Reif v. Cal. Congress of Parents CA4/2 (2014) · DecisionDepot
Reif v. Cal. Congress of Parents CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Sep 17, 2014 No. E056902Unpublished
Filed 9/17/14 Reif v. Cal. Congress of Parents et al. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
RACHEL REIF,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E056902
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIC206139)
CALIFORNIA CONGRESS OF OPINION PARENTS, TEACHERS, AND STUDENTS, INC. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants;
MARILYN ORENS,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Daniel A. Ottolia, Judge.
Dismissed.
Cihigoyenetche, Grossberg & Clouse, Anthony C. Ferguson and Richard R.
Clouse, for Defendants and Appellants and Defendant and Respondent.
Walker Trial Lawyers LLP, Barry M. Walker and Amy M. Oakden. for Plaintiff
and Appellant Rachel Reif.
1
Rachel Reif (plaintiff) was terminated from her position as a Health
Educator/Health Services Assistant for the Riverside County Department of Public
Health, Injury Prevention Services—Safe Routes to School (“SRTS”) program. She then
brought suit against California Congress of Parents, Teachers and Students, Inc. (PTA),
Sandra Ramirez (Ramirez), Marilyn Orens (Orens), Sherri Power (Power), and Lauri
Byers (Byers) (collectively, defendants), alleging four causes of action: defamation, as
well as intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress against all defendants,
and negligence (failure to supervise) against PTA only.
The present appeal and cross-appeal arise from the trial court’s order granting in
part and denying in part defendants’ special motion to strike the complaint as a strategic
lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP motion) pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure1 section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute). The court granted the motion only
with respect to Orens, striking the claims asserted against her. The motion was denied
with respect to all remaining defendants.
Defendants (with the exception of Orens) appeal the partial denial of their anti-
SLAPP motion, contending the court erred when it determined the statements allegedly
made by Byers, Ramirez, and Power were not protected under the anti-SLAPP statute.
Plaintiff cross-appeals the partial grant of the motion with respect to Orens, contending
the trial court erred by treating her alleged statements as protected under the anti-SLAPP
statute. We would have affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court’s order,
1All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
2
finding that defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion should have been granted with respect to all
defendants. However, after this case was fully briefed, our tentative opinion mailed to
the parties, and oral argument had been scheduled at the request of plaintiff and appellant,
we received requests for dismissal of the appeals. We therefore dismiss the appeals.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
In 2008, plaintiff became president of the PTA chapter at Mark Twain Elementary
School in Riverside. In the fall of 2009, after a transition from one PTA treasurer to
another, it was determined that plaintiff had received certain reimbursements in error, and
there were also some missing receipts.3 Plaintiff attributes these mistakes to accounting
errors by the former treasurer, and contends that she returned all money mistakenly paid
to her (about $800 total). Nevertheless, the principal of Mark Twain Elementary School
asked plaintiff to step down as PTA president, stating that she had been directed to make
this request by the 23rd District PTA. Plaintiff resigned, as requested, without conceding
any wrongdoing.
The resignation did not, however, put an end to the matter. After her resignation,
plaintiff alleges Power—who had preceded plaintiff as PTA president at Mark Twain
Elementary, and who had first brought the mistaken payments to plaintiff’s attention—
2We derive our summary of facts from the complaint and from the evidence submitted in support of and against the anti-SLAPP motion.
3 The complaint places the date of these events as fall of 2008, but plaintiff’s declaration submitted in support of her opposition to defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion indicates fall 2009. Given the further information that these events occurred in plaintiff’s “second term as PTA President,” it appears fall of 2009 is more probably the correct date. In any case, the date is not material to the substantive issues raised by the parties.
3
spread rumors about plaintiff’s purported financial misconduct, including stealing from
the PTA.4 In a November 2009 meeting with PTA representatives—Byers, who was then
the PTA Riverside Council President, participated, among others—plaintiff asked for an
opportunity to formally clear her name; however, no charges were ever filed, nor any
formal proceeding of any sort held.
Several years later, in January 2012, plaintiff was hired by SRTS program to serve
as a health educator/health services assistant. On February 20, 2012, plaintiff made a
presentation at a meeting held at Jefferson Elementary School about the SRTS program,
and in particular about a new barcode system for tracking children who walk or ride their
bicycles to school. In addition to plaintiff’s presentation, the meeting included a raffle to
“persuade more volunteers to attend the meeting,” the prizes for which (an iPod and
digital camera) had been donated by the Jefferson Elementary principal. Plaintiff
characterizes the meeting as “a success,” leaving plaintiff and her coworkers, as well as
the principal of Jefferson Elementary, “excited” about the new program, which was
projected to start a few weeks later, on March 7, 2012.
Before the new system could be implemented, however, defendants allegedly
made certain statements that resulted in plaintiff’s termination. Plaintiff contends Power
and Ramirez told Orens, then the Riverside Council PTA president, that plaintiff had
embezzled money from the PTA and as a result had been “involved with the police.”
4 It should be noted that these alleged statements by Byers in 2009 are apparently pleaded as background information, and not as the basis for any claim. Though allegations relating to the events of 2009 are incorporated by reference into plaintiff’s causes of action, the statements that are the explicitly pleaded basis for plaintiff’s claims are those from February 2012, described below.
4
Orens conveyed those statements to plaintiff’s supervisor, Gail Carlson, in a February 21,
2012, phone call, and indicated that PTA and Riverside County Unified School District
would not support the SRTS program if plaintiff continued to be involved.
Additionally, plaintiff contends that Byers contacted the Jefferson Elementary
School principal conveying the same information: that plaintiff had embezzled money
from the PTA and as a result had been “involved with the police.” On February 22, 2012,
plaintiff’s supervisor allegedly learned that the principal, who previously had been
actively supportive of the program, had been “instructed” by Byers and the 23rd District
PTA not to participate in the SRTS program if plaintiff was involved.
Plaintiff explained to her supervisor, Gail Carlson, her perspective on the events
that led to her resignation as PTA president and the rumors that had spread after her
resignation. Plaintiff also explained that no formal charges had ever been brought, police
had never been involved, and that there had been no formal proceeding of any sort in
which she could defend herself or clear her name. Nevertheless, on February 28, 2012,
plaintiff was terminated because she was not able to work effectively with the schools
and, according to the declaration of her supervisor, “as a direct result of the information
received from representatives of the PTA.”
Plaintiff’s complaint, alleging four causes of action, was filed on April 24, 2012.
Three causes of action—the first, third, and fourth, for defamation, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress, respectively—are
asserted against all defendants. Plaintiff’s second cause of action, for “Negligence
(Failure To Supervise),” is asserted only against PTA.
5
Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion was filed on June 5, 2012. After a hearing on
July 12, 2012, in a written order filed August 6, 2012, the court granted the motion with
respect to Orens and struck the claims asserted against her. The court found that Orens’s
alleged statements were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute, and there was no
likelihood of success on the merits due to the litigation privilege. The court denied the
motion in all other respects, finding the statements alleged to have been made by other
defendants not to be protected under the anti-SLAPP statute.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Overview of Anti-SLAPP Motions
Courts construe the anti-SLAPP statute broadly to protect the constitutional rights
of petition and free speech. (§ 425.16, subd. (a); Kibler v. Northern Inyo County Local
Hospital Dist. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 192, 199.) In ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, the trial
court conducts a two-part analysis: the moving party bears the initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case that the plaintiff's cause of action arose from the
defendant's actions in the furtherance of the rights of petition or free speech. (§ 425.16,
subd. (b)(1); Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.) If
the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish a
probability that he or she will prevail on the merits. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1); Flatley v.
Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 314 (Flatley).)
A defendant meets its threshold burden of demonstrating that a cause of action
arises from protected activity by showing that the act or acts underlying the claim fit one
or more of the four categories described in section 426.16, subdivision (e). (Navellier v.
6
Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 88.) These categories include “any written or oral statement
or writing” that is “made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any
other official proceeding authorized by law” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1)), “made in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or
judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law” (id., subd. (e)(2)), or
“made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of
public interest” (id., subd. (e)(3)), as well as “any other conduct in furtherance of the
exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in
connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest” (id., subd. (e)(4)).
“‘“A plaintiff cannot frustrate the purposes of the SLAPP statute through a
pleading tactic of combining allegations of protected and nonprotected activity under the
label of one ‘cause of action.’” [Citation.] Conversely, a defendant in an ordinary
private dispute cannot take advantage of the anti-SLAPP statute simply because the
complaint contains some references to speech or petitioning activity by the defendant.
[Citation.] [Thus] it is the principal thrust or gravamen of the plaintiff’s cause of action
that determines whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies [citation], and when the
allegations referring to arguably protected activity are only incidental to a cause of action
based essentially on nonprotected activity, collateral allusions to protected activity should
not subject the cause of action to the anti-SLAPP statute.’ [Citation.]” (Raining Data
Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1369 (Raining Data Corp).)
Additionally, “a plaintiff cannot avoid operation of the anti-SLAPP statute by attempting,
through artifices of pleading, to characterize an action as a garden variety tort claim
7
when in fact the liability claim is predicated on protected speech or conduct. [Citation.]”
(Ramona Unified School Dist. v. Tsiknas (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 510, 519 (Ramona).)
“‘Review of an order granting or denying a motion to strike under section 425.16
is de novo. [Citation.] We consider “the pleadings, and supporting and opposing
affidavits . . . upon which the liability or defense is based.” [Citation.] However, we
neither “weigh credibility [nor] compare the weight of the evidence. Rather, [we] accept
as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff [citation] and evaluate the defendant’s
evidence only to determine if it has defeated that submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of
law.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 325-326.)
The plaintiff's evidence in support of its showing on the second part of the anti-
SLAPP analysis must be sufficient to support a judgment in its favor if proved at trial.
(Lam v. Ngo (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 832, 845.) Under section 425.16, the merits of the
lawsuit are evaluated “using a summary-judgment-like procedure at an early stage of the
litigation.” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 192.)
Plaintiff incorrectly asserts we should instead perform an analysis similar to that on
demurrer, accepting the allegations of the complaint as true and viewing them in the light
most favorable to plaintiff. But it is well established that “a plaintiff opposing an anti-
SLAPP motion cannot rely on allegations in the complaint, but must set forth evidence
that would be admissible at trial.” (Overstock.com, Inc. v. Gradient Analytics, Inc.
(2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 688, 699 (Overstock).) Even if the complaint in this case were
verified—it is not—the allegations therein would be insufficient to satisfy the second step
of the anti-SLAPP analysis. (Bently Reserve LP v. Papaliolios (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th
8
418, 426.) The pleadings are relevant to the first step of the analysis, that is, determining
whether the causes of action that are the subject of the anti-SLAPP motion arise from
protected activity. (See, e.g., Garretson v. Post (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1508, 1522
(Garretson) [Fourth Dist., Div. Two] [analyzing “pleadings and other related documents”
to determine whether cause of action arose from protected activity].)
B. Analysis
The gravamen of each of the causes of action asserted in the complaint is that
plaintiff was injured by statements made by Orens, Power, Ramirez, and Byers. (See
Raining Data Corp., supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 1369 [“it is the principal thrust or
gravamen of the plaintiff’s cause of action that determines whether the anti-SLAPP
statute applies . . . .’”].) The first cause of action for defamation obviously does so most
directly. Plaintiff’s third and fourth causes of action, for intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress, too, assert only claims of injury from the publication of
the statements by the individual defendants. Plaintiff’s claims against the PTA—
including the second cause of action for negligent supervision asserted only against the
PTA, as well as the remaining three causes of action asserted against “all defendants”—
all rest on the theory that the PTA is responsible, one way or another, for the injurious
statements made by the individual defendants. No allegations that the PTA published any
statements of its own are included.5
5 The trial court remarked that it saw “no reason why the second cause of action for negligent supervision falls under any portion of the anti-SLAPP statute.” But we do: the gravamen of the negligent supervision cause of action is that the individual defendants made certain statements that harmed plaintiff, and that the PTA is responsible [footnote continued on next page] 9
Our analysis of whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies, therefore, must begin with
analysis of whether the alleged statements by each of the individual defendants fall
within subdivision (e) of section 425.16. We will then turn separately to the second
prong of the SLAPP analysis, probability of success.
1. Statements by Orens to Plaintiff’s Supervisor
The trial court, relying on Lee v. Fick (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 89 (Lee), found that
the statements by Orens to plaintiff’s supervisor are protected activity under section
425.16, subdivision (e)(1). We agree with the trial court’s analysis, and expand upon it
below, finding the statements protected under both subdivision (e)(1) and, in the
alternative, subdivision (e)(4).
There is no question that the plaintiff’s former employer is an official agency, as a
subdivision of the Riverside County government. Indeed, plaintiff has not challenged the
trial court’s finding that the County possesses the “quasi-judicial power” that is one of the
possible bases for considering any proceedings it might conduct to be “official
proceedings” in the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1). (See Lee, supra, 135
Cal.App.4th at pp. 96-97)
[footnote continued from previous page]
for those statements. (See Raining Data Corp., supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 1369.) If the statements themselves are protected under the anti-SLAPP statute as to the defendant who uttered the statements, it follows that any claim arising from the statements as to any defendant would be subject to an anti-SLAPP motion. Plaintiff’s negligent supervision claim is predicated on what defendants have contended is protected speech, though the claim is pleaded as the garden variety tort of negligent supervision; it is subject to an anti- SLAPP motion on that basis. (See Ramona, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 519.) We address below whether the statements are in fact protected speech.
10
Plaintiff does contend that Orens’s statements were not made as part of an
“official proceeding” in the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute. We disagree. At the
time the statements were made, there was no ongoing investigation of plaintiff, but
“communications to an official agency intended to induce the agency to initiate action are
part of an ‘official proceeding,’” as that term is in the anti-SLAPP statute. (Lee,
supra,135 Cal.App.4th at p. 96; see Brody v. Montalbano (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 725,
732-733.) Moreover, “official proceeding” should not be equated with “formal hearing”:
matters that are resolved informally may equally be “official proceedings.” (Lee, supra,
at p. 97.) Such official proceedings may include, at least in some circumstances, those
leading to termination of an employee by a public agency, among other things.6 (See,
e.g., id. at p. 91 [involving termination of high school coach by school officials].)
Orens’s statements to plaintiff’s supervisor, as alleged in the complaint, did not
include an express request to initiate official proceedings to remove plaintiff from her
position. But there is “no requirement” that a communication “expressly request an
investigation, hearing or that the agency take any particular action” to fall within the
protection of the anti-SLAPP statute. (Lee, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 97.) And the
assertion that the PTA and Riverside County Unified School District would not support
6 Plaintiff’s assertion that Lee is “expressly limited to complaints made by parents to school authorities about a teacher or principal in the performance of his or her official duties” is incorrect. Rather, the holding in Lee is an application of general principles— and in particular the principle that “communications to an official agency intended to induce the agency to initiate action are part of an ‘official proceeding’” (Lee, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 96)—that have long been applied in a broad range of situations. (See, e.g., Braun v. Bureau of State Audits (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1382, 1390 [collecting some of the “many cases” applying the principle].)
11
the SRTS program if plaintiff continued to be involved is, among other things, a nearly-
direct request to remove plaintiff from any involvement.
In short, Orens’s statements to plaintiff’s supervisor were communications to an
official agency, which in essence ask the county to initiate any proceedings authorized by
law—formal or informal—that might be necessary to remove plaintiff from any
participation in the SRTS program, and explain the reasons why she believed such action
was necessary. Thus, the statements are protected acts under section 425.16, subdivision
(e)(1).
In addition, even if the statements were not protected under subdivision (e)(1) of
section 425.16, they would be protected under subdivision (e)(4), as “conduct in
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right
of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” To qualify
for protection under subdivision (e)(4), the issue must be one of concern to a substantial
number of people, not merely a private controversy of interest to the speaker and a
relatively small, specific audience. (Weinberg v. Feisel (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1122,
1132.) At the same time, the issue must not be one of broad, amorphous public interest,
but rather one identifiable in time and place, and the challenged statements must bear a
significant relationship to the asserted public issue. (Id. at pp. 1132-1133.) A public
issue has been found where statements “concerned a person or entity in the public eye
[citations], conduct that could directly affect a large number of people beyond the direct
participants [citations] or a topic of widespread, public interest [citations].” (Rivero v.
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (2003) 105
12
Cal.App.4th 913, 924 (Rivero).) Where the issue is of interest only to a limited but
definable portion of the public such as a private group, organization, or community, “the
constitutionally protected activity must, at a minimum, occur in the context of an ongoing
controversy, dispute or discussion, such that it warrants protection by a statute that
embodies the public policy of encouraging participation in matters of public
significance.” (Du Charme v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (2003)
First, to the extent the statements discussed above fall within subdivision (e)(1) of
Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, they also fall within the ambit of the litigation
privilege in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), precluding plaintiff from
demonstrating any probability of success. The litigation privilege bars tort causes of
action other than claims of malicious prosecution based on privileged publications or
broadcasts, including those made in “official proceeding[s] authorized by law.” (Civil
Code, § 47, subd. (b); Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 321-322 & fn. 9). Although some
courts—and defendants in their briefing on appeal—have broadly characterized the anti-
SLAPP statute and the litigation privilege codified in Civil Code section 47 as
“congruent” or “coextensive” (see, e.g., Department of Fair Employment & Housing v.
1105 Alta Loma Road Apartments, LLC (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1273, 1288, fn. 23), that
18
is not a complete statement of the law. The California Supreme Court in Flatley, supra,
39 Cal.4th at pp. 322-323, stated that the scope of protection under the two statutes is not
identical and, although “[t]he language in [Code of Civil Procedure] section 425,
subdivision (e)(1) and (2) parallels the description of privileged communications in Civil
Code section 47, subdivision (b), . . . this does not necessarily mean the two statutes are
coextensive or congruent in scope as applied.” (Garretson, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p.
1518 [discussing Flatley].) In Flatley, for example, the Supreme Court concluded that,
even if certain extortionate communications were protected under the litigation privilege,
it would not be “consistent with the language or the purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute to
protect such threats.” (Flatley, supra, at p. 322.) Nevertheless, plaintiff has not argued
that subdivision (e)(1) and the litigation privilege are different in scope as applied to the
facts of this case. To the contrary, plaintiff concedes that if Code of Civil Procedure
section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1) applies to the statements, the “absolute privilege under
Civil Code section 47 would also apply.” Nor do we see any reason to conclude
otherwise.
Second, plaintiff’s evidentiary showing is inadequate with respect to all of her
asserted causes of action. Plaintiff’s claims are all predicated on the notion that each of
the individual defendants published certain defamatory statements about plaintiff in
February 2012, namely, that plaintiff had embezzled money from the PTA and “as a
result had been involved with the police.” Her evidence consists of two declarations; one
from plaintiff, the other from her former supervisor at the SRTS program, Gail Carlson.
Nothing in these declarations, however, establishes that any defendant published any of
19
the alleged defamatory statements. Plaintiff’s own declaration contains the assertion that
Power had “spread rumors” about her in 2009, but nothing about any statements Power or
the other defendants may have made in 2012.7 Gail Carlson avers that plaintiff “was
terminated from her employment . . . as a direct result of the information received from
representatives of the PTA,” but her declaration does not specifically identify any of the
“representatives of the PTA,” nor does it include any description of the “information” she
received from them. There is nothing in either declaration about statements allegedly
made to the principal of Jefferson Elementary School; only the information that Ms.
Carlson learned on February 22, 2012, that the school’s principal would no longer
participate in the program, with no explanation as to why. Thus, there is simply no basis
in the evidence presented to conclude that anyone uttered the defamatory statements
alleged in the complaint, let alone any of the defendants. And, as noted above,
admissible evidence is required for plaintiff to show a probability of success; she cannot
fill in lacunae in the declarations with facts alleged in the complaint. (Overstock, supra,
151 Cal.App.4th at p. 699.)
In short, plaintiff has failed to show a probability of success with respect to any
cause of action, as asserted against any defendant. To the extent the defendant’s alleged
statements fall under the protection of subdivision (e)(1) of the anti-SLAPP statute, the
litigation privilege precludes any such showing. To the extent the statements fall under
the protection of subdivision (e)(4) of the anti-SLAPP statute, plaintiff’s evidence
7 To the extent plaintiff may intend to base any claim on statements dating from 2009, the applicable one-year statute of limitations would bar the claim. (§ 340, subd. (c).)
20
submitted in opposition to defendants’ motion is inadequate to establish a probability of
success. Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, therefore, should have been granted with
respect to all causes of action, as asserted against all defendants.
III. REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL
After this case was fully briefed and a tentative opinion had been drafted and
mailed to the parties, and after oral argument had been set, we received requests for
dismissal of the appeals.
An appellant may not dismiss an appeal as a matter of right. (Huschke v. Slater
(2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1160 [imposing $6,000 sanctions on attorney for
unreasonable delay in notifying appellate court that parties had settled and dismissed the
underlying case].) Rather, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.244(c)(2), “On
receipt of a request or stipulation to dismiss, the court may dismiss the appeal and direct
immediate issuance of the remittitur.” (Italics added.) Thus, dismissal is discretionary.
Here, because the resolution of this case is fact specific, we grant the requests.
IV. DISPOSITION
The appeals are dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ P.J. We concur:
RICHLI J.
MILLER J. 21
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court dismissed the appeals after the parties requested dismissal following the completion of briefing and the issuance of a tentative opinion.
Issues
Whether the trial court erred in its partial grant and partial denial of an anti-SLAPP motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.
Disposition. Dismissed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“However, after this case was fully briefed, our tentative opinion mailed to the parties, and oral argument had been scheduled at the request of plaintiff and appellant, we received requests for dismissal of the appeals.”