People v. Jones CA3

Filed 6/23/14 P. v. Jones CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento) ----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, C072962

v. (Super. Ct. Nos. 11F05052, 11F07268) ROY JONES,

Defendant and Appellant.

After pleading no contest to second degree robbery, four counts of attempted second degree robbery, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, defendant Roy Jones was sentenced to serve 12 years and 8 months in state prison and ordered to pay various fines and fees. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in ordering him to pay $3,040 to the credit union he robbed as restitution for the additional security patrol the credit union hired after defendant and his cohorts robbed the credit union at gun point. We conclude the cost of the additional security patrol for 10 days after defendant’s robbery was a proper restitution award and affirm the judgment. “Restitution is constitutionally and statutorily mandated in California. (People v. Mearns (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 493, 498; Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b).) The

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[1] constitutional mandate for restitution is carried out through Penal Code section 1202.4, which provides, in part: ‘(f) In every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court . . . . The court shall order full restitution unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so, and states them on the record.’ Restitution under this provision ‘shall be of a dollar amount that is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant’s criminal conduct, including, but not limited to’ a list of enumerated items, including medical care, losses to property, and even security measures. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3).)” (People v. Keichler (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1045 (Keichler).) Despite the broad language of section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3), defendant argues the language in section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(J), limits restitution for security measures to “residential” security measures. Because the credit union is not a residence, he contends, the credit union was not entitled to restitution for the additional security patrol following the robbery. We disagree. “ ‘ “A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that a court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citations.] In construing a statute, our first task is to look to the language of the statute itself. [Citation.] When the language is clear and there is no uncertainty as to the legislative intent, we look no further and simply enforce the statute according to its terms. [Citations.]” [Citations.]’ (People v. Phelps (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 946, 949.)” (Keichler, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 1046.)