counsel for appellants stated, "while
[Sky Communities], is currently a suspended corporation, it may be reinstated." Counsel
further stated, "[Sky Communities], is taking steps to be reinstated."
In opposition to the motion to dismiss, appellants argued extensively the appeal
should not be dismissed based on Bourhis, supra, 56 Cal.4th 320, in which the Supreme
Court held a suspended corporation may proceed with an appeal filed during its
suspension because subsequent revival of the corporate status retroactively validates an
earlier notice of appeal. (Id. at p. 323.) They also argued a notice of appeal filed while a
10
corporation is suspended is merely a procedural defect, not a substantive defect affecting
jurisdiction and dismissals based on lack of capacity are disfavored.
Bourhis is not applicable. In response to our request for an update regarding the
status of the suspension, Sky Communities informed us the Franchise Tax Board has not
yet issued a certificate of revivor. Therefore, as a currently suspended company, Sky
Communities is disqualified from exercising any right, power or privilege and, therefore,
lacks the capacity to pursue this appeal. (Rev. & Tax. Code § 23301; Bourhis, supra, 56
Cal.4th at p. 324; Laurel Crest, Inc. v. Vaughn (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 363, 364 (Laurel
Crest) [an appeal of a suspended corporation should be dismissed under the law where
there was no reinstatement]; see Cal-Western Business Services, Inc. v. Corning Capital
Group (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 304, 310, 312 [assignee of a judgment lacked capacity to
enforce the judgment because the assignor's corporate powers were suspended at the time
of assignment and were not revived].) Accordingly, on the record before us, we dismiss
the appeal of Sky Communities.
C
Sky Vista
Sky Vista is an active California corporation. The County argues the three entities
are so intertwined dismissal of Sky Vista, Inc.'s appeal is necessary to prevent Otay
Ranch and Sky Communities "from gaining indirectly any advantage of this appeal."
The County cites Laurel Crest, supra, 272 Cal.App.2d at p. 365 for the proposition
corporate appellants may be prevented from prosecuting an appeal where an adequate
showing is made a dismissed entity would gain an improper advantage of an appeal based
11
on the relationship between the dismissed entity and the remaining entity or entities. No
such showing was made in Laurel Crest even though the complaint in that case alleged
the entities were joint venturers. Recognizing " '[t]he "right of appeal is remedial, and in
doubtful cases the doubt should be resolved in favor of the right whenever the substantial
interests of a party are affected by a judgment," ' " the Laurel Crest court allowed the
non-suspended entities to pursue their appeal. (Ibid.)
Similarly here, the County has not made an adequate showing to dismiss Sky
Vista's appeal. Sky Vista was a general partner in Otay Ranch and counsel for the Otay
Ranch parties represented to the trial court in another case Sky Vista's sole role was to
serve as a partner in Otay Ranch. However, the operative petition for writ of mandate in
this case alleges Sky Vista was one of three petitioners that had been or would be
"directly and adversely affected by the Project as approved by the County" and it had a
direct and beneficial interest in requesting compliance with the Health and Safety Code.
The County cited no authority compelling the conclusion the business relationship
between Sky Vista and the other entities legally requires dismissal of this appeal.
Therefore, we deny the motion to dismiss as to Sky Vista.
II
Cost for Preparing Administrative Record May Include Attorney and Paralegal Labor
Sky Vista contends the trial court abused its discretion in this case by including
compensation for the time the County's retained counsel and paralegals spent to prepare
the administrative record. It argues this amounts to an award of attorney fees, which are
12
not expressly authorized by contract, statute or law. The County contends the trial court
properly exercised its discretion to allow recovery of attorney and paralegal time after
determining the time was reasonable and necessary for preparation of the administrative
record. We agree with the County.
A
The costs to prepare the administrative record for an administrative mandamus
action are recoverable. Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (a), provides
"[e]xcept where otherwise prescribed by statute, the cost of preparing the record shall be
borne by the petitioner" and "[i]f the expense of preparing all or any part of the record has
been borne by the prevailing party, the expense shall be taxable as costs." Code of Civil
Procedure section 1094.6, subdivision (c), specifies the contents of the administrative
record and reiterates the petitioner must bear the cost of preparing the record stating, in
relevant part, "[t]he local agency may recover from the petitioner its actual costs for
transcribing or otherwise preparing the record."
In petitions alleging CEQA violations, Public Resources Code section 21167.6,
subdivision (b)(1), requires payment of "any reasonable costs or fees imposed for the
preparation of the record of proceedings in conformance with any law or rule of court."2
The plaintiff or petitioner may elect to prepare the record in a CEQA case or to agree to
an alternative method of preparing the record, subject to certification of accuracy by the
2 The word "reasonable" was added to subdivision (b)(1) of Public Resources Code section 21167.6 in 2002. (See Historical and Statutory Notes, 56B West's Ann. Pub. Resources Code (2007 ed.) foll. § 21167.6, p. 194; Stats. 2002, ch. 1121, § 4 (SB 1393).)
13
public agency. (Pub. Resources Code, § 21167.6, subd. (b)(2).) We construe similar
statutes in light of one another. (Ziesmer v. Superior Court (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 360,
366.)
The County asserts Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.6 requires an award of
its "actual costs" without a determination of reasonableness or necessity. However, the
County did not cross-appeal and does not ask us to decide this point because it contends
where, as here, a public agency prepares the administrative record and is the prevailing
party, it is entitled to costs the trial court finds to be "reasonably necessary" and
"reasonable in amount" to prepare the administrative record. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§§ 1033.5, subd. (c)(1)-(4), 1094.5; see Marlow v. Orange County Human Services
in determining cost of a hearing transcript sought under Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5 was
reasonable and necessary].)3
"Whether a particular cost to prepare an administrative record was necessary and
reasonable is an issue for the sound discretion of the trial court. [Citations.] Discretion is
abused only when, in its exercise, the court 'exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the
circumstances being considered.' [Citation.] The appellant has the burden of establishing
3 Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (c) provides: "Any award of costs shall be subject to the following: [¶] (1) Costs are allowable if incurred, whether or not paid. [¶] (2) Allowable costs shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation. [¶] (3) Allowable costs shall be reasonable in amount. [¶] (4) Items not mentioned in this section and items assessed upon application may be allowed or denied in the court's discretion." (Italics added.) 14
an abuse of discretion." (River Valley, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 181.) Where "the
determination of whether costs should be awarded is an issue of law on undisputed facts,
we exercise de novo review." (City of Long Beach v. Stevedoring Services of America
(2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 672, 678.)
B
Courts have long recognized the labor costs incurred to prepare an administrative
record are recoverable items of costs. In Citizens for Quality Growth v. City of Mt.
Shasta (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 433, the City presented evidence it did not have sufficient
employees to prepare the record within the time required so it obtained assistance from a
paralegal and a clerk from a private law firm to organize and index the documents. The
trial court found the cost of preparation was necessarily incurred, but the appellate court
reversed and remanded for the court to make a determination about whether the amount
was reasonable. (Id. at pp. 447-448.)
In River Valley, we affirmed an order allowing recovery of labor costs for an
engineer and a paralegal employed by the agency to collect and index an administrative
record. (River Valley, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at pp. 180-183.) We noted the "history and
complexity" of that case "required a complete, organized and adequately indexed
administrative record for the court's proper review, necessitating the expense of physical
and organizational skills to accomplish this result." Under the circumstances, we
concluded the trial court acted within its discretion when it found "it was reasonably
necessary for persons with specialized knowledge" to prepare the administrative record.
(Id. at p. 181.) We held a commonsense reading of the CEQA cost recovery statute
15
required costs for preparation of the administrative record to include time spent to
prepare the record. Otherwise, it would defeat the statutory purpose by shifting the
financial burden to the public agency. "[T]axpayers . . . should not have to bear the cost
of preparing the administrative record in a lawsuit brought by a private individual or
entity." (Id. at p. 182.)
In St. Vincent's School for Boys, Catholic Charities CYO v. City of San Rafael
(2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 989, 1013, 1019, the appellate court affirmed an order awarding
information technology fees and staff labor the City incurred to respond to petitioner's
discovery demands to retrieve electronic data. The trial court did not award costs related
to attorney efforts in preparing the record, but there was no challenge to the trial court's
decision in that regard. (Id. at p. 1013.) In affirming the order, the court stated "where
necessary to preserve the statutory purposes of cost containment and expediting CEQA
litigation, the prevailing party in a CEQA action may recover 'reasonable costs or fees
imposed for the preparation' [citation] of the record, even if the nonprevailing party
elected to prepare the record." (Id. at p. 1019.)
More recently, in California Oak Foundation v. Regents of University of
California (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 227 (California Oak), the appellate court affirmed an
order including labor time for a paralegal and other University staff in an award of costs
for preparation of an administrative record. (Id. at pp. 294-295.) The court noted the
paralegal assembled and indexed the documents in the record and counsel for the
16
University spent additional time reviewing and revising portions of the record.4 Given
the history and complex nature of the proceedings, the appellate court did not find it
surprising "the University spent a great deal of time and expense ensuring the entire
administrative record was prepared and copied in an appropriate manner." (Id. at p. 295.)
The appellate court could not say "the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason in
accepting as reasonable the hours and rates claimed by the University for performing
these necessary tasks." (Ibid.)
The California Oak court distinguished Hayward Area Planning Assn. v. City of
Hayward (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 176, 184-185 (Hayward), which disallowed recovery
of record preparation costs sought under the CEQA statute where the agency delegated
the task to a third party interested in the litigation. In Hayward, the court observed courts
have allowed public agencies to collect the labor costs of outside assistance when
preparing an administrative record, including the use of a private law firm, but no court
"condoned the unilateral delegation of the task to a party with an interest in the
litigation." (Hayward, supra, at p. 184.) The California Oak court did not find Hayward
controlling because the University prepared the record itself and did not improperly
delegate record preparation to a third party. (California Oak, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th
at p. 295.)
Similarly here, the County did not delegate preparation of the record to a third
party. The County undertook preparation of the administrative record after months of
4 It is not clear from the court's discussion of the facts if attorney time was included in the cost award. 17
inaction on the part of the Otay Ranch parties, who initially elected to prepare the
administrative record for their CEQA claim. Given the history and complexity of the
project and how the documents were maintained, we cannot conclude the trial court
exceeded the bounds of reason in determining it was "reasonably necessary" for the
County's retained counsel and paralegals to prepare the administrative record since the
County "did not have the resources or experienced personnel to prepare the [r]ecord."
Sky Vista does not challenge the labor costs charged for County staff or law firm
document clerks to assist with preparation of the administrative record. It challenges
only the labor costs incurred for an attorney and paralegals to prepare the record by
arguing these costs constitute attorney fees. Under Sky Vista's analysis an attorney's
labor for preparation of an administrative record could never be recovered, even if the
hourly amount charged was de minimus.
Code of Civil Procedure sections 1094.5 and 1094.6 require a petitioner to pay
"actual costs" and expenses of preparing the administrative record. Under the particular
circumstances of this case where the trial court found it was reasonably necessary for the
County to incur attorney and paralegal labor costs to prepare the administrative record
within a short window of time, we see no reason to differentiate between those actual
labor costs and actual labor costs for agency staff and document clerks to prepare an
administrative record. Nor do we see a reason to differentiate between labor costs
incurred by individuals directly employed by a public agency and those incurred by
individuals employed by a private law firm retained by the agency, so long as the trial
court determines, as it did here, the labor costs were reasonably and necessarily incurred
18
for preparation of the administrative record. To hold otherwise would undermine the
statutory policy of shifting the costs and expenses of preparing an administrative record
away from the public and to the private individual or entity bringing the lawsuit. (Code
Civ. Proc., §§ 1094.5, subd. (a), 1094.6, subd. (c); see River Valley, supra,
37 Cal.App.4th at p. 182.)
We are not persuaded by Sky Vista's citation to Dep't of Forestry & Fire Prot. v.
Lebrock (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1137. In that case, the court did not allow a prevailing
party to recover attorney fees in an action filed against her by the California Department
of Forestry to recover the costs of suppressing a fire originating on her property. (Id.
at pp. 1138, 1140.) After analyzing the pertinent Health and Safety Code provisions, the
court concluded the statutes delineated recovery for "the costs of suppressing the fire,
providing rescue or emergency services, investigation, making reports, and costs relating
to accounting for the fire and collection of the suppression and rescue costs," but did not
mention attorney fees for enforcing or defending an action to recover such costs.
(Id. at pp. 1140-1141.) Here, Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.6, subdivision (c),
provides for recovery of the "actual costs for transcribing or otherwise preparing the
record." It does not delineate or limit those costs to certain categories. Nor is the County
seeking to recover attorney fees for enforcing or defending an action. It is simply seeking
to recover the costs it actually incurred to prepare the record.
Sky Vista's citation to Science Applications Internat. Corp. v. Superior Court
(1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1095 (SAIC) is also inapposite. In a prior appeal in that case, we
reversed an attorney fee award concluding the contract language at issue did not permit
19
recovery of attorney fees. We remanded to consider whether items the trial court
awarded for "litigation expenses" amounted to attorney fees, which would be disallowed
under the terms of the contract, or as otherwise recoverable costs under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1033.5. (SAIC, supra, at p. 1099.) On a petition for writ of mandate
challenging the new award of costs, we concluded the costs of hiring a "high tech"
paralegal to organize documents and access them in discovery and trial were not
recoverable under the terms of the contract at issue in that case for the same reason we
disallowed recovery of attorney fees. (Id. at p. 1104.) SAIC did not involve costs and
expenses associated with preparation of an administrative record and it has no application
to the facts before us.
C
The Otay Ranch parties did not challenge below the reasonableness of the hourly
rates charged for the attorney and the paralegals for record preparation, which were
discounted from their regular rates to $350 and $100 per hour, respectively. Sky Vista
makes no such challenge on appeal. However, the trial court undertook its own
assessment of the reasonableness of those rates. It took into account the nature and
complexity of the case, the results obtained, the amount of work involved, the skill
required and the time consumed as well as the court's own knowledge and experience
with the rates charged in the community for similar work and concluded the "rates
charged are at the low end of what the court would consider reasonable given the
experience of counsel." The court did limit the amount awarded to only those hours
20
reflecting labor after the date on which the County affirmatively elected to prepare the
administrative record. We find no abuse of discretion in this regard.
III
Evidence Submitted in Reply
Sky Vista contends the trial court abused its discretion in disregarding evidence it
submitted with its reply brief regarding an indemnity agreement between the County and
real party in interest Flat Rock. Sky Vista claims it was unaware of the indemnity
agreement until the County submitted its bills in response to the motion to tax costs and
these bills showed they were sent to both the County and to Flat Rock. Their counsel
then reviewed the administrative record served in this case before the dismissal and
discovered the indemnity agreement. Sky Vista submitted the indemnity agreement to
the court with its reply brief. At the hearing, counsel for the County explained the
agreement and copies of billing invoices had been produced in a related case months
before Sky Vista filed its motion to tax. The trial court disregarded the evidence
submitted with the reply brief, including the indemnification agreement.
"The general rule of motion practice . . . is that new evidence is not permitted with
reply papers. . . . '[T]he inclusion of additional evidentiary matter with the reply should
only be allowed in the exceptional case . . . ' and if permitted, the other party should be
given the opportunity to respond." (Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal. App. 4th 1522,
1537-1538.) "This rule is based on the same solid logic applied in the appellate courts,
specifically, that '[p]oints raised for the first time in a reply brief will ordinarily not be
21
considered, because such consideration would deprive the respondent of an opportunity
to counter the argument.' " (Id. at p. 1538.)
We cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in disregarding the
evidence and argument regarding the indemnification agreement because it was raised for
the first time in reply. Although the trial court has discretion to admit new evidence or
argument on reply under certain circumstances, it was not an abuse of discretion to
decline to do so based on the facts presented in this case. (Jay v. Mahaffey, supra,
218 Cal.App.4th at p. 1538.)
DISPOSITION
The appeals of Otay Ranch and Sky Communities are dismissed. The order and
judgment awarding costs for preparation of the administrative record is affirmed. The
County is entitled to costs on appeal.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, J.
AARON, J.
22
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that a public agency may recover reasonable and necessary labor costs, including attorney and paralegal fees, incurred in preparing an administrative record for a mandamus action when the agency lacks the internal resources to do so.
Issues
Whether a public agency may recover attorney and paralegal labor costs as part of the cost of preparing an administrative record.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding costs for record preparation after the petitioner failed to timely prepare the record.
Whether the appeal should be dismissed for lack of capacity regarding a cancelled limited partnership and a suspended corporation.
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“"[T]axpayers . . . should not have to bear the cost of preparing the administrative record in a lawsuit brought by a private individual or entity."”