emotional abuse of N.A. that escalated during the course of their marriage.
On January 18, 2009, the day after an abusive incident, N.A. informed her family
in India that she had decided to separate from S.A. When N.A. arrived home, S.A. was
angry at her for informing her family about her decision. S.A. yelled at her, touched her
breasts, and tried to unfasten her bra. N.A. screamed and told him to stop, which he did
after first pushing her onto the bed. N.A. called police because she believed she would
need their assistance to leave the home safely. The police arrived, questioned both of
1 All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.
2 "SLAPP" is an acronym for a strategic lawsuit against public participation. (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1109 & fn. 1.)
3 S.A. also appealed a separate judgment in favor of defendant N.A. after the trial court granted her anti-SLAPP motion to strike his complaint against her, but he subsequently dismissed his appeal of the judgment in N.A.'s favor. We refer to S.A. and N.A. by their initials. By doing so, we intend no disrespect to the parties.
2
them, and then arrested S.A. N.A. bailed him out of jail the following day. They
reconciled after he promised to be a better husband and father.
In 2010, during N.A.'s recovery period following a gynecological procedure, S.A.
continued to force her to have sex with him. He also threatened that he would not file her
work visa extension if she did not have sex with him.
In April 2010, before N.A. and S.A. left on a trip to India, S.A. cancelled S.'s
school enrollment against N.A.'s wishes. Shortly before leaving for the airport, he gave
N.A. an envelope filled with papers and told her it contained all of their immigration
documents. After arriving in India, S.A. left with a man whom he claimed was a friend.
N.A. and S. stayed with N.A.'s parents for the entire trip. A few days later, N.A. began
receiving abusive telephone calls and e-mails from S.A., who insisted she meet him alone
to sign divorce papers his attorney had prepared. N.A. then checked the envelope given
her by S.A. and found it did not contain any of her immigration documents. After N.A.
refused to meet S.A. alone, he used increasingly abrasive language toward her. In one
message to her, he stated: "My primary motive is to ruin your life." At about the same
time, N.A. learned that S.A. had transferred all of the money from their joint bank
account to his personal account.
Domestic violence restraining orders. In June 2010, after eventually obtaining
alternate travel documents, N.A. was able to return to the United States. Fearing future
abuse, N.A. filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order against S.A. in the
San Diego County Superior Court. After obtaining an initial temporary restraining order
from the court, N.A. retained attorney Jan Maiden to represent her in her requests for
3
subsequent restraining orders. The court issued a series of amended temporary
restraining orders and ultimately set a June 6, 2011, hearing date for N.A.'s request for a
permanent restraining order.
At the June 6, 2011, hearing, N.A. withdrew her request for a permanent
restraining order against S.A. and the trial court accepted her voluntary dismissal of that
request. Because N.A. had moved to Orange County and filed for legal separation, child
custody, and child and spousal support in the Orange County Superior Court, she no
longer believed a permanent restraining order against S.A. was necessary.
On June 29, 2011, S.A. filed an order to show cause (OSC) why he should not be
awarded attorney fees and costs as sanctions against N.A. for her extensions of the
temporary restraining order, which was based on false allegations, and her subsequent
dismissal of her request for a permanent restraining order. The trial court granted the
motion, finding S.A. was the prevailing party, and awarded him $3,500 in attorney fees
and costs.
Complaint. On June 6, 2012, S.A. filed the instant complaint against N.A. and
Maiden, alleging causes of action for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. He alleged N.A. and Maiden, maliciously and
without probable cause, initiated and actively maintained the domestic violence
restraining orders against him.
N.A. and Maiden filed separate anti-SLAPP motions to strike the complaint
against them. On March 11, 2013, the trial court granted both motions. Finding N.A.'s
request for a domestic violence restraining order "presented a quintessential family law
4
issue," the court applied the holding of Bidna v. Rosen (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 27 (Bidna)
and concluded S.A. could not state a malicious prosecution cause of action against N.A.
and Maiden for their actions in initiating and maintaining requests for the domestic
violence restraining orders against him. The court also found the Civil Code section 47,
subdivision (b), litigation privilege barred his causes of action for abuse of process and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court entered separate judgments for
N.A. and Maiden dismissing S.A.'s action against them. S.A. timely filed notices of
appeal challenging each of those judgments.4
DISCUSSION
I
Anti-SLAPP Motions
Section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute, "provides for the early dismissal of certain
unmeritorious claims that are brought to thwart constitutionally protected speech or
petitioning activity." (Robinzine v. Vicory (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1420-1421
"A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim." (Italics added.)
4 As noted above, S.A. subsequently dismissed his appeal of the judgment in N.A.'s favor. As a result, we address only his appeal of the judgment in Maiden's favor.
5
"Consideration of a section 425.16 motion to strike involves a two-step process.
'First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the
challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity. The moving defendant's
burden is to demonstrate that the act or acts of which the plaintiff complains were taken
"in furtherance of the [defendant's] right of petition or free speech under the United States
[Constitution] or [the] California Constitution in connection with a public issue," as
defined in the statute. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) If the court finds such a showing has
been made, it then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of
prevailing on the claim.' [Citation.] An anti-SLAPP motion must be denied ' "if the
plaintiff presents evidence establishing a prima facie case which, if believed by the trier
of fact, will result in a judgment for the plaintiff. [Citation.]" ' [Citation.] Only a
minimal showing of merit is required." (Robinzine, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1421.)
On appeal, we review a trial court's ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion de novo and
determine independently whether the statute's requirements for the special motion to
strike were satisfied. (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 325; Robinzine, supra,
143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1421; Kajima Engineering & Construction, Inc. v. City of Los
Angeles (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 921, 929.)
II
Malicious Prosecution Cause of Action
S.A. asserts the trial court erred by finding his malicious prosecution cause of
action was barred by the anti-SLAPP statute, arguing he established there was a
probability he would prevail on that cause of action.
6
A
A malicious prosecution action arises from protected activity under the anti-
SLAPP statute because it involves the filing and prosecution of an underlying lawsuit, or
petition to the judicial branch, that allegedly was malicious. (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v.
supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1422.) Malicious prosecution is a "disfavored" cause of
action and the trend has been for courts to limit its expansion. (Sheldon Appel Co. v.
Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 872; Siam v. Kizilbash (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th
1563, 1571 (Siam).)
We conclude the trial court correctly ruled that S.A. did not make a prima facie
case showing there was a probability he would prevail on his malicious prosecution cause
of action against Maiden. We conclude the court correctly applied the holding in Bidna
and found S.A. could not state a malicious prosecution cause of action against Maiden for
her actions in initiating and maintaining N.A.'s requests for domestic violence restraining
orders against him. In Bidna, the court applied the California Supreme Court's reasoning
8
in Sheldon Appel to establish a "bright-line rule" barring malicious prosecution causes of
action arising out of family law proceedings. (Bidna, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at pp. 29-30,
37-39.) Bidna held that "no malicious prosecution action may arise out of unsuccessful
family law motions or OSC's." (Id. at p. 37.) Bidna cited four reasons for adopting that
bright-line rule: (1) family law cases have a "unique propensity for bitterness" that makes
it difficult to distinguish a truly malicious motion from an ordinary one; (2) family law
courts have the unique ability or authority to swiftly discourage "litigious nonsense" or
frivolous motions by imposing attorney fee awards as sanctions; (3) family law matters
often require a special sensitivity and flexibility in crafting remedies and the threat of
malicious prosecution liability would increase the risk for a family law litigant in seeking
any particular remedy and decrease the likelihood of obtaining effective relief; and (4)
malicious prosecution liability would raise malpractice insurance premiums for family
law attorneys and indirectly make clients' access to attorneys more expensive. (Id. at pp.
35-36; see also Siam, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1571-1572.) Although the facts in
Bidna involved underlying child custody motions, the court pronounced a rule precluding
malicious prosecution actions that arise out of family law motions and OSC's. (Bidna, at
p. 37.)
Except for the exception to Bidna's general rule recognized in Nicholson v. Fazeli
(2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1091 (Nicholson), we agree with and adopt Bidna's general
holding and apply it to the circumstances in this case. We conclude a request for a
domestic violence restraining order is a family law motion within the meaning of Bidna.
First, the statutory scheme that authorizes such restraining orders, the Domestic Violence
9
Prevention Act (DVPA), is found in Family Code sections 6200 et seq. The DVPA's
definition of "domestic violence" includes abuse perpetrated against a spouse, former
spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, person with whom the respondent is having or has
had a dating or engagement relationship, and a person with whom the respondent has had
a child. (Fam. Code, § 6211.) Family Code section 6320 authorized the initial and
subsequent amended temporary restraining orders issued by the trial court in this case.
That statute provides:
"The court may issue an ex parte order enjoining a party from . . . striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, harassing, telephoning, . . . contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of the other party, and, in the discretion of the court, on a showing of good cause, of other named family or household members." (Fam. Code, § 6320, subd. (a).)
The fact the DVPA authorizes restraining orders not only for the protection of persons
traditionally considered "family members," but also persons who may not traditionally be
considered "family members," does not preclude a request for a DVPA restraining order
from constituting a family law motion within the meaning of Bidna. Second, requests for
DVPA restraining orders are, in general, heard and decided by judges assigned to the
family law divisions of the county superior courts, as in this case. Based on the DVPA's
statutory scheme and practice, we conclude requests for domestic violence restraining
orders pursuant to the DVPA are "family law motions" within the meaning of Bidna's
holding. In the circumstances of this case, the request by N.A. for an initial DVPA
restraining order, and subsequent requests for extensions and/or amendments, against her
husband, S.A., constitute family law motions within the meaning of Bidna.
10
Furthermore, the reasons Bidna cited for its holding apply equally to this case to
provide support for our conclusion that S.A. is precluded from pursuing a malicious
prosecution cause of action against Maiden. First, the DVPA generally applies where the
victim has been abused, threatened, or harassed by a person who is a family member or
has or had a close relationship with the victim. It is evident based on our consideration of
numerous DVPA appeals that there is often extreme bitterness between the parties,
making it difficult to distinguish a malicious DVPA restraining order request from an
ordinary one. (Bidna, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 35.)
Second, family law courts are authorized to impose attorney fee awards as
sanctions against persons who frivolously or maliciously and without probable cause
request DVPA restraining orders. (Fam. Code, §§ 271, 6344; see § 128.7.) In fact, in
this case the trial court awarded S.A. $3,500 in attorney fees and costs after N.A.
voluntarily dismissed her request for a permanent restraining order. Family law courts
have the unique ability or authority to swiftly discourage "litigious nonsense" or frivolous
motions by imposing attorney fee awards as sanctions. (Bidna, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at
p. 35.)
Third, if malicious prosecution actions were permitted against persons who
request DVPA restraining orders, there would be a "chilling effect" on the ability of
victims of domestic violence and other abuse to obtain protective relief under the DVPA.
(Bidna, supra, 19 Caal.App.4th at p. 35.) That disincentive to apply for protective relief
would be contrary to the public policy underlying, and the legislative intent of, the
DVPA. The DVPA provides: "The purposes of this division are to prevent the recurrence
11
of acts of violence and sexual abuse and to provide for a separation of the persons
involved in the domestic violence for a period sufficient to enable these persons to seek a
resolution of the causes of the violence." (Fam. Code, § 6220.)
Finally, the imposition of malicious prosecution liability on family law attorneys
representing victims of domestic violence based on their representation of victims who
request DVPA restraining orders would logically increase the cost of malpractice
insurance for family law attorneys and presumably make it more expensive for victims to
obtain representation in those family law matters. (Bidna, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 35-36.) Based on our consideration of Bidna's reasons for barring malicious
prosecution claims, we conclude those same reasons apply to the DVPA restraining
orders requested by N.A., and her attorney Maiden, against S.A. in the circumstances of
this case. We conclude both Bidna's holding and reasoning support our conclusion that
S.A. cannot state a malicious prosecution cause of action against Maiden for N.A.'s
request, filed in the family law court, for the initial DVPA restraining order and N.A. and
her attorney Maiden's subsequent requests for extensions, renewals, and/or amendments
of the initial restraining order.
The case of Nicholson, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th 1091 is not apposite to this case
and does not persuade us to reach a contrary conclusion. Nicholson involved
postdissolution judgment proceedings based on the family court's retention of jurisdiction
over property division and other matters. (Id. at p. 1094.) The former wife filed a
complaint against the former husband's trust, a party to the dissolution proceedings,
seeking declaratory relief and imposition of a constructive trust. (Ibid.) The trust filed a
12
cross-complaint against her, seeking possession of a vehicle and certain jewelry alleged
to be trust property in her possession. (Ibid.) The cross-complaint was bifurcated from
the dissolution proceedings and was subsequently voluntarily dismissed by the trust. (Id.
at p. 1095.) The former wife then filed a malicious prosecution action against her former
husband, the trustees of the trust, and their attorney. (Id. at pp. 1095-1096.) The trial
court granted the trustees' demurrer and dismissed the malicious prosecution action
against them. (Id. at p. 1096.)
Nicholson rejected the argument that Bidna's holding and reasoning applied to bar
the malicious prosecution action against the trustees and their attorney. (Nicholson,
supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1096-1099.) Nicholson stated: "While Bidna's broad
language may have suggested that no malicious prosecution cause of action could be
based on any action that 'originate[d] in family law proceedings,' we decline to extend
of action that, for whatever reason, 'originate in family law proceedings.' The cross-
complaint filed by [the trustees' attorney] on behalf of [the trustees] allegedly at the
direction of [the former husband] did not raise any family law issues. . . . The Trust's
action was simply a civil action for possession of property alleged to be trust property
and damages for the loss of trust property. Had this same pleading been separately filed
in the superior court, there would be no question that it could support a malicious
prosecution action . . . . The mere fact that the cross-complainants used the family
division case number and that the cross-complaint was filed in the family division did not
transform the Trust's ordinary civil action against [the former wife] into a family law
13
motion, OSC or other inherently family law proceeding." (Id. at pp. 1098-1099.)
Nicholson also concluded that Bidna's reasons for an absolute bar against malicious
prosecution claims did not apply to ordinary civil actions that originate in family law
proceedings. (Nicholson, at p. 1099.) Nicholson held the trial court erred by sustaining
the defendants' demurrer to the malicious prosecution action. (Ibid.)
We conclude Nicholson is inapposite to this case. Unlike the civil action for
possession of property and damages involved in that case, the underlying motions in this
case were requests for the initial DVPA restraining order and subsequent extensions,
renewals, and/or amendments. As we discussed above, DVPA restraining order
proceedings are family law proceedings over which the family law divisions of the
superior courts have jurisdiction. Therefore, they are not "ordinary civil actions" that
may merely originate in the family court. Nicholson's reasoning does not persuade us to
reach a contrary conclusion.
Our conclusion is further supported by other cases applying Bidna's holding and/or
reasoning to bar malicious prosecution actions against persons who request restraining
orders pursuant to statutory schemes other than the DVPA. In Siam, the court applied the
reasoning of Bidna, Sheldon Appel, and Pace v. Hillcrest Motor Co. (1980) 101
Cal.App.3d 476, 479 [barring malicious prosecution actions arising out of small claims
actions], and concluded malicious prosecution actions cannot be based on an
unsuccessful civil harassment petition under section 527.6. (Siam, supra, 130
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1567, 1571-1574.) Siam held the trial court erred by denying the
14
defendant's anti-SLAPP motion to strike the malicious prosecution claim against him.
(Id. at p. 1574.)
Following Siam's reasoning (based, in part, on Bidna's reasoning), Robinzine
similarly concluded malicious prosecution claims cannot be based on an unsuccessful
workplace harassment petition under section 527.8. (Robinzine, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 1419, 1422-1424.) Robinzine stated:
"Given the substantial similarity between petitions under section 527.6 and section 527.8, the reasoning of Siam applies equally to both statutes. As we have noted, section 527.8 was enacted to allow employers to seek protections comparable to those offered under section 527.6 to enjoin workplace threats or acts of violence against employees. [Citations.] Both statutory schemes describe a streamlined process for obtaining a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. [Citations.] Both envision self- representation by parties without the benefit of counsel, and exempt the process from filing fees. [Citations.] They contain similar provisions concerning notification, enforcement and the consequences of any order obtained in the proceedings. [Citations.] . . . Moreover, a prevailing defendant in an action filed under section 527.8 has available sanctions that can be obtained within the proceeding to redress baseless or harassing allegations. (See § 128.7.)" (Robinzine, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1423-1424, fn. omitted.)
The court held the trial court erred by denying the defendants' anti-SLAPP motion to
strike the malicious prosecution claim against them. (Robinzine, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1424.)
We conclude the basic statutory schemes of, and the public policies and legislative
intents underlying, the DVPA and sections 527.6 and 527.8 are sufficiently similar to
require a result in this case similar to Siam and Robinzine. All three statutory schemes
provide expedited and simplified procedures for victims of violence, abuse, and
15
harassment to obtain temporary and permanent restraining orders to protect them.
Furthermore, because the DVPA is contained in the Family Code and not in the Code of
Civil Procedure (as are §§ 527.6 and 527.8) and intends to help protect victims who are
family members of, or who have or had close relationships to, the alleged abuser, Bidna's
reasoning applies more directly to a DVPA case, such as this case, than to the statutory
schemes authorizing other restraining orders against violence, abuse, and harassment
(i.e., §§ 527.6 and 527.8). Siam and Robinzine's holdings provide additional support for
our conclusion.
Because we have concluded Bidna's holding and reasoning apply to bar S.A.'s
malicious prosecution claim against Maiden, and similar restraining order cases (i.e.,
Siam and Robinzine) support our conclusion, we independently conclude S.A. has not,
and cannot, establish there is a probability he will prevail on his malicious prosecution
cause of action. Based on S.A.'s failure to make a prima facie case on that second prong
of section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1)'s requirements, we conclude the trial court correctly
granted Maiden's anti-SLAPP motion to strike his malicious prosecution cause of action
against her.
III
Abuse of Process Cause of Action
S.A. contends the trial court erred by granting Maiden's anti-SLAPP motion to
strike his abuse of process cause of action, arguing he established there was a probability
he would prevail on that claim.
16
A
"The common law tort of abuse of process arises when one uses the court's process
for a purpose other than that for which the process was designed. [Citations.] It has been
'interpreted broadly to encompass the entire range of "procedures" incident to litigation.'
[Citation.] [¶] '[T]he essence of the tort [is] . . . misuse of the power of the court; it is an
act done in the name of the court and under its authority for the purpose of perpetrating
an injustice.' [Citation.] To succeed in an action for abuse of process, a litigant must
establish that the defendant (1) contemplated an ulterior motive in using the process, and
(2) committed a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of
the proceedings." (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1056 (Rusheen).)
Bidna described the difference between abuse of process and malicious
prosecution, stating:
"Abuse of process is not just another name for malicious prosecution. Simply filing or maintaining a lawsuit for an improper purpose (such as might support a malicious prosecution cause of action) is not abuse of process. [Citation.] [¶] Malicious prosecution and abuse of process are distinct. The former concerns a meritless lawsuit (and all the damage it inflicted). The latter concerns the misuse of the tools the law affords litigants once they are in a lawsuit (regardless of whether there was probable cause to commence that lawsuit in the first place). Hence, abuse of process claims typically arise for improper or excessive attachments [citation] or improper use of discovery [citation]." (Bidna, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 40, italics added.)
The California Supreme Court stated: "[T]he mere filing or maintenance of a
lawsuit―even for an improper purpose―is not a proper basis for an abuse of process
action." (Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc.
17
(1986) 42 Cal.3d 1157, 1169, italics added.) Alternatively stated, neither the initiation of
a meritless claim nor the continued prosecution of a claim after it becomes apparent the
claim is meritless can support an abuse of process cause of action. (Ramona Unified
School Dist. v. Tsiknas (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 510, 520.) Such conduct may support a
malicious prosecution cause of action, but not one for abuse of process. (Ibid.) In
Ramona, we concluded: "[C]ontinued pursuit of meritless litigation for an improper
collateral purpose, although actionable under malicious prosecution principles, is not
separately actionable under an abuse of process theory." (Id. at p. 521.)
B
Considering the first prong of the anti-SLAPP requirements, we incorporate our
discussion regarding malicious prosecution above and conclude an abuse of process
claim likewise involves protected activity under section 425.16. Therefore, the first anti-
SLAPP prong is satisfied.
Regarding the second prong, we conclude S.A. has not established there is a
probability he will prevail on his abuse of process cause of action. The gravamen of his
abuse of process claim is that N.A. and her attorney Maiden initiated and maintained
meritless DVPA restraining order proceedings for malicious purposes. He does not
allege any misuse of process, or the tools of the law, in the course of maintaining those
allegedly meritless DVPA proceedings. S.A.'s claim is for malicious prosecution and not
abuse of process. (Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1056; Oren Royal Oaks Venture v.
Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc., supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1169; Ramona
Unified School Dist. v. Tsiknas, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at pp. 520-521; Bidna, supra, 19
18
Cal.App.4th at p. 40; Adams v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 521, 532 [alleged
malicious filings of meritless motions "are not actionable [as abuse of process] because
there was no subsequent misuse of process and therefore no actionable wrong is
alleged."].) However, as we discussed above, S.A. cannot state a malicious prosecution
claim in a DVPA case, such as this case. Based on S.A.'s failure to make a prima facie
case on that second prong of section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1)'s requirements, we
conclude the trial court correctly granted Maiden's anti-SLAPP motion to strike his abuse
of process cause of action against her.5
IV
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Cause of Action
S.A. contends the trial court erred by granting Maiden's anti-SLAPP motion to
strike his cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), arguing he
established there was a probability he would prevail on that claim.
Regarding the first prong of the anti-SLAPP requirements, we incorporate our
discussion regarding malicious prosecution above and conclude S.A.'s IIED cause of
action for emotional distress caused by N.A. and her attorney Maiden's initiation and
5 By so concluding, we need not address alternative reasons for barring S.A.'s abuse of process claim. Nevertheless, we note that because the gravamen of S.A.'s claim is the initiation and maintenance of DVPA restraining order proceedings, the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), would also likely apply to bar his abuse of process claim. (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b) ["A privileged publication or broadcast is one made: [¶] . . . [¶] [i]n any . . . judicial proceeding"]; Pollock v. University of Southern California (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1429-1430; Navellier v. Sletten (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 763, 770 [initiation and maintenance of action were protected by the litigation privilege].)
19
maintenance of the DVPA proceedings likewise involved protected activity under section
425.16. Therefore, the first anti-SLAPP prong is satisfied.
Considering the second prong, we conclude S.A. has not established there is a
probability he will prevail on his IIED cause of action. The gravamen of his IIED claim
is that N.A. and her attorney Maiden intentionally initiated and maintained meritless
DVPA restraining order proceedings with an intent to cause him emotional distress and
that such conduct was extreme and outrageous. However, as many cases have concluded,
the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), bars IIED claims
arising out of litigation conduct. (See, e.g., Komarova v. National Credit Acceptance,
Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 324, 341; Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1063 ["modern
public policy seeks to encourage free access to the courts and finality of judgments by
limiting derivative tort claims [i.e., IIED claims] arising out of litigation-related
misconduct and by favoring sanctions within the original lawsuit]"]; Silberg v. Anderson
(1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 215 [litigation privilege has "been held to immunize defendants
from tort liability based on theories of . . . [citations] intentional infliction of emotional
distress"]; Rosenthal v. Irell & Manella (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 121, 125; Lerette v. Dean
Witter Organization, Inc. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 573, 579; Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22
Code section 47, subdivision (b), protects communications made "[i]n any . . . judicial
proceeding." In this case, because the alleged wrongful conduct did "not involve any
action outside of ordinary court proceedings [citation] calculated to humiliate or inflict
emotional distress" (Bidna, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 39), the litigation privilege under
20
Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), applies to bar S.A.'s IIED cause of action against
Maiden. S.A. has not established there is a probability he will prevail on his IIED cause
of action. Based on his failure to make a prima facie case on the second prong of section
425.16, subdivision (b)(1)'s requirements, we conclude the trial court correctly granted
Maiden's anti-SLAPP motion to strike his IIED cause of action against her.
V
Conclusion
Because S.A. did not establish there is a probability he will prevail on any of his
three causes of action against Maiden, we conclude the trial court correctly granted her
anti-SLAPP motion to strike those causes of action against her. The court properly
entered the judgment in her favor.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Maiden is entitled to costs on appeal.
McDONALD, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
IRION, J.
21
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that a malicious prosecution action cannot arise from a request for a domestic violence restraining order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, as such requests constitute family law motions subject to the bright-line rule established in Bidna v. Rosen. Furthermore, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, finding them barred by the litigation privilege.
Issues
Whether a malicious prosecution cause of action can arise from a request for a domestic violence restraining order.
Whether the trial court correctly applied the anti-SLAPP statute to the plaintiff's claims for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Bidna held that "no malicious prosecution action may arise out of unsuccessful family law motions or OSC's."”
“We conclude a request for a domestic violence restraining order is a family law motion within the meaning of Bidna.”