California Court of Appeal Aug 14, 2014 No. E055460Unpublished
Filed 8/14/14 Armijo v. Mason CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
OSCAR ARMIJO et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, E055460
v. (Super.Ct.No. INC086617)
JOHN MASON III et al., OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John G. Evans, Judge.
Affirmed.
Oscar Armijo, Luisa Armijo, Nicholas Minervini, and Joan Elaine Minervini,
plaintiffs in pro. per.; Law Office of Raymond Buendia and Raymond Buendia for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Law Offices of Robert B. Mobasseri and Robert B. Mobasseri for Defendants
and Respondents.
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Plaintiffs and appellants Oscar Armijo, Luisa Armijo (collectively, the Armijos),
Nicholas Minervini, and Joan Elaine Minervini (collectively, the Minervinis) sued their
neighbors, defendants and respondents John Mason III and Glenys Sarah Weems
(collectively, the Masons).1 The Armijos and Minervinis (collectively, plaintiffs)
sought (1) to quiet title to a parcel of property (Parcel-1), which was part of the Masons’
property, but which plaintiffs had been using for a period of years; (2) declaratory relief
reflecting plaintiffs had a prescriptive easement to park cars and place trashcans on
Parcel-1; and (3) an injunction requiring the Masons to let plaintiffs use Parcel-1, which
would include removal of a block wall.
After a bench trial, the trial court ruled that plaintiffs could use Parcel-1 “for the
purpose of trash collection as an incident of the right of ingress and egress,” but in all
other respects, ruled in favor of the Masons. Plaintiffs raise two issues on appeal. First,
plaintiffs assert their evidence supports a finding of a prescriptive easement. Second,
plaintiffs contend the Masons should be required to remove the block wall. We affirm
the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The following is a representation of the area in dispute, with the arrows
representing the approximate location of the driveways, and the circles representing the
approximate location of the garages:
1 We use “the Masons” for ease of reference. No disrespect is intended toward Ms. Weems.
2
Yucca Tree Drive
Armijo Property 74-611 Yucca Tree Drive Parcel-1 Minervini Property 74-653 Yucca Tree Drive Armijo Property Pool Area
P a Vacant Home r 74-613 Yucca Tree Drive c Mason Property Other Property e 74-645 Yucca Tree Drive l- 2
Parcel-1 measures 40 feet by 80 feet. Part of Parcel-1 is gravel, and part of it is
asphalt. After a tax default and sale, the Coachella Valley Water District owned Parcel-
1. In 1991, the Water District transferred ownership of Parcel-1 to the then-owner of
the Masons’ property. The 1991 deed for Parcel-1 reflected the following reservations:
“RESERVING to the grantor pipeline easements for construction, operation and
maintenance of present and future lines. [¶] ALSO RESERVING to the grantor and all
adjacent property owners an access easement for ingress and egress.”
A private civil engineer Dale Walters (Walters) testified on behalf of plaintiffs.
After reviewing various documents such as deeds, Walters believed Parcel-1 was
intended, in the past, to be used as a road. Walters did not find any documents
dedicating Parcel-1 as a private road or public road. Walters’s opinion was “based on
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[the] phraseology in the document”; presumably “the document” is the 1991 deed
transferring ownership from the Water District.
The Armijos moved into their home at 74-611 Yucca Tree Drive, in Palm Desert,
in July 1988. The Armijos’ have four children who are now grown. The pool-parcel, in
the drawing ante, is now owned by the Armijos; however, when the Armijos’ children
were younger, four neighbors, including the Armijos, shared a 25 percent ownership
interest in the pool-parcel. Over time, the Armijos purchased the other neighbors’
ownership interests, so the Armijos now owned the pool-parcel.
The Minervinis moved into their home, at 74-653 Yucca Tree Drive, in 1996.
The Masons moved into their home, at 74-645 Yucca Tree Drive, in 2007. The Masons
own Parcel-1, which is encumbered by the ingress/egress easement for adjacent
property owners.
The area in the drawing above marked as “Parcel-2” is owned by the Armijos.
The Armijos parked vehicles on Parcel-2. The Masons constructed a block wall on the
Masons’ residential property, along Parcel-2. In other words, the wall is along the
Masons’ house-property and Parcel-2. Prior to the wall being constructed, the Armijos
would drive across a corner of the Masons’ property to access a driveway for Parcel-2
and then park their vehicles on Parcel-2. The block wall starts at the back of the
Masons’ property. It is unclear where the block wall ends, but it can be inferred from
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the testimony that the wall extends over and beyond the driveway the Armijos had used
to access Parcel-2 when cutting across the corner of the Masons’ property.2
Parcel-2 has trees and tree stumps on it, but the area near the Parcel-2 driveway,
(the driveway that requires cutting across a corner of the Masons’ property) was
relatively free of trees and stumps. Effectively, the Masons blocked the tree-free
Parcel-2 driveway, forcing the Armijos to access Parcel-2 from Parcel-1. When the
Armijos enter Parcel-2 from Parcel-1, it is “very difficult” for the Armijos to fit their
van between the block wall and the trees located on Parcel-2. The Armijos have not
tried removing the trees or tree stumps on Parcel-2. The Armijos cannot park the van
on Parcel-2 the same way they did prior to the wall being built. Oscar has run over
water meters on Parcel-2, breaking the meters, when trying to maneuver the van after
the wall was constructed. The Armijos have been parking the various vans they owned
on Parcel-2 since 1988.
Also since 1988, the Armijos used Parcel-1 to access their home, to park their
cars, for their guests’ to park their cars, to place their trashcans, and for maintenance
people, such as gardeners, to park their trucks. Luisa Armijo (Luisa) used to maintain
Parcel-1 by shoveling gravel and pulling weeds. When Oscar went to look at his
2 It is unclear from the record exactly where the wall ends. During testimony, Oscar was referring to an aerial photograph of the neighborhood and said, “There’s now a block wall here. Goes all the way down to the back of the property.” Nobody clarified for the record where Oscar was pointing on the exhibit. Oscar was asked to explain specifically where the wall was located, and he responded, “It’s—this portion right here and all the way down over here.” Again, nobody clarified for the record where Oscar was pointing on the exhibit.
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property, in order to purchase it, the then-owner of the Armijos’ property told Oscar he
could park on Parcel-1.
Approximately five different people have owned the Mason-property since the
Armijos purchased their home in 1988. The Armijos never spoke to the four prior
owners of the Masons’ property about using Parcel-1; although one of the prior owners
of the Masons’ property (J.R.) offered to sell Parcel-1 to the Armijos, but the Armijos
declined the offer.
When the Masons moved into their residence, the Armijos introduced themselves
and explained where they lived, who the neighbors were, and the different vehicles the
Masons may see parked on Parcel-1. At some point, the Masons gave the Armijos a
document notifying the Armijos that the Armijos could not park their cars on Parcel-1,
and that the Armijos’ use of Parcel-1 was limited to ingress and egress.3 Luisa
explained to Glenys Sarah Weems (Weems) that the Armijos’ children “have nowhere
else to park.”
Nicholas Minervini (Nicholas) has a pool repair and service business. He has
two trucks for his business. Nicholas parks one of his trucks on Parcel-1, along his
property line. Nicholas has been parking a truck on Parcel-1 since 1996. The
Minervinis’ guests also parked on Parcel-1. The Minervinis placed their trashcans on
3 It is unclear exactly when the Masons gave the document to the Armijos. A date is not discussed during the testimony. An exhibit number is not discussed during the testimony. An exhibit list is not included in the clerk’s transcript. We reviewed the register of actions for exhibit references, but could not find one related to a letter. The trial court’s Statement of Decision does not include a date related to the document.
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Parcel-1 or on the Armijos’ property, because the Armijos’ property extends a few feet
past their yard, allowing room for trashcans. The Minervinis’ gardener occasionally
removed weeds on Parcel-1, and the Minervinis helped maintain the Parcel-1 gravel on
one occasion. The Minervinis never asked the prior owners of the Masons’ property or
the Masons for permission to use Parcel-1. When the Minervinis moved into their
home, Nicholas saw other people were parking their vehicles on Parcel-1 and “assumed
it was—it was just like community parking that’s all.”
Upon moving into his home, John Mason III (Mason) noticed other people’s
vehicles parked on Parcel-1. Mason noticed five or six cars at a time parked on Parcel-
1. Mason gave the Minervinis and the Armijos the written notice that they could no
longer park their vehicles on Parcel-1. Nicholas stopped parking his truck on Parcel-1
for a period after the notice, but returned to parking on Parcel-1 once the lawsuit for the
instant case was filed in 2009.
Mason explained that he had the block wall constructed because the area outside
their property “was not that pretty,” and to increase security. Mason only ever saw the
Armijos park a single van on Parcel-2; the Armijos did not park other vehicles there.
Mason believed the wall did not prevent the Armijos from parking their van on Parcel-
2; it was the trees and stumps that prevented the Armijos from going further onto
Parcel-2, but they were still able to park a van on Parcel-2. Mason had a survey
conducted for Parcel-1, which reflected the Minervinis’ yard encroached on Parcel-1;
however, there was nothing reflecting the Minervinis had paid taxes for Parcel-1.
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Mason had never seen the Armijos or Minervinis perform maintenance work on Parcel-
1.
The trial court issued a Statement of Decision. In regard to the quiet title cause
of action, the court found there was no evidence supporting a ruling to quiet title as to
any portion of Parcel-1. The court concluded plaintiffs’ arguments were limited to a
prescriptive easement and injunction, which supported the conclusion that there was no
evidence reflecting the need to quiet title.
As to the prescriptive easement cause of action, the trial court noted plaintiffs
wanted an easement for parking their cars and placing their trashcans. The trial court
found the right to park is not incidental to a right of ingress and egress. The court
presented the rule that a prescriptive easement requires evidence of hostile use of the
property. The court found the evidence reflected the Armijos were told they could park
on Parcel-1 when they moved into the neighborhood and no one complained about their
use of Parcel-1 until the Masons became the owners of Parcel-1. Additionally, the court
found Nicholas never asked for permission to use Parcel-1, he assumed he could use it.
Based upon this evidence, the trial court found plaintiffs’ use of Parcel-1 (parking and
trashcans) was not hostile.
The trial court wrote, “The evidence presented at trial indicates that prior to
Mason/Weems acquiring ownership of [Parcel-1], plaintiffs’ use of [Parcel-1] was
merely the type that is normally allowed by one neighbor to another as a friendly
gesture and accommodation. Such use cannot ripen into a prescriptive right.” The court
held the plaintiffs, along with the future owners of the vacant property, could use
8
Parcel-1 for placement of trashcans for trash pick-up and for temporary parking for
service workers, such as pool cleaners and landscapers.
In regard to the block wall, the trial court noted it was unclear if any portion of
the block wall was located on Parcel-1 since a survey related to the block wall was not
presented at trial. The court noted the Armijos had an easement across Parcel-1, but did
not have an easement across the corner of the Masons’ property that the Armijos had
been using to access Parcel-2. As a result, the court concluded the Armijos failed to
meet their burden of proof regarding a prescriptive easement for accessing Parcel-2,
e.g., they did not have an easement to drive across the Mason’s residential property.
As to the injunction, the trial court found there was no evidence that the Masons
use of Parcel-1 should be enjoined. The court concluded nothing indicated the Masons
were interfering with the plaintiffs’ rights of ingress and egress.
DISCUSSION
A. PARCEL-1
Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred because their evidence established a hostile
use of Parcel-1.
“The elements necessary to establish a prescriptive easement are well settled.
The party claiming such an easement must show use of the property which has been
open, notorious, continuous and adverse for an uninterrupted period of five years.
[Citations.] Whether the elements of prescription are established is a question of fact
for the trial court [citation], and the findings of the court will not be disturbed where
9
there is substantial evidence to support them.” (Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings,
Inc. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 564, 570.)
Under the substantial evidence standard, “‘“the power of an appellate court
begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence,
contradicted or uncontradicted” to support the findings below. [Citation.] We must
therefore view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it
the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor . . . .’
[Citation.]” (Brewer v. Murphy (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 928, 935.)
The “hostile” element requires the claimant’s use of the property be adverse to
the owner, with no permission from the owner being expressed or implied. (Otay Water
Dist. v. Beckwith (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1045; Aaron v. Dunham (2006) 137
Cal.App.4th 1244, 1252.) “Whether the use is hostile or is merely a matter of
neighborly accommodation . . . is a question of fact to be determined in light of the
surrounding circumstances and the relationship between the parties. [Citations.]”
(Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc., supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 572.)
Oscar testified that, when his children were young, he and three of his neighbors
each owned a 25 percent interest in the pool-parcel. Neighbors would use Parcel-2 to
access the pool-parcel. Luisa testified that she cleaned and maintained Parcel-1
because, when the Armijos’ children were young, they would play on Parcel-1. Luisa
was one of the only people on the street who did not work, and therefore had time to
maintain the lot. Luisa explained, the neighbors “would come and tell [her] thank you”
and the neighbors “were grateful” for her help maintaining Parcel-1. When the
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Minervinis moved into their home, Nicholas saw other people were parking their
vehicles on Parcel-1 and “assumed it was—it was just like community parking that’s
all.”
The Armijos both testified that when the Masons moved into the neighborhood,
the Armijos went to introduce themselves to the Masons, but only Weems was present,
Mason was not part of the conversation. During the conversation, the Armijos
explained who they were and the different cars the Masons might see on Parcel-1, e.g.,
one car belonged to the Armijos’ daughter. Luisa said she mentioned the cars because
she wanted the Masons “to know who my kids were.” Oscar said the cars were
mentioned because the Armijos “were just being friendly. We were just being
neighbors, normal people talk about those things.”
The Armijos’ testimony reflects a neighborhood where neighbors were friendly
with one another. They owned property together, helped one another with maintenance
work, and had friendly relationships. When the Masons moved-in, the Armijos did not
tell the Masons, “we claim a right to Parcel-1”; rather, the Armijos had a friendly
conversation about the cars the Masons may see on Parcel-1. From the foregoing
evidence, the trial court could reasonably conclude the Armijos and Minervinis were
using Parcel-1 as part of a neighborly accommodation, since the neighbors had been so
friendly and cooperative with one another. Accordingly, we conclude substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the use was merely a matter of
neighborly accommodation, i.e. permissive use.
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Plaintiffs assert the evidence does not reflect permissive use because plaintiffs
“have made parking use of [Parcel-1] for at least 11 years without the landowner’s
interference.” Plaintiffs rely on the rule that the existence of a prescriptive easement
can be presumed by proving (1) open, notorious, visible, and continuous use of a
property; and (2) a lack of protest or opposition from the dominant property owner.
However, that presumption can be rebutted by evidence of permissive use. (MacDonald
Properties, Inc. v. Bel-Air Country Club (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 693, 702.)
Plaintiffs’ argument ignores (1) the permissive use aspect of the law, and (2) the
foregoing evidence of a cooperative and sharing neighborhood. As detailed ante, there
is evidence reflecting a friendly neighborhood wherein neighbors permissively
accommodated and supported one another. The lack of interference does not equate
with a lack of substantial evidence. Accordingly, we find plaintiffs’ argument to be
unpersuasive.
B. PARCEL-2
Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred by “den[ying] remedy to Appellant Armijo
for [the Masons’] blocking of his access to the [Parcel-2] portion of his property.”
Plaintiffs write, “It is submitted that substantial evidence to support the court’s denial of
relief under any cause of action does not exist.” The argument contains no legal or
record citations. Plaintiffs do not explain what evidence is insufficient and/or how it is
insufficient. Since plaintiffs do not provide legal citations, record citations, or analysis
related to this issue, we deem it to be abandoned. (Benach v. County of Los Angeles
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(2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(1)(B)&(C).)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
KING J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a prescriptive easement over the defendants' property because their use of the land was permissive, rooted in neighborly accommodation rather than hostile use. Additionally, the court affirmed the denial of an injunction regarding a block wall, noting the plaintiffs failed to prove a right to access the specific area blocked by the wall.
Issues
Whether the trial court erred in finding that the plaintiffs' use of the defendants' property was permissive rather than a hostile prescriptive easement.
Whether the trial court erred in denying an injunction requiring the defendants to remove a block wall that obstructed the plaintiffs' access to their own property.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The evidence presented at trial indicates that prior to Mason/Weems acquiring ownership of [Parcel-1], plaintiffs’ use of [Parcel-1] was merely the type that is normally allowed by one neighbor to another as a friendly gesture and accommodation.”
“The “hostile” element requires the claimant’s use of the property be adverse to the owner, with no permission from the owner being expressed or implied.”
“Whether the use is hostile or is merely a matter of neighborly accommodation . . . is a question of fact to be determined in light of the surrounding circumstances and the relationship between the parties.”