Jones v. County of San Diego CA4/1 (2014) · DecisionDepot
Jones v. County of San Diego CA4/1
California Court of Appeal Jun 24, 2014 No. D064099Unpublished
Filed 6/24/14 Jones v. County of San Diego CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
JEFFERY JONES, D064099
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2012-00054587- CU-FR-NC) COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Earl H.
Maas III, Judge. Affirmed.
Jeffery Jones, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, and Stephanie A. Karnavas, Deputy
County Counsel, for Defendant and Respondent.
Jeffery Jones sued the County of San Diego (the County) for damages allegedly
caused by the County's miscalculation and misreporting of Jones's delinquent child
support payments. The County demurred on the ground of prosecutorial immunity. The
trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered a judgment of
dismissal. Jones appeals. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
"This case comes to us after the sustaining of a general demurrer; accordingly, the
rule is that we accept as true all the material allegations of the complaint." (Shoemaker v.
Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 7.) The facts as disclosed by Jones's pleadings are as follows:
In 1992, the El Dorado County Superior Court issued an order that Jones pay $187
per month for child support arrearages. In 1998, pursuant to a stipulation between Jones
and the County's Office of the District Attorney, an order was entered in the San Diego
County Superior Court requiring Jones to pay $398 in monthly child support going
forward and $50 per month toward an accrued support obligation of $18,000. Over the
following several years, Jones observed errors and inconsistencies in the crediting of his
child support payments and the accounting of his child support obligations, some of
which were corrected. The County allegedly violated the court's support order and kept a
"secret set of books" in which it added a daily charge of $5 and interest to Jones's support
obligations.
In 2004, "approximately $30,000 in bogus arrearages and interest" were reported
to El Dorado County. By the end of 2007, "the fictitious obligations generated by the
1998 abuse of authority by [the County] continued to accumulate," adding
approximately $36,000 to the account being maintained by El Dorado County. As a
result of these arrearages, El Dorado County issued an order to suspend Jones's driver's
license in December 2007. (See Fam. Code, § 17520.)
2
In November 2008, the "bogus amounts" reported by the County "disappeared"
when El Dorado County "confirmed" the "bogus nature" of the reported charges and
corrected Jones's account. Nevertheless, El Dorado County refused to rescind its order to
suspend Jones's driver's license, despite numerous requests that it do so. As a result, in
July 2010, Jones's work truck was "impounded on an 'unlicensed driver hold.' " The
impoundment "deprived [Jones] of his transportation" and caused a "sudden and
unexpected inability to perform his livelihood."
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Jones sued the County, and in an amended complaint asserted counts labeled
abuse of authority, negligence, and denial of due process. The gist of each count was that
the County's inaccurate accounting and reporting of Jones's delinquent child support
payments violated a court order and led to the suspension of his driver's license,
impoundment of his truck, and destruction of his livelihood. Jones sought damages for
lost income, the value of his impounded truck, the value of another vehicle that was
repossessed, and pain and suffering.
The County generally demurred to the amended complaint on the ground, among
others, that it was immune from liability under Government Code sections 815.2,
subdivision (b) and 821.6.1 (See Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Samuel v.
1 Government Code section 821.6 states: "A public employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable cause." Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (b) states: "Except as otherwise provided 3
Stevedoring Services (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 414, 422 [defendant may raise immunity by
general demurrer].) Jones filed opposition papers, and the County filed reply papers.
The trial court held a hearing on the demurrer, at which Jones submitted a
proposed second amended complaint to the court for consideration. The court took the
matter under submission and later issued an order sustaining the demurrer on the ground
the County was statutorily immune from liability because Jones's counts were "premised
on the allegation that [the County] performed negligent accountings during the course of
a child support proceeding." The court also stated it had examined Jones's proposed
second amended complaint, concluded it did not state a cause of action against the
County, and denied Jones's request for leave to amend. The court entered a judgment
dismissing Jones's action with prejudice.
DISCUSSION
Jones claims to be the "victim of failures of the [County] to perform its legally
mandated duties," and he "cries out to [this court] in the hope that the wisdom embodied
therein may revive his recently dismissed [c]omplaint against the [County]." Jones
suggests we may "be able to find a legally viable cause of action that [he] could amend
into his complaint within the following allegations." Although we are not unsympathetic
to Jones's plight, we must decline his invitation to revive the action because he has not
met his appellate burden to show reversible error.
by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is immune from liability." 4
It is well-settled that a judgment is presumed correct, and to obtain reversal an
appellant must affirmatively show prejudicial error through reasoned argument, including
citation of material facts in the appellate record, and discussion of applicable legal
authority. (E.g., In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994; Flores v. Department of
has not explained why claims based on Family Code section 4701 or Civil Code
section 1798.45, subdivision (b) (or any other claims he might assert against the County)
would not be subject to the same prosecutorial immunity that barred the claims asserted
in his prior pleadings. Thus, were Jones to assert claims based on these statutes in a
second amended complaint, they would fail as a matter of law. "Of course, if the
proposed amendment fails to state a cause of action, it is proper to deny leave to amend."
(Foxborough v. Van Atta (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 217, 230.)
Finally, in rejecting his challenge to the judgment, we are mindful that Jones is
representing himself on appeal and claims to have gained "pleading skills" through
"practice and research" so that "he CAN do a better job of stating his case, if given
another opportunity." Self-representation, however, does not allow a litigant to avoid the
obligation to make an affirmative showing of error on appeal. (Rappleyea v. Campbell
9
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985; Bianco v. California Highway Patrol (1994) 24
Cal.App.4th 1113, 1125-1126; see Flores, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 205 ["The same
rules apply to a party appearing in propria persona as to any other party."].) We therefore
conclude Jones's failure to provide an adequate record for us to assess error and his
failure to state a cogent legal argument supported by authority establishing reversible
error require us to affirm the judgment dismissing his action against the County.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
IRION, J.
WE CONCUR:
HALLER, Acting P. J.
McINTYRE, J.
10
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the County of San Diego is immune from liability under Government Code sections 815.2 and 821.6 for claims arising from the calculation and reporting of child support obligations in the course of judicial proceedings. Furthermore, the court affirmed the dismissal because the appellant failed to provide a cogent legal argument or an adequate record to demonstrate reversible error.
Issues
Whether the County of San Diego is immune from liability for claims arising from the calculation and reporting of child support obligations.
Whether the appellant met the burden of showing reversible error in the trial court's order sustaining the demurrer and denying leave to amend.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Under Government Code sections 815.2, subdivision (b) and 821.6, "county government and its employees have immunity from liability for actions taken to collect child support from [a parent]."”
“The trial court thus correctly sustained the County's demurrer.”