California Court of Appeal Jun 27, 2014 No. G048870Unpublished
Filed 6/27/14 P. v. Khounani CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G048870
v. (Super. Ct. No. R-00558)
RYAN JOSEPH KHOUNANI, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Vickie Lynn Hix, Commissioner. Affirmed. Marsha F. Levine, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel and
Alana Cohen Butler, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. * * *
Ryan Joseph Khounani appeals from a postjudgment order granting a
petition to revoke his postrelease community supervision (PRCS). (Pen. Code, § 3455; all statutory references are to the Penal Code unless noted.) He contends the probation
officer’s imposition of intermediate sanctions following a violation of PRCS conditions
precluded the probation officer from filing a revocation petition under section 3455 based on those same violations. For the reasons expressed below, we disagree and affirm the
In August 2011, Khounani pleaded guilty to auto taking (Veh. Code,
§ 1085l, subd. (a)) and received a 16-month prison term. In April 2012, he was released
from prison and placed on PRCS. In May 2012, the Orange County Probation
Department filed a petition (§ 3455) alleging Khounani violated the terms of his PRCS by
possessing a weapon, using the weapon to threaten another person, and leaving the state without permission. In June 2012, he admitted the violations and the court reinstated
PRCS on condition he serve 90 days in local custody with credit for 72 days.
In September 2012, the probation department petitioned for an arrest
warrant alleging Khounani had failed to report to his probation officer and was not living
at the address he provided. In October 2012, the probation officer filed a second
revocation petition alleging Khounani had violated PRCS by disobeying a protective
order to stay away from his father and his father’s residence, possessing hypodermic
syringes, heroin, and hydrocodone, failing to report to his probation officer and maintain
an approved residence, failing to make himself available for random drug testing, and
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refusing to seek drug treatment. Khounani admitted violating PRCS. The court revoked
and reinstated PRCS and ordered him to serve 90 days in county jail, less 60 days credit. Probation filed a third petition in December 2012, alleging Khounani
violated a restraining order, used a controlled substance while in a residential drug
treatment facility, and refused to report to probation to take a drug test. Khounani admitted the violations and the court ordered him to serve 180 days in local custody, less
150 days credit.
On June 19, 2013, probation filed a fourth petition. It alleged Anaheim
police had arrested Khounani for robbery and vehicle tampering (count 1), tested positive
for opiates and marijuana on April 18, 2013, (count 2), and failed to successfully
complete a residential drug treatment program referred to him on May 9, 2013, (count 3).
Following a hearing in August 2013, the court found Khounani violated PRCS. It
revoked and reinstated PRCS, and ordered him to serve 160 days in local custody, less
106 days credit. He appeals from that order. II
DISCUSSION Probation’s Imposition of Intermediate Sanctions Following Violations of PRCS Conditions Did Not Preclude Filing of a Revocation Petition Based on Same Violations
At the August 2013 hearing, the prosecutor elected to proceed only on the
allegations Khounani violated PRCS by testing positive for opiates and marijuana on
April 18, 2013, (count 2), and failing to successfully complete a residential drug
treatment program referred to him on May 9, 2013, (count 3). Khounani’s probation
officer Mario Martinez testified at the hearing that after he learned about the positive
drug test in April, he referred Khounani to a treatment program on May 9. He classified
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this as a “remedial sanction,” attempting to resolve the issue without arrest. On June 4,
he received paperwork reflecting Phoenix House had discharged Khounani. On June 12,
Martinez decided not to arrest Khounani and instead gave him another opportunity to
address his drug abuse. Martinez directed Khounani to participate in code-a-phone drug
testing, which is random testing at the probation office at least every other day. He also
placed Khounani on GPS monitoring. Khounani was arrested by Anaheim police two
days later. The revocation hearing officer found “[t]he fact [the probation officer]
afforded [Khounani] an opportunity to continue to remain out of custody and have an
opportunity to do the code-a-phone . . . and G.P.S. shows that the probation officer was
willing to work with him. [¶] However, the violations were committed, and I find he is in
violation of his supervision.”
Section 3451 generally provides that nonviolent persons released from
prison on or after October 1, 2011, are subject to PRCS by the county’s probation
department for a period not to exceed three years. Section 3454 provides probation may
determine appropriate conditions of supervision (see § 3453 [mandatory conditions of
supervision]) consistent with public safety, including electronic monitoring, and
appropriate rehabilitation and treatment services. Probation may “determine appropriate incentives,” and “order appropriate responses to alleged violations, which can
include, . . . immediate, structured, and intermediate sanctions up to and including
referral to a reentry court . . . .” (§ 3454; see § 3450, subd. (b)(8)(A)-(L) [immediate and
structured sanctions include, but are not limited to, flash incarceration, intensive
community supervision, home detention with electronic monitoring or GPS monitoring,
mandatory community service, restorative justice programs, work, training, or education
in a furlough, work release program, day reporting, mandatory residential or
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nonresidential substance abuse treatment programs, mandatory random drug testing,
community-based residential programs offering structure, supervision, drug treatment,
alcohol treatment, psychological counseling, mental health treatment, or any combination
of these and other interventions].)
Section 3455 provides that if probation has determined intermediate
sanctions (§ 3454, subd. (b)) are not appropriate, it “shall petition the court pursuant to
Section 1203.2 to revoke, modify, or terminate postrelease community supervision.”
(§ 3455, subd. (a)) “Upon a finding that the person has violated the conditions of
postrelease community supervision, the revocation hearing officer shall have authority to
do all of the following: [¶] (1) Return the person to postrelease community supervision
with modifications of conditions, if appropriate, including a period of incarceration in
county jail. [¶] (2) Revoke and terminate postrelease community supervision and order
the person to confinement in the county jail. [¶] (3) Refer the person to a reentry court
pursuant to Section 3015 or other evidence-based program in the court’s discretion.”
(Ibid.) “Confinement . . . shall not exceed a period of 180 days in the county jail for each
custodial sanction.” (§ 3455, subd. (d).)
Khounani argues probation had “two options,” namely “a remedial [i.e., an immediate, structured, and intermediate] sanction, or . . . where it is determined that a
remedial sanction is not appropriate, seek revocation of PRCS.” Khounani asserts the
probation officer elected the first option on June 12 by opting not to arrest him for testing
positive for drugs on April 18 and flunking out of Phoenix House, instead adding new
conditions, code-a-phone drug testing and GPS. The PRCS revocation petition followed
Khounani’s arrest on new charges June 14, but the prosecutor elected not to seek
revocation based on this incident. According to Khounani, “[t]here simply is no authority
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for the agency” to impose both an intermediate sanction and petition the court under to
section 1203.2 to revoke, modify, or terminate PRCS before the new sanctions (code-a-
phone drug testing and GPS) had been tested.
Neither party addresses the appropriate standard of review. Generally,
where the facts are undisputed and the question involves statutory interpretation, the
appellate court reviews the issue under a de novo or independent standard of review.
(People v. Fuentes (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1288; see People v. Lazlo (2012)
206 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1068 [issue whether trial court prohibited from relying on
previously suppressed evidence at probation violation hearing turned solely on a question
of law and the standard of review on appeal is de novo].) Assuming the statutes
authorize the action, the probation department’s determination that intermediate sanctions
are not appropriate (§ 3455, subd. (a)) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The
revocation hearing officer’s determination the person has violated a PRCS condition is
reviewed for substantial evidence (People v. Urke (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 766, 773), but
its decision to revoke or modify PRCS and impose a period of incarceration in county jail
is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Ibid. [court’s discretion will not be disturbed in the
absence of a showing of abusive or arbitrary action, burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion rests squarely on the defendant, and only in extreme cases should an appellate
court interfere with the discretion of the trial court in revoking probation].)
Here, Khounani’s arrest on June 14 reflected the intermediate sanctions
imposed by the probation officer on June 12 were no longer an appropriate response to
Khounani’s violations. Nothing in section 3455 precluded the probation officer on June
19 from filing the revocation petition. Although the prosecutor later decided not to
pursue revocation based on the new charges at the revocation hearing in August 2013,
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once the petition was filed, the revocation hearing officer had authority to determine
whether Khounani violated his PRCS conditions, including those for which intermediate
sanctions had been attempted, and had authority under section 3455 to order a period of
incarceration. Presumably, the revocation hearing officer assessed the situation at the
time of the revocation hearing. Had Khounani complied with the probation officer’s
intermediate directives after his arrest, and the new charges were later determined to be
unsubstantiated, the hearing officer presumably would not have incarcerated Khounani.
In that situation, the revocation hearing officer simply could return Khounani to PRCS
without modifying the probation officer’s new conditions and without incarceration.
(§ 3455, subd. (a)(1).) But here there is no evidence Khounani continued to comply with
the directive to drug test and submit to GPS monitoring after June 14. The court also
remarked Khounani was “still in custody on [the] new case.” This is not a case where the
probation officer changed his mind capriciously to file a revocation petition,
notwithstanding the probationer’s compliance with the intermediate sanctions. We
discern no abuse of discretion by either the probation officer or the revocation hearing
officer.
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III
DISPOSITION The postjudgment order is affirmed.
ARONSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’LEARY, P. J.
MOORE, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that a probation officer's prior imposition of intermediate sanctions for postrelease community supervision (PRCS) violations does not preclude the subsequent filing of a formal revocation petition under Penal Code section 3455 for those same violations.
Issues
Whether a probation officer is precluded from filing a PRCS revocation petition after previously imposing intermediate sanctions for the same violations.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Nothing in section 3455 precluded the probation officer on June 19 from filing the revocation petition.”