California Court of Appeal Jul 31, 2014 No. D060304Unpublished
Filed 7/31/14 Chau v. Chau CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
ROSEMARY CHAU, Individually and as D060304 Trustee, etc.,
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. GIC875156) v.
PAUL M. CHAU,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Joan M. Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Elliott Kanter and Elliot N. Kanter for Defendant and Appellant.
Law Offices of Gregory Y. Lievers and Gregory Y. Lievers for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Paul Chau appeals from an order denying his motion to vacate the judgment and
statement of decision entered in favor of his sister, Rosemary Chau, individually and as
the trustee of the JRLR Trust, on claims for fraud and money had and received. Paul also
challenges the granting of Rosemary's request for attorney fees against his company,
Systems Construction Design & Development LLC (Systems Construction). Paul
contends there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding (1) that he
committed fraud and (2) as to which of multiple contracts was the controlling contract
between the parties. He also contends the trial court erred by (3) allowing Rosemary to
Here, Paul's present appeal raises the situation described above and would
essentially give him two bites at the apple. This appeal plainly raises issues identical to
those raised in Paul's prior appeal from the judgment (Chau I, supra, D059411). As we
have explained, in the prior appeal, Paul challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the trial court's findings on fraud and the controlling contract, the trial court's
ruling allowing Rosemary to amend her complaint, and the trial court's failure to issue a
proposed statement of decision and judgment. (Ibid.) We resolved these issues against
Paul and affirmed the judgment against him. (Ibid.) Our decision is conclusive on Paul's
rights in this appeal. (Talley v. Valuation Counselors Group, Inc. (2010) 191
Cal.App.4th 132, 146-147, fn. 11.) Accordingly, we decline to consider Paul's first,
second, third and sixth issues in this appeal.
II. Alter Ego Liability
Paul contends "[t]he [trial] [c]ourt erred in finding [a]lter [e]go liability as there is
not sufficient evidence to show the legal requirements for liability." The issue is waived.
The extent of Paul's argument on alter ego liability is one sentence in the
conclusion of his opening brief. He does not develop his argument or cite any authority
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to support his position. " 'Appellate briefs must provide argument and legal authority for
the positions taken. "When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to
support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as
waived." ' [Citation.] 'We are not bound to develop appellants' arguments for them.
[Citation.] The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court
to treat the contention as waived.' " (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194
Cal.App.4th 939, 956.)
III. Attorney Fees
Paul contends the trial court erred in awarding Rosemary attorney fees against
Systems Construction because service of her motion was defective. Paul does not have
standing to assert this claim.
To have standing to appeal, a party must be "legally aggrieved" by the appealable
order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 902; In re Jasmine S. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 835, 841-842.)
A party is legally aggrieved for appeal purposes only if his or her rights or interests are
"injuriously affected" by the judgment. (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d
730, 737; Crook v. Contreras (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1201.) "[A party] may not
assert error that injuriously affected only nonappealing coparties." (Rebney v. Wells
Fargo Bank (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1117, 1128.)
Here, Rosemary sought attorney fees as the prevailing party on Systems
Construction's cross-complaint for breach of contract against her. The court granted her
request for attorney fees in the amount of $367,028 against Systems Construction. Paul
was not a party to the cross-complaint, and the court did not award attorney fees against
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him personally. Thus, Paul was not "injuriously affected" by the challenged order
because it did not affect his legal rights.
The party aggrieved by the challenged attorney fee award in this case was Systems
Construction; however, as we previously stated, we dismissed Systems Construction's
appeal due to its failure to file an appellate brief. Paul does not have standing to
challenge an order that injuriously affected only a nonappealing coparty. (Rebney v.
Wells Fargo Bank, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 1128.)
DISPOSTION
The order is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to costs on appeal.
MCINTYRE, J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, Acting P. J.
AARON, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the denial of the defendant's motion to vacate the judgment, ruling that the issues raised were either previously decided in a prior appeal, waived for lack of development, or lacked standing.
Issues
Whether the trial court erred in denying a motion to vacate a judgment based on issues previously adjudicated in a prior appeal.
Whether the appellant waived the issue of alter ego liability by failing to provide argument or legal authority.
Whether the appellant has standing to challenge an attorney fee award entered against a non-appealing co-party.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“It is established that an order denying a motion to vacate a judgment is deemed appealable only to the extent it raises new issues unavailable on appeal from the judgment.”
“The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the contention as waived.”
“Paul does not have standing to challenge an order that injuriously affected only a nonappealing coparty.”