Meaux v. Springfield CA1/5

Filed 7/16/14 Meaux v. Springfield CA1/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

ORVILLE MEAUX et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, A139840 v. JUAQUIN SPRINGFIELD, (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG13667731) Defendant and Respondent.

Juaquin Springfield prevailed on an anti-SLAPP1 motion and moved for an award of attorney fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c).2 Plaintiffs in the action below, Orville Meaux and his company (collectively Meaux), appeal the fee award. We conclude that most of Meaux’s arguments are forfeited by failure to cite relevant legal authority or specific facts in the record, and by raising new arguments for the first time on appeal or in the reply brief. We further find that Meaux fails to demonstrate an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling, and consequently we affirm. I. BACKGROUND In February 2013, Meaux, individually and doing business as The Portal Herbal Health Collective, sued Juaquin “Moe” Ramaundy Springfield and Briann Marie Diaz for defamation, fraudulent misrepresentation, interference with prospective economic 1 SLAPP refers to “strategic lawsuit against public participation.” (Equilon Enterprises, LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 57 & fn. 1.) 2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

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advantage, breach of fiduciary duty, slander and libel. He alleged that Springfield and Diaz “entered into a concerted action to bring false allegations against Meaux in order to take over [The Portal Herbal Health Collective],” inter alia by making false claims that Meaux had sexually harassed Diaz in a 2012 lawsuit against Meaux (apparently filed in the superior court of Santa Clara County). Springfield moved to strike all but one cause of action against him pursuant to section 425.16. The trial court granted the motion and ruled that Springfield was entitled to recover his reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1). Those rulings are not challenged on appeal. Springfield filed a memorandum of costs and a motion for attorney fees supported by billing records. He sought $34, 961.58 in attorney fees and costs, representing 47.36 hours of legal work (39.76 hours on the anti-SLAPP motion and 7.6 hours on the fee motion) at a billing rate of $400 per hour and a contingency risk multiplier of 2.0 (on the anti-SLAPP motion work but not the fee motion work), plus $113.58 in costs. Springfield later raised his fee and cost request to a total of $39,104.58 based on additional work he performed on a reply brief. Springfield’s counsel, Ian Kelley, averred that he represented Springfield on the anti-SLAPP motion on a contingency basis, and that the $400 billing rate was “within the range of rates which I charge paying clients in my private practice for non-contingency matters.” Kelley averred that he had practiced law for 12 years; taught constitutional law for 10 years, most recently as an adjunct professor at John F. Kennedy School of Law; argued before the California Supreme Court; and was “versed in the area of anti-SLAPP law and brought specialized expertise to this litigation.” He also cited two San Francisco area cases where attorney fees were awarded based on hourly rates of $375 and $650 for attorneys with 8 and 25 years of experience respectively (an environmental enforcement action) and $425 to $450 for attorneys with 11 years of experience (a civil rights action). In opposition, Meaux argued “this case does not meet the mini[m]um requirements for a fee enhancement” (without citing supporting facts or legal authority) and that the entire fee request should be denied because of alleged misconduct by Springfield and