California Court of Appeal Jul 8, 2014 No. D064366Unpublished
Filed 7/8/14 P. v. Salazar CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D064366
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD238365)
RICHARD ANGEL SALAZAR,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Kenneth K. So, Judge. Affirmed.
Mazur & Mazur and Janice R. Mazur, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon Jr., and Parag
Agrawal, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
In 2011, Richard Angel Salazar (Salazar) pled guilty to corporal injury to spouse
(Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a))1 and attempting to dissuade a witness from reporting a
crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1)). He admitted one serious felony prior conviction (§ 667,
subd. (a)(1)) and one strike prior (§§ 667, subd. (b)-(i), 668, 1170.12) arising from a 2008
convictions used for sentencing enhancement in limited circumstances where a
determination of an alleged constitutional violation may be made without disrupting
efficient judicial administration: (1) denial of counsel (id. at p. 431; Garcia v. Superior
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Court (1997) 14 Cal.4th 953, 963, citing Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335)3 or
(2) failure to secure a proper waiver of the defendant's rights to a jury trial, silence, and
confrontation (Boykin-Tahl rights) (Allen, supra, at p. 442; People v. Sumstine (1984) 36
Cal.3d 909, 918-919 (Sumstine), citing Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 & In re
Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122). Otherwise, the validity of a prior conviction is typically
litigated in a separate proceeding, such as habeas corpus. (Allen, at p. 429; People v.
Villa (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1063, 1074.)
Salazar contends the limited category of pretrial motions to strike or invalidate
prior convictions should be expanded to include challenges to the factual basis for a prior
plea under section 1192.5. Section 1192.5 requires a court to inquire to "satisfy itself that
the plea is freely and voluntarily made, and that there is a factual basis for the plea."
(§ 1192.5.) Although there is no federal constitutional requirement for a factual basis
inquiry, the Supreme Court has observed "the statutory mandate of section 1192.5 helps
ensure that the 'constitutional standards of voluntariness and intelligence are met.' "
(People v. Holmes (2004) 32 Cal.4th 432, 438 (Holmes).)
3 In Garcia, the Supreme Court concluded collateral attacks on prior convictions based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims should not be entertained in pretrial motions because such motions would disrupt, rather than further, the effective administration of justice. Such matters, which typically are not resolved on the record alone, are more appropriately resolved on habeas corpus. (People v. Garcia, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 964-965.)
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We need not decide if a challenge to the factual basis for a plea under section
1192.5 should be considered a constitutional defect subject to a pretrial motion to strike.4
In this case, the court considered and denied Salazar's pretrial challenge to his prior
conviction by way of a petition for writ of error coram nobis, alternatively framed as a
motion to set aside the conviction. Even if this was not the proper vehicle for challenging
the factual basis of a prior plea, the court did not err in denying the motion because, as we
shall explain, Salazar did not meet his burden to establish an actual denial of his
constitutional rights.
II
A defendant challenging a prior conviction by way of a motion to strike must
allege "actual denial of his constitutional rights." (Sumstine, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 922.)
Once the prosecution produces evidence the defendant suffered the alleged prior
conviction, " 'the defendant shall thereupon have the burden of producing evidence that
his constitutional [ . . . rights were] infringed in the prior proceeding at issue.' " (Id. at
4 "As a prudential matter, we routinely decline to address constitutional questions when it is unnecessary to reach them." (Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 1, 17, fn. 13.) "Generally, courts should not pass on constitutional questions when a judgment can be upheld on alternative, nonconstitutional grounds. Courts should follow a policy of judicial self- restraint and avoid unnecessary determination of constitutional issues." (California Teachers Assn. v. Board of Trustees (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 431, 442; People v. Pantoja (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1, 10 [when statutory grounds dispose of an issue, courts should avoid constitutional questions because " 'we do not reach constitutional questions unless absolutely required to do so to dispose of the matter before us' "].)
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p. 923, quoting People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204, 217.) If the defendant meets this
burden, the prosecution may then produce rebuttal evidence. (Ibid.)
Salazar presented no evidence his guilty plea was not entered into knowingly or
voluntarily.5 Instead, Salazar's challenge focuses on the stipulation to the preliminary
hearing transcript as the factual basis for the plea. He contends "the court's acceptance of
a stipulation that the preliminary hearing provided a factual basis for the plea, when in
fact, it did not . . . constitutes a failure of the court to comply with its obligation to ensure
that there is a factual basis for the plea." He further contends, "where the record does not
establish that there is a factual basis for a plea, neither does it establish that the
constitutional standards of voluntariness and intelligence have been met." (Underscoring
omitted.)
In essence, Salazar argues the alleged silence of the preliminary hearing transcript
about whether Salazar attempted to intimidate or dissuade his wife from testifying
truthfully establishes he was denied his constitutional rights. This is insufficient. A
defendant cannot rely on mere silence in the record to meet his or her burden of
challenging a prior conviction by collateral attack in a pretrial proceeding. (Sumstine,
supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 924.)
5 Salazar's declaration in support of his motion to set aside the prior conviction states, "I never knew that the plea bargain I entered into in this case lacked an adequate factual basis when I pled guilty." He states his new attorney told him his prior plea bargain "was arguably unconstitutional, because there wasn't a factual basis for my plea of guilty." Salazar does not state he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter his guilty plea to the charge of witness intimidation under section 136.1, subdivision (a). Nor does he deny he attempted to intimidate his wife or otherwise influence her to change her testimony at the 2008 preliminary hearing. 12
Additionally, "a trial court possesses wide discretion in determining whether a
sufficient factual basis exists for a guilty plea. The trial court's acceptance of the guilty
plea, after pursuing an inquiry to satisfy itself that there is a factual basis for the plea, will
be reversed only for abuse of discretion." (Holmes, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 443.)
To establish a factual basis for a plea, the court is not required to question the
defendant about each element of the charged offense or possible defenses. (Holmes,
supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 440, 442.) Nor is it necessary for the court to be convinced of the
defendant's guilt. (Ibid.) A trial court may satisfy its statutory duty under section 1192.5
by either making an inquiry from the defendant or from defense counsel. (Holmes, at pp.
440, 442.) A "stipulation by counsel to the plea's factual basis is consistent with the
legislative purpose of the statute. While defendant may not be in a position to recognize
whether his acts do or do not ' "constitute the offense with which he is charged" '
[citation], defense counsel is well suited to make such a determination." (Id. at p. 440,
fn. 5.)
The Supreme Court has made clear a trial court may accept a stipulation from
defense counsel about the existence of a factual basis for the plea, even without reference
to a particular document. (People v. Palmer (2013) 58 Cal.4th 110, 118 (Palmer).)
Defense counsel has broad authority to stipulate to factual and procedural matters on
behalf of a client and such stipulations obviate the need for proof. (Ibid.) The court
explained trial courts should be afforded "flexibility in establishing a factual basis for the
plea, without undermining the primary goal of assuring that the defendant entered the
plea voluntarily and intelligently" because, in part, "a rule limiting trial courts' discretion
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to accept conditional pleas predicated on stipulations by counsel would raise potential
concerns for the defense function." (Id. at p. 119.) The Palmer court further explained,
"defense counsel may advise acceptance of a plea agreement based in part on admissions
the client has made or on other defense investigation, and may rely on such admissions or
investigation in stipulating to the factual basis for a plea. We will not read into section
1192.5 a requirement that counsel explicitly refer to those privileged sources as the basis
for the stipulation." (Ibid.)
In this case, the preliminary hearing judge, after hearing the testimony of Christina
and the police officers and reviewing the evidence, made factual findings Christina did
not provide credible or truthful testimony when she recanted and attempted to absolve
Salazar by blaming herself for the altercation. Instead, the court found Christina's
statements to the police officers were credible. The court also found Salazar "looks like a
guy who can handle himself. He looks pretty well put together and physically competent.
And certainly she would be no physical match for him."
After the preliminary hearing, the court granted a motion to amend the complaint
to add the witness intimidation charge under section 136.1, subdivision (a). Salazar
agreed to plead guilty to this charge to obtain a deal for the shortest amount of prison
time possible.
At the change of plea hearing, the court confirmed Salazar had enough time to talk
to his lawyer about the charges and any potential defenses. He affirmed he understood
what was going on in court and no one forced him to plead guilty. In addition, the court
confirmed Salazar signed and understood everything on the change of plea form, which
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included an acknowledgment his conviction would be a serious felony "strike" that would
result in substantially increased penalties in future felony cases.
Salazar admitted in the change of plea form to the charge of witness intimidation
under section 136.1, subdivision (a) and stipulated to the transcript of preliminary hearing
(at which he was present) as providing a basis for the charge. At the change of plea
hearing, in Salazar's presence, defense counsel and the prosecutor confirmed all parties
stipulated to the preliminary hearing transcript as containing "a factual basis." Salazar
entered his guilty plea without objection. At no time did Salazar protest his factual
innocence. The court also solicited a statement from defense counsel affirming a belief
the plea was in Salazar's best interest.
The fact the defense attorney and the defendant, both of whom were present at the
preliminary hearing, agreed what occurred at the hearing supported a factual basis for a
witness intimidation charge is sufficient. Defense counsel was not required to state on
the record precisely how the preliminary hearing provided a basis for the plea or any
other privileged sources of information leading to the advice to accept the plea. (Palmer,
supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 119.)
Based on this record, we find no procedural error in the acceptance of Salazar's
2008 plea. We conclude the stipulation that the preliminary hearing transcript contained
a factual basis satisfied the requirements of section 1192.5 and the trial court acted within
its discretion by accepting Salazar's plea. Because Salazar did not meet his burden to
establish his constitutional rights were violated, the court properly denied his challenge to
the 2008 conviction for sentence enhancement.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, J.
O'ROURKE, J.
16
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to invalidate a 2008 prior conviction, as the defendant failed to meet his burden of proving a constitutional violation and the record supported the existence of a factual basis for the original plea.
Issues
Whether a challenge to the factual basis of a plea under Penal Code section 1192.5 constitutes a constitutional defect subject to a pretrial motion to strike.
Whether the defendant met his burden to establish an actual denial of his constitutional rights regarding his 2008 guilty plea.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“A defendant cannot rely on mere silence in the record to meet his or her burden of challenging a prior conviction by collateral attack in a pretrial proceeding.”
“The trial court's acceptance of the guilty plea, after pursuing an inquiry to satisfy itself that there is a factual basis for the plea, will be reversed only for abuse of discretion.”
“We conclude the stipulation that the preliminary hearing transcript contained a factual basis satisfied the requirements of section 1192.5 and the trial court acted within its discretion by accepting Salazar's plea.”