Cortina v. Wells Fargo Advisors CA4/1 (2014) · DecisionDepot
Cortina v. Wells Fargo Advisors CA4/1
California Court of Appeal Jun 24, 2014 No. D064516Unpublished
Filed 6/24/14 Cortina v. Wells Fargo Advisors CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
AVELINO CORTINA III, D064516
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2013-00036936-CU-JR-CTL) WELLS FARGO ADVISORS, LLC,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Randa
Trapp, Judge. Affirmed.
TechLaw and Dana B. Robinson for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Albert & Will and Mitchell J. Albert for Defendant and Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Avelino Cortina III appeals from the judgment of the trial court entered
after the trial court confirmed an arbitration award entered against Cortina and in favor of
intervention in the arbitration process be minimized. [Citations.] Because the decision to
arbitrate grievances evinces the parties' intent to bypass the judicial system and thus
avoid potential delays at the trial and appellate levels, arbitral finality is a core
component of the parties' agreement to submit to arbitration. Thus, an arbitration
decision is final and conclusive because the parties have agreed that it be so. By ensuring
that an arbitrator's decision is final and binding, courts simply assure that the parties
receive the benefit of their bargain." (Id. at p. 10, italics omitted.)
"[T]he Legislature has reduced the risk to the parties of [an erroneous] decision
[by an arbitrator] by providing for judicial review in circumstances involving serious
problems with the award itself, or with the fairness of the arbitration process."
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(Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 12.) For example, Code of Civil Procedure2 section
1286.2 sets forth the grounds for vacating an arbitrator's award. That section states in
pertinent part:
"(a) [T]he court shall vacate the award if the court determines that: [¶] (1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means. [¶] (2) There was corruption in any of the arbitrators. [¶] (3) The rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by misconduct of a neutral arbitrator. [¶] (4) The arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted. [¶] (5) The rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by the refusal of the arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or by the refusal of the arbitrators to hear evidence material to the controversy or by other conduct of the arbitrators contrary to the provisions of this title. [¶] (6) An arbitrator making the award either: (A) failed to disclose within the time required for disclosure a ground for disqualification of which the arbitrator was then aware; or (B) was subject to disqualification upon grounds specified in Section 1281.91 but failed upon receipt of timely demand to disqualify himself or herself as required by that provision. However, this subdivision does not apply to arbitration proceedings conducted under a collective bargaining agreement between employers and employees or between their respective representatives."3
2 Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
3 In addition, section 1286.6 provides limited grounds for the correction of an arbitration award, providing in pertinent part: "[T]he court, unless it vacates the award pursuant to Section 1286.2, shall correct the award and confirm it as corrected if the court determines that: [¶] (a) There was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in the description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award; [¶] (b) The arbitrators exceeded their powers but the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted; or [¶] (c) The award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits of the controversy." 6
"In light of these statutory provisions, the residual risk to the parties of an
arbitrator's erroneous decision represents an acceptable cost—obtaining the expedience
and financial savings that the arbitration process provides—as compared to the judicial
process." (Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 13.)
"When parties contract to resolve their disputes by private arbitration, their
agreement ordinarily contemplates that the arbitrator will have the power to decide any
question of contract interpretation, historical fact or general law necessary, in the
arbitrator's understanding of the case, to reach a decision. [Citations.] Inherent in that
power is the possibility the arbitrator may err in deciding some aspect of the case.
Arbitrators do not ordinarily exceed their contractually created powers simply by
reaching an erroneous conclusion on a contested issue of law or fact, and arbitral awards
may not ordinarily be vacated because of such error, for ' "[t]he arbitrator's resolution of
these issues is what the parties bargained for in the arbitration agreement." ' [Citation.]"
(Gueyffier v. Ann Summers, Ltd. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1179, 1185.)
B. Analysis
Cortina contends that the trial court should have vacated the arbitration award
against him pursuant to section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5), on the ground that he was
" 'substantially prejudiced . . . by the refusal of the arbitrators to hear evidence material to
the controversy.' " According to Cortina, he requested from Wells Fargo "all e-mails
regarding my promissory notes and this arbitration," but Wells Fargo "denied his
requests, arguing that evidence relating to this restructuring is irrelevant." Wells Fargo
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produced 12 e-mails in response to Cortina's request. According to Cortina, there were
far more than 12 e-mails in Wells Fargo's possession that included discussions regarding
the promissory notes at issue.
Cortina filed with the arbitration panel a motion to compel additional e-mail
communications from Wells Fargo, but the panel denied his motion. Cortina is now
attempting to frame that ruling as one that resulted in the arbitration panel "refus[ing] to
hear pertinent evidence to the controversy." We disagree. The arbitration panel's
discovery ruling is not reviewable by a court, even if the panel's decision resulted from an
error of law. Further, Cortina has not established that the evidence in the e-mails was
relevant to the arbitration proceeding.
"Discovery in arbitration is generally limited." (Berglund v. Arthroscopic & Laser
Surgery Center of San Diego, L.P. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 528, 534 (Berglund).) Further, all
discovery disputes between parties to an arbitration agreement must be submitted "to the
arbitral, not the judicial, forum." (Id. at p. 535.) " 'It is the job of the arbitrator, not the
court, to resolve all questions needed to determine the controversy. [Citation.] The
arbitrator, and not the court, decides questions of procedure and discovery. [Citations.]' "
(Briggs v. Resolution Remedies (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1400.)
"Arbitrators do not 'exceed[] their powers' within the meaning of [the arbitration
provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure] 'merely by rendering an erroneous decision on
a legal or factual issue, so long as the issue was within the scope of the controversy
submitted to the arbitrators. "The arbitrator's resolution of these issues is what the parties
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bargained for in the arbitration agreement." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" In short, 'having
submitted the [discovery] issue to arbitration, [a party] cannot maintain the arbitrator[]
exceeded [his or her] powers, within the meaning of section 1286.6, subdivision (b), by
deciding it, even if [he or she] decided it incorrectly.' [Citation.]" (Alexander v. Blue
Cross of California (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1089.) Thus, even if an arbitrator's
discovery ruling was incorrect, reviewing that decision for correctness is not within the
court's authority. (Moncharsh. supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 28.)
Cortina is, in effect, asking us to review the arbitration panel's ruling regarding his
discovery motion by contending that the arbitration panel's decision prevented the panel
from reviewing evidence material to the arbitration. However, rulings regarding
discovery and procedure are within the arbitration panel's authority, and we are without
power to review those rulings, even if erroneous.
In any event, Cortina's contention that he was "substantially prejudiced" by the
"failure of the Panel to hear material evidence" is belied by his own acknowledgment that
the e-mails that he sought in discovery involved, at most, discussions concerning
Cortina's attempt to restructure the promissory notes. Acknowledging that his attempt to
restructure the notes was unsuccessful, Cortina admits that he resigned "[w]hen the
parties reached an impasse" with respect to any restructuring. Cortina has not established
that the e-mails that he sought in discovery are at all relevant to the material question at
issue in the arbitration—i.e., whether Cortina was under an obligation to pay the
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remaining balances on the promissory notes that he signed in favor of Wells Fargo once
his employment with Wells Fargo terminated.
The arbitration panel did not refuse to "hear material evidence" in denying
Cortina's motion to compel Wells Fargo to produce all of the e-mails related to Cortina's
attempt to restructure the promissory notes.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
AARON, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
NARES, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that an arbitration panel's discovery ruling is a decision of law not subject to judicial review, and that the appellant failed to demonstrate the panel refused to hear material evidence.
Issues
Whether a trial court may review an arbitration panel's discovery ruling regarding a motion to compel evidence.
Whether an arbitration panel's denial of a motion to compel constitutes a refusal to hear material evidence under Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We conclude that the arbitration panel's ruling with respect to Cortina's motion to compel was a decision of law made by the panel, and, as such, is not subject to review by a court.”
“The arbitrator, and not the court, decides questions of procedure and discovery.”
“The arbitration panel did not refuse to "hear material evidence" in denying Cortina's motion to compel Wells Fargo to produce all of the e-mails related to Cortina's attempt to restructure the promissory notes.”