California Court of Appeal Sep 16, 2014 No. D064711Unpublished
Filed 9/16/14 P. v. Trasvina CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D064711
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD245664)
MARITZA ADELINA TRASVINA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Amalia L.
Meza, Judge. Affirmed.
Kleven McGann Law and Sarah Kleven McGann, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, and Teresa Torreblanca, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
This case arose out of two fights that occurred outside a nail salon in the City of
San Diego and involved defendant Maritza Adeline Trasvina, her four codefendants
(Trasvina's mother, Eleanor Govea; Eleanor's daughter, Christina Govea;1 Tara Torum;
and Brittney Spivey, who are not parties to this appeal), and two victims (Elizabeth
and one count of mayhem in violation of section 203, subdivision (d) (victim: Elizabeth).
At the sentencing hearing, the court suspended the imposition of sentence and
granted Trasvina three years of formal probation.
Trasvina appeals, contending her mayhem conviction must be reversed because
there is no substantial evidence to show the victim, Elizabeth, suffered permanent
disfigurement. We conclude substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that she
suffered permanent disfigurement within the meaning of section 203. Accordingly, we
affirm the judgment.
1 As Eleanor Govea and Christina Govea share the same last name, in the interests of clarity we refer to them by their first names. We intend no disrespect.
2 As Elizabeth Cuevas and Conception Cuevas also share the same last name, in the interests of clarity we refer to them by their first names. Again, we intend no disrespect.
3 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On December 29, 2012, Trasvina's mother, Eleanor, called Trasvina at work and
said she was at a nail salon and two sisters─Conception and Elizabeth─had threatened
her. Trasvina drove to the nail salon on El Cajon Boulevard. By the time she arrived,
Eleanor and Conception had been arguing and swearing at one another for about 45
minutes. Trasvina's half-sister, Christina, arrived at the nail salon around the same time
as Trasvina.
Trasvina, who testified on her own behalf, admitted she threw the first punch by
hitting Conception outside the nail salon. A large fight─involving Trasvina, Conception,
Elizabeth, Eleanor, Christina, Torum, and Spivey─broke out. This first fight was
captured by a cellphone video recording, which was later posted on Facebook and played
for the jury. During the fight Trasvina repeatedly kicked Conception, and Christina used
a tire iron to hit Conception several times, while Conception was lying on the ground.
Trasvina testified that she kicked Conception in the back while Christina was hitting her
with the tire iron because Trasvina was afraid for her life and she felt she needed to
protect herself. Conception testified that neither she nor her sister Elizabeth was bleeding
at the end of this first fight.
Elizabeth and Conception both testified that a second fight started outside the nail
salon about a minute later. Elizabeth testified that when she ran outside, Trasvina hit her
on the left side of her face with a "silver" metal weapon that was larger than the tire iron
Christina was using again to hit Conception.
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The second fight ended when Trasvina and her family left after Trasvina hit
Elizabeth in the face with the metal weapon. Elizabeth and Conception were taken to the
hospital in an ambulance. Conception suffered a head injury that required six staples.
Elizabeth had a gaping wound on the left side of her face below her mouth. Conception
described Elizabeth's wound as "a hole" in her face. The wound, including the hole, is
depicted in color photographs that were taken at the hospital and received in evidence.4
Elizabeth testified she suffered this wound when Trasvina hit her with a piece of metal.
Elizabeth also testified that treatment of her injury required stitches, and that she had
suffered scarring on her face as a result of the injury.
DISCUSSION
Trasvina contends her mayhem conviction must be reversed because there is no
substantial evidence to show the victim, Elizabeth, suffered permanent disfigurement.
Specifically, Trasvina asserts that although the prosecution "presented evidence from
several witnesses describing [Elizabeth's] injury from the day of the fight as well as three
pictures of her injury," it presented no evidence she suffered any permanent
disfigurement. She asserts "[t]he record does not include how many stitches [Elizabeth]
received," it "does [not] describe the size of the wound on the day of the incident," and it
does not describe "the size or existence of any remaining scar or permanent
disfigurement." Trasvina further asserts "the photos [(People's Exhibits Nos. 7-9)] and
the remainder of the record provide no description of the present day appearance of the
4 At the Attorney Generals' request, these photographs─People's Exhibits Nos. 7 through 9─were transmitted to this court. 4
injury"; and, thus, "it is impossible to establish that [Elizabeth] was permanently
disfigured." We conclude substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that Elizabeth
suffered a permanent disfiguring injury to her face.
A. Applicable Legal Principles
1. Mayhem
The crime of simple mayhem is codified in section 203, which provides: "Every
person who unlawfully and maliciously deprives a human being of a member of his body,
or disables, disfigures, or renders it useless, or cuts or disables the tongue, or puts out an
eye, or slits the nose, ear, or lip, is guilty of mayhem." (Italics added.)
The California Supreme Court recently explained that "[s]ection 203 generally
prohibits six injurious acts against a person, three that specify a particular body part and
three that do not: (1) dismembering or depriving a part of someone's body; (2) disabling
or rendering useless a part of someone's body; (3) disfiguring someone; (4) cutting or
disabling the tongue; (5) putting out an eye; and (6) slitting the nose, ear or lip." (People
v. Santana (2013) 56 Cal.4th 999, 1003 (Santana), italics added.)
Although section 203 does not expressly require that a mayhem conviction
involving disfigurement be based on proof that the disfigurement is permanent, "case law
has 'grafted' on to section 203 the requirement that a disfiguring injury be permanent."
(Santana, supra, 56 Cal.4th. at p. 1007, quoting People v. Newby (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th
1341, 1347.) A disfiguring injury "'may be considered legally permanent for purposes of
mayhem despite the fact that cosmetic repair may be medically feasible.'" (Santana, at p.
1007, quoting People v. Hill (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1574-1575.)
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The Santana court also explained that the rationale for the crime of mayhem is
"'"the preservation of the natural completeness and normal appearance of the human face
and body."'" (Santana, supra, 56 Cal.4th. at p. 1004, quoting People v. Newble (1981)
120 Cal.App.3d 444, 451, italics added.)
"'[N]ot every visible scarring wound' may establish mayhem under section 203."
(Santana, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1004, quoting Goodman v. Superior Court (1978) 84
Cal.App.3d 621, 625.) However, a conviction of mayhem under section 203 does not
require proof that the disfigurement is "serious" or that the disfiguring wound required
extensive suturing. (Santana, at p. 1010.)
2. Substantial evidence standard of review
When assessing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
conviction, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review, under which we view
the evidence "in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it
discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid
value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt." (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578; see also Jackson v.
Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319.) "The same standard of review applies to cases in
which the prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence." (People v. Maury
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396.)
We do not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or reevaluate
the credibility of witnesses. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206; People v.
Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.) "Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the
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testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact." (People v. Young (2005) 34
Cal.4th 1149, 1181.)
B. Analysis
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment of conviction, as
we must (People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 578), we conclude the prosecution
met its burden of presenting substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact
could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Elizabeth suffered a legally permanent
disfiguring injury to her face within the meaning of section 203, which she testified she
suffered when Trasvina hit her with a piece of metal. As already noted, Elizabeth's pre-
surgery facial wound is depicted in color photographs that were taken at the hospital and
received in evidence. As Trasvina correctly asserts on appeal, the photographs show that
the wound "was approximately [one to one-and-a-half] inches long between her lower lip
and chin." The victim's sister, Conception, described Elizabeth's wound as a "hole" in her
face. One of the photographs depicting a close-up view of the wound shows that the hole
passes through the left side of Elizabeth's face to the inside of her mouth. The
photographs also show that a chunk of skin is missing below the hole.
Although the record contains no photographic evidence depicting Elizabeth's face
following the surgical repair of the wound, substantial evidence establishes the wound
required suturing and resulted in scarring that altered the normal appearance of her face.
Specifically, after the prosecutor showed Elizabeth the three photographs of her facial
wound and she acknowledged she had suffered that wound, the prosecutor asked her,
"How did it make you feel when you say that that was the injury to your face?" Elizabeth
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answered, "I was crying. I'm going to be scarred for life." The following exchange then
took place between the prosecutor and Elizabeth:—
"[Prosecutor:] Did you receive any treatment for that injury at the hospital that day?
"[Elizabeth:] Yeah, I got—I got stitches in my—on my face.
"[Prosecutor:] And have you had scarring from that injury?
"[Elizabeth:] Yes.
"[Prosecutor:] Have you ever considered whether you would down the road receive any treatment for the scarring?
"[Elizabeth:] Yes.
"[Prosecutor:] Have you received any?
"[Elizabeth:] No, not yet.
"[Prosecutor:] And what type of treatment have you considered?
"[Elizabeth:] Some surgery. Plastic surgery or something."
Elizabeth's testimony that she "got stitches" on her face, that she had suffered
"scarring" as a result of her injury, that she felt she was "going to be scarred for life," and
that she had considered undergoing cosmetic surgery as treatment for the scarring amply
supports a finding that she suffered a legally permanent injury to her face that was
disfiguring in that it resulted in scarring that altered the normal appearance of her face.
This evidence is sufficient to support the jury's finding that Elizabeth suffered permanent
disfigurement for purposes of section 203. As already discussed, the fact that cosmetic
surgical repair of the scarring may be feasible is of no moment. (Santana, supra, 56
Cal.4th. at p. 1007 [Disfiguring injury "'may be considered legally permanent for
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purposes of mayhem despite the fact that cosmetic repair may be medically feasible.'"].)
Also, Trasvina's complaint that "[t]he record does not include how many stitches
[Elizabeth] received" is unavailing. A conviction of mayhem under section 203 does not
require proof that the disfiguring wound required extensive suturing. (Santana, at p.
1010.) Her complaint that the record does not describe the size of Elizabeth's residual
scar is also unavailing because section 203 does not provide that the disfiguring injury
must be of a minimum size, and a conviction of mayhem under section 203 does not
require proof that the disfigurement be serious (Santana, at p. 1010). As noted, our
Supreme Court recently explained that the rationale for the crime of mayhem is " ' "the
preservation of the natural completeness and normal appearance of the human face and
body." ' " (Santana, at p. 1004, italics added.)
For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Trasvina's claim that her mayhem
conviction must be reversed because there is no substantial evidence to show the victim
suffered permanent disfigurement, is without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NARES, J. WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
HUFFMAN, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that substantial evidence supported the jury's finding that the victim suffered permanent disfigurement under Penal Code section 203, as the victim's testimony regarding scarring and the photographic evidence of the facial wound were sufficient to sustain a mayhem conviction.
Issues
Whether there was substantial evidence to support a mayhem conviction under Penal Code section 203 regarding the requirement of permanent disfigurement.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We conclude substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that she suffered permanent disfigurement within the meaning of section 203.”