California Court of Appeal Sep 15, 2014 No. E055733Unpublished
Filed 9/15/14 Tran v. Tran CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
CINDY TRAN,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E055733
v. (Super.Ct.No. CIVRS912563)
HUYEN THI TRAN, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Ben T. Kayashima,
Judge. (Retired judge of the San Bernardino Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
Huyen Thi Tran, Defendant and Appellant in pro. per.
Telep Law, Desiree Telep, and Tina Dao for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Plaintiff Cindy Tran and defendant Huyen Tran are adult sisters. According to
Cindy, she bought a house in Pomona and rented it to Huyen. Later, she refinanced the
Pomona house, borrowing approximately $178,000 more, and lent this amount to Huyen,
who used it to buy a building in Ontario. Huyen then stopped paying rent; Huyen also
refused to repay the loan.
Huyen testified to a very different version of the same events. According to
Separately and alternatively, the evidence, in fact, was ample to support the
judgment. Huyen argues that there was insufficient evidence of an oral loan agreement,
but Cindy clearly testified that there was an oral loan agreement. Huyen argues that there
was “[n]o handshake and [n]o witnesses . . . .” A contract, however, does not require a
handshake or any other particular formalities. Moreover, no third-party witnesses were
necessary. “The testimony of a single witness, even if that witness is a party to the case,
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may constitute substantial evidence. [Citation.]” (Consolidated Irrigation Dist. v. City of
Selma (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 187, 201.)
In any event, Kacie corroborated Cindy, testifying that Huyen admitted borrowing
a large sum of money from Cindy to make a major purchase. Huyen complains that
Kacie was vague and did not know the details of the transaction. That does not take
away, however, from the facts that she did know. Huyen also complains that Kacie’s
testimony was “hearsay.” (Bolding omitted.) This is true, but it was admissible hearsay
— it was based on Huyen’s own statements. (Evid. Code, § 1220.)
Huyen also argues that there was insufficient evidence of a breach of contract.
Cindy testified, however, that she asked Huyen when she was going to repay the loan,
and Huyen replied that she was “not going to pay at all.” This constituted an anticipatory
breach of contract. (See generally Taylor v. Johnston (1975) 15 Cal.3d 130, 137-138.)
Moreover, Huyen had promised to pay the loan when she sold the Ontario building;
nevertheless, she gave the Ontario building to a relative, making it clear that she was
never going to pay.
Huyen argues that Cindy’s testimony was contradictory. We perceive no material
contradictions. As Huyen points out, Cindy testified that she knew that Huyen wanted to
borrow $178,000; however, she did not know what Huyen wanted the money for. This is
not contradictory. Cindy also admitted that eventually, she learned that Huyen wanted
the money so she could buy the Ontario building. Once again, this is not contradictory.
At worst, Cindy was vague about the exact purchase price and loan amount for the
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Pomona house; however, this could have been an innocent memory lapse, as it involved a
deal some seven years earlier. Finally, even assuming that Cindy did contradict herself,
“‘[c]onflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the
reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to
determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a
determination depends.’ [Citation.]” (DiQuisto v. County of Santa Clara (2010) 181
Cal.App.4th 236, 261.)
Finally, Huyen points to her own and her husband’s testimony on various points.
The trial court, however, expressly found that Cindy and Kacie were credible, whereas
Huyen and her husband were not. And it had good reason for this. For example, Huyen
claimed that she paid the down payment on the Pomona house, but she did not introduce
any documentary proof of this. Likewise, Huyen claimed that she made over $100,000 of
improvements to the Pomona home, but she did not introduce any documentary proof of
this, either. Finally, Huyen was impeached by her email referring to her payments on the
Pomona house as “rent.”
We note that, while Cindy, as the plaintiff, had the overall burden of proof, she
was entitled to a presumption that she was the owner of full beneficial title to the Pomona
house. (Evid. Code, § 622.) Huyen had to rebut this presumption — if at all — by clear
and convincing evidence. (Ibid.) Thus, even if the trial court was simply unable to
decide whether to believe Cindy or Huyen, it would have been required to conclude that
the equity in the Pomona house belonged to Cindy. “Significantly, when it applies, the
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form of title presumption may not be ‘rebutted by evidence that title was taken in a
particular manner merely to obtain a loan.’ [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Fossum
(2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 336, 345, fn. 5.)
Huyen makes a brief, off-hand reference to the statute of limitations. We deem
her to have forfeited any related contention by failing to cite any relevant authorities or to
provide any reasoned argument. (Lewis v. City of Benicia (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1519,
1539.) In any event, the statute of limitations on a cause of action for breach of contract
runs from the date of the breach, not the date of the contract. (Church v. Jamison (2006)
143 Cal.App.4th 1568, 1583.) Huyen repudiated the loan in October 2009, and Cindy
filed this action in November 2009 — well within any possible limitations period.
Similarly, Huyen makes a brief, off-hand reference to the statute of frauds. Once
again, we deem her to have forfeited any related contention by failing to cite any relevant
authorities or to provide any reasoned argument. In any event, in the trial court, Huyen’s
counsel conceded that, if the transaction was “a pure money loan” — i.e., not an
investment in the Ontario building — the statute of frauds would not apply. The trial
court expressly found that the transaction was an “oral loan.” Hence, we need no decide
whether the statute of frauds applied; even assuming the trial court erred by finding that it
did not, the error was invited.
We therefore conclude that the judgment is supported by substantial evidence.
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IV
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Cindy is awarded costs on appeal against Huyen.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RICHLI Acting P. J.
We concur:
MILLER J.
CODRINGTON J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the trial court's judgment awarding the plaintiff $178,000 for breach of an oral loan agreement was supported by substantial evidence, noting that the trial court's credibility determinations are binding on appeal.
Issues
Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding of an oral loan agreement and subsequent breach.
Whether the appellant forfeited the sufficiency of the evidence challenge by failing to discuss the evidence supporting the judgment.