three years’ probation, subject to terms and conditions including that he serve 60 days in
jail.
At trial, defendant claimed he was lawfully growing 100 marijuana plants for a
medical marijuana collective under the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 (the CUA)
(§ 11362.5) and the Medical Marijuana Program Act (the MMPA) (§ 11362.7 et seq.),
and was therefore not guilty of unlawful marijuana cultivation (§ 11358), possession for
sale (§ 11359), or the lesser included offense of marijuana possession (§ 11357).
In the nonpublished portion of this opinion, we reject defendant’s claims that the
court erroneously denied his motion to suppression evidence of his 100 marijuana plants
and his motion to exclude unMirandized3 statements he made to police officers. In the
2All further statutory references are to the Health & Safety Code unless otherwise indicated.
3 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).
2
published portion, we address defendant’s claims of evidentiary and instructional error
concerning his lawful cultivation defense.
We first address defendant’s claim that the court erroneously refused to allow his
cannabis expert, William Britt, to give opinion testimony critical to his lawful cultivation
defense, including that defendant was lawfully cultivating the marijuana under the
MMPA and that a $20,000 sum he expected to be paid for his 100 marijuana plants, when
fully grown, did not include an unlawful profit. (§ 11362.765, subd. (a) [MMPA does not
allow cultivation or distribution of marijuana for profit].) We conclude the expert’s
testimony on these and other points was properly excluded because the expert lacked
sufficient evidence to render the opinions. (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (b).)
We then address defendant’s additional claim that the court erroneously instructed
the jury on his lawful cultivation defense under the MMPA. (§§ 11362.765, 11362.775.)
We agree the instructions misstated the applicable law under the MMPA, but conclude
defendant did not produce sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt he was lawfully
growing the 100 marijuana plants for himself and other qualified patients, and he was not
earning a profit. Accordingly, there was insufficient evidence to support instructing the
jury on defendant’s MMPA defense. We therefore affirm the judgment.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Prosecution Evidence
Around 1:00 a.m. on June 11, 2010, Fontana Police Officer Casey Mutter went to
a house in Fontana to investigate a report of an elderly woman in the front yard calling
3
for help. He found an elderly woman standing in the driveway with the garage door
open, claiming her son, defendant, was holding her “prisoner” inside the house. After
speaking to defendant inside the house, Officer Mutter determined the woman was
suffering from dementia and took her into custody pursuant to Welfare and Institutions
Code section 5150.
Officer Mutter noticed an odor of marijuana as he went into the house through the
pedestrian door inside the garage. Inside the house he found defendant asleep on a bed in
a bedroom. As he woke defendant, he noticed a small amount of marijuana in a baggie
on the bed and asked defendant where he got the marijuana. Defendant said the
marijuana was his, he was growing marijuana in a room in the house, and pointed to a
large black tarp covering the entryway to the grow room. Defendant showed Officer
Mutter the marijuana plants, along with some “paperwork” that was attached to the wall
next to the tarp. He claimed the paperwork showed he was lawfully cultivating the
marijuana for a medical marijuana collective in Malibu called the Green Galleon.
Officer Mutter contacted the narcotics unit, and Officer Joshua Rice, a narcotics
officer, came to the house with two other officers. Officer Rice smelled marijuana in the
area in front of the house. Inside the garage, he saw duct tubing used for ventilation
going into the walls of the house and a “very strong[]” odor of marijuana coming through
the duct tubing. In the grow room, he saw around 100 marijuana plants growing under
seven metal lamp shades, with 1,000-watt light bulbs, powered by numerous electrical
cords.
4
Officer Rice sat down with defendant in the living room and spoke to him about
the marijuana plants. Defendant explained he was growing the plants for the Green
Galleon collective because he was having financial problems and needed to make money.
He was living with and caring for his elderly mother who was on the verge of losing the
house to foreclosure, he needed to provide for his ex-wife and daughter, and “just have a
better lifestyle.” He had spoken with his cousin, Paul Miller, about his financial
problems, and Miller took him to the Green Galleon collective in Malibu. He later signed
the “paperwork” to become part of the collective. Someone from the collective gave him
100 immature or “clone” marijuana plants and told him he would be paid $20,000 if he
returned the plants, fully grown, to the collective. He would be reimbursed for his costs
and expenses incurred in growing the plants, including his electricity bills, which he
estimated would total around $4,000. He was planning to reinvest some of his $20,000
“profit” in larger grows to make larger profits. He gave his paperwork from the
collective to Officer Rice, along with his physician’s recommendation to use marijuana
and his medical marijuana identification card.4 Officer Rice testified that in his opinion
defendant possessed the 100 marijuana plants for sale because he “was going to hand
over 100 plants for $20,000.”
4 The parties stipulated that the 100 plants found in the house were marijuana plants and that defendant had a valid and current medical marijuana identification card.
5
B. Defendant’s Testimony
In his defense, defendant testified he was growing the marijuana plants for himself
and other patient-members of the Green Galleon collective. His residence was in Malibu,
but he lived with his elderly mother in Fontana during most of the week and was her full-
time caretaker. Five people comprised the Green Galleon collective: himself, his
mother, his roommate Victor Tamayo, his cousin Paul Miller, and a man named Brian,
whose last name he did not know.
After defendant told Miller he was having financial difficulties, Miller advised
him he could make money growing marijuana “over a period of time.” Miller provided
him with 100 “clone” or “infant” marijuana plants, and he set up the indoor growing
operation in his mother’s Fontana house. The 100 plants were his first “grow” for a
medical marijuana collective, but he had grown marijuana “for other people” in
Humboldt County, among other places, during the 1970’s and 1980’s.
Miller was the only person from the Green Galleon collective with whom
defendant had spoken concerning his growing operation. His role as a “bud tender” for
the collective was to grow the plants to maturity and return them to Miller, who was to
distribute them among the members of the collective and the original suppliers of the
plants. Miller and Tamayo sometimes helped defendant with his growing operation by
watering the plants and turning the grow lights on and off when defendant was not at his
mother’s house in Fontana.
6
In total, defendant had invested $10,000 in his growing operation. He did not
recall telling the officers he was going to make a “pure profit” of $20,000 from growing
the 100 marijuana plants and handing them over to Miller. He expected to be reimbursed
for his costs of growing the plants and his labor, or time and effort involved in growing
the plants, and he saw himself as an employee of the collective. He was cultivating the
marijuana to become financially solvent and understood he would make his $10,000
investment back over time and several medical marijuana grows. Britt’s expert testimony
is discussed below.
III. ANALYSIS/THE PRETRIAL MOTIONS
A. The Suppression Motion Was Properly Denied
In a pretrial motion, defendant moved to suppress the physical evidence found in
his house, including the marijuana plants and lamps, the observations the officers made
based on being inside his house, and his statements to the officers inside the house. (Pen.
Code, § 1538.5.) The People filed a written opposition. The motion was denied
following a hearing that was combined with the preliminary hearing. Defendant claims
the suppression motion should have been granted because all of the challenged evidence
was obtained during or as a result of a warrantless search in violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights. We conclude the motion was properly denied.
1. The Evidence Adduced on the Suppression Motion
During the hearing on the suppression motion, Officer Mutter testified that around
1:00 a.m. on June 11, 2010, he was dispatched to a house in Fontana to investigate a
7
“suspicious circumstances” call. He found an elderly woman outside the house,
“screaming and yelling.” The woman told him that her son, defendant, was holding her
“prisoner.” It appeared to Officer Mutter the woman might be suffering from dementia.
Officer Mutter asked the woman for permission to enter the home, and she gave
him permission. The garage door was open, and Officer Mutter went into the house
through a door connecting the garage to the house. He intended to perform a “welfare
check” and determine whether the woman was in a safe environment. Inside the garage,
he smelled a “strong odor of marijuana.”
Inside the house, Officer Mutter saw defendant lying on a bed and a small bag of
marijuana on the bed. He woke defendant and asked him where he got the marijuana.
Defendant said he grew the marijuana and pointed toward a room covered with an
opaque, black plastic tarp. Officer Mutter looked behind the tarp and saw marijuana
plants growing there. Defendant said he was lawfully growing the marijuana for a
collective and produced some paperwork to support his claim.
After speaking with defendant about the woman outside the house, Officer Mutter
determined the woman had Alzheimer’s disease and was not being held against her will.
He took her into custody pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150.
Officer Mutter then summoned Officer Rice to the scene to determine whether the
marijuana grow was lawful under California’s medical marijuana laws. Officer Rice
smelled marijuana from outside the house. Inside the house, Officer Rice observed 100
marijuana plants growing in the living room under metal lamp shades and 1,000-watt
8
lights. Each plant was over three feet tall and in the “budding” stage. Officer Rice
estimated that an ounce of marijuana could have been harvested from each plant. The
heat from the lamps was being channeled, with a fan, through air ducts leading into the
garage.
Office Rice spoke to defendant inside the home in the presence of three or four
other officers, some of whom were wearing plain clothes and others uniforms. Defendant
was never read his Miranda rights and was never told he was free to leave. Defendant
told Officer Rice he was growing the marijuana for a medical marijuana collective to
make money because he had been having financial problems. The collective had
provided him with 100 “clone” or “baby” plants to grow, and he expected to be paid
$20,000 when the plants were fully grown, plus his expenses, leaving him with $20,000
“pure profit,” according to Officer Rice. Defendant said he intended to use the profit to
pay bills, take care of his mother and child, improve his lifestyle, and continue growing
marijuana.
Defendant gave Officer Rice some paperwork which he claimed showed he was
growing the marijuana for a medical marijuana collective. Aside from the quantity of
marijuana plants growing in the house, the officers found no evidence indicating
defendant was selling marijuana; there were no packaging materials, scales, client lists, or
“pay/owe” lists. Nor was there any evidence that defendant had yet received any money
for the marijuana plants.
9
2. The Trial Court’s Ruling on the Suppression Motion
Following the officers’ testimony, defense counsel argued the suppression motion
should be granted because “there was no probable cause to search. The officer could
have easily [gotten] a warrant. Any consent that was given was purely a submission to
authority.” Before the prosecutor could explain the People’s position, the trial court
denied the motion.
The court explained: “First of all, I think the officer’s presence at the scene was
legitimate. It was in response to a circumstance that was unknown to him at the time he
responded. At the time he responded, he smells marijuana, and I think at that point
further inquiry or investigation may be necessary and legitimate.”
3. Analysis
In reviewing the denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence pursuant to
Penal Code section 1538.5, we review the record in the light most favorable to the ruling
and uphold the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, if substantial evidence
supports them. (People v. Superior Court (Chapman) (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1004,
1011.) Based on the trial court’s well-supported factual findings, we independently
determine whether the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
(People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 830, citing People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d
591, 597) and what particular legal principles are relevant to this legal determination
(People v. Gemmill (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 958, 963).
10
In California, federal constitutional standards govern the admissibility evidence
derived from governmental searches and seizures. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (f)(2);
People v. Troyer (2011) 51 Cal.4th 599, 605; People v. Barnes (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th
1508, 1513.) The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits only
unreasonable searches and seizures.5 (Florida v. Jimeno (1991) 500 U.S. 248, 250;
Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart (2006) 547 U.S. 398, 403 [“the ultimate touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness’. . . .”].) A warrantless entry into a home to
conduct a search or seizure is presumptively unreasonable, and the government bears the
burden of establishing that exigent circumstances or another exception to the warrant
requirement justified the entry. (People v. Rogers (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, 1156.)
Under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement, officers may enter
a home without a warrant in order to render emergency assistance when the officers have
an objectively reasonable basis to believe an occupant of the home is or might be
seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury. (Brigham City, Utah v.
Stuart, supra, 547 U.S. at pp. 402-406; People v. Gemmill, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at pp.
961, 964.) “‘“There is no ready litmus test for determining whether such circumstances
exist, and in each case the claim of an extraordinary situation must be measured by the
facts known to the officers.”’” (People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 465.)
5 The Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.)
11
Here, the emergency aid exception justified Officer Mutter’s entry into the home.
As the trial court indicated, Officer Mutter had insufficient information, based solely on
his initial encounter with defendant’s elderly mother, to determine whether she needed
emergency assistance and, if so, what kind. When Officer Mutter arrived at the house in
response to a report of “suspicious circumstances,” he encountered an elderly woman in
the driveway with the garage door open, “screaming and yelling” and claiming her son,
defendant, was holding her “prisoner” inside her “own home.” Though it appeared to
Officer Mutter that the woman was suffering from dementia, Officer Mutter acted
reasonably in entering the house to determine whether defendant was holding the woman
captive and she needed to be protected from defendant, or whether she was suffering
from dementia, needed protection from herself, and should be held pursuant to Welfare
and Institutions Code section 5150. Officer Mutter entered the house to conduct a
“welfare check,” that is, to see whether the woman was in “a safe environment.”
Further, the woman gave Officer Mutter her permission to enter the house. A
search based on consent is another exception to the warrant requirement. (Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 219.) Consent to a search may be given by the
defendant who later challenges the search’s constitutional validity, or it may be given by
“‘a third party who possesses common authority over the premises’ . . . .” (People v.
Superior Court (Walker) (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1198.) This principle rests “‘on
mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control . . . so that
it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the
12
inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their
number might permit the common area to be searched.’” (People v. Bishop (1996) 44
Cal.App.4th 220, 237.) Based on the woman’s presence outside the house at 1:00 a.m.
and her statement that defendant was holding her captive in her own home, Officer
Mutter had reason to believe the woman lived in the house and was authorized to consent
to his warrantless entry, even though she appeared to be suffering from dementia.
Defendant argues Officer Mutter violated the “knock and announce” rule by
failing to knock and announce his presence and purpose before he entered the house. The
“knock and announce” principle is part of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth
Amendment. (Wilson v. Arkansas (1995) 514 U.S. 927, 929-930, 934.) It requires that
“police officers entering a dwelling must knock on the door and announce their identity
and purpose before attempting forcible entry.” (Richards v. Wisconsin (1997) 520 U.S.
385, 387.) But the police may forego the knock and announce requirement when they
have “a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the
particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the
effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of
evidence.” (Id. at p. 394.)
Given the information available to him at the time he entered the house, Officer
Mutter could have reasonably believed that knocking and announcing his presence and
purpose would have allowed defendant to destroy any evidence he was holding the
elderly woman captive. In addition, the woman’s consent to allow the officer to enter the
13
house excused any requirement the officer may have otherwise had to knock and
announce his presence and purpose. Under the circumstances, the officer acted
reasonably in failing to knock and announce his presence and purpose before entering.
Defendant further argues any emergency had passed by the time Officer Mutter
entered the house because, at that time, the woman was safely in Officer Mutter’s patrol
car with his partner. Her safety inside the patrol car did not obviate Officer Mutter’s
need to enter the house to determine whether she required emergency assistance and, if
so, what kind. His lack of sufficient information to make this determination, and the
woman’s consent to his entry into the house, justified his warrantless entry to determine
whether and, if so, what kind of emergency aid she required.6
In the trial court, the prosecution argued defendant effectively consented to the
search of the grow room. Defendant maintains he did not freely and voluntarily consent
to the search of the grow room. Instead, he argues he only told Officer Mutter he was
growing marijuana behind the tarp because he had no choice but to submit to the officer’s
authority.
6 As the court observed in Georgia v. Randolph (2006) 547 U.S. 103, 118: “No question has been raised, or reasonably could be, about the authority of the police to enter a dwelling to protect a resident from domestic violence; so long as they have good reason to believe such a threat exists, it would be silly to suggest that the police would commit a tort by entering . . . to determine whether violence (or threat of violence) has just occurred or is about to (or soon will) occur, however much a spouse or co-tenant objected. (And since the police would then be lawfully in the premises, there is no question that they could seize any evidence in plain view or take further action supported by any consequent probable cause[.] [Citation.])”
14
When the prosecution relies upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, it
has the burden of showing “the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.”
(Bumper v. North Carolina (1968) 391 U.S. 543, 548, fn. omitted; see also United States
v. Shaibu (9th Cir. 1990) 920 F.2d 1423, 1426 [consent must also be “unequivocal and
specific”].) The prosecution cannot discharge its burden by showing no more than mere
acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority. (Bumper v. North Carolina, supra, at pp.
548-549.) Nor can implied consent be construed from the failure of the defendant to
“protest the entry.” (People v. Superior Court (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 122, 127.) The
voluntariness of a person’s consent to a search is question of fact to be determined from
the totality of the circumstances. (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, 412 U.S. at pp. 248-
249.)
Substantial evidence supports the court’s implied finding that defendant freely and
voluntarily consented to Officer Mutter’s initial search and Officer Rice’s subsequent
search of the grow room. When Officer Mutter asked defendant where he obtained the
marijuana in plain view on his bed, defendant claimed he was legally growing marijuana
and gestured toward the room with its entryway covered by the opaque black tarp, and
showed Officer Mutter paperwork supporting his claim he was legally growing the
marijuana. Construed in the light most favorable to the People, the evidence shows
defendant was confident in his position he was lawfully growing the 100 marijuana
plants. He had paperwork to support his claim, posted on the wall outside the living
room, and freely showed the paperwork to the officers.
15
At no time did defendant question or object to any of the officers’ presence in the
house or to their search of the grow room, despite having had ample time and opportunity
to do so. If he had any such objections, he could have raised them at any point during his
encounter with the officers, without challenging the officers’ authority, but he apparently
chose not to do so. Because substantial evidence supports it, we are required to uphold
the court’s implied finding that defendant freely and voluntarily consented to the search
of the grow room. (People v. Troyer, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 605.)
Lastly, defendant claims Office Rice’s subsequent entry and separate search of the
grow room constituted a separate violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, in addition
to and apart from the Fourth Amendment violations by Officer Mutter. He argues Officer
Rice’s search was not consensual for the same reason Officer Mutter’s initial search was
not consensual: he was merely submitting to the officers’ authority. He also argues that
if his mother’s claim of being held captive was the initial reason for the police presence,
she was secure in the patrol car and Officer Mutter had determined she was in no danger
inside the home by the time Officer Rice arrived on the scene.
We disagree that Officer Rice’s search violated defendant’s Fourth Amendment
rights. Although the emergency involving defendant’s mother had passed by the time
Officer Rice arrived at the house, his search was lawful for the same reason Officer
Mutter’s initial search was lawful: defendant impliedly consented to it. Again, the
evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s denial of the
suppression motion, indicated defendant was confident in his belief that he was legally
16
growing marijuana. Thus, substantial evidence supports the court’s implied finding that
defendant freely and voluntarily consented to each officer’s search of the grow room.
Just as he made no objection to Officer Mutter’s initial search, defendant did not object
when Officer Rice entered the house and searched the grow room. He showed Officer
Rice the same paperwork supporting his legal cultivation claim that he showed Officer
Mutter. On this record, defendant’s implied consent to allow Officer Mutter to search the
grow room extended to Officer Rice’s subsequent search.
B. The Miranda Motion Was Properly Denied
Defendant made an oral motion in limine to exclude the statements he made to the
officers at his house—including his statement to Officer Rice that he expected to earn a
$20,000 “pure profit” from his medical marijuana grow—on the ground the statements
were taken in violation of his Miranda rights. Defendant was not read his Miranda rights
before he spoke to the officers.
The motion was denied following a hearing, and defendant’s statements to the
officers were admitted during the prosecution’s case-in-chief. Defendant claims the
motion should have been granted. We disagree. Defendant was not in custody when he
made the statements and voluntarily agreed to speak with the officers.
1. Relevant Background
At the hearing on the Miranda motion, Officer Mutter testified that after he woke
defendant he asked defendant where he obtained the small amount of marijuana in plain
view on his bed and defendant told him, “I pretty much grow it myself,” and gestured
17
toward the black tarp covering the living room where numerous marijuana plants were
growing. Officer Mutter was in uniform when he questioned defendant, did not discuss
“specifics” with him, and called the narcotics unit. At some point, Officer Mutter’s
partner, Officer Macias, entered the house and was also in uniform. Officer Mutter did
not recall whether Officer Macias was with him when he questioned defendant.7 After
Officer Mutter saw the marijuana plants, defendant showed him paperwork supporting
his claim he was growing the marijuana for a medical marijuana collective. Officer
Mutter agreed defendant “wasn’t free to just walk away” after Officer Mutter saw the
marijuana plants and called the narcotics unit. Still, Officer Mutter did not handcuff
defendant or place him in custody.
When Officer Rice arrived, he contacted defendant in the living room. He was
wearing plain clothes, and there were two other officers wearing plain clothes and two
officers in uniform. He did not read defendant his Miranda rights before he questioned
him. He told defendant he was not under arrest and he “just wanted to talk to him about
his marijuana grow.”
When asked whether defendant could have “just walked out of the house, walked
away from you and the other officers,” Officer Rice responded: “[I]f he had somewhere
to go, he could have gone. I told him he wasn’t going to be placed under arrest at that
time, and he agreed to speak with me. He was in his house, so he didn’t really appear to
7It was unclear whether other officers had arrived outside and were taking care of defendant’s mother by the time Officer Mutter’s partner, Officer Macias, entered the house.
18
have anywhere to go. But if he said he needed to leave, we could have wrapped up our
investigation, and he could have left.”
Officer Rice asked defendant about his relationship with the collective and how its
growers were compensated. Defendant did not appear nervous and was not arrested
following the interview. The trial court denied the motion, finding defendant was not in
custody or “in a custodial setting” when he spoke to the officers.
2. Analysis
“Miranda advisements are only required when a person is subjected to custodial
interrogation. [Citation.] A suspect is in custody when a reasonable person in the
suspect’s position would feel that his ‘freedom of action is curtailed to a “degree
associated with formal arrest.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Bejasa (2012) 205
Cal.App.4th 26, 35 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].) “In determining whether an individual was
in custody, a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation
. . . .” (Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 322.)
Though no single factor is dispositive of the custody determination, relevant
factors include: “‘(1) [W]hether the suspect has been formally arrested; (2) absent
formal arrest, the length of the detention; (3) the location; (4) the ratio of officers to
suspects; and (5) the demeanor of the officer, including the nature of the questioning.’”
(People v. Pilster (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1403.)
Additional factors include: “[W]hether the suspect agreed to the interview and
was informed he or she could terminate the questioning, whether police informed the
19
person he or she was considered a witness or suspect, whether there were restrictions on
the suspect’s freedom of movement during the interview, and whether police officers
dominated and controlled the interrogation or were ‘aggressive, confrontational, and/or
accusatory,’ whether they pressured the suspect, and whether the suspect was arrested at
the conclusion of the interview.” (People v. Pilster, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1403-
1404.)
In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to exclude statements based on a
Miranda violation, “‘we accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and
inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if supported by substantial evidence. We
independently determine from the undisputed facts and the facts properly found by the
trial court whether the challenged statement was illegally obtained.’ [Citation.]” (People
v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 385.)
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination that defendant was
not in custody when he was questioned by Officer Mutter and later by Officer Rice.
Accordingly, no Miranda advisements were necessary. Though Officer Mutter testified
defendant was not free to leave after he discovered the marijuana plants, there is no
indication that Officer Mutter told defendant he was not free to leave. (Stansbury v.
California, supra, 511 U.S. at p. 325 [“An officer’s knowledge or beliefs may bear upon
the custody issue if they are conveyed, by word or deed, to the individual being
questioned”].) Officer Mutter did not place defendant in handcuffs, and there was no
evidence he restricted defendant’s movement in any way. Nor was there any evidence
20
Officer Mutter was aggressive, confrontational, or accusatory toward defendant, or told
defendant he was a suspect in a criminal investigation. Officer Mutter questioned
defendant for no more than one minute, then contacted the narcotics unit.
Before Officer Rice questioned defendant, he told defendant he was not going to
be placed under arrest at that time, and he “just wanted to talk to him about his marijuana
grow.” According to Officer Rice, defendant agreed to speak with him. Though Officer
Rice questioned defendant in the presence of four other officers, there was no testimony
that any of the officers were aggressive, confrontational, or accusatory toward defendant,
or pressured defendant to answer any questions. (Cf. United States v. Craighead (9th Cir.
2008) 539 F.3d 1073, 1078-1079, 1083 [presence of numerous armed officers to execute
search warrant turned suspect’s home into “police-dominated atmosphere” amounting to
custody for purposes of Miranda].) As Officer Rice promised, defendant was not taken
into custody following Officer Rice’s interview, and it does not appear the interview was
lengthy.
Though Officers Mutter and Rice questioned defendant in his home in the middle
of the night after he was unexpectedly awakened by Officer Mutter, and it appears
defendant had nowhere else to go, the totality of the circumstances indicates defendant
was not in custody and could have refused to answer the officers’ questions without being
taken into custody. In sum, “the interplay and combined effect of all the circumstances,”
“on balance,” did not “create[] a coercive atmosphere such that a reasonable person
21
would have experienced a restraint tantamount to an arrest.” (People v Aguilera (1996)
51 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1162.)
IV. ANALYSIS/MMPA ISSUES
A. Summary of California’s Medical Marijuana Laws
1. The CUA
In the November 1996 general election, California voters passed Proposition 215,
an initiative statute titled Medical Use of Marijuana. The measure added section
11362.5, the Compassionate Use Act of 1996, to the Health and Safety Code. (People v.
Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 463; § 11362.5, subd. (a).) The CUA grants patients and
their primary caregivers limited immunity from state criminal prosecution, including a
defense at trial, for two marijuana-related offenses: possession (§ 11357) and cultivation
(§ 11358). (People v. Mower, supra, at pp. 470, 474; People ex rel. Lungren v. Peron
relating to the possession of marijuana, and Section 11358, relating to the cultivation of
marijuana, shall not apply to a patient, or to a patient’s primary caregiver, who possesses
or cultivates marijuana for the personal medical purposes of the patient upon the written
or oral recommendation or approval of a physician.” (§ 11362.5, subd. (d).)
The CUA’s limited immunity from state criminal prosecution for unlawful
marijuana possession and cultivation applies solely to qualified patients and their primary
caregivers who possess or cultivate marijuana for the patient’s personal use. (People v.
Mower, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 474-475.) As one court has explained, the CUA is a
22
“narrowly drafted statute designed to allow a qualified patient and his or her primary
caregiver to possess and cultivate marijuana for the patient’s personal use . . . .” (People
v. Urziceanu (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 747, 772-773 (Urziceanu), italics added.) The
court reasoned: “The use of the singular identifying the patient and primary caregiver as
the person privileged to engage in the identified conduct and the term ‘personal medical
purposes’ suggests the Compassionate Use Act was designed for a single patient to grow
or possess his or her own marijuana, or to have that marijuana possessed or grown for
him or her by his or her caregiver. While a primary caregiver could care for and cultivate
more than one patient’s marijuana, this language lends no support to defendant’s
contention that ‘patients’ and their ‘caregivers’ can collectively pool talents, efforts, and
money to create a stockpile of marijuana that is to be collectively distributed.” (Id. at p.
768.)8
2. The MMPA
In 2003, the Legislature enacted the MMPA (§ 11362.7 et seq.) in response to the
CUA’s stated purpose, among others, to “encourage the federal and state governments to
8The CUA defines a “primary caregiver” as “the individual designated by the person exempted under this section [i.e., a qualified patient] who has consistently assumed responsibility for the housing, health, or safety of that person.” (§ 11362.5, subd. (e); see People v. Mentch (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 283.) A person does not qualify as a primary caregiver merely by having a qualified patient designate him or her as such or by providing a patient with medical marijuana. (Id. at pp. 283-285.) A person asserting primary caregiver status must prove “at a minimum that he or she (1) consistently provided caregiving [to a qualified patient], (2) independent of any assistance in taking medical marijuana, (3) at or before the time he or she assumed responsibility for assisting with medical marijuana.” (Id. at p. 283.)
23
implement a plan to provide for the safe and affordable distribution of marijuana to all
patients in medical need of marijuana.” (§ 11362.5, subd. (b)(1)(C); Urziceanu, supra,
132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 782-783.) The MMPA did not amend the CUA; it is a separate,
legislative scheme that implements the CUA. (People v. Hochanadel (2009) 176
Cal.App.4th 997, 1012-1013; County of San Diego v. San Diego NORML (2008) 165
Cal.App.4th 798, 829-831.)
The MMPA “expressly expands the scope of the [CUA] beyond the qualified
defense to cultivation and possession of marijuana” to possession of marijuana for sale
(§ 11359) among other offenses. (Urziceanu, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 784.) In
contrast to the more restrictive CUA, the MMPA “contemplates the formation and
operation of medicinal marijuana cooperatives that would receive reimbursement for
marijuana and the services provided in conjunction with the provision of that marijuana.”
(Id. at p. 785; see §§ 11362.765,11362.775.) The MMPA “abrogated” pre-MMPA case
law, including Peron, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th 1383, to the extent that case law “took a
[more] restrictive view” of the activities allowed by the CUA than the MMPA.
(Urziceanu, supra, at p. 785.)9
The MMPA seeks to “[e]nhance the access of patients and caregivers to medical
marijuana through collective, cooperative cultivation projects.” (Stats. 2003, ch. 875,
9 “At the heart of the MMPA is a voluntary ‘identification card’ scheme that, unlike the CUA—which . . . provides only an affirmative defense to a charge of possession or cultivation—provides protection against arrest for those and related crimes.” (People v. Kelly (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1008, 1014.)
24
§ 1(b)(3), pp. 6422-6423.) To this end, section 11362.775 of the MMPA provides:
“Qualified patients, persons with valid identification cards, and the designated primary
caregivers of qualified patients and persons with identification cards, who associate
within the State of California in order collectively or cooperatively to cultivate marijuana
for medical purposes, shall not solely on the basis of that fact be subject to state criminal
sanctions under Section 11357 [possession of marijuana], 11358 [cultivation], 11359
[possession for sale], 11360 [transportation], 11366 [maintaining a place for the sale,
giving away or use of marijuana], 11366.5 [making available premises for the
manufacture, storage or distribution of controlled substances], or 11570 [abatement of
nuisance created by premises used for manufacture, storage or distribution of controlled
substances].”
The MMPA defines a “qualified patient” as “a person who is entitled to the
protections of [the CUA] but who does not have an identification card” issued pursuant to
the MMPA. (§ 11362.7, subd. (f).) The MMPA contains guidelines limiting the amount
of “dried marijuana” a qualified patient or qualified primary caregiver may possess and
the number of “mature” and “immature” plants these persons may maintain or cultivate
for the qualified patient (§ 11362.77) but, as applied, these limits cannot be less than the
amount of marijuana necessary to meet the qualified patient’s current medical needs.
(People v. Kelly, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 1043-1049.)
The MMPA does not allow qualified patients, valid identification cardholders, or
their primary caregivers to earn a profit from the cultivation or distribution of medical
25
marijuana, whether through a cooperative, collective, or otherwise. Section 11362.765
states: “(a) Subject to the requirements of this article, the individuals specified in
subdivision (b) shall not be subject, on that sole basis, to criminal liability under Section
11357, 11358, 11359, 11360, 11366, 11366.5 or 11570. However, nothing in this section
shall authorize the individual to smoke or otherwise consume marijuana unless otherwise
authorized by this article, nor shall anything in this section authorize any individual or
group to cultivate or distribute marijuana for profit.” (Italics added.)10
Together, sections 11362.765 and 11362.775 of the MMPA plainly allow qualified
patients, valid identification cardholders, and their primary caregivers to pool their efforts
and resources to cultivate marijuana for the qualified patients and holders of valid
identification cards, in amounts necessary to meet the reasonable medical needs of the
10 Subdivision (b) of section 11362.765 states: “Subdivision (a) shall apply to all of the following: [¶] (1) A qualified patient or a person with an identification card who transports or processes marijuana for his or her own personal medical use. [¶] (2) A designated primary caregiver who transports, processes, administers, delivers, or gives away marijuana for medical purposes, in amounts not exceeding those established in subdivision (a) of Section 11362.77, only to the qualified patient of the primary caregiver, or to the person with an identification card who has designated the individual as a primary caregiver. [¶] (3) Any individual who provides assistance to a qualified patient or a person with an identification card, or his or her designated primary caregiver [§ 11358] in administering medical marijuana to the qualified patient or person or acquiring the skills necessary to cultivate or administer marijuana for medical purposes to the qualified patient or person.” Subdivision (c) of section 11362.765 states: “(c) A primary caregiver who receives compensation for actual expenses, including reasonable compensation incurred for services provided to an eligible qualified patient or person with an identification card to enable that person to use marijuana under this article, or for payment for out-of-pocket expenses incurred in providing those services, or both, shall not, on the sole basis of that fact, be subject to prosecution or punishment under Section 11359 [possession for sale] or 11360 [transportation].”
26
qualified patients and cardholders—without being subject to criminal sanctions for,
among other offenses, unlawful marijuana possession (§ 11357), cultivation (§ 11358), or
possession for sale (§ 11359)—provided they do not earn a profit from the cultivation,
distribution, or sale of the medical marijuana.
3. The Guidelines
Section 11362.81, subdivision (d) of the MMPA directs the California Attorney
General to “develop and adopt appropriate guidelines to ensure the security and
nondiversion of marijuana grown for medical use by patients qualified under the [CUA].”
In 2008, the California Attorney General, Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Department of Justice,
issued “Guidelines for the Security and Non-Diversion of Marijuana Grown for Medical
Use” (Guidelines). The Guidelines are not binding on the courts but are entitled to
People v. Hochanadel, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 1011.)
The Guidelines are intended to serve several purposes: “(1) ensure that marijuana
grown for medical purposes remains secure and does not find its way to non-patients or
illicit markets, (2) help law enforcement agencies perform their duties effectively and in
accordance with California law, and (3) help patients and primary caregivers understand
how they may cultivate, transport, possess, and use medical marijuana under California
law.” (Guidelines, p. 1, italics added.) The Guidelines observe: “Under California law,
medical marijuana patients and primary caregivers may ‘associate within the State of
27
California in order collectively or cooperatively to cultivate marijuana for medical
purposes.’ (§ 11362.775.)” (Guidelines, § IV, p. 8.)
In order to help cooperatives and collectives operate within the law, the Guidelines
require that “[a]ny group that is collectively or cooperatively cultivating and distributing
marijuana for medical purposes should be organized and operated in a manner that
ensures the security of the crop and safeguards against diversion for non-medical
purposes.” (Guidelines, § IV.A., p. 8.) A group organized as a nonprofit, agricultural
cooperative must comply with applicable provisions of the Corporations Code and the
Food and Agricultural Code. For example, the group must “file articles of incorporation
with the state and conduct its business for the mutual benefit of its members.”
(Guidelines, § IV.A.1., p. 8.)
Regarding collectives, which unlike cooperatives are neither statutorily defined
nor governed by statute, the Guidelines state: “California law does not define collectives,
but the dictionary defines them as ‘a business, farm, etc., jointly owned and operated by
the members of a group.’ [Citation.] Applying this definition, a collective should be an
organization that merely facilitates the collaborative efforts of patient and caregiver
members - including the allocation of costs and revenues. As such, a collective is not a
statutory entity, but as a practical matter it might have to organize as some form of
business to carry out its activities. The collective should not purchase marijuana from, or
sell to, non-members; instead, it should only provide means for facilitating or
coordinating transactions between members.” (Guidelines, § IV.A.2., p. 8.)
28
Cooperatives and collectives must be “Non-Profit Operation[s]” (Guidelines, § IV.B.1, p.
9) and “should acquire marijuana only from their constituent members, because only
marijuana grown by a qualified patient or his or her primary caregiver may lawfully be
transported by, or distributed to, other members of a collective or cooperative
(§§ 11362.765, 11362.775). The collective or cooperative may then allocate it to other
members of the group. Nothing allows marijuana to be purchased from outside the
collective or cooperative for distribution to its members. Instead, the cycle should be a
closed-circuit of marijuana cultivation and consumption with no purchases or sales to or
from non-members. To help prevent diversion of medical marijuana to non-medical
markets, collectives and cooperatives should document each member’s contribution of
labor, resources, or money to the enterprise. They should also track and record the
source of their marijuana.” (Guidelines, § IV.B.4., p. 10, italics added.)
In accordance with section 11362.765 of the MMPA, the Guidelines provide that
medical marijuana grown at a collective or cooperative may be “a) Provided free to
qualified patients and primary caregivers who are members of the collective or
cooperative; [¶] b) Provided in exchange for services rendered to the entity; [¶] c)
Allocated based on fees that are reasonably calculated to cover overhead costs and
operating expenses; or [¶] d) Any combination of the above.” (Guidelines, § IV.B.6.,
p. 10, italics added.) Thus, “[a]ny monetary reimbursement that members provide to the
collective or cooperative should only be an amount necessary to cover overhead costs and
operating expenses.” (People v. Hochanadel, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1010-1011.)
29
B. The Expert Testimony of the Defense Cannabis Expert Was Properly Limited
1. Background
William Britt was the executive director of the Association of Patient Advocates, a
grassroots organization he formed 15 years earlier to help persons with mental and
physical disabilities gain access to services and alternative treatments. He had a high
school education and “some training” and experience in accounting, but no medical,
legal, or horticultural degrees. He had spoken about medical marijuana to medical
professionals, law enforcement agencies, city councils, and other groups, and had
testified as a cannabis expert over 50 times in Los Angeles County. He was the only
cannabis expert whom the Los Angeles County Superior Court considered qualified to be
appointed to assist indigent criminal defendants in Los Angeles County. He had testified
as an expert on the particular issue of “compensation to growers” “at least 20, 30 times,”
and he was a medical marijuana patient himself.
The prosecution moved in limine to prevent Britt from testifying about the indicia
of lawfully operating medical marijuana collectives, their costs of cultivating marijuana,
and their methods of compensating their members for cultivation services performed for
the collective. At an Evidence Code section 402 hearing, Britt testified there were “[a]t
least a thousand” medical marijuana collectives in California. When asked how a
medical marijuana collective differs from a cooperative, if at all, Britt responded that
cooperatives are legally defined entities; they must have a board of directors and must
operate in accordance with certain rules. In contrast, collectives are not legally defined,
30
are “generally more loosely operated” than cooperatives, and “one collective can be very
different than another collective.”
Britt had heard of the Green Galleon collective in Malibu through advertisements
and through speaking to medical marijuana patients who may have been members of the
collective, but he knew nothing about its methods of operation. He did not know who ran
the collective, how many members it had, how the labor of running the collective was
divided among its members, or where or how the collective obtained its marijuana. His
understanding of defendant’s relationship with the collective was based entirely on
defendant’s representations; he had not spoken to anyone at the collective to verify
defendant’s membership or relationship with the collective. Britt agreed that, due to his
lack of knowledge about the Green Galleon’s methods of operation, he could not offer an
opinion whether it was operating as a lawful medical marijuana collective or not.
At the hearing on the in limine motion, defendant argued his lawful cultivation
defense was based on “how collectives operative” and “[w]hether or not services are
reimbursed.” Relying on Urziceanu, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th 747, he argued the law
allowed him to cultivate marijuana as a member of a collective and receive reasonable
compensation for his services. The trial court took a restrictive view of the permissible
scope of Britt’s testimony, and ruled he could not testify “regarding any salary or
reimbursement for participating as a marijuana grower or a collective . . . .” Relying on a
pre-MMPA case, Peron, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th 1383, the court ruled the subjects of
“compensation or salary, reimbursement” to members of a marijuana collective were “off
31
the table” because the law prohibited the sale or possession for sale of marijuana “even as
a nonprofit organization.”
As additional support for its ruling, the court noted there appeared to be “no set
rules” governing how medical marijuana collectives could lawfully operate, and a “great
variance” in the ways collectives operated. But the court found even “more troubling”
Britt’s admission that he lacked information concerning the Green Galleon’s methods of
operation and consequent inability to opine whether the collective was lawfully operating
under California’s medical marijuana laws. Given Britt’s lack of information about the
Green Galleon’s methods of operation, the prosecutor argued Britt would “speculate
wildly” about whether defendant was lawfully cultivating marijuana for the collective.
The court agreed, saying: “I don’t know how [Britt] can possibly opine what specifics
may have been related to their setup, their operation, their labor, their numbers, their
members, those types of things.” Based on his other qualifications, the court ruled Britt
could testify whether there were any indications defendant was selling marijuana or
possessed the 100 marijuana plants for sale. The court also ruled Britt could testify “as a
patient advocate” concerning defendant’s personal use of marijuana as a “pain
management” strategy, if a proper foundation were laid for that testimony.
In his subsequent testimony before the jury, Britt indicated his knowledge of
compensation and reimbursement for expenses incurred in cultivating medical marijuana
was based on his interviews of “hundreds if not thousands” of medical marijuana patients
concerning how, why, and when they used marijuana, and how they cultivated marijuana.
32
He had “visited numerous cultivation sites and collectives,” and had consulted with
attorneys, mostly defense attorneys.
The court sustained numerous prosecution objections and refused to allow Britt to
testify concerning compensation lawfully paid to and expenses reasonably incurred by
persons who grow marijuana for medical marijuana collectives. The court also ruled
Britt did not lay a sufficient evidentiary foundation to opine that the 100 marijuana plants
defendant was growing would produce no more marijuana than necessary to supply the
needs of a collective comprised of six medical marijuana patients. Nor was he qualified
to render any legal opinions, including on the legal distinctions between unlawful and
lawful marijuana cultivations. The court clarified: “If he wants to testify to his own
personal use, if he wants to testify, again, as to being a patient advocate with respect to
his personal knowledge about [defendant] and his purported use, he can go there. But he
is not to testify about these other issues that call for legal opinions on areas that are
outside and not relevant to our concern.”
Britt later testified that an average medical marijuana patient consumes about three
to six pounds of marijuana per year, and a collective would therefore need to produce 18
to 36 pounds of marijuana per year to supply marijuana for six members. When asked
how much usable marijuana defendant’s 100 marijuana plants would likely produce, Britt
testified that would be hard to determine because the yield from indoor-grown plants
depends greatly on the quantity and quality of the indoor lighting the plants receive.
Finally, Britt testified that in his experience it typically costs $3,000 to produce one
33
pound of marijuana, and the initial cost to establish a “seven-light grow setup” such as
defendant’s would be around $7,000 to $10,000.
2. Analysis
Defendant claims the court’s limitations on Britt’s expert testimony deprived him
of his due process right to present critical evidence on his lawful cultivation defense.
“Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, criminal prosecutions
must comport with prevailing notions of fundamental fairness.” (California v. Trombetta
(1984) 467 U.S. 479, 485.) This means that states must afford a defendant “a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense” to criminal charges. (Ibid.) A defendant is
denied that opportunity when the state is permitted “‘to exclude competent, reliable
evidence . . . when such evidence is central to the defendant’s claim of innocence,’”
absent a valid justification for excluding the evidence. (Montana v. Egelhoff (1996) 518
U.S. 37, 53, citing Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 690-691.)
But here, defendant does not identify what testimony Britt could have competently
given but was precluded from giving concerning his lawful cultivation defense. (Evid.
Code, § 801, subd. (b) [expert opinion testimony is limited to opinion based on matter
perceived by, personally known to, or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing].) Britt admitted he knew nothing about the Green Galleon collective’s methods
of operation, who ran it, how many members it had, how the labor of running it was
divided among its members, or how its members obtained marijuana. Britt had not
spoken to anyone at the collective to verify defendant’s membership in it or relationship
34
with it. Given his lack of personal knowledge or other information concerning its
operations, Britt agreed he could not competently opine that the Green Galleon collective
was lawfully operating as a medical marijuana collective under the MMPA. (See Evid.
Code, § 801, subd. (b).)
In addition, Britt lacked a sufficient evidentiary foundation to opine that defendant
was not earning an unlawful profit for cultivating the 100 marijuana plants for the
collective. (§ 11362.765, subd. (a) [persons may not profit from sale or distribution of
medical marijuana]; Guidelines, § IV.B.6., p. 10 [medical marijuana may be allocated
among members of medical marijuana collective or cooperative “based on fees that are
reasonably calculated to cover overhead costs and operating expenses”].) Defendant’s
statements to the officers and trial testimony did not provide the necessary evidentiary
foundation.
Though defendant denied telling Officer Rice he expected to earn a $20,000 “pure
profit” from his 100-plant marijuana grow, and he only expected to make money growing
marijuana “over a period of time,” he never explained how much he expected to earn
from his 100-plant grow and any additional “grows” for the collective. Nor did he
estimate the amount of time and effort he had invested and expected to invest in his 100-
plant grow and in his planned additional grows, or tie that amount of time and effort to
the amount of compensation he expected to earn for cultivating marijuana for his
collectve. (Guidelines, § IV.B.4., p. 10 [“[C]ollectives and cooperatives should
document each member’s contribution of labor, resources, or money to the enterprise.”].)
35
To be sure, defendant estimated he had invested $10,000 in his lights and other
growing equipment and he testified he expected to be reimbursed for that amount and his
other out-of-pocket costs and expenses incurred in growing the marijuana (e.g., his
electricity bills), in addition to being paid for the marijuana plants he was growing. But
there was no evidence tying the reasonable value of defendant’s cultivation services to
the amount of compensation he expected to be paid for his marijuana plants.
Accordingly, there was no evidentiary basis for Britt to opine defendant was not earning
an unlawful profit for cultivating and distributing—i.e., selling—his marijuana plants to
the collective. By the same token, Britt had no evidentiary basis to opine that the
$20,000 defendant told Officer Rice he expected to be paid for his 100 plants, when fully
grown, plus his out-of-pocket costs incurred in growing the plants, was reasonably
calculated to cover no more than his “overhead costs and operating expenses,” including
the reasonable value of his labor and services rendered in cultivating the plants.
(Guidelines, § IV.B.6., p. 10.)
Britt also lacked a sufficient evidentiary foundation to opine that the 100 plants
defendant was currently cultivating would produce no more marijuana than necessary to
supply the current medical needs of a collective comprised of six qualified patients,
including defendant. (§ 11362.77; People v. Kelly, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1049.)
Although Britt testified an average medical marijuana patient consumes three to six
pounds of marijuana per year, and a collective comprised of six qualified patients would
need 18 to 36 pounds of marijuana per year, he could not estimate how much marijuana
36
defendant’s 100 plants would produce. He said the yield from indoor-grown plants
depends greatly on the quantity and quality of indoor lighting the plants receive, and he
had no evidence about the quantity or quality of lighting the 100 plants were receiving.
Thus, by his own admission, Britt could not reasonably estimate the amount of marijuana
defendant’s 100 plants would produce, or whether that amount exceeded 18 to 36 pounds
per year, the amount he indicated was necessary to meet the reasonable medical needs of
six average qualified patients.11
Defendant criticizes the court’s reliance on the pre-MMPA case, Peron, in ruling
Britt could not testify on the subjects of “compensation or salary, reimbursement” to
qualified patients of a medical marijuana collective in exchange for their services
rendered and costs incurred in cultivating marijuana for the collective. Peron correctly
pointed out that the CUA does not allow marijuana to be sold, even “on an allegedly
nonprofit basis.” (Peron, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 1392.) Still, we agree the court’s
reliance on Peron was misplaced.
The MMPA abrogated Peron and other pre-MMPA cases to the extent the cases
construed the CUA more restrictively than the subsequently-enacted MMPA allows.
11 It is unclear from the record whether the Green Galleon collective was comprised of six members, as defendant indicated, or whether defendant only knew of six members, including himself, and the collective actually had many more members. It appears from Britt’s testimony that the collective had many more members, but there was no solid, reliable evidence that it did. Britt had only heard of the collective through advertisement and by speaking with persons he said may have been members, but he did not know how many members it had. Thus, the only competent evidence presented was that the collective was comprised of six persons, including defendant.
37
(Urziceanu, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 785.) The MMPA and the Guidelines allow
nonprofit groups comprised of qualified patients, valid medical marijuana identification
cardholders, and their respective primary caregivers, if any, to pay each other and receive
compensation and reimbursement from each other in amounts necessary to cover the
“overhead costs and operating expenses” incurred in cultivating and providing medical
marijuana to qualified patient members of the group. (§§ 11362.765, 11362.775;
Guidelines, § IV.)
As defendant points out, appellate court decisions issued following his August
2012 trial have acknowledged, at least implicitly, that the MMPA and the Guidelines
allow qualified patients and persons holding valid identification cards to be paid
reasonable compensation for cultivating marijuana for other qualified patients. (See, e.g.,
People v. Jackson (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 525, 537 [the Guidelines “appear to
contemplate that collectives and cooperatives will dispense [i.e., sell] marijuana and that
that there will be an exchange of cash consideration”]; People ex rel. City of Dana Point
v. Holistic Health (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1016, 1020, 1026-1027 [summary judgment
against marijuana dispensary for nuisance abatement and illegal business practices
improper where substantial evidence showed dispensary was operating as nonprofit
enterprise]; People v. Colvin, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 1039 [not all members of
38
medical marijuana cooperative or collective must participate in cultivating marijuana for
other members].)12
Nevertheless, Jackson, Colvin, and Holistic Health do not assist defendant’s claim
that the court erroneously limited Britt’s expert testimony. Notwithstanding its misplaced
reliance on Peron, the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Britt to offer
his expert opinion that defendant was only earning reasonable compensation and was not
earning an unlawful profit on his 100-plant medical marijuana grow. (People v.
Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 828 [court’s decision to exclude evidence is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion]; Lent v. Tillson (1887) 72 Cal. 404, 422 [a court abuses its
discretion when it fails to follow the law and apply appropriate criteria in determining the
admissibility of evidence].) As discussed, Britt had no evidentiary foundation to offer
that opinion, and he admitted he could not competently opine that the Green Galleon
collective was lawfully operating under state law.
12 We agree with the observation in People ex rel. Trutanich v. Joseph (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1512, 1523 that: “Section 11362.765 allows reasonable compensation for services provided to a qualified patient or person authorized to use marijuana,” but we disagree with the qualifying phrase, “but such compensation may be given only to a ‘primary caregiver.’” (Ibid., italics added.) Nothing in section 11362.765 or the Guidelines indicates that only primary caregivers may receive reasonable compensation for cultivating marijuana for a nonprofit group of qualified medical marijuana patients. Rather, groups comprised solely of qualified patients may grow medical marijuana for each other, provided they do not earn a profit on their cultivation services rendered or their expenses incurred. (§ 11362.765.)
39
C. Insufficient Evidence Supported Defendant’s Lawful Cultivation Defense
Defendant claims he was denied a fair trial because the court misinstructed the
jury on his lawful cultivation defense under the MMPA. We agree the instructions did
not accurately state the law applicable to defendant’s defense that he was lawfully
cultivating marijuana under the MMPA. Nevertheless, the errors were not prejudicial
because the evidence was insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt defendant was not
earning a profit on his medical marijuana cultivation operation.
1. The Relevant Instructions
The jury was instructed that unlawful possession of marijuana (§ 11357) was a
lesser included offense to the unlawful cultivation (§ 11358) and possession for sale
(§ 11359) charged in counts 1 and 2, respectively. In substantially similar language, the
jury was instructed on how defendant’s lawful cultivation defense applied to the unlawful
cultivation and possession for sale charges.
On how the lawful cultivation defense applied to the unlawful cultivation charge
in count 1, the jury was instructed: “Possession or cultivation of marijuana is lawful if
authorized by the [CUA]. The [CUA] allows a person to possess or cultivate marijuana
(for personal medical purposes or as the primary caregiver of a patient with a medical
need) when a physician has recommended or approved such use. The amount of
marijuana possessed or cultivated must be reasonably related to the patient’s current
medical needs. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant was not authorized to possess or cultivate marijuana for medical purposes.
40
If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this
crime. [¶] A primary caregiver is someone who has consistently assumed responsibility
for the housing, health, or safety of a patient who may legally possess or cultivate
marijuana.” (CALCRIM No. 2370.)
On how the lawful cultivation defense applied to the possession for sale charge in
count 2, the jury was instructed: “Possession of marijuana is lawful if authorized by the
[CUA]. The [CUA] allows a person to possess marijuana for personal medical purposes
or as the primary caregiver of a patient with a medical need when a physician has
recommended or approved such use. The amount of marijuana possessed must be
reasonably related to the patient’s current medical needs. The People have the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not authorized to possess the
marijuana for medical purposes. If the People have not met this burden, you must find
the defendant not guilty of this crime. [¶] A primary caregiver is someone who has
consistently assumed responsibility for the housing, health, or safety of a patient who
may legally possess or cultivate marijuana.” (CALCRIM No. 2375.)
The court further instructed the jury in the language of section 11263.775:
“Qualified patients, persons with valid identification cards, and the designated primary
caregivers of qualified patients and persons with identification cards, who associate
within the State of California in order collectively or cooperatively to cultivate marijuana
for medical purposes, shall not solely on the basis of that fact be subject to state criminal
sanctions under Section 11357, 11358, 11359, 11360, 11366, 11366.5 or 11570. [¶] You
41
have heard evidence that the defendant possessed a valid medical marijuana
recommendation from a physician. [¶] Simple possession of marijuana is lawful under
the [CUA] and the [MMPA] if a person has a valid physician’s recommendation.
Possession for sale, and the actual sale of marijuana is not lawful even if a person has a
valid medical marijuana recommendation from a physician. [¶] The People have the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed marijuana
with the intent to sell.” (Italics added.)
The jury was further instructed on a mistake of fact defense: “The defendant is
not guilty of possession for sale of marijuana if he did not have the intent or mental state
required to commit the crime because he reasonably did not know a fact or reasonably
and mistakenly believed a fact. [¶] If the defendant’s conduct would have been lawful
under the facts as he reasonably believed them to be, he did not commit possession for
sale of marijuana. If you find the defendant believed that he was being reimbursed by a
co-op or a collective and if you find that belief was reasonable, he did not have the
specific intent or mental state required for possession for sale of marijuana. [¶] If you
have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant had the specific intent or mental
state required for possession for sale of marijuana, you must find him not guilty of that
crime.” (CALCRIM No. 3406.)
2. Analysis
We review a court’s instructions de novo to determine whether they correctly state
the law or effectively direct a finding adverse to the defendant by removing an issue from
42
the jury’s consideration. (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.) “Our task is to
determine whether the trial court ‘“fully and fairly instructed on the applicable law.”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lopez (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 698, 708.) In
determining whether the jury was fully and fairly instructed on the applicable law, we
consider the instructions as a whole and each in light of the others. (People v. Moore
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 1104, 1140.) We also consider the entire trial record, including the
arguments of counsel, and assume the jurors understood and correlated all of the
instructions. (People v. Lopez, supra, at p. 708.)
The instructions did not accurately state the law supporting defendant’s lawful
cultivation defense, essentially because the instructions were based on the CUA, not the
MMPA. The CUA does not contemplate the lawful cultivation or sale of medical
marijuana through nonprofit organizations. Instead, it allows a patient and his or her
primary caregiver to grow or possess marijuana solely for the patient’s medical purposes,
and for no other persons or groups of persons. (Urziceanu, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p.
768.) In contrast, the MMPA allows qualified patients, valid identification cardholders,
and their respective primary caregivers, if any, to form nonprofit groups, and through
those groups, pay each other and receive compensation and reimbursement from each
other in amounts necessary to cover the “overhead costs and operating expenses” of
cultivating and providing medical marijuana to the qualified patient and valid cardholder
members of the group. (§§ 11362.765, 11362.775; Guidelines, § IV; see People v.
Jackson, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 537 [MMPA does not limit number of qualified
43
patient members a medical marijuana cooperative or collective may have]; People v.
Colvin, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 1039 [not all members of cooperative or collective
must participate in cultivating marijuana for other members].)
The instructions erroneously told the jury that in order to find defendant was
lawfully cultivating the 100 marijuana plants—and was therefore not guilty of unlawful
cultivation (§ 11358) or possession for sale (§ 11359)—it had to find he was either the
primary caregiver for the other alleged five members of the Green Galleon collective or
was growing no more marijuana than necessary for his own medical use. In this respect,
the instructions comported with the CUA but were contrary to the MMPA.
The instructions also erroneously stated: “Possession for sale, and the actual sale
of marijuana is not lawful even if a person has a valid medical marijuana
recommendation from a physician.” (Italics added.) Though nothing in the MMPA
allows any individual or group to cultivate or distribute marijuana for profit
(§ 11362.765, subd. (a)), the Guidelines allow marijuana grown through a nonprofit
collective or cooperative to be “[a]llocated based on fees that are reasonably calculated to
cover overhead costs and operating expenses[.]” (Guidelines, § IV.B.6., p. 10; see also
§ 11362.775.)
Nothing in the other instructions or the arguments of counsel cured these
instructional errors. Nonetheless, there was insufficient evidence to support defendant’s
lawful cultivation defense; thus, defendant was not entitled to instructions on the defense.
When a defendant claims he or she was lawfully cultivating marijuana under the MMPA
44
(§§ 11362.765, 11362.775) as a defense to marijuana-related charges including unlawful
cultivation (§ 11358) and possession for sale (§ 11359), the defendant has the burden of
producing evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt. (People v. Mower,
supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 476-482; People v. Jackson, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 533.)
The trial court is required to instruct sua sponte on a defense only if substantial evidence
supports it, the defendant is relying on it, and it is consistent with the defendant’s theory
of the case. (People v. Villanueva (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 41, 49.)
People v. Solis (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 51 is instructive. Solis and other
defendants operated a 1,700-member medical marijuana dispensary, the Healing Center
(THC), out of a storefront in Santa Barbara. THC was not registered as nonprofit.
Several of its customers reported they became members by filling out a form, and they
had no involvement with the dispensary other than purchasing marijuana there. (Id. at p.
54.) In one year, Solis received $80,000 in income from THC and spent it on family
expenses and entertainment. He purchased marijuana from unidentified sources and
resold it to the dispensary for double the price he paid. Other venders also sold marijuana
to THC, and Solis knew some of those vendors used false names to avoid “legal
problems.” Police tracked down one vendor who was not a member of the dispensary.
(Id. at pp. 54-55.)
The trial court rejected Solis’s MMPA defense in a bench trial, finding there was
insufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt whether THC was operating on a
nonprofit basis. (People v. Solis, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 56.) The court reasoned in
45
part: “Monetary reimbursement that members provide to [a] collective or cooperative is
limited to an amount necessary to cover overhead costs and operating expenses.
[Guidelines, § IV.B.6., p. 10.] Defendants have provided no evidence of actual overhead
costs or expenses that had to be reimbursed. Rather, the reimbursement amount or, as
Solis described it, pricing was simply double the amount [THC] paid for [the]
marijuana.” (Ibid.) The trial court also found there was no evidence that THC members
“pooled money” to collectively grow marijuana, and no evidence that the monies paid to
THC went into collective cultivation of marijuana. To the contrary, the evidence showed
the revenues went to vendors, many of whom were unknown and two of whom were not
members of THC, and to Solis for his “entertainment and living expenses.” (Ibid.)
The trial court found Solis guilty of possessing marijuana for sale (§ 11359) and a
misdemeanor count of selling or transporting marijuana (§ 11360, subd. (a); People v.
Solis, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 54). The appellate court agreed there was insufficient
evidence to support Solis’s MMPA defense that he was lawfully cultivating marijuana for
a nonprofit collective, and affirmed the judgment. (People v. Solis, supra, at p. 59.)
Here, too, the evidence supporting defendant’s lawful cultivation defense fell short
of raising a reasonable doubt that defendant was lawfully cultivating and lawfully
possessing marijuana for sale, on a nonprofit basis, to a lawfully operating marijuana
collective. First, there was insufficient evidence that the Green Galleon collective was
lawfully operating a nonprofit medical marijuana collective comprised solely of qualified
patients, valid identification cardholders, or their primary caregivers. (§§ 11362.765,
46
11362.775; Guidelines, § IV.) With the exception of defendant, there was no evidence
that any of the collective’s other five members were qualified patients. (§ 11362.7, subd.
(f).) Nor was there any evidence that the collective was registered, organized, or
operating as a nonprofit organization (see Guidelines, § IV.A.2., p. 8) or that it was
organized with sufficient structure to ensure nondiversion of marijuana to illicit markets
(Guidelines, § IV.B., pp. 9-11). Defendant testified that half of the marijuana he
harvested from his 100-plant grow would be given to his cousin Miller, the person from
the collective who provided him with the 100 “clone” plants, but there was no evidence
that any of the marijuana harvested from defendant’s grow would be given for free or
sold, on a nonprofit basis, solely to qualified patient members of the collective.
Lastly, defendant asserts a “clear and accurate instruction stating a medical
marijuana patient is entitled to reimbursement an[d] compensation for cultivating for the
collective was required.” We disagree. Such an instruction would have been too broadly
worded and therefore misleading, because it would not have limited the amount of
permissible reimbursement to the amount of out-of-pocket costs incurred in cultivating
the marijuana, nor would it have limited the amount of permissible compensation to the
reasonable value of the cultivation services rendered. Under the MMPA, a qualified
patient or valid identification cardholder is entitled to receive only reasonable
compensation for his labor or services rendered in cultivating medical marijuana for other
qualified patient members of his nonprofit group, plus reimbursement for his out-of-
47
pocket expenses incurred, but he may not earn a profit from growing medical marijuana.
(§ 11362.765; Guidelines, § IV.B.1., B.6., pp. 9-10.)
V. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION
KING J.
We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
CODRINGTON J.
48
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the trial court properly excluded expert testimony regarding the legality of the defendant's marijuana cultivation because the expert lacked sufficient evidence to support his opinions. Furthermore, the court held that the trial court's jury instructions regarding the Medical Marijuana Program Act were erroneous, but that the error was harmless because the defendant failed to produce sufficient evidence to support the defense.
Issues
Did the trial court err in excluding expert testimony regarding the defendant's lawful cultivation defense?
Did the trial court err in its jury instructions concerning the Medical Marijuana Program Act?
Was there sufficient evidence to support the defendant's medical marijuana defense?
Disposition. affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We conclude the expert’s testimony on these and other points was properly excluded because the expert lacked sufficient evidence to render the opinions.”
“We agree the instructions misstated the applicable law under the MMPA, but conclude defendant did not produce sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt he was lawfully growing the 100 marijuana plants for himself and other qualified patients”