People v. Paz CA1/1

Filed 7/3/14 P. v. Paz CA1/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A140526 v. FELIX CAMELINO PAZ, (Napa County Super. Ct. No. CR167133) Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Feliz C. Paz appeals from a judgment following a jury verdict finding him guilty of unlawfully setting fire on forest land (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (c)).1 The trial court sentenced him to the lower term of two years doubled because of a prior strike, plus a consecutive five-year term on a prior serious felony conviction enhancement, for a total sentence of nine years in state prison. His appellate counsel has raised no issues and asks this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any issues that would, if resolved favorably to defendant, result in reversal or modification of the judgment. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was notified of his right to file a supplemental brief, but did not file anything further. Upon independent review of the record, we conclude no arguable issues are presented for review, and affirm the judgment. DISCUSSION In August 2013, the Napa County District Attorney filed a criminal complaint against defendant, alleging one felony count of unlawfully and maliciously setting fire to 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal code unless otherwise indicated. 1

a structure and forest land (§ 451, subd. (c)) and one felony count of unlawfully and recklessly causing a fire to a structure or forest (§ 452, subd. (c)). It was further alleged defendant had suffered a prior “strike” conviction (§ 667, subds. (b)–(i)) and a prior serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). At the preliminary hearing, Deputy Sheriff Jon Thompson testified he received a call of a suspected arson fire and an individual fleeing the area. As he approached the area of the fire in his patrol car, he saw defendant carrying a backpack and walking up an embankment toward the roadway. He estimated he was, at that point, about 1,000 to 2,000 yards from the field that was on fire. He ordered defendant to the ground and handcuffed him. Defendant was speaking rapidly and somewhat incoherently about having lighter fluid that was flame retardant, “believing in his name” so “he would not try to blow up the world,” and “Jesus and the devil.” After defendant was placed in the patrol car, Thompson spoke with a witness who had walked past the area, which was not then on fire, saw defendant talking and singing to himself, then heard a strange sound and returned to the area, and saw defendant now standing over a fire. No one else was in the area. The witness called 911 and saw defendant walk in the direction of the highway where Thompson had found him walking up the incline. The witness accompanied Thompson to the patrol car, and before Thompson could complete an identification admonition, the witness blurted out he was “100 percent sure” defendant was the person he had seen in the field. Fire Captain William Laird testified he conducted the fire origin and cause determination. Out of the 11 origin classes, he eliminated all but arson. He cited the witness and the fact a can of lighter fluid was found, although he did not determine the exact ignition source. The fire burned no more than a quarter of an acre. The trial court ruled a sufficient showing had been made to hold defendant for trial. The district attorney thereafter filed a two-count information, charging defendant with arson of a structure or forest (§ 451, subd. (c)) and recklessly causing a fire (§ 452, subd. (c)). It was further alleged defendant had suffered a prior strike conviction (§ 667, subds. (b)–(i)) and a prior serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).