People v. Kieu CA4/3

Filed 7/28/14 P. v. Kieu CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G048645

v. (Super. Ct. No. 11ZF0127)

CATHERINE KIEU, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Richard F. Toohey, Judge. Affirmed as modified. Christine Vento, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Kristen Kinnaird Chenelia, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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A jury convicted defendant, Catherine Kieu, of aggravated mayhem (Pen. Code, § 205; all further statutory references are to Penal Code) and torture (§ 206). The jury also found defendant used a deadly weapon (§ 12022 subd. (b)(1)). The trial court sentenced defendant to life with the possibility of parole for aggravated mayhem, concurrently to life with the possibility of parole for torture, and one year consecutive for the deadly weapon enhancement. Defendant raises three claims. First, she contends her torture conviction should be reversed because there was insufficient evidence she intended to cause cruel or extreme pain and suffering. Since the evidence supports a reasonable inference that defendant intended to cause cruel or extreme pain and suffering, we affirm this count. Second, defendant argues the court violated section 654 when it sentenced her concurrently for aggravated mayhem and torture. Section 654 applies because defendant’s actions formed an indivisible continuous course of conduct with one objective. We order the sentence on the torture charge stayed. Third, defendant argues she was entitled to presentence conduct credits under section 2933.1. The Attorney General concedes this point and we agree.