California Court of Appeal Jun 25, 2014 No. D065416Unpublished
Filed 6/25/14 P. v. McFadden CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APEA, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D065416
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD249941)
ALEJANDRO RAY MCFADDEN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Eugenia
Eyherabide, Judge. Affirmed.
Theresa Osterman Stevenson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Alejandro Ray McFadden pleaded guilty to one count of making a criminal threat
(Pen. Code, § 422) and one count of corporal injury to a spouse/roommate (Pen. Code,
§ 273.5, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced McFadden to two years eight months in
state prison.
McFadden timely appealed from the judgment. Appointed counsel filed a brief
pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), setting forth the facts of the
case and requesting that we review the entire record. Pursuant to Anders v. California
(1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), appointed counsel suggested we consider two issues: (1)
may be manifested either orally or in writing. [Citation.] The voluntariness of a waiver
is a question of law which appellate courts review de novo. [Citation.]" (People v.
Pannizon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80.)
Here, the record clearly shows McFadden manifested his consent to the stipulated
sentence. McFadden's plea agreement states that he was promised a "stipulated 2 years 8
3
months state prison [sentence] concurrent with any parole or PRCS violation." The plea
agreement makes no reference to a sentence any less than two years eight months. In
fact, McFadden placed his initials next to the paragraph that reads, "I understand that I
may receive this maximum punishment as a result of my plea: 4 y[ea]rs 8 months . . . ."
McFadden also placed his initials next the sentence that reads, "I am entering my plea
freely and voluntarily, without fear or threat to me or anyone closely related to me."
Additionally, McFadden's attorney signed the plea stating that he had reviewed the entire
plea agreement with McFadden and explained each of the terms, including the stipulated
sentence.
Moreover, when taking the plea, the record shows the trial court asked McFadden
if he understood his stipulated sentence to be "two years and eight months in the state
prison," and McFadden stated he did. The trial court also advised McFadden that "[t]he
maximum penalty could be four years and eight months in the state prison . . . ."
McFadden stated he understood.
We independently conclude on this record that McFadden knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily consented to the sentence of two years eight months.
Indeed, from our own review of the record we have found no evidence whatsoever to
support his contention that he was promised, or reasonably could have expected, a
sentence of less than this term, including one year as he alleges in his brief.
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II
"To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show
both that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. [Citations.] Counsel's performance was deficient if the
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms. [Citation.] Prejudice exists where there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
[Citation.]" (People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 92-93.) "A defendant who raises
the issue on appeal must establish deficient performance based upon the four corners of
the record." (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1003.)
Here, McFadden has not satisfied his burden to show his counsel's performance
was deficient. On the plea form, McFadden placed his initials next to the paragraph
stating that his attorney had advised him of all possible consequences of his plea. During
the taking of the plea, the trial court asked McFadden if his attorney went over the plea
forms with him. McFadden stated that he did and that he had no further questions. In
light of the foregoing, and given that McFadden was facing possible confinement of four
years eight months for the offenses, we independently conclude McFadden's guilty plea
was not the result of ineffective assistance of counsel.
5
DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
BENKE, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR:
NARES, J.
McDONALD, J.
6
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the defendant's guilty plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and that the defendant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.
Issues
Whether the defendant's waiver of constitutional rights and entry of his plea were voluntary and knowing.
Whether the defendant's guilty plea was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We independently conclude on this record that McFadden knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily consented to the sentence of two years eight months.”
“McFadden has not satisfied his burden to show his counsel's performance was deficient.”