Dynalectric v. Super. Ct. CA4/1 (2014) · DecisionDepot
Dynalectric v. Super. Ct. CA4/1
California Court of Appeal Sep 18, 2014 No. D066452Unpublished
Filed 9/18/14 Dynalectric v. Super. Ct. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL - FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DYNALECTRIC CO., D066452
Petitioner, (Super. Ct. No. 37-2007-00074230-CU- BC-CTL) v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY,
Respondent;
POINT CENTER FINANCIAL, INC.,
Real Party in Interest.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. William R. Nevitt, Jr., Judge. Petition
granted.
Niddrie, Fish & Addams, LLP, David A. Niddrie; Law Offices of Murray M.
Helm, Jr., and Murray M. Helm, Jr., for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Landau Gottfried & Berger LLP and Robert G. Wilson for Real party in interest.
Petitioner Dynalectric Company (Dynalectric) seeks a writ of mandate directing
the trial court to enter a judgment in its favor against real party in interest Point Center
Financial, Inc. (Point Center) and to award costs incurred on appeal, in conformity with
the disposition contained in our opinion in Brewer Corp. v. Point Center Financial, Inc.
(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 831, 848 (Brewer Corp.). We grant the petition.
Dynalectric was a respondent and Point Center was the appellant in Brewer Corp.,
supra, 223 Cal.App.4th 831, which concerned the liability of Point Center (the
construction lender) to Dynalectric (a construction contractor) on a bonded stop notice.
In Brewer Corp., Point Center contended the trial court erroneously ruled that as a matter
of law Dynalectric did not have to serve Point Center with a preliminary notice in order
to maintain a stop notice claim. (Id. at p. 848.) We concluded this legal ruling was error,
but also concluded the parties had not had a full and fair opportunity to litigate a
potentially dispositive factual issue of excuse for not serving a preliminary notice.
(Id at pp. 851, 853.) We therefore provisionally reversed the judgment in favor of
Dynalectric and remanded the matter for further proceedings on the excuse issue.
(Id. at p. 856.) The disposition portion of the opinion further stated: "If the trial court
finds in favor of Dynalectric on the existence of a factual excuse for not serving a
preliminary notice on [Point Center], the judgment in favor of Dynalectric is affirmed and
Dynalectric is to recover its costs on appeal. Alternatively, if the trial court finds against
Dynalectric on the existence of a factual excuse, the judgment in favor of Dynalectric is
reversed and [Point Center] is to recover its costs on appeal." (Id. at pp. 856-857.)
On remand, the parties stipulated to the facts necessary to determine the excuse
issue and then presented the stipulation and a proposed order to respondent. The
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proposed order included, among other terms, the following: "3. Dynalectric has a valid
and enforceable bonded lender stop notice against Point Center. [¶] 4. Based on that
factual finding, the Court of Appeal's opinion deems the Judgment is affirmed and
Dynalectric is entitled to recover its costs on appeal." The trial court stated it did not
believe it could affirm its own judgment, modified the proposed order by striking out
paragraph 4, and signed and filed the proposed order as modified.
Dynalectric petitioned us for a writ of mandate directing the trial court to affirm
the prior judgment it had obtained against Point Center and to award costs incurred in the
prior appeal. We solicited an informal response from Point Center and notified the
parties we were considering issuing a peremptory writ of mandate in the first instance.
(See Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178-180.) In a letter
response, Point Center stated it stipulated to the facts underlying the excuse issue and did
not oppose issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance.
DISCUSSION
We conclude Dynalectric is entitled to writ relief. When by a decision on appeal
the reviewing court directs the entry of a specific judgment, the trial court must enter the
judgment directed, and the proper remedy for its failure to do so is a writ of mandate.
(Hampton v. Superior Court (1952) 38 Cal.2d 652, 655-656; Butler v. Superior Court
(2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 979, 982 (Butler); Bakkebo v. Municipal Court (1981)
124 Cal.App.3d 229, 234.) Our disposition of the appeal directed that Dynalectric's
judgment against Point Center be affirmed and Dynalectric be awarded costs on appeal if,
as happened on remand, the factual issue of excuse was resolved in favor of Dynalectric.
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(Brewer Corp., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at pp. 856-857.) The trial court failed to carry out
these directives, however, when it struck paragraph 4 from the parties' proposed order. A
writ of mandate therefore lies to correct this error.
We further conclude issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is
appropriate because the facts are not in dispute, the legally correct result is clear, Point
Center concedes the propriety of writ relief, and the matter should be expedited.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1088; Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1240-1241;
Butler, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 983.)
DISPOSITION
Let a writ of mandate issue directing respondent to enter judgment in favor of
Dynalectric and against Point Center, nunc pro tunc to February 15, 2012, on the same
terms as the judgment of that date that was the subject of the appeal in Brewer Corp.,
supra, 223 Cal.App.4th 831, and to conduct further proceedings as necessary to award
Dynalectric the costs it incurred in that appeal. The parties shall bear their own costs of
these writ proceedings. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.493(a)(1)(B).)
McINTYRE, J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, Acting P. J.
IRION, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that a trial court must enter a judgment as directed by an appellate court's mandate, and a writ of mandate is the appropriate remedy when the trial court fails to comply with those specific directives.
Issues
Whether the trial court erred by failing to enter judgment and award costs as directed by the appellate court's prior opinion.
Whether a writ of mandate is the appropriate remedy for a trial court's failure to follow appellate directives.
Disposition. Petition granted
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“When by a decision on appeal the reviewing court directs the entry of a specific judgment, the trial court must enter the judgment directed, and the proper remedy for its failure to do so is a writ of mandate.”